Judgment ( 1. ) THE decision rendered in this writ shall also govern disposal of other writ being W. P. No. 411 of 2004, because in both these writs identical issue is involved. Facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. ( 2. ) THE petitioner is a private limited company engaged, inter alia, in the business of manufacture and sale of a product called "speciality hydrocarbon industrial solvents". They have set up their manufacturing unit at Megh Nagar in District--Jhabua in State of M. P. According to petitioner, they have invested substantial amount in setting up of this manufacturing unit which has gone into commercial production. ( 3. ) UNDER the Scheme of State Sales Tax Laws (Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1958 and then after its repeal Madhya Pradesh Commercial Tax Act, 1994), the State has offered exemption to certain categories of dealers engaged in class of business of manufacture and sale from payment of sales tax on their goods provided they satisfy the conditions prescribed under the exemption notification (annexure P 3 ). In order to examine the cases of eligible dealers, the notification (annexure P 3) has provided the procedure as to how and in what manner and which committee shall examine their cases with a view to find out as to whether a dealer is eligible and if so, to what extent he/they can enjoy the sales tax exemption on the sale of their goods. The State has formed three committees for examining the cases of eligible dealer. To begin with, the dealer is required to make an application to what is known as District Level Committee (DLC) then to State Level Committee (SLC) if the application is rejected by the DLC and lastly to State Appellate Committee by way of appeal. ( 4. ) CONDITIONS 4 (c), (d) and 10 (2) of the annexure appended to exemption notifications (annexure P 3) provide for constitution of these committees. They read as under: 4 (c ). The District Level Committee shall consist of the following officers: 1. Collector of the District. Chairman 2. Zonal Officer, Industries Vice Chairman 3. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Member Member or his nominee not below the rank of Sales Tax Officer. 4. Representative of the Madhya Pradesh Member Financial Corporation ( 5. They read as under: 4 (c ). The District Level Committee shall consist of the following officers: 1. Collector of the District. Chairman 2. Zonal Officer, Industries Vice Chairman 3. Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax Member Member or his nominee not below the rank of Sales Tax Officer. 4. Representative of the Madhya Pradesh Member Financial Corporation ( 5. ) MANAGING Director of the Madhya Pradesh Member Audyogik Vikas Nigam or his nominee not below the rank of a general manager. ( 6. ) GENERAL Manager, District Industries Centre. Member-Secretary ( 7. ) DISTRICT Treasury Officer. Member ( 8. ) DISTRICT Lead Bank Officer. Member 4 (d ). The State Level Committee shall consist of the following officers: 1. Commissioner of Sales Tax. Chairman Member 2. Managing Director, Madhya Member Pradesh Audyogik Vikas Nigam. 3. Industries Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh. Member-Secretary 10 (2 ). The State Appellate Committee shall consist of the following members: 1. Minister-in-charge, Commerce and Indus- Chairman tries Department. 2. Minister-in-charge, Commercial Taxes Member Department. 3. Principal Secretary/secretary, Commercial Member Taxes Department. 4. Principal Secretary/secretary, Law and Member Legislative Affairs Department. 5. Principal Secretary/secretary, Commerce Member-Secretary and Industries Department. 5. Similarly conditions 5 (a) and 10 (3) which read as under A provides for quorum for constitution of these committees: 5 (a ). The quorum for the District Level Committee shall be four and for the State Level Committee, it shall be two but the quorum of the District Level Committee shall not be deemed to be full in the absence of the member at serial number 3 of Clause (c) of paragraph 4. 10 (3 ). The quorum for the State Appellate Committee shall be three: Provided that the quorum shall not be deemed to have been c completed in absence of the member specified at Sr. No. 4 and any one out of the members specified at Sr. Nos. 2 and 3 of sub-para (2 ). 6. It is the case of the petitioner that they applied to DLC for claiming exemption from payment of sales tax on their goods manufactured by them in their unit. However, the DLC by their letter dated October 8, 2002 (annexure P 4) rejected their application. The petitioner then approached to SLC. However, by order dated July 3, 2003 (annexure P 7) the SLC also rejected their application. However, the DLC by their letter dated October 8, 2002 (annexure P 4) rejected their application. The petitioner then approached to SLC. However, by order dated July 3, 2003 (annexure P 7) the SLC also rejected their application. The petitioner then filed appeal (annexure P 8) to the State Appellate Committee. However, by impugned order (annexure 12) the Appellate Committee also rejected the appeal giving rise to filing of this writ. 7. As mentioned supra, the constitution of SLC, i. e. , State Level Committee shows that it is chaired by Commissioner of Sales tax/commercial Tax by virtue of his office along with two other members. Even these two members occupy the post of members by virtue of office named therein. Same is the case with regard to constitution of State Appellate Committee under Sub-clause (2) of Clause 10. This appellate committee consists of five members. It is chaired by Minister-in-charge of Commerce and Industries Department. One of its members who is also designated as Secretary is Principal Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department. 