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2004 DIGILAW 732 (PNJ)

Swai Ram v. Guddu Alias Dawood

2004-07-20

VIRENDER SINGH

body2004
Judgment Virender Singh, J. 1. Guddu alias Dawood, Shamsher Singh, Raj Pal, Kuldeep Singh, Jagdish, Nage Singh, Ram Kala, Kura Ram, Pardeep Gill and Pitter were booked in case FIR No. 136 dated 11.8.1996, under Sections 148, 302/149, 120- B, 452 and 324 IPC and under Section 25 of the Arms Act registered at Police Station Rajound. All the respondents stand acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kaithal vide impugned judgment dated 15.2.1999. State of Haryana has not preferred any appeal against their acquittal. The learned counsel for the petitioner confirms this fact. Therefore, this revision petition by Swai Ram. 2. The delay in filing the appeal has already been condoned vide order dated 20.4.2004. Lower Court records have also been received. 3. Mr. S.S. Dinarpur has put appearance on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 8 whereas service upon respondent Nos. 9 and 10 had not been effected as they are not residing at the addresses given in the memo of parties. The learned counsel for the petitioner states that he is not aware of the latest addresses of these respondents. 4. I have heard Mr. Surender Dhull, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.S. Dinarpur, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 8. With their assistance, I have also gone through the entire record. 5. All the main witnesses of the occurrence namely Swai Ram, Dharam Pal and Girdhari Lal have been disbelieved by the trial Court and it has reached the conclusion that the prosecution has miserably failed to show that any of the respondents were responsible for the incident resulting into murder of Surinder Singh or causing injuries to his father Swai Ram PW-1. The learned trial Court has entered into detailed discussion for disbelieving the prosecution case. My attention has been drawn to the relevant paras of the impugned judgment which runs from Para No. 13 onwards. The statements of the witnesses have also read over before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The sole grouse shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned trial Court has given much importance to the affidavit of PW-1 Swai Ram, PW-2 Dharam Pal his brother and PW-3 Girdhari Lal his another brother without caring for their substantive evidence in Court for which the specific role has been attributed to some of the respondents as main assailants. According to the learned counsel, this approach adopted by the learned trial Court in discarding the prosecution case is uncalled for and as such the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside. 7. On the other hand Mr. Dinarpur while taking me through the statement of the aforesaid main witnesses and has stated that Dharam Pal PW-2 who is the real brother of Swai Ram was declared as hostile by the State as he did not support the prosecution case and even otherwise all the three witnesses including Swai Ram PW-1 have not disowned the affidavits already tendered by them. My attention has been drawn to the cross-examination of all three witnesses. 8. I do not agree with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. All the material aspects have been dealt with in the impugned judgment including the pleas now raised by learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned trial Court while commenting on many weaknesses in the prosecution case has acquitted the respondents. 9. The scope of revision against the acquittal has been well discussed by the Honble Apex Court in a judgment rendered in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh alias R.P. Singh and others v. State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) and another, 2002(4) RCR(Criminal) 61 (SC), their Lordships of the Apex Court have observed that in the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to interfere in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It was further observed that that the High Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. It was further observed by their Lordships that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction against an order of acquittal at the instance of a private party, the Court exercises only limited jurisdiction and should not constitute itself into an appellate Court which has a much wider jurisdiction to go into questions of facts and law and to convert an order of acquittal into one of conviction. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. 10. It cannot be lost sight of that when a re-trial is ordered, the dice is heavily loaded against the accused, and that itself must caution the Court exercising revisional jurisdiction. 10. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singhs case (supra), their Lordships have relied upon the decisions in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196; K.C. Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788; Akalu Ahir and others v. Ramdeo Ram, 1973(2) SCC 583; Patakalapti Narayana Gajapathi Raju and others v. Ramapalli Peda Appadu and another, AIR 1975 SC 1854 and Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707. Having regard to the facts of the case in hand and following the aforesaid ratio, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of acquittal calling for interference by this Court. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed.