N. S. VEERABHADRAIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is by the defendants questioning the findings recorded on issues 24, 25, 26, 29 and 30 in the negative in O. S. No. 10 of 2001 on the file of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Honnavar, dated 27-8-2001. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are as follows: the plaintiffs claiming to be the hereditary Archaks from time immemorial and have been performing their duties called 'poojapali'. This practice has been in vogue since ancient times, consistent with the custom. The plaintiffs' family have been exercising their right continuously, peacefully, openly and reasonably to the knowledge of all without protest or obstruction. This has moral and legal recognition apart from that of the public. This is a religious mandate and a question of right. Purohit being a symbolic Sacred Fire is "the leader" and not the servant as the niruktha and etimological interpretation and origin go. His duty is to secure the individual devotees 'adhi Bhautika', 'adhi Daivika' and 'adhyatmika' peace while conducting rituals outside the upadhi gambit and his realm extends to spiritual horizons, where there are no trustees of mundane assets of 'la munde'. Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to get emoluments in the form of share in the offerings made by the devotees. The ancestors of the plaintiff were not appointed by any authority and when the first consecration took place, there were no trustees. The trustees are only the managers of the properties of the trust who are expected to keep the sanctity and decorum in the temple which comes within the ambit of the management of the properties. The manager of the endowment cannot arrogate himself the power of removing a hereditary Archak having proprietary nature of right. He can be removed after filing a suit and getting a decree. Tiie plaintiffs have been holding office not at the pleasure of the defendants. Their dismissal does not come within the scope of the term of'administration of management' of the religious endowment. The plaintiffs are well-versed in conducting rituals pertaining to the "stalsampradaya" on the lines prescribed by Agama and tantras. They are men of character and have been leading austere lives. Their emoluments for the Upadhi vritti consists of Tastik which fetches Rs. 73. 00 (39-6-0 and 33-10-0) in all per year to the two families. The plaintiffs are well-versed in conducting rituals pertaining to the "stalsampradaya" on the lines prescribed by Agama and tantras. They are men of character and have been leading austere lives. Their emoluments for the Upadhi vritti consists of Tastik which fetches Rs. 73. 00 (39-6-0 and 33-10-0) in all per year to the two families. Further, they get half share in the "phalavali" and the whole of the 'padiakki' received by the endowment. "phalavali" means the fruits, nuts, vegetables etc. , dedicated by the devotees either in the temple for decoration or at the alter. It is the symbolic sacrificial-dedication of the produce of the land grown by the devotees. 'padiakki' is the rice and coconut given by the devotees as dana to the officiating priest to take home. On this count, the priest has to accept the many negative karmas done by the 'dhata', to mitigate which the priest has to perform penance. It is a morsel of sin in a sense and its redressal calls for an austere life. The plaintiffs are entitled to get one anna in a Rupee worth of panchakajjaya placed at the alter at the time of Panchakajjaya pooja performed on the request of the devotees. Giving of dakshina depends on the volition of the devotees. Prior to 1950, the priests themselves used to collect dakshina for Panchakajjaya Neivedya in addition to half coconut for the coconuts offered. Since 1950, the trustees undertook to supply Panchakajjaya and started to collect its value from the devotees but the share in the offering viz. , one anna was shown separately in their accounts as that of the priests and given to them. That the plaintiffs' right which is in the nature of the property was and is being acquiesed by the defendants. Their conduct, omissions, commissions, resolutions etc. , estoppel them from acting in derogation of the same. The Archakship is not a job or a vocation but a hereditary religious office which they have to discharge ungrudgingly. This religious office to officiate as Archak is a vrithi with emoluments attached to it in the form of tastik etc. , giving it the nature of heritable and partible property which also carried a status of legal character with it. That this state of harmony and co-operation between the trustees and Archaks continued till about 1974-75. This religious office to officiate as Archak is a vrithi with emoluments attached to it in the form of tastik etc. , giving it the nature of heritable and partible property which also carried a status of legal character with it. That this state of harmony and co-operation between the trustees and Archaks continued till about 1974-75. At this time, the trustees appear to have thought of preparing a "niyamavali" probably meant for regulating the activities like Pooja and viniyogas etc. The said Code was not evolved either under a statute or in consultation with the archaks. It disclosed their mala fide intention of coming in between the devotees arid the Archaks by acting as intermediary to receive and Act as conduct line for emoluments from the devotees as the agents of Archaks for the spiritual and Agamic function officiated by the Archaks. This was against all ethical, traditional and customary precepts. The emoluments received by the Archaks are not income of the temple. Instead, they are part of their return for officiating as priests. Though the said emolument was not truly a sizeable one, the trustees thought otherwise. The Archaks having objected to the unreasonable demands of the trustees, the latter developed an hostile animus and the issue became a matter of prestige for the trustees. Their subsequent conduct is the result of the same. The trustees in order to induct their own henchmen as Archaks have been making hectic efforts for eliminating the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs received a notice dated 