8. At the relevant time, i. e. , at the time when the case of the petitioner referred supra, was under consideration before the SLC, it was chaired by Shri V. Tripathi who was Commissioner-- Commercial Tax/sales Tax. In other words, by virtue of office held by Mr. V. Tripathi of Commissioner, Sales Tax/commercial Tax, he occupied the post of chairman of SLC and became a party to the decision rendered by the said SLC on July 3, 2003 (annexure P 7 ). As observed supra, the SLC rejected the application made by the petitioner. ( 9. ) IT so happened, Shri V. Tripathi, i. e. , Commissioner, Commercial Tax and Chairman of SLC in the meantime and after disposal of case of petitioner by SLC was promoted and posted as Principal Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department. It was by virtue of this new office, he (Mr. V. Tripathi) became member of State Appellate Committee as per requirement of Clause 10 (2x5) ibid. ( 10. ) AS mentioned supra, the petitioners appeal (annexure P 8) filed before State Appellate Committee against the decision of SLC (annexure P 7) was heard by Appellate Committee which included Mr, V. Tripathi as one of the members of the Appellate Committee. V. Tripathi) became member of State Appellate Committee as per requirement of Clause 10 (2x5) ibid. ( 10. ) AS mentioned supra, the petitioners appeal (annexure P 8) filed before State Appellate Committee against the decision of SLC (annexure P 7) was heard by Appellate Committee which included Mr, V. Tripathi as one of the members of the Appellate Committee. It is in this appeal, the petitioner moved an application (annexure P 10) raising an objection inter alia, that since Mr. V. Tripathi happened to be party to the decision impugned in the appeal (he being a Chairman of SLC) and hence, he should disassociate himself as one of the appellate members while hearing the appeal arising out of his own decision. It is this objection which was overruled by the Appellate Committee saying that since there are other members also in the Appellate Committee along with Mr. V. Tripathi and hence his presence and/or participation would not in any way affect either the constitution of Appellate Committee or decision taken by the said Appellate Committee. After overruling the preliminary objection raised b the petitioner, the Appellate Committee proceeded to decide the appeal on merits and dismissed it thereby upholding the order passed by SLC. As observed supra, it is this order (annexure P 12) which is sought to be impugned in this writ by the petitioner. The notice of the writ was issued to the respondents including respondent No. 2 (Mr. V. Tripathi ). All are served and represented. They have also filed the return for and on behalf of State. In substance, the respondents have defended the impugned orders including all proceedings. ( 11. ) HEARD Shri PM Choudhary, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Amit Agarwal, learned Government Advocate for respondent-State. ( 12. ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner in substance made twofold submissions. In the first place, he contended that the very fact that Mr. V. Tripathi happened to be a party to a decision rendered by SLC as Chairman (annexure P 7) and he also happened to be a member of Appellate Committee, he should not have heard the appeal filed by the petitioner against annexure P 7, i. e. , the order to which Mr. V. Tripathi was a party as Chairman of SLC. V. Tripathi was a party as Chairman of SLC. In the second place, learned Counsel assailed the impugned order on merits contending that it is not sustainable in law. In reply, learned State Counsel for the respondents defended the impugned proceedings on the same reasoning which were made basis by the Appellate Committee for A rejecting the preliminary objections raised by the petitioner before them. ( 13. ) HAVING heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, I find force in the first submission urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. As a consequence, the petition succeeds and has to be allowed resulting in remand of the case to State Appellate Committee with certain directions as indicated infra. ( 14. ) THE question involved in this writ has to be decided keeping in view the law laid down by the Supreme Court in its two leading decisions reported in AIR1970 SC 150 , (1969 )2 SCC262 , [1970 ]1 SCR457 (A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India) and a recent decision reported in AIR1998 SC 2050 , [1998 (79 )FLR684 ], JT1998 (3 )SC 701 , 1998 (3 )SCALE411 , (1998 )5 SCC513 , [1998 ]1 SCR811 (State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak ). It is in these two decisions, their Lordships examined and explained the real import/extent and applicability of classic maxim "nemo Debet Esse Judex In Propria Sua Causa" and the principle "justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done". It is in these cases, their Lordships examined the various facts of "bias" and emphasised the need of "fair play" or "fair hearing" in quasi-judicial and administrative matters. Indeed in the words of their Lordships, these two decisions are "locus classic" in judicial field. ( 15. ) IN Kraipak case AIR1970 SC 150 , (1969 )2 SCC262 , [1970 ]1 SCR457 , the selection committee had been constituted under regulation 3 of the Indian Forest Services (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966 for the purpose of making selection to any State Cadre of the All India Forest Service. The Chief Conservator of Forests was selected. ( 15. ) IN Kraipak case AIR1970 SC 150 , (1969 )2 SCC262 , [1970 ]1 SCR457 , the selection committee had been constituted under regulation 3 of the Indian Forest Services (Initial Recruitment) Regulations, 1966 for the purpose of making selection to any State Cadre of the All India Forest Service. The Chief Conservator of Forests was selected. Setting aside the selection, their Lordships held that the Chief Conservator of Forests being one of the candidates seeking to be selected to the All India Forest Services should not have been included as a member of the Selection Board because of possibilities of bias. While examining the issue of bias in great detail in the context of English authorities, in paras 15 and 20 their Lordships held as follows: 15. It is unfortunate that Naqishbund was appointed as one of the members of the selection board. It is true that ordinarily the Chief Conservator of Forests in a State should be considered as the most appropriate person to be in the selection board. He must be expected to know his officers thoroughly, their weaknesses as well as their strength. His opinion as regards their suitability for selection to the All India Service is entitled to great weight. But then under the circumstances it was improper to have included Naqishbund as a member of the selection board. He was one of the persons to be considered for selection. It is against all canons of justice to make a man judge in his own cause. It is true that he did not participate in the deliberations of the committee when his name was considered. But then the very fact that he was a member of the selection board must have had its own impact on the decision of the selection board. Further admittedly he participated in the deliberations of the selection board when the claims of his rivals particularly that of Basu was considered. He was also party to the preparation of the list of selected candidates in order of preference. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. At every stage of his participation in the deliberations of the selection board there was a conflict between his interest and duty. Under those circumstances it is difficult to believe that he could have been impartial. The real question is not whether he was biased. It is difficult to prove the state of mind of a person. Therefore what we have to see is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. We agree with the learned Attorney-General that a mere suspicion of bias is not sufficient. There must be a reasonable likelihood of bias. In deciding the question of bias we have to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. It was in the interest of Naqishbund to keep out his rivals in order to secure his position from further challenge. Naturally he was also interested in safeguarding his position while preparing the list of selected candidates. . . . 20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely, (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet ease judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem ). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules A should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala, Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, dated July 15, 1968 AIR1969 SC 198 , [1969 ]1 SCR317 the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case. ( 16. ) THEN came yet another classic on the subject from the Supreme Court. This case, i. e. , State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak AIR1998 SC 2050 , [1998 (79 )FLR684 ], JT1998 (3 )SC 701 , 1998 (3 )SCALE411 , (1998 )5 SCC513 , [1998 ]1 SCR811 has more closeness so far as the facts of this case are concerned. In this case, a petition was allowed by learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court (Justice A. K. Sengupta ). The decision of single Judge was then set aside by the division Bench. In this case, a petition was allowed by learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court (Justice A. K. Sengupta ). The decision of single Judge was then set aside by the division Bench. However, in second round of litigation started by the same petitioner, whose petition had been dismissed by the division Bench earlier, the single Bench dismissed the second writ. The petitioner then filed appeal before the division Bench against this dismissal. This time, the division Bench was presided over by Justice A. K. Sengupta along with other Judge. This division Bench heard the appeal and allowed it by granting the same relief which justice A. K. Sengupta sitting singly in the earlier round of litigation had granted to the writ petitioner (though the same was overruled by the earlier division Bench in first round of litigation ). It is with this background, the matter was carried in special leave to appeal by the respondent of writ in Supreme Court. ( 17. ) THEIR Lordships were at pains to examine the role and propriety of justice A. K. Sengupta in becoming a member of division Bench in hearing the appeal against an order of single Judge. This is how their Lordships began their examination of the issue by formulating the question: Whether judicial obstinacy can be treated as a form of bias is the question which we intend to answer in these appeals. As the answer depends upon the peculiar facts involved in these cases they are being examined in a little detail. ( 18. ) AFTER setting out the facts in detail, their Lordships in para 22 posed the pointed question: 22. An appeal against this judgment was disposed of by a division Bench which included Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta. The question which, therefore, arises is whether Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta could sit in the division Bench to decide the appeal against that judgment ? It is this question which their Lordships examined in detail, I feel it proper to quote in extenso the entire discussion of their Lordships to appreciate their reasoning which is contained from para 23 to para 36: 23. All judicial functionaries have necessarily to have an unflinching character to decide a case with an unbiased mind. Judicial proceedings are held in open court to ensure transparency. All judicial functionaries have necessarily to have an unflinching character to decide a case with an unbiased mind. Judicial proceedings are held in open court to ensure transparency. Access to judicial record by way of inspection by the litigant or his lawyer and the facility of providing certified copies of that record are factors which not only ensure transparency but also instill and inspire confidence in the impartiality of the court proceedings. 