Judgment Anil Dev Singh, CJ.-This appeal is directed against the Judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 25th February, 2003, rendered in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 150 of 1995. The facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows:- 2. Ratan Singh, the original petitioner in the writ petition, was appointed on temporary basis as Bus Driver in the respondent Corporation in the year 1966. With effect from 3rd June, 1971 his services were regularised. Thereafter, on 16th August, 1978 he was declared confirmed on the post of Driver. During the course of his service he suffered disability on account of weak eye-sight and, as a consequence thereof , he was not able to driver the vehicle. In view of his disability his services were terminated by the respondents on 21st January, 1993. It needs to be noted that if he had continued in service he would have attained the age of superannuation on 30th September, 1993. Aggrieved by his termination he filed a writ petition inter alia on the ground that he should have been continued in service till the date of his superannuation or, in the alternative, he should have been given salary from the date of his termination to the date of his superannuation. He also prayed that the period from the date of termination to the date of superannuation should be counted for determining the retiral benefits. The learned Single Judge rejected the submissions of the original petitioner in the writ petition and dismissed the writ petition. 3. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 4. It needs to be noted that the disability from which the original petitioner was suffering was acquired by him during the course of the employment. The order terminating the services of the original petitioner was passed on 27.01.1993 when he had only 9 months to attain the age of superannuation. For a person, who had served for more than 26 years with the respondent Corporation, losing his job 9 months before the date of his superannuation was a big blow to him. The Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 1994 (4) SCC 460 , held that where a person becomes incapable to carry out his duties due to physical disability he should be accommodated against a post on which he could work inspite of his disability. The Supreme Court in Narendra Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Ors., 1994 (4) SCC 460 , held that where a person becomes incapable to carry out his duties due to physical disability he should be accommodated against a post on which he could work inspite of his disability. Again in Anand Behari & Ors. vs. RSRTC, AIR 1991 SC 1003 , the Supreme Court held that employees who are struck with disability should be provided compensatory relief such as alternative employment etc., by the employer by working out a scheme and their services should not be terminated. 5. In University of Rajasthan vs. Surendra Kumar Goyal, 2003 (2) WLC (Raj) 578, where an Aquatic Coach was retired on the ground of his disability because of prolapsed intervertebral disc, this Court held that the employee should have been adjusted against an alternative post in the light of his condition of health. It is significant to note that the legislature enacted the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995. The legislature enacted the statute recognising the discrimination, which was meted out to the candidates suffering from disabilities at the stage of entry into service and the employees suffering from the disability acquired after entry into service. Section 47 of the Act deals with the situation where an employee acquires disability after he enters into the service. It inter alia provides that no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank an employee who acquires disability during his service. The provision is meant to remove the discrimination between an employee, who suffers from any disability during the service and other employees. Realizing the hardship, which an employee would suffer in case of his termination on the ground of his disability, the legislature intervened and made the aforesaid provision to eliminate any sort of discrimination. Thus, the legislature itself recognised the discrimination, which an employee may suffer due to acquisition of disability during his service. The Court, therefore, can come to the rescue of such an employee with the help of Section 47 of the Act or even without the help of Section 47 of the Act, to remove the discrimination by directing reinstatement of an employee whose services have been terminated on account of disability acquired during the course of his employment. 6. The Court, therefore, can come to the rescue of such an employee with the help of Section 47 of the Act or even without the help of Section 47 of the Act, to remove the discrimination by directing reinstatement of an employee whose services have been terminated on account of disability acquired during the course of his employment. 6. Learned Counsel for the respondents pointed out that the services of the petitioner were terminated in the year 1993 when the Act had not come into force. The learned Counsel is correct in his submission. But, even in a case where Section 47 of the Act stricto sensu may not apply, the principles embodied therein would apply as they are meant to remove discrimination from which a person with disability suffers in the matter of employment. Even where provisions of Section 47 of the Act are not applicable to a case of disability acquired by an employee surely Article 14 will apply, which mandates obligation and elimination of discrimination. 7. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation is not an ordinary employer. It is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Corporation is hand and voice of the State. Bodies like the Corporation have to act like model employers. The services of the petitioner Ratan Singh were prematurely terminated notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner would have reached the age of retirement only after 9 months of the termination of his services and when only 9 months were left a model employer would not have terminated the services but would have accommodated the employee against a suitable post, keeping in view the disability of the employee. The premature termination of employment of the original petitioner only 9 months before reaching his date of retirement on account of disability acquired during the course of employment was thus against the principles of justice, fair play and equity. 8. In Anand Bihari’s case (Supra), the Supreme Court, highlighting the discrimination meted out to the drivers in the employment of State Road Transport Corporations on being affected by weak eye-sight, observed as follows :- “As is commonly known, the drivers of the buses run by the Corporation such as the present one, have to drive the heavy motor vehicles in sun, rain, dust and dark hours of night. In the process, they are exposed to the glaring and blazing sunlight and beaming and blinding lights of the vehicles coming form the opposite direction. They are required to strain their eye-sight every moment of the driving, keeping a watchful eye on the road for the bumps, bends, and slopes, and to avoid all kinds of obstacles on the way. It is this constant straining of eyes on the road which takes its inevitable toll of the vision. The very fact that in a short period, the Corporation had to terminate the services of no less than 30 drivers who are before us shows the extent of the occupational hazard to which the drivers of the Corporation are exposed during their service. It also shows that weakening of the eye-sight is not an isolated phenomenon but a widespread risk to which those who take the employment of a driver expose themselves. Yet the Corporation treats their cases in the same manner and fashion as it treats the cases of other workmen who on account of reasons not connected with the employment suffer from ill-health or continued ill-health. That by itself is discriminatory against the drivers. The discrimination against the employees such as the drivers in the present case, also ensues from the fact that whereas they have to face premature termination of service on account of disabilities contracted from their jobs, the other employees continue to serve till the date of their superannuation. Admittedly, no special provision is made and no compensatory relief is provided in the service condition for the drivers for such premature incapacitation. There is no justification in treating the cases of workmen like drivers who are exposed to occupational diseases and disabilities on par with the other employees. The injustice, inequity and discrimination is writ large in such cases and is indefensible.” 9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we allow the instant appeal and set aside the order of the learned Single Judge. The respondents are directed to treat the original petitioner in the writ petition as having continued in service from the date of his premature termination to the date of his superannuation which he would have reached but for termination of his employment. The original petitioner is held entitled to all consequential benefits as well. The respondents are directed to treat the original petitioner in the writ petition as having continued in service from the date of his premature termination to the date of his superannuation which he would have reached but for termination of his employment. The original petitioner is held entitled to all consequential benefits as well. It is also directed that the monetary benefits flowing from the aforesaid order shall accrue to the appellants, the legal representatives of the original petitioner Ratan Singh. The money due to appellants shall be worked out by the respondents in accordance with above directions and payment shall be made to the appellants within six weeks.