21-9-1994 allegedly terminating their services as Archaks to perform the Pooja in the temple. It is alleged in the said notice that the plaintiffs and their people are harassing the administrative staff etc. , and that they are not performing their duties as required under religious rules and customs etc. Subsequently, on 28-9-1994, a defamatory publication was published in the 'samyuktha Karnataka' daily by the first defendant suggesting that the plaintiffs were misappropriating the amounts sent to them by the devotees for the purpose of sevas in the temple. This allegation is a new founded one and is absent in the termination notice showing the manifest mala fide intention of the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their right by hook or by crook. The said notices are patently illegal and untenable. All the acts of omissions and commissions mentioned in the notices are cooked up ones. This allegation is a new founded one and is absent in the termination notice showing the manifest mala fide intention of the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their right by hook or by crook. The said notices are patently illegal and untenable. All the acts of omissions and commissions mentioned in the notices are cooked up ones. At no point of time, the plaintiffs were appraised of these so-called deficiencies or were called upon to answer to any of the allegations now levelled against them in the notices. The entire act on the part of the trustees is mala fide one and is motivated by ill will and hostility coupled with the sense of arrogance and egoistic assumption. On the above pleadings plaintiffs instituted the suit for declaration to declare that the plaintiffs are the hereditary Archaks of Shri Mahaganapathi (Vinayaka Dev) temple of Indagunji in Honnavar Taluk and for consequential reliefs and to declare that the order of termination issued by the defendants dated 21-9-1994 is illegal, void and contrary to the principles of natural justice etc. ( 3 ) THE trust filed a detailed written statement denying the title of archakship as hereditary. The suit pertaining to Sri Vinayaka Dev of idagunji, Honnavar Taluk, is a public trust registered under the provisions of the BOMBAY PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT, 1950. The present suit filed against the trustees of this Public Trust and the relief prayed in the plaint directly relates to the administration and management of the public trust Sri Vinayaka Dev, idagunji, as such, without making the temple trust as a party or without making the Vinayaka Dev as a party, the suit itself is not maintainable. The relief claimed by the plaintiffs in this suit is directly hit by the provisions of section 50 of the BPT Act. Hence, the suit is not maintainable as per Sections 50, 51, 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act read with Section 9 of the cpc. Admittedly, the defendants 1 to 5 are the trustees of Sri Vinayaka Dev temple of Idagunji appointed by the District Court, Karwar. The arrangements of Pooja, viniyogas are the part of administration of the temple trust and the plaintiffs Archaks used to work as per the directions and under the administration of the Trustees and work allotted to them is also a part of the administration of the trust. The arrangements of Pooja, viniyogas are the part of administration of the temple trust and the plaintiffs Archaks used to work as per the directions and under the administration of the Trustees and work allotted to them is also a part of the administration of the trust. The alleged rights of the plaintiffs are never noted under the provisions of the BPT Act nor registered in any documents relating to the Public Trust under the provisions of the BPT Act. The plaintiffs have not obtained the permission of the Charity Commissioner as required under Section 51 of the BPT Act to file this present suit. Hence, the suit is not maintainable in law. The plaintiffs have filed O. S. No. 17 of 1976 claiming their remuneration, emoluments and also for accounts for such arrears of emoluments and injunction in the Court of Munsiff, Honnavar. The suit came to be dismissed and even Miscellaneous Application No. 5 of 1988 for restoration of the suit also came to be rejected finally on 17-9-1994. The present suit is based on the same cause of action and the similar relief adding one more declaratory relief is nothing but a multiplicity of proceedings and it is clearly hit by the provisions of implied res judicata and the plaintiffs are also estopped to claim the relief as claimed in the suit. Moreover, the services of the Archaks plaintiffs came to be validly terminated with effect from 21-9-1994 and on the date of the suit the plaintiffs were not at all working as archaks nor performing any Pooja, viniyogas and as such the plaintiffs are not entitled for any reliefs much less permanent injunction as claimed. Admittedly, Sri Vinayaka Dev Temple of Jdagunji in Honnavar Taluk is a public Trust registered under the Bombay Trust Act as stated in the plaint. It is denied that the plaintiffs are the hereditary Archaks or they have a hereditary right of Archakship with emoluments attached and it is also not correct that the termination of the services of the plaintiffs by the present trustees is arbitrary, illegal and unreasonable. The termination is simplicitor and the defendants being the trustees have the right to terminate the services of the servants of the temple trust including the services of the plaintiffs who were working as poojaris or Archaks in the temple trust. The existing trustees viz. The termination is simplicitor and the defendants being the trustees have the right to terminate the services of the servants of the temple trust including the services of the plaintiffs who were working as poojaris or Archaks in the temple trust. The existing trustees viz. , defendants 1 to 5 were appointed under Section 47 of the Act by the district Judge, Karwar, as and when the vacancies arose. Among the plaintiffs, plaintiff 1 also applied for trusteeship of this temple trust by filing an application before District Court, and the brother of plaintiff 3, one paratneshwar Bhat had also filed an application for appointment of trustees of this temple