24. Unlike suits, proceedings under article 226 of the Constitution are not conducted strictly following the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure but are held in accordance with the procedure devised by the High Court itself under which a fair hearing is provided to the parties concerned before a decision is rendered. In other words, principles of natural justice are observed strictly in letter and spirit. One of the requirements of natural justice is that the hearing should be done by a Judge with an unbiased mind. 25. Bias may be defined as a pre-conceived opinion or a predisposition or pre-determination to decide a case or an issue in a particular manner, so much so that such pre-disposition does not leave the mind open to conviction. It is, in fact, a condition of mind, which sways judgments and renders the Judge unable to exercise impartiality in a particular case. 26. Bias has many forms. It may be pecuniary bias, personal bias, bias as to subject-matter in dispute, or policy bias, etc. In the instant case, we are not concerned with any of these forms of bias. We have to deal, as we shall presently see, a new form of bias, namely, bias on account of judicial obstinacy. 27. Judges unfortunately, are not infallible. As human beings, A they can commit mistakes even in the best of their judgments reflective of their hard labour, impartial thinking and objective assessment of the problem put before them. In the matter of interpretation of statutory provisions or while assessing the evidence in a particular case or deciding questions of law or facts, mistakes may be committed bona fide which are corrected at the appellate stage. This explains the philosophy behind the hierarchy of courts. Such a mistake can be committed even by a Judge of the High Court which are corrected in the Letters Patent Appeal, if available. 28. This explains the philosophy behind the hierarchy of courts. Such a mistake can be committed even by a Judge of the High Court which are corrected in the Letters Patent Appeal, if available. 28. If a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires that the Judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to that judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, re-write the overruled judgment. Even if it was a decision on a pure question of law which came to be overruled, it cannot be reiterated in the same proceedings at the subsequent stage by reason of the fact that the judgment of the higher court which has overruled that judgment, not only binds the parties to the proceedings but also the Judge who had earlier rendered that decision. That Judge may have his occasion to reiterate his dogmatic views on a particular question of common law or constitutional law in some other case but not in the same case. If it is done, it would be exhibitive of his bias in his own favour to satisfy his egoistic judicial obstinacy. 29. As pointed out earlier, an essential requirement of judicial adjudication is that the Judge is impartial and neutral and is in a position to apply his mind objectively to the facts of the case put up before him. If he is pre-disposed or suffers from prejudices or has a biased mind, he disqualifies himself from acting as a Judge. But Frank, J. , of the United States in In re Linahan, 138 F 2nd 650, says: if, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of Judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one will. The human mind, even, at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with pre-dispositions Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by. . . taking the oath of office as a Judge, a man ceases to be human and strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine. [see also Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law (1973 Edition), page 155; Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De Smith (1980 Edition), page 272; II Administrative Law Treatise by Davis (1958 Edition), page 130. ] 30. [see also Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law (1973 Edition), page 155; Judicial Review of Administrative Action by De Smith (1980 Edition), page 272; II Administrative Law Treatise by Davis (1958 Edition), page 130. ] 30. These remarks imply a distinction between pre-judging of facts specifically relating to a party, as against pre-conceptions or pre-dispositions about general questions of law, policy or discretion. The implication is that though in the former case, a Judge would disqualify himself, in the latter case, he may not. But this question does not arise here and is left as it is. 31. This Court has already, innumerable times, beginning with its classic decision in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR1970 SC 150 , (1969 )2 SCC262 , [1970 ]1 SCR457 laid down the need of fair play or fair hearing in quasi-judicial and administrative matters. The hearing