JUDGMENT : Tarun Agarwala, J. The Plaintiffs filed a suit for a permanent injunction praying that the Defendants be restrained from interfering in the possession of the land in dispute or from raising any boundary wall. It was alleged that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant No. 4 owned a house from the time of their ancestors and that their sehan was towards the South of the said house, which was in their possession much before the enactment of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Plaintiffs further alleged that their palanis, cattle, troughs, etc. existed on the said land and the land was also being utilised for different household purposes. The Plaintiffs also alleged that the disputed land was unbounded and that the Plaintiffs had started the construction of the boundary wall after leaving a small passage between their house and the sehan. The boundary wall could only be constructed till the plinth level as their leave ended and they had to go back to Bombay where they were working. The Plaintiffs alleged that when they came back again to the village they started the constructions again, but this time it was opposed by the Defendants, hence the suit. 2. The Defendants denied the plaint allegations and submitted that the map shown in the plaint was incorrect. The disputed land belongs to the Defendants and their palanis existed on the land in dispute. The Defendants contended that the disputed land was being used for different household purposes by them. The Defendants had always been in possession of the land in dispute. It was also alleged that a passage always existed between the house of the Plaintiff and the disputed land in question. The Defendants further alleged that they had constructed the wall, but the same could not be completed on account of the injunction order obtained by the Plaintiffs in the present suit. The Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs were always out of the village in connection with their service and were never tilling their agricultural land and in fact had let out their agricultural land to others, and therefore, there was no need of keeping any bullock or agricultural equipment or using the land in question for the aforesaid purposes. The Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs were always out of the village in connection with their service and were never tilling their agricultural land and in fact had let out their agricultural land to others, and therefore, there was no need of keeping any bullock or agricultural equipment or using the land in question for the aforesaid purposes. The Defendants further contended that the Plaintiffs and other members of their family were living jointly and in the partition, the building in which the Plaintiffs are residing presently came into their share. This building was previously being used for keeping cattle and for other household purposes. Further, there was no door towards the south of the Plaintiffs' building and therefore, the Plaintiffs had no direct access to the plot in question. 3. The trial Court, after framing the issues, decreed the suit and came to the conclusion that the Plaintiffs were the owners and in possession of the disputed land and that the Defendants had no concern with the same. 4. The appellate Court reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs with costs. The appellate Court held that the Plaintiffs were neither in possession nor were using the land in question for their household purposes. On the other hand, the appellate Court found that the land in question was appurtenant to the Defendants' house and that the Defendants were using the land in question for their household purposes. 5. Against the judgment of the appellate Court, the Plaintiff-Appellants has preferred the present second appeal before this Court. At the time of the admission of the appeal, the following substantial questions of law was formulated, namely: Whether the lower appellate Court was justified in reversing the finding of the trial Court that the land in suit was appurtenant to the Plaintiffs' house. 6. Heard Sri. S. N. Singh, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Sri. A. N. Bhargava, the learned Counsel for the Defendants opposite parties. 7. Sri. 6. Heard Sri. S. N. Singh, the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Appellants and Sri. A. N. Bhargava, the learned Counsel for the Defendants opposite parties. 7. Sri. S. N. Singh, the learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that the land in question was appurtenant to the Plaintiffs' house and that the suit of the Plaintiffs was rightly decreed by the trial Court and that the trial Court committed an error in dismissing the suit on the sole ground that a lane separated the house of the Plaintiffs with the disputed land and therefore, the disputed land could not be termed as appurtenant to the Plaintiffs' house. The learned Counsel for the Appellants further contended that the lower appellate Court had reversed the findings of fact of the trial Court on the question of appurtenant land on the sole ground that a passage existed between their house and the disputed land without reversing the finding arrived at by the trial Court and without considering the reasons given by the trial Court. 8. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the Defendants submitted that they were always in possession and had been using the land for their household purposes and that the land in question was liable to be settled in their favour by virtue of Section 9 of the Act. 9. From the pleadings and the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, I find that both the parties are claiming the disputed piece of land as their sehan. Both the parties are claiming the protection envisaged u/s 9 of the Act. In order to settle the controversy, it is necessary to look into the provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, especially Section 9 of the said Act. 10. Section 4 of the Act provides that w.e.f. the date to be notified, all the estates in U.P. to which the Act applies shall stand transferred to and shall vest in the State of U.P. free from all encumbrances. 