ORDER: The revision petitioners are the defendants 2 to 8 in the suit. The first respondent is the plaintiff and the 2nd respondent is the first defendant in the suit. The first respondent filed the suit, claiming that he is the tenant under the 2nd respondent, praying for permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from evicting him, except by due process of law. He also filed an application under O.39, Rule 1 and Civil Procedure Code in I.A.No.724 of 2003 for grant of temporary injunction. The trail Court granted an order of interim injunction. Aggrieved by the same, the defendants 2 to 8 have preferred this civil revision petition. Heard the learned advocate for the revision petitioners and the respondents. 2. Mr.P.L.Narayanan, the learned advocate for the revision petitioners would contend that the 2nd respondent has no right in the suit property and the lease said to have been granted is created one and the same is not valid and therefore, the suit filed by the first respondent is not maintainable. Neither the 2nd respondent nor the first respondent was in possession of the suit property on the date of filing of the suit. It is stated that the 2nd defendant’s father was the previous owner of the property covered under two documents. At the time when the Village was taken over under the Act No.30 of 1963, the Settlement Tahsildar, Thanjvaur granted patta in the name of the 2nd defendant and 5 others. The property is comprised in T.S.No.2981/1 to 2981/5, which consists of 12 shops and a hotel building and the vacant land. For the site buildings, urban land tax was also levied and it was paid by the pattadars, i.e., the revision petitioners and the present patta number is 4259. Superstructure tax also stands in the name of Sambandam Chettiar and Thirunavukkarasu Chettiar, the petitioners 2 and 3/defendants 3 and 4. The first defendant, Umayal Achi is not even a pattadar and she has no right in the suit property. Umayal Achi’s mother-in-law was Kruppayee alias Meenatchi, step sister of the first defendant’s father, Meyyappa Chettiar. Umayal Achi has been attempting to lay a false claim to the suit property and she has already filed a suit in O.S.No.1507 of 2002 before the Sub Court, Namakkal, in which, the suit property was not included at all. The first defendant can neither claim title nor possession to the property. Umayal Achi has been attempting to lay a false claim to the suit property and she has already filed a suit in O.S.No.1507 of 2002 before the Sub Court, Namakkal, in which, the suit property was not included at all. The first defendant can neither claim title nor possession to the property. For about more than 60 years, the suit property has been in the possession and enjoyment of Meyyappa Chettiar and his legal heirs to the knowledge of Umayal Achi. In fact, to put an end to the unnecessary claim by Umayal Achi, certain value properties were sold to her as per wishes of her mother-in-law in 1961. Again on 17.5.1993, Umayal Achi has given a registered release deed in respect of all the properties. As such, Umayal Achi, the 2nd respondent herein has no right in the suit property nor in possession of the same. The lease deed dated 14.7.2002 said to have been executed by the 2nd respondent in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff is only a concocted document. That in the certificate issued by the Village Administrative Officer, it is stated that it was learnt by him that the plaintiff is having a two wheeler stand. The VAO has stated so only with a view to help the plaintiff to get an order of injunction. Thatched shed and pandal were hurriedly erected at about 1.00 a.m. on 20.9.2003 for this purpose, two lorry loads of persons were hired and the agent of the 2nd defendant, N.S.Manivasagam had also reported the same to the police and on enquiry, he came to know that one Raja and Subramanian were the men behind this illegal an criminal trespass. They entered into the plaint vacant site, which is the subject matter of the suit and blocked by a wall and also by a gate, abutting the road on the eastern side and the wall was demolished and also the gate was forcibly removed. As neither, the 1st respondent nor the 2nd respondent was in possession of the suit property, the first respondent is not entitled to maintain the suit for permanent injunction and also not entitled to get an order of interim injunction. As neither, the 1st respondent nor the 2nd respondent was in possession of the suit property, the first respondent is not entitled to maintain the suit for permanent injunction and also not entitled to get an order of interim injunction. But, however, the first respondent after having obtained an order of injunction, trespassed into the suit property and also to put up a construction in the suit property and the suit is a abuse of process of law, resulting in miscarriage of justice and therefore, the petitioners have invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and pray to strike off the plaint itself and also to direct the first respondent to deliver vacant possession of the suit property to the revision petitioners. 3.Per contra, Mr.P.Jayaraman, the learned senior advocate for the 2nd respondent would contend that the 1st respondent/plaintiff is a lessee under the 2nd respondent/1st defendant and by virtue of the lease deed executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff he, in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and also paid a huge amount of advance and also paying the rent. The plaintiff is running a two wheeler stand in the suit property. The plaintiff’s possession was also authenticated by the VAO and the same was counter signed by the Tahsildar, wherein, it is indicated that the plaintiff has been running a two wheeler cycle stand in the suit property and therefore, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and hence, he is entitled to maintain the suit for permanent injunction and also for interim injunction. 