has to be by a person sitting with an unbiased mind. To the same effect is the decision in S. P. Kapoor (Dr) v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 2181 . In an earlier decision in Mineral Development Ltd. v. State of Bihar AIR1960 SC 468 , [1960 ]2 SCR609 , it was held that the Revenue Minister, who had cancelled the petitioners licence or the lease of certain land, could not have taken part in the proceedings for cancellation of licence as there was political rivalry between the petitioner and the Minister, who had also filed a criminal case against the petitioner. This principle has also been applied in cases under labour laws or service laws, except where the cases were covered by the doctrine of necessity. In Financial Commissioner (Taxation), Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh 1996 III AD (SC )669 , AIR1996 SC 3287 , JT1996 (4 )SC 326 , (1996 )114 PLR223 , 1996 (3 )SCALE561 , (1996 )9 SCC281 , [1996 ]3 SCR812 the Settlement Commissioner was held to be not competent to sit over his own earlier order passed as Settlement Officer under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The maxim Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Sua Cause was invoked in Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab (1997 )10 SCC641. 32. The above maxim as also the other principle based on the most frequently quoted dictum of Lord Hewart, C. J. , in R. v. Sussex, JJ ex. The maxim Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Sua Cause was invoked in Gurdip Singh v. State of Punjab (1997 )10 SCC641. 32. The above maxim as also the other principle based on the most frequently quoted dictum of Lord Hewart, C. J. , in R. v. Sussex, JJ ex. P. Mc Carthy (1924) 1 KB 256, at page 259, that: it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. constitute the well-recognised rule against bias. 33. Bias, as pointed out earlier, is a condition of mind and, therefore, it may not always be possible to furnish actual proof of bias. But the courts, for this reason, cannot be said to be in a crippled state. There are many ways to discover bias; for example, by evaluating the facts and circumstances of the case or applying the tests of real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of bias. De A Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980 Edn. , 262, 264, has explained that reasonable suspicion test looks mainly to outward appearance while real likelihood test focuses on the courts own evaluation of the probabilities. 34. In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon (1968) 1 WLR 815 it was observed whether there was a real likelihood of bias or not has to be ascertained with reference to right minded persons; whether they would consider that there was a real likelihood of bias. Almost the same test has also been applied here in an old decision, namely, in Mank Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi AIR1957 SC 425 , [1957 ]1 SCR575. In that case, although the court found that the Chairman of the Bar Council Tribunal, appointed by the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, to enquire into the misconduct of Manak Lal, an advocate, on the complaint of one Prem Chand was not biased towards him, it was held that he should not have presided over the proceedings to give effect to the salutary principle that justice should not only be done, it should also be seen to be done in view of the fact that the Chairman, who, undoubtedly, was a Senior Advocate and an ex-Advocate-General, had, at one time, represented Prem Chand in some case. These principles have had their evolution in the field of administrative law but the courts performing judicial functions only cannot be excepted from the rule of bias as the Presiding Officers of the court have to hear and decide contentious issues with an unbiased mind. The maxim Nemo Debet Esse Judex in Propria Sua Causa and the principle justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done1 can be legitimately invoked in their cases. 35. Applying these principles in the instant case, it will be seen that although the judgment passed by Mr Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta in the first writ petition in which he had given a direction that the respondents shall be promoted with effect from March 13, 1980 was set aside, he (Mr justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta), in the sub-sequent writ petition between the same parties, gave a declaration that the respondents shall be treated to have been promoted with effect from March 13, 1980. Significantly such a declaration was not prayed for and what was prayed in the subsequent writ petition was a direction to the State Government to pay arrears of salary of the higher post with effect from March 13, 1980. To put it differently, in the first writ petition, Mr Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta commanded promote the respondents with effect from March 13, 1980: in the second writ petition he directed treat the respondents as promoted with effect from March 13, 1980. There is hardly any difference between the two judgments. In fact, the second writ petition constitutes a crude attempt to revive the directions passed by Mr. Justice Ajith Kumar Sengupta in the first judgment, and curiously, Mr Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta, sitting in the division Bench, wrote, a second time, a judgment which was already overruled. He garnished the judgment by innocuously providing that arrears would not be payable to the respondents nor will the respondents affect the seniority of others. But the garniture cannot conceal the deceptive innocence as it is obvious, on a judicial scrutiny, that paramount purpose was to re-write the overruled judgment. 