trust. However, the learned District Judge practically deprecated and rejected the application filed by plaintiff 1, Shivaram Narayan Bhat and others. The other allegations of the plaint by para wise are denied. Accordingly, prayed to dismiss the suit. ( 4 ) THE 6th defendant filed separate written statement contending that the plaintiffs have not taken any permission from the authorities i. e. , from the charity Commissioner, Belgaum, before filing the present suit or before adding the trust as defendant 6. On this count alone, the suit deserves to be dismissed not only as against defendant 6-trust but also against defendants 1 to 5 who have been representing the public trust as trustees. The Charir commissioner is a necessary party. On this count also, the suit is bad fo non-joinder of necessary party and the suit deserves to be dismissed. The sui is barred under Section 9 of the CPC and denied all other averments and prayed to dismiss the suit. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the plaint and the written statements, the followin: issues were framed:1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are the hereditary Archaks of sri Vinayak Dev Temple, Idagunji and not the appointed one?2. Do they further prove that they have hereditary Archakship with emoluments attached to it?3. Whether the defendants prove that the property where the suit temple is situated originally belonged to the family of Sabhahits and whether the defendants prove that originally suit temple was private temple of Sabhahit family?4. Whether the defendants prove that plaintiff 1-Shivaram Narayan bhat, brother of plaintiff 3 had applied for trusteeships of the suit temple?5. Whether the plaintiffs prove that originally they belonged to idagunji Village?6. Whether the defendants prove that plaintiff 1-Shivaram Narayan bhat, brother of plaintiff 3 had applied for trusteeships of the suit temple?5. Whether the plaintiffs prove that originally they belonged to idagunji Village?6. Whether the plaintiffs prove that their ancestors were also working as managers and custodians of the temple and its properties?7. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the families of the plaintiffs were acting in dual capacity as Archaks and Managers as Sabhahits or deemed Sabhahits till the end of last decade of last century?8. Whether the plaintiffs prove that Upadhi Vrithi of the suit temple belongs to the family of plaintiffs only?9. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they have a customary right to officiate as Archaks under Vrithi Upadhi?10. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they have a customary right to act as purohits?11. Whether the plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to have half share in Phalavali and the whole of Padiakki and one anna in a rupee worth of panchakajjaya?12. Whether the plaintiffs prove the genealogy given in the schedule of the plaint?13. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the family of plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 were performing Pooja, viniyogas etc. , turn by turn as alleged in para 5 of the plaint and whether the same has been continued?14. Whether the said arrangement of performing Pooja turn by, turn by them is not binding on the defendants and whether it is the internal arrangement of the plaintiffs?15. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the family settlement and judgments referred in para 9 of the plaint are concerning the defendants and they are binding on the defendants?16. Whether defendants prove the Niyamavali were prepared lawfully in August 1975 and have been implemented legally and they are binding on the plaintiffs?17. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs are estopped from contending that the Niyamavalis are not binding on them on account of acquiescence ?18. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the notices issued are illegal and not binding on them?19. Whether the plaintiffs prove that the defendants have or had no authority to terminate them from Archakships and the alleged termination of their Archakships is illegal and not binding on them?20. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs were extracting huge amounts from the devotees in the form of Dakshina, Shashwat pooja and were committing sinful acts and to the detriment to the temple, trust and the devotees?21. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs were extracting huge amounts from the devotees in the form of Dakshina, Shashwat pooja and were committing sinful acts and to the detriment to the temple, trust and the devotees?21. Whether the defendants prove that from 21-9-1994 till the date of passing of order on I. A. No. 1 by the Court, the plaintiffs were not working as Archaks and that the Archaks appointed by the Trust were performing poojas, viniyogas etc. , during that period?22. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs have not been performing any acts in the temple as Archaks since 9-4-1996 and the archaks appointed by the Trust have been performing poojas and viniyogas in the temple since 9-4-1996?23. Whether the defendants prove that the plaintiffs have other vocations and occupations and that plaintiffs own fertile, wet and garden lands?24. Whether the defendants prove that the suit is hit by the provisions of Section 51 of the BPT Act and whether the suit of the plaintiffs is bad in law for want of permission from the Charity Commissioner concerned?25. Whether the defendants prove thai the suit is hit by the provisions of Sections 50, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act and is not maintainable?26. Whether the defendants prove that the suit is bad in law for non-joinder of necessary parties as contended in para 3 of the written statement?27. Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiffs is hit by the provisions of the principles of res judiccita?28. Whether there is no cause of action for this suit?29. Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiffs is bad in law for non-joinder of Charity Commissioner concerned as party?30. Whether the defendants prove that the suit of the plaintiffs is barred under the provisions of Section 9 of the CPC and this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?31. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs sought?32. What order or decree?" ( 6 ) AT the stage of evidence the defendant filed an application under Order 14, Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC, to try Issues 24, 25, 26, 29 and 30 as preliminary issues. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), after hearing the Counsels for the plaintiffs and defendants recorded a finding on issues 24, 25, 26, 29 and 30 in the negative. The learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), after hearing the Counsels for the plaintiffs and defendants recorded a finding on issues 24, 25, 26, 29 and 30 in the negative. Being aggrieved of the finding of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Di\ ision), the defendants have come up with this revision. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners Sri G. S. Visveswara contended that Sri Maha Ganpathi Temple situated at Idagunji in Honnavar Taluk is one of the famous temples coming within the purview of the Bombay Public Trust act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the "bpt Act")- The plaintiffs have claimed the relief to declare them as hereditary Archaks of Idagunji Maha ganapathi Temple to perform nithya nymithika poojas, abhisheka, archana. nyvedya, vratas and gana homas etc. , and for consequential reliefs. The defendants-trustees by a notice dated 21-9-1994 terminated the services of the plaintiffs as Archaks. Therefore, the plaintiffs have filed a suit to declare the notice dated 21-9-1994 as illegal claim ing the share in the offerings given by the devotees. That suit as is brought itself is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed as the permission under the BPT Act has not been obtained. The learned Civil Judge, Karwar framed as many as 32 issues on the basis of the plaint and the written statements. The defendants have filed application to try issues 24, 25,26,29 and 30 as preliminary issues. The application filed by the defendants came to he dismissed by order dated 27-8-2001. As against the said order, defendants have come up with this revision. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel further contended that the amended provision ot section 1 15 of the CPC is also not a bar. In case, if the application would have been allowed, the suit would have been decided in final disposal, then the order would have been revisable. Even alter the amendment of provision of section I 15 of the CPC", it is revisable if this revision were to be allowed, it could have been ended in a final disposal of the suit. Therefore, contended that the revision is very well-maintainable. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel relying on the provisions of Section 50 of the BPT act, contends that the suit as is brought without the consent of the Charity commissioner is not maintainable. Therefore, contended that the revision is very well-maintainable. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel relying on the provisions of Section 50 of the BPT act, contends that the suit as is brought without the consent of the Charity commissioner is not maintainable. In support of his contention, lie relied on the decision in Workmen of Lokashikshana Trust v M/s. Lokashikshana Trust and its Newspaper Publications and Others. Accordingly, prayed to allow the revision by dismissing (he suit itself. ( 10 ) ON the other hand, the learned Counsel Sri Gopal Hegde appearing for the respondents contended that the respondents have been serving as Archaks from time immemorial, that is, from the time of their great-grandfathers and by virtue of the same, they have acquired title to hold the hereditary office. The relief claimed in the plaint does not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the BPT Act. Therefore, the consent is not necessary. The plaintiffs are not claiming any properties endowed to the temple. Also not claiming anything from the trust properties of the temple. What they are claiming is only the offerings (dakshine) offered by the devotees. The plaintiffs have been performing particular type or form of Pooja since the time immemorial. Whatever, the devotees offer will be received by them as hereditary Archaks. Further, he contended that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is to declare them as hereditary Archaks. Therefore, the trustees have no right to terminate the hereditary Archaks. Consequently, the termination is bad unless and until it is abolished by a legislation. He further contended that the application filed for mandatory injunction to continue them as hereditary Archaks was dismissed and as against the said order, CRP No. 29! of 1995 was preferred before this court. This Court while considering the contentions in the revision held that. She relief by way of mandatory injunction cannot be granted on an interlocutory application as it is in the nature of granting final relief which can be granted only after the suit is tried and rights of the parties are decided Dr. Ganapathi Narayan Sabhahit and Others v Shivaram Nurayun Bhat and others. Further, contended that only after remanding the matter, the defendants have filed additional written statement and took the defence. Thereafter, the issues were framed on the application filed by the defendants to try these issues as preliminary issues. Ganapathi Narayan Sabhahit and Others v Shivaram Nurayun Bhat and others. Further, contended that only after remanding the matter, the defendants have filed additional written statement and took the defence. Thereafter, the issues were framed on the application filed by the defendants to try these issues as preliminary issues. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel Sri Gopal Hegde contended that the Civil Court has jurisdiction under Section 9 of the CPC. Therefore, obtaining the consent is altogether different. Ultimately, the suit may be dismissed for want of consent. In support of his contentions, he has relied on the decisions in AIR 1969 (3) SC 807 (sic), Ugam Singh and Another v Kesrimal and Others, Kar vidyavardhak Sangha and Others v Gopal Ramachandra Pandit and another, Sri Kallalagar Devasthanam by Executive Officer, K. N. Radhakrishna v Thiruvengadathan Thirumalai Nambigal and Another, nagappayya Bhat and Others v Maharajaswamy Varaha Devarn of Sri maharajaswarny Varaha Temple, Maravanthe, Kundapura and Others. Shankar Narayan Giri v Kamalabai Venkatesh Deshpande and Other bheemasenacharya Srinivasacharya Gudi and Others v Gaday veeranarayana Dev and Others , Hadu Mohapatra and Others v Radha bewa , Mangobinda Panda v Sritnat Paramahansa Paribrajakacharja sankar Shri Sachidananda Swami , Gurupadayya Charantayya Adavimath v chikkayya and lastly, the decision in Sahebgouda (dead) by L. Rs and Others v Ogeppa and Others. ( 12 ) RELYING on the decisions cited supra contended that the provisions of sections 50, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act are not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is only in respect of the matters specified in Sections 50, 79 and 80 of the BPT Act, that the suit is not maintainable. In the present case, the plaintiffs' suit is only to declare their individual rights as hereditary archaks and that the entire burden is on the plaintiffs to show that they arc the hereditary Archaks. The individual rights claimed by the plaintiffs do not come within the ambit of Section 50 of the BPT Act. It was also contended that the hereditary Archaks cannot be removed except by a legislation, that is, by abolishing the hereditary offices like in the matter of abolition of village office under the Village Offices Abolition Act. But, no legislation is enacted to abolish the hereditary office coming under the BPT Act. It was also contended that the hereditary Archaks cannot be removed except by a legislation, that is, by abolishing the hereditary offices like in the matter of abolition of village office under the Village Offices Abolition Act. But, no legislation is enacted to abolish the hereditary office coming under the BPT Act. Therefore contended that the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmities as such and prayed to dismiss the revision. ( 13 ) IN reply, the learned Counsel Sri G. S. Visveswara contended that to bring a suit against a trust registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act, the consent of the Charity Commissioner is a must under Section 50 (iii) of the act. Therefore, the present suit without obtaining the permission of the charity Commissioner is not maintainable. Therefore, prayed to set aside the impugned order by allowing the revision petition. ( 14 ) IN the light of the submissions, the points for consideration that arise are:1. Whether sanction or permission for the plaintiffs is required to institute the suit for adjudication of their personal civil rights which are hereditary in respect of performing Pooja of the deity registered under the BOMBAY PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT, 1950?2. If so, the impugned order is liable to be interfered with? ( 15 ) THE pleadings in the plaint makes clear, the plaintiffs claiming their right to perform Pooja as hereditary have also pleaded that they have acquisitioned their right. Thereby they have gained an independent title insofar as performing Pooja of Ganapathi Devaru situated at Idagunji and that the defendants' trust have no right whatsoever to meddle in discharging their duties from performing Pooja of Ganapathi Devaru. It is in that sense, now the Court has to consider the intention of the legislation in enacting the bombay PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT, 1950. In the preamble, it is stated as under:"the Act is intended to regulate and make better provisions for the administration of public religious and charitable trusts in the State of bombay. To carry out effectively its object, the Bombay Public Trust act, 1950 creates for the first time a unified and special organisation to deal with charity matters. The Act contains several new features. Unlike the previous legislations on the subject, it applies to all communities. To carry out effectively its object, the Bombay Public Trust act, 1950 creates for the first time a unified and special organisation to deal with charity matters. The Act contains several new features. Unlike the previous legislations on the subject, it applies to all communities. It also applies to all public trusts, irrespective of the size of their income and irrespective of the fact whether any schemes have been framed for them by the Court. The definition of "public trust" has been widened so as to include societies registered under the Societies registration Act, 1860 and Dharmaday which were never included before. Under this Act, the charity organisation exercises considerable powers of supervision and control over the trusts. The Act requires every public trust irrespective of its income to be registered. It also requires annual accounts to be audited. The scope of the audit has also been widened'". ( 16 ) THE very scope of the Act provides that the public trust registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is to administer the affairs of the temple and maintain true accounts. ( 17 ) CHAPTER VII deals with functions and powers of Charity commissioner commencing from Sections 42 to 56-B. One such section is section 50 which deals with suits relating to public trusts which reads as follows:"50. In any case. (i) where it is alleged that there is a breach of a public trust; (ii) where a declaration is necessary that a particular property is a property belonging to a public trust or where a direction is required to recover the possession of such property or the proceeds thereof or for an account of such property or proceeds from any person including a person holding adversely to the public trust; or (iii) where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any public trust, the Charity Commissioner or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the consent in writing of the Charity commissioner as provided in Section 51 may institute a suit whether contentious or not in the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate, to obtain a decree for any of the following reliefs. (a) an order for the recovery of the possession of such property or proceeds thereof; (b) the removal of any trustee or manager; (c) the appointment of a new trustee or