4. The learned advocate for the 2nd respondent/first defendant would further contend that as against the order of injunction granted by the trial Court, the revision petitioners have preferred an appeal in C.M.A.No.84 of 2003 before the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, in which, an order was passed on 5.4.2004, directing the District Munsif Court to expedite the trial and dispose of the same within three months from the date of receipt of the case records, after affording opportunity to both sides to adduce oral and documentary evidence. It is submitted that the said order is an appealable order and if the revision petitioners are aggrieved, they could have challenged the said order, but they have done so. It is submitted that the said order is an appealable order and if the revision petitioners are aggrieved, they could have challenged the said order, but they have done so. The revision petitioners having subjected to the appeal remedy by filing C.M.A., wherein also an order was passed, the said order was not challenged and therefore, the present civil revision is not maintainable. 5. The first respondent also submitted that the revision petitioners are not entitled to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, as adumbrated under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. 6. Mr.Sundaragopal, the learned advocate for the first respondent/plaintiff would contend that he is a lessee under the 2nd respondent and in pursuance of the said lease, he has been in possession of the suit property and also running a cycle stand. The tenant has not concerned about any dispute with the third party and his interest has got to be protected and the interim order passed is sustainable. 7. Now, we have to consider as to whether the revision petitioners/defendants are entitled to invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, in questioning the validity of the order passed by the trial Court under O.39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C.? 8. Mr.P.L.Narayanan, the learned advocate for the revision petitioners and contend that whenever there is an abuse of process of Court, which would result in miscarriage of justice, this Court has to interfere with the same and this Court is empowered to do so under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. In order to support to his submissions, he relied upon the following judgments. 9. In The Ahmedabad Manufacturing and Calico Printing Company Limited v. Ramtahel Ramanand and others, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1698, it was held, "Art.227 of the Constitution no doubt, does not cover on the High Court power similar to that of an ordinary Court of appeal.... The power under Art.227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.“ 10. The power under Art.227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.“ 10. In Renuka Devi v. D.Manohara, (1998)1 L.W. 355 , it was held,” At the time when the revision was being heard, the order of injunction was not in force, and it is admitted by both counsels that the interim order was already vacated. Under ordinary circumstances, I would have dismissed the civil revision petition as infructuous. But certain telling facts compel me to say that the dismissal of the injunction petition itself may not be sufficient to meet the ends of justice especially when certain facts are brought to my notice. While exercising the powers under Art.227 of the Constitution of India, this Court is entitled to take into consideration the grievance of the party, and if it is found to be true, it is also duty bound to see that the grievance is redressed to the maximum possible extent.... The effect of the order is that the respondent has come to the Court with a fraudulent document so as to deprive another person of her property. Even though the injunction application was dismissed, if he continues in possession on the basis of the fraudulent document, is not the Court impliedly holding him to continue in possession? The Court in such cases will have to be little more active, since such person should not get the benefit out of their own fraud.... The person coming to the Court with false case, with the aid of false and fraudulent document, is not entitled to any equity, nor he is entitled to get any orders in his favour. The law is settled that such cases should be thrown out even at the threshold. The Court has also a duty to see that as far as possible, litigation is avoided, and multiplicty of proceedings are avoided, and when the Court has such a power to grant relief, it should not close its eyes on technicalities.“ 11. In P.Chenchu Ramiah v. A.M.Noohu Nachia and another, (1999)1 L.W. 37 , (S.S.Subramani, J.) the C.R.P. was filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India by the first defendant in the suit, challenging the order of interim injunction granted by the lower Court. In P.Chenchu Ramiah v. A.M.Noohu Nachia and another, (1999)1 L.W. 37 , (S.S.Subramani, J.) the C.R.P. was filed under Art.227 of the Constitution of India by the first defendant in the suit, challenging the order of interim injunction granted by the lower Court. The revision petitioner stated that he filed a counter alleging that there is a fraud committed by the plaintiff and the business that has been conducted by him has now been taken possession forcibly under the guise of implementing the interim order. It is his case that he is running a business by name New Sangam Lodge, and he had been a tenant of this building for the last more than 25 years. He also said that he has taken on lease the property owned by the plaintiff and he has paid her huge amount by way of advance at the inception of tenancy. According to him, the plaintiff has also executed a lease deed in his