36. In view of these facts, we are constrained to observe that it was not competent for Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta to have presided over the Bench in which the impugned judgment was passed as he had already expressed his opinion in the earlier writ petition which was overruled. 36. In view of these facts, we are constrained to observe that it was not competent for Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta to have presided over the Bench in which the impugned judgment was passed as he had already expressed his opinion in the earlier writ petition which was overruled. He should have disassociated himself from that Bench in keeping with the high traditions of the institution so as to give effect to the rule that justice should not only be done, it should manifestly be seen to have been done apart from sitting in appeal, though collaterally, over his own judgment. ( 19. ) WHEN I apply the aforesaid reasoning to the facts of this case, then it follows as a necessary consequence that in all fairness Mr. V. Tripathi should have disassociated himself from the appellate committee in keeping with the high tradition of the institution as he was sitting in appeal over his own judgment which he rendered as Chairman of SLC. Indeed, the facts of this and that of Shivananda Pathaks case AIR1998 SC 2050 , [1998 (79 )FLR684 ], JT1998 (3 )SC 701 , 1998 (3 )SCALE411 , (1998 )5 SCC513 , [1998 ]1 SCR811 , are so similar to a large extent that reasoning applied by the Supreme Court in setting aside the judgment of division Bench can be safely adopted to set aside the decision of an Appellate Committee in this case without any difficulty. Mr. V. Tripathi being a Chairman of SLC had already expressed his opinion along with other two members rejecting the case of peti- tioner. In my humble view, it did not make much difference that he (Mr. V. Tripathi) was one member along with 2 others as SLC and/ or that he was one member along with 4 others in State Appellate Committee. The very fact that he was involved in deliberation of decision making along with others renders him ineligible to become a member of Appellate Committee. In the words of Supreme Court in aforementioned 2 cases, here comes an element of bias and "human probabilities". The very presence of member may lead to a feeling that bias may operate against an aggrieved. This is how the maxim applies to the case and gets attracted to maintain highest standard of transparency in judicial decisions. In the words of Supreme Court in aforementioned 2 cases, here comes an element of bias and "human probabilities". The very presence of member may lead to a feeling that bias may operate against an aggrieved. This is how the maxim applies to the case and gets attracted to maintain highest standard of transparency in judicial decisions. He thus, could not sit as a member of Appellate Committee to decide the appeal arising out A of his own decision. Indeed, he could not have been a Judge of his own cause by sitting as one of the appellate member for deciding the appeal. This act on his part was against the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kraipak case AIR 1970 SC 150 and Shivananda Pathaks case (1998) 5 SCC 513 . It has thus, vitiated the impugned appellate order passed by such appellate committee. ( 20. ) ACCORDINGLY and in view of aforesaid discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated February 28, 2004 (annexure P 12) passed by State Appellate Committee is hereby quashed by writ of certiorari. It is hereby directed that appeal filed c by the petitioner (annexure P 8) against the order dated July 3, 2003 (annexure P 7) passed by SLC shall be heard by a State Level Appellate Committee constituted in terms of Clause 10 (2) of the Rules of which Mr. V. Tripathi--Principal Secretary, Commerce and Industries Department, shall not be the member. In case, if committee feels that appeal can be heard in terms of rule by the remaining members of the committee, then it shall be so heard. However, if it is found that it cannot be so heard then, any other Principal Secretary/ Secretary, as the case may be, of Commerce and Industries Department as per Clause 10 (2)/ (5) shall be nominated only for the appeal filed by the petitioner and for all those appeals of this nature arising out of orders passed by Mr. V. Tripathi as Chairman of SLC to enable the fresh constituted committee to decide the appeal on merits. It is made clear that constitution of Appellate Committee of which Mr. V. Tripathi is the member shall continue to function as it is for all other cases. In other words, this order may not be construed to mean that Mr. V. Tripathi as Chairman of SLC to enable the fresh constituted committee to decide the appeal on merits. It is made clear that constitution of Appellate Committee of which Mr. V. Tripathi is the member shall continue to function as it is for all other cases. In other words, this order may not be construed to mean that Mr. V. Tripathi is held ineligible to function as member of Appellate Committee. The prohibition of his becoming member of appellate authority will only confine to those appeals which are filed against his orders where he has acted as chairman of SLC. It is made clear that this Court has not applied its mind to the facts of the case on merits and hence, the Appellate Committee shall hear and decide the appeal uninfluenced by any of the observations made by this Court on merits as also the Appellate Committee shall decide the appeal totally uninfluenced by the fact of petition being allowed. ( 21. ) LET this be done within six months as an outer limit. ( 22. ) NO costs.