10. Section 4 of the Act provides that w.e.f. the date to be notified, all the estates in U.P. to which the Act applies shall stand transferred to and shall vest in the State of U.P. free from all encumbrances. The vesting of the estate was dependent on the issuance of the notification by the State of U.P. Pursuant to the issuance and publication of the notification u/s 4 of the Act, the rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries in every estate ceased and came to an end by virtue of Section 6 of the Act and that the same vested in the State of U.P. free from all encumbrances. However, the provisions of Section 6 are subject to the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Section 9 is an exception to Section 6 of the Act, which reads as under: 9. Private wells, trees in abadi and buildings to be settled with the existing owners or occupiers thereof.-All wells, trees in abadi and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate belonging to or held by an intermediary or tenant or other person whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings within the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed 11. From a perusal of Section 9 of the Act, it is clear that this section mitigates the rigours of vesting and provides for a continuity of the possession of the wells, trees, buildings and the area appurtenant thereto to those persons who held them before the date of vesting and that the site of the well or the building with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with the said person who had been in the possession before the date of vesting. 12. Section 9 not only deals with the buildings and wells, but also with their sites. The object of the section is two fold. 12. Section 9 not only deals with the buildings and wells, but also with their sites. The object of the section is two fold. Firstly, the properties, namely, trees, wells and buildings situate within an estate and belonging to or held by an intermediary, tenant or any other person shall continue to belong to them irrespective of whether they are residents of the village or not. Secondly, the sites of the wells and buildings with land appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with such persons. 13. In the present case, admittedly, the structures of the Plaintiffs and the Defendants are buildings as contemplated u/s 9 of the Act. The land appurtenant to the building would be deemed to be settled with the owners thereof. 14. Both the Plaintiffs and the Defendants are claiming the disputed piece of land as the area appurtenant to their building. The question that arises is as to what is the meaning of word "appurtenant" as used in Section 9 of the Act. The Supreme Court in Maharaj Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1977) 1 SCC 155 , has explained the meaning of word "appurtenant" as contemplated u/s 9, as: 26. "Appurtenance" in relation to a dwelling, or to a school, college includes all land occupied therewith and used for the purposes thereof (Words and Phrases Legally Defined-Butterworths, 2nd Edn.) has a distinct and definite meaning............. Prima facie it imports nothing more than what is strictly appertaining to the subject matter of the devise or grant and which would in truth, pass without being specially mentioned. Ordinarily, what is necessary for the enjoyment and has been used for the purpose of the building, such as easements, alone will be appurtenant. Therefore, what is necessary for the enjoyment of the building is alone covered by the expression 'appurtenance'. 15. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the word "appurtenant" in the case of buildings, means the open piece of land for the beneficial enjoyment of the building itself. It is, therefore, clear that before a person is entitled to claim a settlement u/s 9 of the Act, it must be found that the land was necessary for the enjoyment of the building. 16. It is, therefore, clear that before a person is entitled to claim a settlement u/s 9 of the Act, it must be found that the land was necessary for the enjoyment of the building. 16. The question that is to be considered is whether the land in question was being used and occupied by the Plaintiffs-Appellants for the enjoyment of their building or was being used and occupied by the Defendants for the enjoyment of their building. 17. The appellate Court found that the boundary wall was constructed by the Defendants and not by the Plaintiffs-Appellants. The appellate Court further found that no door existed towards the South of the Plaintiffs' house and that the Plaintiffs had no direct access to the land in question. Further the appellate Court found that there was a lane running between the Plaintiff's house and the disputed land in question. The appellate Court further found that the Plaintiffs-Appellants were not using the disputed land as their sehan from the time of their ancestors and came to this conclusion on the basis of an admission made by the Plaintiffs, namely, that before the partition with the members of their family, the present house of the Appellants was being used for keeping cattle, etc. and that the sehan of the Plaintiffs before the partition was towards the East of the house and not towards the South. The appellate Court further found that the Defendants were using the land in dispute by tethering their cow, keeping fodder, and other agriculture implements. On the aforesaid findings, the appellate Court found that the land in dispute was being used by the Defendants for their household purposes from the time of their ancestors are, therefore, they are in possession of it. 18. The trial Court in its judgment also found that the disputed land was being used for tethering cattle, keeping fodder, etc. The trial Court further observed that one cow on the disputed land belongs to the Defendants. The trial Court, however, held that the Plaintiff was the owner of the land in question on the reasoning that the Plaintiffs possessed agricultural land whereas the Defendants did not possess any agricultural land and, therefore, presumed that the agricultural equipments, cattle, fodder, etc. found on the disputed land belongs to the Plaintiffs. 