favour. There were prior Court proceedings between them and he has also installed four telephones in his lodge. It is also said that on 4.9.1998, some of his staff members have been kidnapped, for which he filed a complaint before the police and he is also intending to file a habeas corpus petition before this Court in connection with the same. He denied the allegation that he is a rent trespasser. In the back ground of the above said case, it was held,” The first respondent after having suppressed material facts, did obtain an interim order and delayed the communication of the same so as to prevent the petitioner herein from taking timely action. It was a perpetuated fraud. If I am to maintain the interim order and direct the lower Court to dispose of it on merits, I must justify the dispossession of the petitioner. Such an argument cannot be accepted....In view of the impugned order, a person’s business is affected. It is a case where the Court below was misled by the first respondent. Secondly, the Court also did not think of considering the statutory ingredients before passing the order....The Court below also thought of violating the guidelines, which ultimately landed on innocent person on the street. It is a case where the Court below was misled by the first respondent. Secondly, the Court also did not think of considering the statutory ingredients before passing the order....The Court below also thought of violating the guidelines, which ultimately landed on innocent person on the street. In such cases, when the illegality has come to the notice of this Court, I feel that this Court is duty bound to restore the person so affected, to his original position, and also see that he is given necessary protection....It is the duty of the Court to rectify its mistake and the inherent powers of Court must be exercised in such cases to see that at least to a certain extent, injustice already done is remedied. The word ‘abuse’ means, misuse or using one’s position for something for which it is not intended. In the case, first respondent misused the machinery of this Court to obtain an unfair advantage by misleading the Court below. The Court below also played its part in committing an illegality. Under these circumstances, I feel that this is a fit case where the petitioner must be put in possession of the property." 12. In S.P.Chengalvraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jaganath (dead) by L.Rs. and others, (1994)1 L.W. 21, ‘fraud’ has been defined that a person whose case is based on falsehood has no right to approach the Court and he can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation. It was held, "Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage." 13. In Bajonji Diunshaji Engineer and others v. AMY Dhunjisha Gandhi and others, (1997)2 S.C.C. 388, the question as to the applicability of Sec.13-A(2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act, came for consideration and the High Court in petition under Art.227 of the Constitution of India considered the question of maintainability of the application submitted by the appellants under Sec.13-A(2) and held that no case has been made out by the appellants that the respondents had committed any breach of the terms of the license. Under said circumstances, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in considering the other questions relating to the merits which had yet to be considered by the competent authority and disposing of the application filed by the appellants that was pending before the authority. 14. In E.K.Palanisamy v. A.M.Murugesan and six others, (1999)2 L.W. 142 , the plaintiffs have filed a suit as if they were in exclusive possession of the entire property. It is denied by their own admission. The plaintiffs wanted to play a fraud and get an order of injunction. The Court was also made a victim. Therefore, the impugned order has to be set aside. Once the order of injunction itself is not valid, was the Court justified in granting police protection? The Court has got powers to implement the order of injunction provided circumstances so warrant. The power of the Court is not a mater in issue. The question is, under what circumstances, the Court can compel the police to implement the order? The enforcement of an ad interim injunction under which the aid of the police should be viewed more strictly. The Court must also enter a finding that a finding that the police help is necessary in such a case and there are emergent circumstances which warrant the implementation of the order by the police. 15. In A.Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S.Chellappan and others, (2000)7 S.C.C. 695 , as against the order of interim injunction granted under O.39, Rules 1 and 2, the aggrieved party approached the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. It was argued in those circumstances that the High Court should not have entertained a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution when the respondent had two remedies statutorily available to him. First is that the respondent could have approached the trial Court for vacating, if not for any modification, of the interim ex parte order passed. Second is that an appeal could have been preferred by him against the said order. It is open tot he respondent to opt either of the two remedies. First is that the respondent could have approached the trial Court for vacating, if not for any modification, of the interim ex parte order passed. Second is that an appeal could have been preferred by him against the said order. It is open tot he respondent to opt either of the two remedies. But, however, when the Court is not in a position to carry out his legal obligation in disposing of the injunction application within thirty days as prescribed under the rule and if for any reason, the Court is not able to finally dispose of the application within