manager; (cc) vesting any property in a trustee; (d) a direction for taking accounts and making certain inquiries; (e) a declaration as to what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) a direction authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) the settlement of a scheme or variations or alterations in a scheme already settled; or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of (he case may require: provided that no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in this section shall he instituted in respect of any public trust except in conformity with the provisions thereof, ( 18 ) THE overall reading of the above section makes it clear that in case if it is alleged that there is a breach of public trust or for declaring a particular property as a trust property or for recovery of possession from any person holding it adversely to the interest of public trust or where it is necessary for purposes of proper administration, a direction is required from the Court to seek permission of the Charity Commissioner as provided under clause (iii) of Section 50 in respect of (a) recovery of possession of such property; (b) the removal of any trustee or manager; (c) the appointment of a new trustee or manager; (cc) vesting any property in a trustee; (d) a direction for taking accounts and making certain inquiries; (e) a declaration as to what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust; (f) a direction authorising the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; (g) the settlement of a scheme or variations or alterations in a scheme already settled, or (h) granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case max require. ( 19 ) IT is in respect of the above matters, to institute a suit, the permission of the Charity Commissioner is a must and essential. ( 19 ) IT is in respect of the above matters, to institute a suit, the permission of the Charity Commissioner is a must and essential. In the present case, the relief claimed in the plaint is to declare that the plaintiffs are the hereditary archaks, for upadhi rights which they are enjoying since lime immemorial and consequently to declare that the termination of the plaintiffs by the defendants by the letter dated 21-9-1994 is illegal, void and contrary to the principles of natural justice and for other consequential reliefs. ( 20 ) IT is with this background, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsels for the petitioners and respondents have to be examined. ( 21 ) IN the case of Workmen of Lokashikshana Trust, supra, considering the facts and pleadings this Court held as under:"a reading of the plaint averments and the reliefs prima facie give an impression that a consent is necessary in terms of Sections 50 and 5 1 of the Bombay Public Trust Act". In the case supra, the plaintiffs sought for the relief to restrain the secretary of Public Trust from continuing in post beyond the age of superannuation fixed under the scheme of Industrial Employees Standing orders Act. It is in that view of the matter the Court observed that permission of the Charity Commissioner is a must and the same also falls within the category of (b) removal of any trustee or manager. Therefore, there cannot be any dispute regarding the findings of this Court holding that sanction is a must. But, in the present case, the relief claimed by the plaintiffs does not fall under any of the categories of clause (iii) of Section 50 of the Bombay Public trust Act. Therefore, the same cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. But, in the present case, the relief claimed by the plaintiffs does not fall under any of the categories of clause (iii) of Section 50 of the Bombay Public trust Act. Therefore, the same cannot be made applicable to the facts of this case. ( 22 ) IN the case of Ugam Singh, supra, while considering the scope of section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at the end of para 16, the Court observed thus:"it is clear therefore that a right to worship is a civil right, interference with which raises a dispute of a civil nature though as noticed earlier disputes which are in respect of rituals or ceremonies alone cannot be adjudicated by Civil Courts if they are not essentially connected with civil rights of an individual or a sect on behalf of whom a suit is filed. In our view, the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellant to the maintainability of the suit is not well-founded". ( 23 ) THIS makes clear that if the relief claimed by an individual or by a section asserting their civil rights, then the suit is very well-maintainable. ( 24 ) THIS Court while considering the provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of the BOMBAY PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT, 1950 reported in Kar Vidyavardhak Sangha, supra, held that if the suit comes within the ambit of Section 50 (a) to 50 (h), the consent of the Charity Commissioner is necessary or otherwise not. ( 25 ) IN the case of Sri Kallalagar Devasthanam by Executive Officer, supra, while considering the provisions of Sections 73 and 43 of the Madras hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1927), the Court held as under:"archaic dismissed by trustees Suit to set aside wrongful dismissal is not barred". The Court further observed as under: 'the dismissal of the Archak by the trustees cannot be regarded to be an act of "administration or management of a religious endowment" having regard to the definition of the term "religious endowment". A suit by an Archak for setting aside his wrongful dismissal relates to a persona! right and is not therefore, barred under section 73". ( 26 ) THIS Court while considering the provisions of Sections 57 and 93 and 62 (ii) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, in the case of Nagappayya Bhat, supra, at paras 14 and 15 observed as under:"14. right and is not therefore, barred under section 73". ( 26 ) THIS Court while considering the provisions of Sections 57 and 93 and 62 (ii) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951, in the case of Nagappayya Bhat, supra, at paras 14 and 15 observed as under:"14. Similarly, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held in mulraj v Murti Raghunathji Maharaj, that order of stay is addressed to Court while that of injunction is passed as against party. Under section 62 of the Act, the word used is only 'stay' and not ' injunction'. The Civil Court ordinarily has the power of granting stay or injunction in any suit unless it is prohibited or barred under the special statute. If the Legislature intended to prohibit the Civil Court while entertaining civil suits and petitions under the Act, it would have specifically mentioned that no injunction should be granted. On the other hand, the prohibition contained under the Act for the Civil Court is only not to stay the order of the Deputy Commissioner or the Commissioner. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant, there is absolutely no prohibition as such under the Act for the Civil Court to grant injunction depending on the merits of the suit. Fven otherwise, the Court has got inherent power in an appropriate case to grant injunction if the parties make out a good case. In addition to that, this Court itself as referred to above in CRP No. 1 1 10 of 1971 has granted injunction in favour of the appellant and that order has not been set aside. Further, injunction is sought only against defendant 1 and not against other defendants. Under those circumstances, 1 have no hesitation to hold that the Court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the Civil Court while entertaining a suit under this Act has power to grant injunction. Accordingly, Point No. (1) is answered in the affirmative i 5. The learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that an appeal against an interlocutory order cannot be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless it is established that the order passed by the Court below is perverse, arbitrary and injudicious. Accordingly, Point No. (1) is answered in the affirmative i 5. The learned Counsel for the respondent has vehemently argued that an appeal against an interlocutory order cannot be interfered with by the Appellate Court unless it is established that the order passed by the Court below is perverse, arbitrary and injudicious. Under those circumstances, it is necessary for this Court to find out as to whether the order suffers from any of these illegalities to entertain this appeal the learned Court below has held whether the plaintiff has got hereditary right to perform the panchakajjaya seva or whether this right is entrusted in the trust of the 1 st defendant temple is a question to be decided at the final disposal of the case. He also referred to the various proceedings in between these parties. This dispute started right from 1954 and the appellants have been agitating for their rights. It is no doubt true that trustees, are the persons who are having administrative control of the institution. However, as trustees they passed an order that all Archaks have got a right to claim share in the offerings". ( 27 ) THIS makes clear when the Archaks claim the hereditary rights, is a matter to be decided at the final disposal thereby the Civil Court has jurisdiction not only to entertain the suit but also to grant injunction. ( 28 ) IN the case of Shankar Narayan Giri, supra, while considering the provisions of Sections 50 and 51 of the Bombay Public Trust Act and the provisions of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court observed that,"exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court should not be inferred readily. It must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied". ( 29 ) THEREFORE, it is clear that unless the parties go for a trial in the present set of facts, it cannot be held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is ousted. ( 30 ) IN the case of Hadu Mohapalra. supra, similarly, while considering section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1952) and section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at para 7, the Court observed as under:"a suit by a shebayat against the villagers who prevented him from performing sevapuja of the deity and possessing the deity's properties is not prohibited under the Act. supra, similarly, while considering section 73 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act (2 of 1952) and section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, at para 7, the Court observed as under:"a suit by a shebayat against the villagers who prevented him from performing sevapuja of the deity and possessing the deity's properties is not prohibited under the Act. There is no provision in the Act for determining or deciding a dispute of the present nature. Section 73 can only apply to disputes or matters for which provision has been made in the Act. It does not bar suits under the general law which do not fall within the scope of any of the provisions of the Act. In my opinion, the present suit is not one in respect of the administration or management of the temple and there is also no provision in the Act for determining or deciding a dispute of the present nature. Therefore, it is not hit by section 73 of the Act". ( 31 ) IN the present case, the plaintiffs have questioned firstly, the action of the trust in removing them from the Archakship and secondly, sought for a declaratory relief in respect of their personal rights for performing Pooja. Therefore, it cannot be said that the suit is not maintainable for want of sanction under Section 50 (iii) of the Bombay Public Trust Act. ( 32 ) SO also, in the case of Managob'uidu Panda, supra, the Court held as under:"that section bars from the cognizance of Civil Courts, suits for enforcement of a right which depends entirely on the decision of questions as the religious rights or ceremonies". ( 33 ) IN respect of such enforcement of their independent rights, the suit is very well-maintainable in a Civil Court. ( 34 ) IN the case of Gurupadayya Charantayya Adavimath, supra, while considering the provisions of Sections 79, 80 and 19 of the Bombay Public trust Act (29 of 1950), at para 16, the Court observed thus:"suit for religious office is a suit of a civil nature. The general rule of law as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, unless there is an express or implied bar to the entertainment of a suit of a civil nature, the ordinary Civil Courts are bound to entertain the claim. The general rule of law as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, unless there is an express or implied bar to the entertainment of a suit of a civil nature, the ordinary Civil Courts are bound to entertain the claim. There is no bar for the Civil Courts to decide such dispute". ( 35 ) THOUGH the similar question came up before the Apex Court in the case of Sahebgouda, supra, after considering the provisions of Section 9 of the cpc and Sections 79 and 80 of the Bombay Public Trust Act (29 of 1950), the court observed as under: "suit for Pujariki rights of performing Pooja Jurisdiction of civil Courts to try suit Whether expressly barred by Section 80 of act. . . . . .