19. In my view, the approach adopted by the trial Court is erroneous. found on the disputed land belongs to the Plaintiffs. 19. In my view, the approach adopted by the trial Court is erroneous. The trial Court has presumed that the agriculture implements, cattle, fodder, etc. found on the disputed land belongs to the Plaintiffs on the sole ground that the Plaintiffs possessed agricultural land and that the Defendants did not possess any agricultural land and, therefore, presumed that the Defendants did not require the agricultural implements, cows, etc. and that the Plaintiffs owned the cattle, fodder, etc., which was being used by them for their household purposes. The trial Court has lost sight of the fact that the Plaintiffs were never tilling their land since the time of their forefathers and that the Plaintiffs had let out their agricultural land to others for tilling. The trial Court has also not considered the fact that the Defendants and their forefathers were tilling the land of others including the Plaintiff's land. In view of the evidence led by the parties, and on the basis of the admission of the Plaintiffs, it is clear that the Plaintiffs were never residing in the village as they were working in Bombay and that they had let out their agricultural land to others. On the other hand, the evidence before the trial Court clearly reveals that the Defendants were tilling the land and their cows and fodder were found on the disputed piece of land. Witnesses have also deposed that the Defendants were always in possession of the land in question. Not only this, the Advocate Commissioner in his report has found that the palanis of the Defendants also existed on the disputed piece of land. The map prepared by the Advocate Commissioner was different from that of the mapshown by the Plaintiffs in their plaint and tallied with the map of the Defendants. Not only this, the Defendants have proved that they had constructed the boundary wall. Thus, in my view, the findings of the trial Court was not based on the evidence led by the parties and was based on surmises and conjectures. The appellate Court rightly reversed the decree of the trial Court and correctly dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs. 20. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the appellate Court reversed the decree without considering the reasoning of the trial Court is wholly incorrect. The appellate Court rightly reversed the decree of the trial Court and correctly dismissed the suit of the Plaintiffs. 20. The argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellants that the appellate Court reversed the decree without considering the reasoning of the trial Court is wholly incorrect. The appellate Court after considering the evidence has clearly recorded a finding that the land in question was being used by the Defendants for their household purposes. The appellate Court further found that the Plaintiffs were not using the land for their household purposes before the date of vesting. On the other hand, the appellate Court further found that the land in dispute was appurtenant to the building of the Defendants. 21. The question as to whether the land is appurtenant to a particular house or not is a question of fact. The appellate Court had clearly found that the Defendants were using the house in question for their household purposes and that they were using the same since the time of their ancestors, and, therefore, the land was appurtenant to the Defendants' building. In Smt. Satya Gupta Alias Madhu Gupta Vs. Brijesh Kumar, (1998) 6 SCC 423 , the Supreme Court held in para 16 as under: 16. At the outset, we would like to point out that the findings on facts by the lower appellate Court as a final Court of facts, are based on appreciation of evidence and the same cannot be treated as perverse or based on no evidence. That being the position, we are of the view that the High Court, after reappreciating the evidence and without finding that the conclusions reached by the lower appellate Court were not based on the evidence, reversed conclusions on facts on the ground that the view taken by it was also a possible view on the facts. The High Court, it is well-settled, while exercising jurisdiction u/s 100, CPC cannot reverse the findings of the lower appellate Court on facts merely on the ground that on the facts found by the lower appellate Court another view was possible. 22. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Hamida and Others Vs. Md. Kahlil, (2001) 5 SCC 30 . 23. Thus, I see no reason to disturb the findings given by the appellate Court. 22. The same view was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Hamida and Others Vs. Md. Kahlil, (2001) 5 SCC 30 . 23. Thus, I see no reason to disturb the findings given by the appellate Court. I, therefore, hold that the lower appellate Court was justified it holding that the land in question was appurtenant to the Defendant's house and was justified in reversing the findings of the trial Court. 24. In view of the aforesaid, I find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.