the aforesaid time, the Court has to record the reasons thereof in writing and if any of these two courses was done by the Court, then what would be the fate of the party. It was held, "It is the acknowledged position of law that no party can be forced to suffer for the inaction of the Court or its omissions to act according to the procedure established by law. Under the normal circumstances the aggrieved party can prefer an appeal only against an order passed under Rules 1, 2, 2-A, 4 or 10 of O.39 of the Code in terms of O.43, Rule 1. He cannot approach the appellate or revisional Court during the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of temporary injunction. In such circumstances, the party which does not get justice due to the inaction of the Court in following the mandate of law must have a remedy. So we are of the view that in a case where the mandate of O.39, Rule 3-A of the Code is flouted, the aggrieved party, shall be entitled to the right of appeal notwithstanding the pendency of the application for grant or vacation of a temporary injunction, against the order remaining in force....But, the question remains whether the High Court should have entertained the petition under Art.227 of the Constitution when the party had two other alternative remedies. Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy. Though no hurdle can be put against the exercise of the Constitutional powers of the High Court it is a well recognised principle which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy. The High Court need not have entertained the revision petition at all and the party affected by the interim ex parte order should have been directed to resort to one of the other remedies." 16. In S.Viswanathan v. M/s.Sri Muruga Agencies, represented by its Partner, R.V.Ramasamy and others, (2002)1 T.L.N.J. 13, (K.P.Sivasubramaniam, J.), this Court considered the circumstances, under, which, interference by this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India could be made. It was held, "it is true that the said power of interference must be exercised only in rare cases and I felt doubtful at the time of hearing the arguments. But, after I went through the series of facts as mentioned above and outrageous conduct on the part of the plaintiff in collusion with the tenants, I feel that if this Court declines to interfere even in a case of this type, the very administration of justice would be rendered a mockery. If parties are allowed to play hide and seek and hood wink the process of law, people will lose faith in the Courts. If a legitimate relief and decree obtained are rendered only a piece of paper and cannot be executed and the law breaker is given a signal to continue his high handed activity, it will badly reflect only ineffective administration of justice and result in loss of confidence in the Courts. Sec.9, Civil Procedure Code does not give liberty to parties who do not act bona fide and if the High Court does not interfere on the ground that the suit should go through its normal course, it will not be possible to execute any decree. It is all the more distressing to hear accusation of collusion and fraud against the affected party and legalistic arguments to sustain such blatant illegal actions and clear abuse of process of Court." 17. It is all the more distressing to hear accusation of collusion and fraud against the affected party and legalistic arguments to sustain such blatant illegal actions and clear abuse of process of Court." 17. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others, (2003)6 S.C.C. 675 , it was held, "The power of the High Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution is always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it. The curtailment of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code by Amendment Act 46 of 1999 does not take away and could not have taken away-the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari to a Civil Court, nor is the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution taken away or whittled down. The power exists, untrammeled by the amendment in Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code and is available to be exercised subject to rules of self discipline and practice which are well settled“. It was further held,” It is well settled that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Art.227 is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in the High Court is paving the path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. The power under Art.227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Art.226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. “ Exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. Supervisory jurisdiction may be refused to be exercised when an alternative efficacious remedy by way of appeal or revision is available to the person aggrieved. The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. The parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a strait jacket formula or rigid rules..... If it intervenes in pending proceedings there is bound to be delay in termination of proceedings. If it does not intervene, the error of the moment may earn immunity from correction. The facts and circumstances of a given case may make it more appropriate for the High Court to exercise self restraint and to intervene because the error of jurisdiction though committed is yet capable of being taken care of and corrected at a later stage and the wrong done, if any, would be set right and rights and equities adjusted in appeal or revision preferred at the conclusion of the proceedings. But, there may be case where ‘a stitch in time would save nine’. The power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of judicial conscience.” 18.Per contra, Mr.P.Jayaraman, the learned senior advocate for the 2nd respondent would submit that based upon the documents filed by the respondent, the trial Court granted an order of injunction, which is an appealable order. The revision petitioners have also preferred C.M.A.No.84 of 2003 and it was allowed in their favour and the lower appellate Court gave a direction to the trial Court to dispose of the suit within three months. There is an alternative remedy of appeal available to the petitioners and in fact the petitioners have also filed the appeal. As such, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution cannot be sparingly used as it has been done by the revision petitioners. There is an alternative remedy of appeal available to the petitioners and in fact the petitioners have also filed the appeal. As such, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution cannot be sparingly used as it has been done by the revision petitioners. The conduct of the revision petitioners having approached the appellate Court and approaching this Court, for the very same relief would amount to an abuse of process of Court and the same is not permissible. It is submitted that the trial Court discussed evidence and came to its own conclusion as to who was in possession of the land and the evidence assessed by the trial Court cannot be reassessed for revalue by this Court under Art.227 of the Constitution. To support his contention, the 2nd respondent relied upon the following judgments. 19. In Maruti Bala Raut v. Dashrath Babu Wathae and others, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2051, the scope of Art.227 was considered. In the said case, in the revision under Sec.76 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, the Revenue Tribunal upheld the order of the Prant Officer that one M was a tenant in possession on the particular date but the High Court on an application under Art.227 discussed the evidence and relying upon its discussion of the evidence in the other similar case before it held that M was not the tenant. The Apex Court held, “The order of the Court could not be sustained. The High Court while exercising its powers under Art.227 was not entitled to discuss the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the evidence as to who was in possession of the land. That was a matter for the revenue authorities. The High Court had plainly overstepped the limits of its powers under Art.227.” 20. In Altaf Khan v. Mohd. Amin Khan and others, (1995)4 S.C.C. (Supp.) 72, the plaintiff obtained an order of temporary injunction from the trial Court and the same was upset by the appellate Court. The plaintiff sought to introduce certain documents before the appellate Court in order to strengthen his case in support of the order of the trial Court. The appellate Court declined that prayer. The plaintiff sought to introduce certain documents before the appellate Court in order to strengthen his case in support of the order of the trial Court. The appellate Court declined that prayer. The plaintiff approached the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution and the High Court having found fault with the appellate Court in declining to take into consideration documents sought to be introduced by the plaintiff to support his case and having rejected the documents, the High Court went on to examine them and form its own view on merits. In the said context, the Apex Court held, “The High Court should not have substituted its own opinion on the merits of the case on induction of documents at the instance of the plaintiff. Having taken those documents on record it ought to have remanded the matter back to the lower appellate Court for its opinion, for, its opinion was necessary as the final Court of fact.” As the High Court did not do it, the order passed by the High Court was interfered by the Apex Court. 21. In Mohammed Shafeequ v. Mirza Mohammed Husain and others, (2002)9 S.C.C. 460, it was held that when lower Court passes an order in exercise of discretion vesting in it, the High Court ought not to set it aside under Art.227 on the basis of too technical view. It was held, “The High Court has taken too technical a view of the error committed by the appellant in pursuing the remedy available to him under the law. The appellant had been prosecuting his remedy diligently and there is nothing to doubt his bona fides. These aspects were taken into consideration by the learned Additional District Judge while condoning the delay in fling the revision. The High Court ought not to have interfered with the order of the Additional District Judge, condoning the delay in filing the revision, being an order passed in exercise of discretion vested in the learned Additional District Judge and for that reason, was not open to interference by this High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution.” 22. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan and others, (2001)6 S.C.C. 569 , the question arose under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. In Punjab National Bank v. O.C.Krishnan and others, (2001)6 S.C.C. 569 , the question arose under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The decree passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta was challenged in a petition under Art.227. The High Court allowed the petition by observing that as the mortgaged property directed to be sold was situate in Chennai, the Debts Recovery Tribunal had no territorial jurisdiction in respect thereto and it could not have directed, sale of the mortgaged property. The Bank preferred an appeal and the Apex Court held, "5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Sec.29 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Art.227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act". 6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of appeal under Sec.20 and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. Even though a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Arts.226 and 227 of the constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under the said Constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Art.227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by the Act." 23. In Mohan Amba Prasad Agnihotri and others v. Bhaskar Balwant Aher (D) through L.Rs., (2000)3 S.C.C. 190 , the Supreme Court dealt with a case arisen out of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rate Controls Act, 1947 read with Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Sec.109(o). There were concurrent findings by the Courts below that the tenant was guilty of imprudent use, causing damage and waste of property. There were concurrent findings by the Courts below that the tenant was guilty of imprudent use, causing damage and waste of property. But, under the revision filed by the tenant under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution, the High Court reversed the findings of the trial Court on all the three grounds, in which, eviction was ordered. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court, wherein it was held, "The High Court failed to notice both the pleadings and the proof on the aspect of damage to the property and erroneously came to the conclusion that the finding was not supported by any evidence and set aside the same on a non-existent ground..... The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.227 is not appellate but supervisory. It cannot interfere with a finding of fact recorded by a lower Court/tribunal unless there is no evidence to support the finding or the finding is perverse." 24. Exercise of jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution is limited and restrictive in nature. It is so exercised in normal circumstances for want of jurisdiction, errors of law, pervise findings and gross violation of natural justice, to name a few. It is merely a revisional jurisdiction and does not confer an unlimited authority or prerogative to correct all orders or even wrong decisions made within the domain of the inferior tribunal, except where it is a perverse recording thereof or not based on any material whatsoever resulting in manifest injustice, interference under the article is not called for. 25. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution is by no means appellate in nature for correcting errors in the decision of the subordinate Courts or tribunals but it is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority. In the exercise of this jurisdiction the High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of an inferior Court or tribunal if there was no evidence to justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come or in other words it is a finding which was perverse in law. Except to the limited extent indicated above the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. Except to the limited extent indicated above the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. These are the view and observations made in Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, (2002)8 S.C.C. 400 . 26. The power of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution is to see whether the lower Court/tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity; in other words the Court is concerned not with the decision but with the decision making process. (Government of National Capital Territory, Delhi v. Inder Pal Singh Chandha and others, (2002)9 S.C.C. 461 ). 27. In Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Company Limited and another, (2003)3 S.C.C. 524 , an appeal filed by the insurer under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came for consideration. Where a statute provides an appeal on limited grounds, the said grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a writ petition under Art.226/227." Speaking for the Bench, V.N.Khar, C.J.I. has observed, "6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Art.226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Sec.149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statue it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Sec.149(2) of the Act. This being the legal position, the petition filed under Art.227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. This being the legal position, the petition filed under Art.227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Sec.115, C.P.C. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Sec.115, Civil Procedure Code has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Art.226 of the Constitution." 28. In State of A.P. v. P.V.Hanumantha Rao (Dead) through L.Rs. and another, (2003)10 S.C.C. 121 , it was held, "30.....the remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the ‘decision’ of the subordinate Court, tribunal or authority but it is against the ‘decision-making process’. In the decision-making process’, if the Court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the Constitutional power of the High Court under Art.226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining." 