P. B. MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) BOTH the appeals are admitted. Learned advocate Mr. K. V. Shelat waives notice of admission on behalf of respondents 1/1 to 1/9 and Mr. Anshin Desai waives service of notice of admission on behalf of the respondent No. 2. With the consent of the parties, both the appeals are taken up for final hearing today. Since the point is involved in both these Appeal from Orders is common, both these Appeal from Orders are disposed of by this common order. 1. 1 for the sake of convenience, the appellant of Appeal from Order No. 373 of 2003 is referred to as the plaintiff all throughout and the respondents of the said Appeal from Order are referred to as the defendants all throughout. ( 2 ) THE appellant of Appeal from Order No. 373 of 2003 is plaintiff of Special Civil Suit No. 127 of 2002. The said suit is filed before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gandhinagar. The case of the plaintiff in the said suit is that the defendants No. 1 to 9 had agreed to sell the suit property, which is a land situated at village Sughad, Taluka and District Gandhinagar, bearing survey No. 36, admeasuring 4 Hectres 29 Are and 95 sq. mtrs. , as well as 1 Are and 01 sq. mtr. admeasuring in all 4 Hectres 26 Are and 96 Sq. mtr. According to the plaintiff, initially the said land was running in the name of one Nathabhai Ashabhai, who is ancestor of defendants No. 1 to 9. The said Nathabhai had executed a will in favour of Deval Amrishbhai and Amrishbhai Jagmohanbhai on 15. 6. 1982. Subsequently, the said Nathabhai expired on 1. 3. 1986 and therefore, the name of Deval and Amrish were recorded in the revenue records by way of entry No. 2033 by virtue of the will executed by the deceased Nathabhai in their favour. According to the plaintiff, thereafter some revenue dispute took place as the Collector took the said entry in review, and in the meanwhile, the said Deval and Amrish as well as defendants No. 1 to 9 entered into a settlement on 1. 11. 1994 by which all of them agreed to sell the suit property to the present plaintiff, and it was agreed that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 11. 1994 by which all of them agreed to sell the suit property to the present plaintiff, and it was agreed that the plaintiff should pay Rs. 3,60,000/_ to the defendants No. 1 to 8 as well as Rs. 3,60,000/_ to Deval and Amrish. The said agreement was notorised on the very day. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff had paid Rs. 50,000/_ to the defendants No. 1 to 8 on the very same day as well as paid Rs. 80,000/_ to the said Deval and Amrish. The said amount, according to the plaintiff was paid by accounts payee cheque. As the defendant No. 1 to 8 were required to obtain certain permission under the Revenue laws, it was agreed that the sale deed is to be executed within six months on the defendants No. 1 to 8 getting permission from the revenue authorities. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the defendants No. 9 was managing the affairs of the suit property on behalf of the defendants No. 1 to 8 and therefore, by a separate writing the plaintiff agreed to pay an amount to defendant No. 9 for the services which he was required to render for making necessary applications for getting permission from the revenue authorities. According to the plaintiff, he has also paid subsequent payments from time to time to the defendants No. 1 to 8 as well as to Deval and Amrish, and that he has paid the entire amount of sale consideration of Rs. 7,20,000/_ by way of cheque, and in view of that, the defendants are now only nominal owners and the plaintiff has obtained possession of the disputed land, in view of the fact that full consideration is paid to the defendants. According to the plaintiffs, since the defendant could not get necessary permission, the parties could not get the sale deed executed, and therefore even the name of the defendants continued in the revenue records. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has also constructed one small room (ordi), and had appointed a watchman to guard the suit property. The said guard was taking care of the suit property since 1995. However, as per the case of the plaintiff, on 19. 9. It is also the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has also constructed one small room (ordi), and had appointed a watchman to guard the suit property. The said guard was taking care of the suit property since 1995. However, as per the case of the plaintiff, on 19. 9. 2002, the plaintiff received a telephone call from the watchman engaged by him that about 15 people are trying to disturb the said possession, and even they have assaulted the watchman and threatened him with dire consequences if he fails to go out of the disputed property, and the watchman of the plaintiff was, therefore, required to run away from the site. According to the plaintiff, he subsequently came to know that the defendants No. 1 to 8 have entered into some transaction with regard to the suit property. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance of the said agreement dated 1. 11. 1994. It is prayed that the defendants No. 1 to 8 may be directed to take necessary permission from the revenue authority and may be further directed to execute the sale deed, and defendants No. 9 and 10 may be directed to sign the sale deed as confirming parties in such registered sale deed. A declaration is also sought to the effect that whatever documents are executed by the defendants No. 1 to 8 is null and void, and not binding to the plaintiff. Permanent injunction is also sought for to the effect that the defendant may be restrained from transferring or dealing with the property in question during the pendency of the suit. 2. 1 in the said suit, the plaintiff also gave a separate application for interim injunction exh. 5. By filing this application, it is prayed that the defendant may be restrained from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff and that they may be restrained from entering into the suit land and may be restrained by interim injunction not to transfer the suit property during the pendency of the suit. 2. 3 the aforesaid suit was resisted on behalf of the defendants. Defendants No. 1 to 8 resisted the said suit by filing their written statement at Exh. 35. The said suit was resisted on various grounds. The defendants have denied execution of any agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs. 2. 3 the aforesaid suit was resisted on behalf of the defendants. Defendants No. 1 to 8 resisted the said suit by filing their written statement at Exh. 35. The said suit was resisted on various grounds. The defendants have denied execution of any agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiffs. It is stated in the written statement that so far as defendants No. 9 is concerned, he is only an agent of defendants No. 1 to 8. It is further averred that the suit in question is time barred. The so called agreement to sell is of the year 1994 as against that the defendants No. 1 to 8 have already given public notice on 6. 2. 1997 and in the public notice, the defendants No. 1 to 8 have asserted their possession over the suit property. The said public notice is also replied to by the defendant no 15. 2. 1997. The defendants have denied such writing in the notice correspondence as they have replied to the notice on 22. 2. 1997. According to the defendants, the plaintiff has not filed the suit within 3 years from February 1997 during which period there was exchange of notice between the parties. The defendants No. 1 to 8 have also denied the averment made in the plaint regarding payment of amount of Rs. 3,60,000/_. On these and such other grounds, the suit of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendants No. 1 to 8. 2. 4 so far as defendant No. 10 is concerned, he has filed a separate written statement where a stand is taken to the effect that the suit is time barred. He has pointed out that he has already purchased the land by a registered sale deed. It is the say of the defendant No. 10 that by virtue of the registered sale deed, the defendant No. 10 has purchased the land on 9. 8. 2002 admeasuring 34921 sq. mtrs. from defendants No. 1 to 8 for doing agricultural work. It is further his case that before such purchase, the land was also converted from new tenure to old tenure by order of Mamlatdar, Gandhinagar dated 20/22. 7. 2002 and subsequently the sale is executed in his favour on 24. 7. 2002. It was, therefore, prayed that the suit was required to be dismissed. It is further his case that before such purchase, the land was also converted from new tenure to old tenure by order of Mamlatdar, Gandhinagar dated 20/22. 7. 2002 and subsequently the sale is executed in his favour on 24. 7. 2002. It was, therefore, prayed that the suit was required to be dismissed. ( 3 ) SO far as defendant No. 1 of the aforesaid suit is concerned, she has also field a separate substantive suit, being Special Civil Suit No. 125 of 2002. The said suit is, in fact, filed earlier by a day as compared to Special Civil Suit No. 127/02 of which reference is made above. In the aforesaid S. C. S. No. 125/02, the plaintiff [defendant No. 1 of SCS No. 127/02] has prayed that because of weak financial condition, the plaintiffs father was required to take some loan, and since the plaintiff and her family members were in need of money the plaintiff relied upon the defendants and were required to sign some documents at the instance of the defendants. It is also stated by the said plaintiff that the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay entire amount to the defendant with interest, and even willing to deposit the said amount before the Court, and that the defendants want to grab the property. In the aforesaid suit, the plaintiff has prayed that the defendants may be restrained by permanent injunction not to interfere with the plaintiffs possession of the land bearing survey No. 37 admeasuring 10 Acres and 0. 23 Gunthas. It was further prayed that the agreement dated 29. 04. 1994 be declared as illegal, null, and void. and not binding to the plaintiff. 3. 1 the said plaintiff also submitted an interim application at Exh. 5 in which it is prayed that the defendants may be restrained from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff by way of interim injunction. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge decided both the interim injunction applications by a common order. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff of S. C. S. No. 127 of 2002 has failed to prove that he is in physical possession of the suit property. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge decided both the interim injunction applications by a common order. The learned trial Judge came to the conclusion that the plaintiff of S. C. S. No. 127 of 2002 has failed to prove that he is in physical possession of the suit property. The trial Court came to the conclusion that there is no primafacie cased in favour of the plaintiff, and as even in the revenue records, the name of the defendants is continued from time to time. The so called agreement is dated 1. 11. 1994 as against which the suit is filed on 20. 09. 2002 , and for such a long period, the plaintiff has not tried to institute any proceedings by filing a suit for specific performance and that the suit is, therefore, barred by delay and latches. The trial Court also found that the revenue entry also runs in the name of the defendants and there is nothing to show that the plaintiff is in possession of the disputed land. The trial Court has also relied upon the panchnama drawn in S. C. S. No. 301 of 1993 [which is filed by defendants No. 1 to 8 against Amrish and Deval about which reference is made earlier] to the effect that the will is bogus etc. ]. In the said panchnama, it was stated that the defendants are in physical possession of the suit property. The trial Court, therefore, found that the defendants No. 1 to 9 are in physical possession of the suit property and the trial Court accordingly held that the plaintiff is neither having prima facie case nor balance of convenience is also not in favour of the plaintiff. The application of the plaintiff was therefore rejected. The trial Court also observed that a copy of the said order may be placed in the Cross Suit being S. C. S. No. 125 of 2002. ( 5 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the trial Court, the plaintiff of S. C. S. No. 127/02 has filed A. O. 373/03 and he has also filed Appeal from Order No. 374 of 2003 against the order passed below Exh. 5 in S. C. S. No. 125/02. However, the trial Court has not passed any separate order regarding interim injunction application below exh. 5 in S. C. S. No. 125/02. However, the trial Court has not passed any separate order regarding interim injunction application below exh. 5 in S. C. S. No. 125/02 except observing that intimation of order passed below exh. 5 in S. C. S. No. 127/02 be kept in the file of S. C. S. No. 125/02. Since the appellant has challenged both the orders passed in the respective suits and since the point is common in both the suits, the appeals are disposed by this common order. ( 6 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta for the appellant-original plaintiff vehemently submitted that the trial Court has not properly considered the documentary evidence on record and has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the suit of the plaintiff suffers from delay and latches. It is submitted that the trial Court has also failed to appreciate that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land, and, therefore, injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff was required to be granted. Mr. Mehta also further submitted that the plaintiff has successfully proved that he has paid considerable amount of Rs. 7,20,000/_ and accordingly he has paid the entire consideration to defendants and the plaintiff was also put in possession. Under the circumstances, the trial Court should have granted injunction. Mr. Mehta also submitted that in any case, there is a triable issue involved in the case, and, therefore, the defendants were required to be restrained by interim injunction not to transfer or alienate the suit property during the pendency of the suit as according to him, if ultimately the plaintiff succeeds, his entire suit will become infructuous. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, Mr. K. V. Shelat for defendants No. 1 to 8 as well learned Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned counsel for defendant No. 10 vehemently submitted that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property and, infact, was never in possession of the suit land at any point of time. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, Mr. K. V. Shelat for defendants No. 1 to 8 as well learned Mr. Mihir Joshi, learned counsel for defendant No. 10 vehemently submitted that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property and, infact, was never in possession of the suit land at any point of time. It is submitted on behalf of the defendants that the so called agreement to sell is an oral agreement, and it is not a registered documents, and the so called payment is not in connection with the agreement of sale of the suit land, and since the defendants No. 1 to 8 were in need of money, the plaintiff had given some loan and at that time, by committing fraud, he has got some documents executed. It is submitted that as back as in 1997, the defendant No. 1 to 8 gave public notice asserting their right over the property and at that time the plaintiff replied, but thereafter he has not approached the court by filing suit and waited for about 7 years before filing the present suit. It is submitted that the suit is barred by limitation. It is also pointed out that the plaintiff has not even mentioned about the public notice and his reply in the plaint, and there is suppression of material fact to that extent, and has filed the suit under the pretext that he is in possession on the date of filing the suit, as if nothing has happened in between. It is also pointed out that by virtue of the sale deed, defendant No. 10 has become owner of the suit property, and even defendant No. 10 has been put in possession of the disputed land. Under the circumstances, it was submitted that the trial Court has rightly rejected the application for interim injunction. ( 8 ) DURING the course of hearing, the learned advocate Mr. Mehta fairly submitted that after filing of the said suit, his client has lost possession, for which the plaintiff has preferred separate application under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for getting the possession restored, and according to him, the said application is pending. The fact that such application is pending is, as such, not in dispute. Mehta fairly submitted that after filing of the said suit, his client has lost possession, for which the plaintiff has preferred separate application under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for getting the possession restored, and according to him, the said application is pending. The fact that such application is pending is, as such, not in dispute. ( 9 ) BOTH the learned advocates have relied upon various documentary evidence on record and have also cited various judgments to substantiate their respective say. I have also gone through the entire record and proceedings and the order of the trial Court. ( 10 ) THE principal question which requires consideration is: whether the plaintiff is in a position to establish his prima facie case and is entitled to get interim injunction during the pendency of the suit. ( 11 ) IT is required to be noted that at present, the plaintiff is not in possession of the disputed land, and, therefore, now there is no question of considering the aspect about granting prohibitory injunction to the defendants because as per the plaintiffs own say, he has now lost the possession of the land in question. It is required to be noted that at the time when even the trial court decided application below Exh. 5, the plaintiff was not in possession, and he had already taken a recourse to section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary for the trial Court to go in detail in connection with the fact whether injunction can be granted or not, especially when the plaintiff has not even prayed for a mandatory relief of restoration of possession. However, learned advocate Mr. Mehta has vehemently submitted that even though he is not in possession of the disputed land at present, there is ample evidence on record to show that subsequent to execution of the banakhat, his client was put in possession. In view of this submission of Mr. Mehta, I am required to consider whether there is any prima facie case for coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was put in possession of the disputed land at any point of time after the so called agreement for sale. In view of this submission of Mr. Mehta, I am required to consider whether there is any prima facie case for coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was put in possession of the disputed land at any point of time after the so called agreement for sale. However, this Court is of the opinion that since the plaintiff has already taken separate proceedings under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, any observation made in this connection may prejudice the case of either side. Yet, since this Court is called upon to decide this question, this Court has to consider the aforesaid aspect of possession in this case. ( 12 ) IN this connection, so far as the question of possession is concerned, it is required to be noted that the so called agreement for sale is an unregistered document. There is evidence to show that all throughout, the property has remained in the Revenue records in the name of the defendants. Even the revenue is paid by the defendants from time to time. It is also required to be noted that as back as on 6. 2. 1997, an advertisement was given by the defendants wherein the defendants have asserted their right over the suit property, wherein they have also stated that the defendants are in physical possession of the suit property and they have not executed any document in favour of the plaintiff. Even that public notice was replied to by the plaintiff. It is pertinent to note that, therefore, the defendants have already asserted their right over the suit property and asserted their possession over the disputed property as back as 6. 2. 1997, and have even denied execution of any document in favour of the plaintiff. Yet, the plaintiff has not taken any care to file any proceedings before the Court for protecting his possession, if any, over the disputed land. Ultimately, the suit is filed after about 7 years. ( 13 ) MR. Mehta for the appellant-plaintiff argued that as per the agreement of sale, the sale deed was required to be executed only after conversion of the suit land from old tenure to new tenure. Ultimately, the suit is filed after about 7 years. ( 13 ) MR. Mehta for the appellant-plaintiff argued that as per the agreement of sale, the sale deed was required to be executed only after conversion of the suit land from old tenure to new tenure. He further submitted that the said conversion took considerable time, and immediately after conversion of the land from new tenure to old tenure, the suit is filed, and, therefore, in his submission, the suit cannot be said to be barred by limitation, or it cannot be said that the suit suffers from delay and latches. However, in my view, so far as the question about threat to the possession of the plaintiff is concerned, if really the plaintiff was in actual physical possession, a suit for permanent injunction protecting the possession could have been filed especially when the defendants have already stated in the public notice that they are in physical possession of the suit property. Mr. Mehta, however, argued that even if such public notice is given, since there was no physical threat to the plaintiff and since at that time the defendant had not tried to disturb the physical possession, the plaintiff was not required to go to the Court for protecting his possession. He submitted that unless the defendants actually come and try to take away the possession, the plaintiff cannot go to the court for obtaining injunction against such threat of dis-possession. I am not in a position to agree with such assertion on the part of the advocate for the plaintiff. It is not the law that unless one is actually dispossessed, one cannot go to the court for protecting the possession by way of filing a suit for injunction, more particularly, in the instant case, in the background of the public advertisement of the defendants asserting their possession and denying execution of any documents. It is an undisputed fact that the defendants gave a public advertisement. It is also an undisputed fact that thereafter for about 7 years, the plaintiff did nothing and has not taken any proceedings for even safeguarding the possession. This important circumstances primafacie suggest that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. He waited for 7 years for filing the suit, and at that time, he asked for interim injunction. This important circumstances primafacie suggest that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land. He waited for 7 years for filing the suit, and at that time, he asked for interim injunction. It is not possible to accept the say of the plaintiff that it was not necessary for him to go to the Court for protecting his possession unless there is threat of actual dispossession from the defendants. Mr. Mehta further submitted that since there was no actual threat, and subsequently when the watchman of the plaintiff was removed and was beaten up, ultimately, the plaintiff decided to file the suit and prayed for injunction. The said argument is absolutely not convincing in view of the public advertisement and reply issued as back as February 1997. It is also required to be noted that subsequently also, in the revenue records, the name of the defendant continued to appear. It may be true that since the land was not converted from new tenure to old tenure, the name of the original owner, i. e. the defendants, continued to remain in the revenue records. It is, however, required to be noted that even though in the year 1997 the defendants gave a public notice denying execution of any document qua the suit property, yet the plaintiff has not bothered even to take appropriate legal proceedings. He has not even tried to take follow up action and has not even asked the defendants to take appropriate permission for converting the land from Old tenure to new tenure Even during the 7 years i. e. from the date of public notice till the suit is filed, there is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff has addressed even a single letter urging the defendants to get the land converted. Such conduct of the plaintiff creates a doubt whether there was a genuine transaction of agreement to sell entered into between the parties. Mr. Mehta, however, relied upon certain payment receipts executed by the so called agent of the defendants. Such receipts are at pages 177 to 183 of the compilation of the proceedings of A. O. 373/03, which shows that certain amounts were paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in connection with the sale of land in question. Mr. Mehta, however, relied upon certain payment receipts executed by the so called agent of the defendants. Such receipts are at pages 177 to 183 of the compilation of the proceedings of A. O. 373/03, which shows that certain amounts were paid by the plaintiff to the defendant in connection with the sale of land in question. All these receipts are of the year 1995 and the payment is received by Arvindbhai M. Valand, who, according to Mr. Mehta, was an agent of respondents No. 1 to 8. It is also true that some receipts are placed on record showing some payments having been made by the plaintiff to respondent No. 9. However, there is a serious dispute whether the defendant No. 9 was given any authority to collect the amount on behalf of the other defendants. Simply because the defendant No. 9 is stated to be an agent of defendants No. 1 to 8, that by itself does not empower the defendant No. 9 to collect any amount on behalf of other defendants, though primafacie it appears that there is some transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 9. I am not inclined to make any wider observation at this point, but all these receipts, as stated earlier are of the year 1995, and thereafter, the plaintiff slept over his rights for all these years. Even in a given case an agreement to sell is executed, the so called purchaser cannot remain silent for years. As stated earlier, even the plaintiff has not requested the defendant to expedite the proceedings before the revenue authorities for conversion of the land, and ultimately, the defendants, on their own got the land converted from new tenure to old tenure, and ultimately by a registered sale deed, the suit land was was sold in favour of defendant No. 10. At the time when the sale deed was executed after the land was converted from new tenure to old tenure, the plaintiff ultimately approached the Court by filing the aforesaid suit. Even in the said suit, the plaintiff has not challenged the sale deed. However, Mr. Mehta submitted that subsequently an amendment is made challenging the sale deed and the said application for amendment is yet not decided by the trial Court. Even in the said suit, the plaintiff has not challenged the sale deed. However, Mr. Mehta submitted that subsequently an amendment is made challenging the sale deed and the said application for amendment is yet not decided by the trial Court. Simply because some receipts are produced by the plaintiff showing that some payment was made to the so called agent of defendants No. 1 to 8, it is not possible to believe that all throughout the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land, and receipt of some payments cannot be said to be a proof in this behalf, as there are other evidence on record which prove otherwise. It is required to be noted that even two panchnamas were drawn in this matter, which are placed on record. One panchnama dated 28. 9. 2001 drawn by Ghabhabhai Jivabhai Parmar, Talati-cum-Mantri of Sughad Group Gram Panchayat which shows that the defendants are in physical possession of the defendants and they are cultivating the land in question. It seems that the said panchanama is drawn in connection with the proceedings for converting the land from new tenure to old tenure. The Talati has also recorded statement of Arvindbhai Valand, the so called agent of the defendants No. 1 to 8 and in the statement also, it is made clear that the defendants are in possession of the suit land and they are cultivating the land in question. ( 14 ) THE other panchnama is drawn in Regular Civil Suit No. 301 of 93 in connection with the suit filed by the defendants against one Deval Amrishbhai Parikh. wherein a panchanama is drawn on 11. 6. 94 in which also the possession of the defendant is clearly shown, though ofcourse that panchnama is prior to the so called agreement to sell in question. Mr. Mehta has also relied upon the banakhat chitti and memorandum of understanding between the parties in connection with the case of agreement to sell. However, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and considering the evidence as discussed above, it is not possible to believe that the plaintiff is in physical possession of the disputed land, and it is not possible to believe that such a position continued even at the time of filing the suit. ( 15 ) MR. However, considering the totality of the facts and circumstances and considering the evidence as discussed above, it is not possible to believe that the plaintiff is in physical possession of the disputed land, and it is not possible to believe that such a position continued even at the time of filing the suit. ( 15 ) MR. Joshi has also relied upon the order passed by the Deputy Collector under section 203 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code wherein he has made reference about the possession of the defendant. Mr. Mehta submitted that the said order passed by the Deputy Collector in not placed on record of the trial Court, and, therefore, the same may not be taken into consideration. Mr. Mehta further submitted that against the aforesaid order, an appeal is also preferred and the same is pending. However, even if the said order is not taken into consideration, in view of the circumstances indicated above, it cannot be said that the trial Court has committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove that he is possession of the disputed land. Though the trial Court has not dealt with the said aspect in detail, I have gone through the records and proceedings. As stated earlier, the plaintiff has not bothered to assert his right for 7 years even after the defendants have tried to raise dispute about possession of the disputed land as back as 1997 by way of public advertisement. In view of the public notice, it is not possible for me to accept the say of the plaintiff that he has remained in possession subsequent to the execution of the agreement to sell. It, therefore, cannot be said that the trial Court has committed any error of law or of fact in refusing to grant interim relief to the plaintiff qua possession of the suit property. Even as per the say of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was dispossessed for which he has initiated separate proceedings under the provisions of Specific Relief Act. Even in view of this, the prayer for interim relief has become infructuous, and no mandatory injunction is prayed for. Even as per the say of the plaintiff, the plaintiff was dispossessed for which he has initiated separate proceedings under the provisions of Specific Relief Act. Even in view of this, the prayer for interim relief has become infructuous, and no mandatory injunction is prayed for. I am conscious that the above finding may affect the case of the plaintiff which is instituted under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, but since the matter was argued at length, I am required to deal with the points raised before me. It is, however, clarified that the Court before whom the application under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is pending, will decide the same as per the evidence produced by both the sides without being influenced by the observations made in this order. ( 16 ) MR. Mehta at this stage submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in coming to the conclusion that the suit suffers from delay and latches. He submitted that the limitation starts only from the moment the land is converted from new tenure to old tenure because the sale deed was to be executed after the said conversion. It is true that if the sale deed was to be executed after the land was put to a particular use, on such conversion if the suit is filed immediately, then the suit cannot be said to be barred by delay and latches. However, it is directed that this observation of the trial Court may be treated only as a tentative observation for deciding exh. 5 application and the trial Court shall decide this issue at the time of final disposal of the suit without taking into consideration the observations made by the trial Court while deciding application below exh. 5. ( 17 ) MR. Mehta further submitted that in any case, the defendants may be restrained from transferring the suit property during the pendency of the suit proceedings. ( 18 ) IN support of his above submission, Mr. 5. ( 17 ) MR. Mehta further submitted that in any case, the defendants may be restrained from transferring the suit property during the pendency of the suit proceedings. ( 18 ) IN support of his above submission, Mr. Mehta has relied on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of K. L. PATEL vs. N. K. PATEL reported in AIR 1976 GUJ 154 wherein this Court has held that a mere agreement to sell does not create any interest or any right in the property agreed to be purchased and a person who has agreed to sell an immovable property stands in a sort of fiduciary relationship with the person who has agreed to purchase and, therefore, the former cannot commit any breach of his obligation and if he attempts to do so, he can be prevented from doing so by a suitable injunction under section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. He, therefore submitted that the defendants No. 1 to 8 could not have sold the land to the defendant No. 10 and they cannot commit any breach of the obligation undertaken by them, and in fact, they are in the capacity of trustees on behalf of the original plaintiff qua the suit property. He, therefore, submitted that the defendant No. 10 may be restrained from further transferring the property to other parties. He further submitted that in any case, qua the portion of the land which is still in the possession of defendants No. 1 to 8, i. e. 7874 sq. mtrs, the defendants No. 1 to 8 may be restrained from transferring the said portion of the land to any other person. ( 19 ) LEARNED counsel Mr. Mihir Joshi, who is appearing for the subsequent purchaser has submitted that the defendant No. 10 being the lawful owner, cannot be subjected to any injunction as he has purchased the property by paying full consideration and there is a registered sale deed in his favour, and he is a bonafide purchaser. He submitted that in any case, in view of the delay, no injunction can be granted against the defendants because the defendants have, as back as 1997 gave a public notice. He further submitted by such delay, right in favour of third parties has already been created. He submitted that in any case, in view of the delay, no injunction can be granted against the defendants because the defendants have, as back as 1997 gave a public notice. He further submitted by such delay, right in favour of third parties has already been created. He also offered certain comments upon the Memorandum of Understanding executed between the plaintiff and the defendant No. 9, who has signed the MOU as an agent of the defendants No. 1 to 8 as well as the banakhat and certain recitals in the MOU and in some receipts to the effect that the possession is given to the plaintiff. Mr. Joshi submitted that the defendant No. 10 cannot be restrained by injunction from dealing with the property as by virtue of the registered sale deed, he is entitled to enjoy the property in the manner he wants to enjoy. He further submitted that even otherwise, the sale deed, which is in favour of the defendant No. 10, is not even challenged by the plaintiff, and a mere general prayer is made in the suit that whatever transaction the defendants No. 1 to 8 have entered into may be set aside. Mr. Joshi also submitted that the plaintiff has not even prayed for consequential relief of damages in the suit. Mr. Joshi further submitted that the plaintiff was aware about the transaction as otherwise the plaintiff would not have joined the defendant No. 10 as party to the proceedings. He has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of HAMUMANTHAPPA vs. MUNINARAYANAPPA reported in (1996) 11 SCC 696 . In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court observed as under in paragraph 5 of the judgment:"5. THE question, therefore, arises whether an injunction can be issued against the appellant? It is not in dispute that pending that Partition Suit No. 88 of 1966, the respondent had purchased the land belonging to his vendors including 39 guntas of land under registered sale deed dated 24-2-1986. Undoubtedly, the respondent was not a party to the compromise decree dated 29-2-1990. It is not in dispute that pending that Partition Suit No. 88 of 1966, the respondent had purchased the land belonging to his vendors including 39 guntas of land under registered sale deed dated 24-2-1986. Undoubtedly, the respondent was not a party to the compromise decree dated 29-2-1990. Since he purchased the property pending the suit for partition, a compromise decree having been executed by the parties in which the right of the appellant to the extent of 39 gunthas was crystallized and he was duly put in possession, necessarily, he was in lawful possession of the property as an owner. The question is whether an injunction can be issued against the lawful owner? It is settled legal position that no injunction can be issued against a lawful owner of the property. The High Court proceeded on the premise that the appellant was put in possession of the property after the interim injunction was granted by the trial Court. It is factually incorrect since the injunction was granted by the trial Court only on 5-1-1994 by which date he had already been put in possession by the Tehsildar under the panchanma dated 22-7-1993. Under these circumstances, the High Court also was in error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant cannot be in lawful possession since he had come in possession after the injunction was issued under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, CPC. "19. 