- Cause of action arose when respondents obstructed appellants in performing puja in temple and took away puja articles Relief claimed are for declaration that appellants are wahiwat pujaris and have pujariki rights of performing puja And also consequential decree for injunction restraining respondents Question which requires adjudication does not expressly come whithin purview of Act, i. e. . no declaration regarding existence or otherwise of trust/trust property claimed Jurisdiction of Civil Court not ousted Fact that application was pending before Assistant Charity Commissioner for registration of temple and its property as public trust, irrelevant". ( 36 ) THIS makes clear that where parties have claimed independent title as hereditary office holders to perform Pooja, in my opinion, Section 50 of the bombay Public Trust Act is not attracted to hold that the suit is not maintainable. ( 36 ) THIS makes clear that where parties have claimed independent title as hereditary office holders to perform Pooja, in my opinion, Section 50 of the bombay Public Trust Act is not attracted to hold that the suit is not maintainable. ( 37 ) THIS position is made clear in the case of Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v anil Panjwani wherein it is held as under:"civil PROCEDURE CODE, 1908, Section 9 Jurisdiction of civil Court to try suit Statutory provision conferring jurisdiction or exclusive jurisdiction on a special Tribunal to try a particular class of cases Effect Proper stage for pleading exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction Held, even in the presence of such a provision Civil court can entertain a suit of that class on certain grounds Further, held, exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred Any objection as to exclusion of Civil Court's jurisdiction should be taken before the Trial Court and at the earliest, otherwise, in the absence ofproof of prejudice, the higher Court may refuse to entertain such a plea In the present case, plaint seeking declaration of title to property and consequential reliefs on the basis of a contract for sale executed by the seller on the basis of an allotment order by a co-operative Society Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was a member of the society, nor was claiming under a member In such circumstances, held, neither of the parties was covered under Section 75 (1 ) (a) to (e) of the Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 nor was the dispute covered by Section 75 (2) (a) to (c) thereof Hence, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to try the suit, held, not excluded defendant's plea that Civil Court should have relegated the plaintiff to seek remedy under the 1965 Act, rejected Moreover, such a plea not having been taken before the Courts below, held, could not be permitted to be taken at hearing before Supreme Court co-operative Societies Rajasthan Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (13 of 1965), Section 75 (1 ) (a) to (e) and (2) (a) to (c)". ( 38 ) KEEPING in mind the decisions supra, the plaintiffs having claimed hereditary poojariship or as Archaks from time immemorial even before Oie establishment of the trust, they are entitled to assert their independent right as such to claim the relief. ( 38 ) KEEPING in mind the decisions supra, the plaintiffs having claimed hereditary poojariship or as Archaks from time immemorial even before Oie establishment of the trust, they are entitled to assert their independent right as such to claim the relief. ( 39 ) THE overall reading of the provisions of the Bombay Public 1 rust Act, 1950, provides for administration in respect of the matters relating to Public, religious and Charitable Trusts. The person who has to file a suit in respect of the matters provided under Section 50 of the Act has to obtain permission as provided under Section 51. Where the claim of the plaintiff is for adjudication of his legal rights, then it falls under Section 9 of the CPC. In such matters, for adjudication of civil rights, the consent or permission of the Charity commissioner does not arise. That apart, none of the provisions of the bombay PUBLIC TRUSTS ACT, 1950 specifically bars filing of the suits which are of civil in nature for adjudication of personal rights. In the present case, the plaintiffs have sought for adjudication of their claim by virtue of their continuation of their hereditary rights in performing Pooja. Therefore, it is the civil Court which has to adjudicate the matter and no permission is required. The relief claimed also does not come under any one of the categories mentioned in Section 50 of the Act so as to seek permission from the Charity commissioner before instituting the suit. It is in that view of the matter, the contention of the learned Counsel Sri G. S. Visweswara that the permission of the Charity Commissioner is a must cannot be accepted in the present set of facts pleaded in the plaint and also taking note of the relief claimed in the plaint. ( 40 ) VIEWING the matter from any angle, I do not find any infirmity as such to interfere with the impugned order. Accordingly, the revision is dismissed. ( 41 ) PARTIES shall bear their own costs. ( 42 ) THE suit is of the year 1994 and it is re-numbered as O. S. No. 10 of 2001. The same is pending since the last 9 years. Therefore, the Trial Court is directed to dispose of the suit on merits within a period of 6 months by posting the matter on day-to-day basis. --- *** --- .