29. From the various decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the revision petitioners and the respondents, it could broadly be deduced, when this Court can interfere with the orders passed by the Court below under Art.227 of the Constitution. These are all only illustrative and not exhaustive. (a) The power under Art.227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. These are all only illustrative and not exhaustive. (a) The power under Art.227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate Courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. (b) While exercising the powers under Art.227 of the Constitution, if this Court comes to the conclusion that an order has been obtained by suppression of material facts and also by playing fraud, this Court is entitled to take into consideration the grievance of the party and if it is found to be true, it is also duty bound to see that the grievance is redressed to the maximum extent possible. (c) When an interim order an order has been obtained by practicing fraud upon the Court, since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court, and also, it would amount to an abuse of process of Court, the Court has inherent power to set aside the order obtained by practicing fraud. (d) When there are alternative remedies available, even though there is no hurdle on the part of the High Court to entertain a petition under Art.227 of the Constitution, it is a well recognized principle, which gained judicial recognition that the High Court should direct the party to avail himself of such remedies one or the other before he resorts to a Constitutional remedy under Art.227 of the Constitution. (e) The power of the High Court under Art.226/227 of the Constitution is always in addition to the revisional jurisdiction conferred on it. (f) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (g) It is well stated that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Art.227 is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. (g) It is well stated that the power of superintendence conferred on the High Court under Art.227 is administrative as well as judicial, and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. (h) The power under Art.227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Art.226 in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. (i) The High Court while exercising it powers under Art.227 is not entitled to discuss the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the evidence as to who was in possession of the land. That was a matter for the revenue authorities. (j) The High Court is not entitled to interfere with the order passed by the subordinate Courts after such orders were passed in exercise of discretion vested before the Court below and it is not open for the High Court to interfere with such orders in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution. (k) Where there is a hierarchy of appeal provision available in the Act, the fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Arts.226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, which is expressly barred. (l) When there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution. (m) The High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction can only interfere with the lower Courts’ findings of fact only when it is perverse or there is no evidence to support it and when grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (n) Exercise of jurisdiction under Art.227 of the Constitution is limited and restrictive in nature. It can be exercised in the circumstances where orders passed were for want of jurisdiction, errors of law, perverse findings and gross violation of natural justice. (o) The right of appeal is statutory right and when such statute provides an appeal remedy on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Art.226/227 of the Constitution. (o) The right of appeal is statutory right and when such statute provides an appeal remedy on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Art.226/227 of the Constitution. (p) Writ petition/revision filed under Art.227 of the Constitution before the High Court is not against the ‘decision’ of the subordinate Court, tribunal or authority, but it is against the ‘decision-making process’. If the ‘decision-making process’ ignores vital evidence and arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstruced the provisions of the relevant act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the Constitutional power of the High Court under Art.226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining". (q) Exercise of power of the High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution would arise when an order was passed without any jurisdiction or there is an error of law, perverse findings and gross violation of natural justice. (r) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Art.227 is not appellate, but, supervisory. It cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by a lower Court/tribunal, unless there is no evidence to support the finding or the finding is perverse. 30. With the above said back grounds, now let us analyse our case. 31. The first respondent claiming, that he is a tenant under the 2nd respondent, filed the suit for bar injunction on 15.9.2003 and nowhere in the plaint, he has stated that he had put up pandal/sheds for parking of two wheelers. The plaintiff has also not even stated that he is having electricity service connection on the date of filing of the suit. But, however, the first defendant supported his case. The trial Court took a view that the correctness or the validity of the lease deeds said to have been executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff has got to be decided only at the time of trial. But, however, based upon the report filed by the Advocate Commissioner, who was appointed only at the instance of the defendants/revision petitioners, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the property and granted injunction. But, however, based upon the report filed by the Advocate Commissioner, who was appointed only at the instance of the defendants/revision petitioners, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the property and granted injunction. But, in C.M.A.No.84 of 2003 preferred by the revision petitioners, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that there are clinching evidence to show that the revision petitioners are the owners and in possession of the suit property and the first defendant has no right to lease out after getting injunction, and the plaintiff after getting an order of injunction trespassed into