1 mr. Joshi submitted that the facts of the case are identical, and no injunction can be issued against the defendant No. 10. ( 20 ) MR. Joshi also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of PUKHRAJ D. JAIN vs. GOPALAKRISHNA reported in (2004) 7 SCC 251 . In that case, the Apex Court considered the question about limitation in connection with specific performance of the contract as well as in connection with readiness and willingness to perform essential terms of contract on the part of the purchaser, and it has been held in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the judgment as under :"5. THE facts in the present case speak for themselves. The agreement in question was executed by Appellants 6 to 10 (original owners) in favour of G. Gopalakrishna (Respondent 1) on 5-12-1974. He himself issued a legal notice rescinding the contract and claiming refund of the advance amount paid. THE facts in the present case speak for themselves. The agreement in question was executed by Appellants 6 to 10 (original owners) in favour of G. Gopalakrishna (Respondent 1) on 5-12-1974. He himself issued a legal notice rescinding the contract and claiming refund of the advance amount paid. Thereafter on 7-11-1977, he filed a suit for recovery of the advance amount paid by him. This clearly shows that he gave up his right under the contract for execution of sale deed of the property in his favour. After considerable period of time he filed an application for amendment seeking to convert the suit into one for specific performance of agreement of sale but the said application was dismissed by the trial court on 3-12-1984 as being barred by limitation. The revision preferred against the said order was dismissed by the High Court and therefore the finding of the trial court that the relief seeking specific performance of agreement of sale had become time barred attained finality. The suit for recovery of the amount was decreed by the trial Court on 24-7-1985 but on account of a very clever device adopted by Respondent 1 of seek additional sum of Rs. 125 towards cost of legal notice and thereafter not paying the requisite additional court fee of Rs. 12-50 on the enhanced claim, the High Court in a revision filed by him set aside the decree for refund of the amount and rejected the plaint. The suit giving rise to the present appeal was instituted by respondent 1 on 2-4-1988 wherein he again sought specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 5-12-1974. The trial Court was of the opinion that the present suit was filed after nearly 14 years. Even in the earlier suit (OS No. 801 of 1977) the amendment sought by Respondent 1 wherein he wanted to convert his suit into one for specific performance of agreement of sale had been rejected and a finding had been recorded that the relief for specific performance had already become time-barred and this finding had been affirmed in revision by the High Court. Aticle 54 of the Limitation Act provides a limitation of three years for instituting a suit for specific performance of a contract. Aticle 54 of the Limitation Act provides a limitation of three years for instituting a suit for specific performance of a contract. This period of 3 years has to be reckoned from the date fixed for the performance, or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. Appellants 6 to 10 (original owners of the property) had opposed the application moved by Respondent 1 in the earlier suit for amendment seeking relief of specific performance of the agreement on the ground of limitation and their plea was accepted. Thus it is crystal clear that long before filing of the present suit (OS No. 1629 of 1988) Respondent 1 had notice of the fact that the original owners were not prepared to execute the sale deed in his favour. The original owners (Appellants 6 to 10) sold the property in dispute in favour of Appellants 1 to 5 on 18-4-1985 after the amendment application had been rejected by the trial Court on the finding that the relief for specific performance had become barred by limitation. On these facts no other inference was possible and the trial Court was perfectly justified in holding that the suit (OS No. 1629 of 1988) was barred by limitation. 6. Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act lays down that specific performance of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him, other than terms the performance of which has been prevented or waived by the defendant. Explanation (ii) to this sub-section provides that the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and willingness to perform, the contract according to its true construction. The requirement of this provision is that the plaintiff must aver that he has always been ready and wiling to perform the essential terms of the contract. Therefore, not only should there be such an averment in the plaint but the surrounding circumstances must also indicate that the readiness and willingness continue from the date of the contract till the hearing of the suit. Therefore, not only should there be such an averment in the plaint but the surrounding circumstances must also indicate that the readiness and willingness continue from the date of the contract till the hearing of the suit. It is well settled that equitable remedy of specific performance cannot be had on the basis of pleadings which do not contain averments of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform his contract in terms of Forms 47 and 48 CPC. Here Respondent 1 himself sent a legal notice rescinding the contract and thereafter filed OS No. 801 of 1977 on 7-11-1977 claiming refund of the advance paid by him. In fact the suit for recovery of the amount was decreed by the trial court on 24-7-1985 but he himself preferred a revision against the decree wherein an order of rejection of the plaint was passed by the High Court. In such circumstances, it is absolutely apparent that Respondent 1 was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in view of the mandate of section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, no decree for specific performance could be passed in his favour. The trial court, therefore, rightly held that the suit filed by Respondent 1 was not maintainable. "20. 1 relying upon the observations of the Apex Court, Mr. Joshi argued that even after the public advertisement, the plaintiff has remained silent for a long period and he has not even tried to pursue the matter with the defendants No. 1 to 8 asking them to initiate proceedings before the appropriate revenue authorities for conversion of the land. Mr. Joshi submitted that the defendants No. 1 to 8 could not have remained silent for such a long period, and that itself is suggestive of the fact that the agreement to sell was never intended to be enforced and that such agreement was executed for some other collateral purposes. It was submitted that there is nothing to show that over these 7 years the plaintiff has shown any willingness to perform his part of the contract, and he has not even shown any willingness to see that if any permission is required under the revenue law, the defendants No. 1 to 8 may be asked to perform the said act as per the so called agreement. He submitted that the defendants No. 1 to 8 have sold the land to defendant No. 10 after getting necessary permission, and has also executed a sale deed. He therefore submitted that the defendant No. 10 cannot be restrained from dealing with the property since he has purchased the property by way of a registered sale deed whereas the plaintiff is claiming his right on the property on the basis of a so called agreement to sell which is not even registered. ( 21 ) IT is, no doubt, true that there is nothing to show that for such a long period, the plaintiff has tried to show his willingness to perform his obligation as per the agreement in question by asking the defendants to take appropriate proceedings. There is not a single paper on record in this connection. It is also equally true that in this case the plaintiff remained silent for years and did not urge the defendants No. 1 to 8 for taking appropriate steps as per the agreement for obtaining necessary permission under different statutes. In a given case, even a decree for specific performance can be refused by the Court, even if it is found that the agrement is genuine, if it is found that the plaintiff himself is not willing to get the sale deed executed. It is not open for a person to wait indefinitely, without asking the other side even to perform his part of the contract. Waiting for a long time, in a given case, may dis-entitle the plaintiff even to get a decree for specific performance. As pointed out earlier, the plaintiff has never event tried to find out as to what had happened about the conversion of the land from new tenure to old tenure. There is not a single letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant for all these years. Even the sale deed executed by the defendants No. 1 to 8 in favour of the defendant No. 10 is not challenged in the suit, though it is pointed out that subsequently an application is made before the trial Court for amendment of the plaint, and the same is pending before the trial Court. Even the sale deed executed by the defendants No. 1 to 8 in favour of the defendant No. 10 is not challenged in the suit, though it is pointed out that subsequently an application is made before the trial Court for amendment of the plaint, and the same is pending before the trial Court. ( 22 ) BE that as it may, since the suit is pending and the subsequent purchaser is joined as defendant No. 10 in the said suit, it is directed that if the defendant No. 10 sells or transfers the property in any manner whatsoever, the defendant No. 10 shall disclose to the purchaser about pendency of the aforesaid suit qua the property in question, and that the transaction shall be subject to the final result of the suit, and the name and full address of such purchaser before the trial Court, and thereafter, it will be open for the plaintiff to amend the plaint for joining the said purchaser/s, if any, as party-defendant/s, and it will be open for the plaintiff to pray for necessary relief against such purchaser/s so that if ultimately the suit is allowed, appropriate decree can be passed by the court. Under the circumstances, the prayer of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 10 may be restrained from transferring or alienating the property cannot be granted. Even going the judgment of the trial Court, it seems that the Exh. 5 was argued only in connection with the possession, and has not argued the case regarding alienation of the property. ( 23 ) SIMILARLY, the prayer of the appellant to restrain the defendants No. 1 to 8 from transferring or alienating the part of the property in their possession cannot be granted in view of the fact that plaintiff has filed to prove his prima facie. The defendants No. 1 to 8 cannot be, therefore, restrained from dealing with their property in the manner in which they like. The defendants No. 1 to 8 cannot be, therefore, restrained from dealing with their property in the manner in which they like. However, since the suit is pending, the defendants No. 1 to 8 shall disclose to the subsequent purchaser/s, if any, about pendency of the aforesaid suit qua the property in question, that the transaction shall be subject to the final result of the suit, and the name and full address of such purchaser shall be disclosed before the trial Court, and thereafter, it will be open for the plaintiff to amend the suit and join the said purchaser/s as party-defendant/s, and make necessary prayers against such purchaser/s, so that ultimately in case the suit is decreed, the may not be infructuous or unexecutable. ( 24 ) SUBJECT to what is stated above, I do not find any substance in the Appeals from Order and both the Appeals stand dismissed, with no order as to costs. ( 25 ) AT this stage, Mr. Mehta requests that the order in question may be stayed for some time, more particularly in view of the fact that while issuing notice in these Appeals, this Court has granted interim relief which is continued till today. However, considering the facts as stated above, and considering the fact that the plaintiff waited for more than 7 years before going to the court of law, and considering the fact that the plaintiff has already been given liberty to join the subsequent purchaser/s as party-respondents, I am not inclined to stay this order. The request is, therefore, rejected. ( 26 ) IN view of the aforesaid order passed in the main Appeals from Order, the Civil Applications do not survive, and it stand disposed of accordingly. Notice is discharged. No order as to costs. .