the property and put up thatched huts. That in the report filed by the Advocate Commissioner dated 26.9.2003, it has been stated that the electricity connection was obtained only on 24.9.2003 i.e., after the filing of the suit and the sand spray in the suit property were still wet and bamboos and thatches are fresh as well as the iron gate is not there. The report also indicated the prior existence of the wall and the same was also demolished, subsequent to the filing of the suit by the plaintiff. The lower appellate Court also had observed that the learned District Munsif erred in granting injunction on the wrong impression, that the plaintiff’s possession was made out by the report of the Advocate Commissioner due to the wrong appreciation of the facts and misconception of the legal aspects. The lower appellate Court further observed that the plaint was filed on 16.9.2003 armed with ex parte order of injunction, on 20.9.2003 at about 1.00 a.m., the iron gate and the wall blocking entry in the suit property were high handedly demolished and the two thatched sheds and a thatched pandal were hurriedly erected and for which purpose, two lorry loads of persons were hired by the plaintiff as contended by the learned advocate for the defendants would appear to me in all probability might have been true, as enlightened in the report of the Advocate Commissioner, that would evidently show that the plaintiff was not in possession and enjoyment of the suit property on the date and prior to the filing of the suit. The lower appellate Court has also further observed that in the lease deed dated 14.7.2003, Ex.A-1, the suit schedule property was mentioned only as vacant land. The lower appellate Court has also further observed that in the lease deed dated 14.7.2003, Ex.A-1, the suit schedule property was mentioned only as vacant land. Exs.A-3 and A-4 were found to be filed after the suit and much evidentiary value cannot be attached to them. Ultimately, it was held that the plaintiff was not inducted with possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property on the date of the filing of the suit with the existing physical features narrated in the report of the Advocate Commissioner and there was no balance of convenience on the part of the plaintiff and allowed the appeal and also set aside the order and decreetal order dated 14.11.2003 passed in I.A.No.724 of 2003 in O.S.No.253 of 2003. But, however, the lower appellate Court directed the trial Court to dispose of the suit within three months. 32. The lower appellate Court having come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not at all in possession of the suit property and also having vacated the order of injunction granted by the trial Court, it has become easy for this Court to come to the conclusion that the order passed by the lower appellate Court does not suffer from any infirmity. 33. On going through the plaintiff, affidavit filed by the plaintiff and also the counter filed by the revision petitioners and the order passed by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court and also the documents filed before the trial Court, I come to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent, Umayal Achi, first defendant in the suit was not at all in possession of the suit property on the date of granting lease in favour of the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff could not have taken possession of the suit property. But, it appears that after filing of the suit and after obtaining the order of injunction, the plaintiff was able to gain possession with the help of the ex parte order of injunction and it is nothing short of an abuse of process of Court. But, it appears that after filing of the suit and after obtaining the order of injunction, the plaintiff was able to gain possession with the help of the ex parte order of injunction and it is nothing short of an abuse of process of Court. But, on the other hand, it has been established that the revision petitioners have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, as their father was the previous owner of the suit property, enjoying the same from the year 1938 and settlement patta was also given in favour of the revision petitioners and they have been paying urban land tax and also superstructure tax for the shops and in the suit filed by the 2nd respondent in O.S.No.1507 of 2002, the suit property was not shown as one of the interests and subsequently only, she claimed some right to the suit property and it is cumulatively and positively proved that Umayal Achi was not in possession of the suit property and she is not entitled to lease out the property in favour of the first respondent and the lease deed is a connected document to defeat the rights of the revision petitioners, who even according to him, were in possession of the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. As their lawful possession was interfered with, by the first respondent with the help of the interim order obtained by him, I feel that the revision petitioners should be put back in possession of the suit property, failing which, the first respondent would try to perpetuate his illegal possession, which would cause grave injustice to the revision petitioners. 34. For the reasons stated above, I hereby direct the first respondent, T.Sivakumar, who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.253 of 2002 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thanjavur, to hand over possession of the suit property forthwith to the revision petitioners and report the same to the Court on or before 7.6.2004. If the first respondent/plaintiff fails to surrender possession to the revision petitioners, further directions will follow, when the case is posted on 14.6.2004. Post the case on 14.6.2004. 35. In the result, the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. is closed.