JUDGMENT : Pradeep Kant, K.S. Rakhra, JJ. Heard Sri S. K. Mehrotra, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri S.C. Yadav for the Respondent. 2. The Petitioner while in service as Taquavi Collection Amin in District Gonda was faced with an order of termination of services dated 28.3.1967. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order of termination of services the Petitioner preferred a claim petition before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal challenging the impugned order dated 28.3.1967, which was dismissed on 7.11.1986. 3. The order passed by the Tribunal as well as the order of termination of services were challenged by means of a Writ Petition No. 1909 of 1987 in the High Court by the Petitioner. The learned single Judge vide order dated 7.9.1988 allowed the writ petition and quashed the order passed by the Tribunal. 4. On getting the desired relief from the High Court the Petitioner approached the Tribunal for execution of the order. At the relevant time, the order passed by the Tribunal was liable to be executed by the District Judge, on issuance of certificate u/s 5(7) of the Public Services (Tribunal) Act. The Tribunal however, vide its order dated 29.9.1989 rejected the prayer of the Petitioner on the ground that the order passed by the Tribunal (dismissing the claim petition) has been set aside by the High Court vide order dated 7.9.1988, therefore, no certificate u/s 5(7) of the Public Services (Tribunal) Act could have been issued by this Tribunal. The Petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order by means of the present writ petition. 5. Despite challenge being made to the impugned order passed by the Tribunal the Petitioner also made a prayer that Respondent 2 and 3 namely, the State of U.P. and the Agriculture Officer, district Gonda, be directed to treat the Petitioner in continued service till 15.10.1991, i.e., the date of his retirement and to pay him the entire arrears of salary and the salary as and when it falls due continuously and regularly. Obviously in view of the order passed by the High Court the Petitioner is seeking an action against the opposite parties in pursuance of the relief given by the Hon'ble Court. It may be noticed that the order passed in Writ Petition No. 1909 of 1990 on 7.9.1988 was challenged by the State before the Supreme Court but the SLP was dismissed on 3.3.1989. 6. It may be noticed that the order passed in Writ Petition No. 1909 of 1990 on 7.9.1988 was challenged by the State before the Supreme Court but the SLP was dismissed on 3.3.1989. 6. A peculiar situation has arisen in the case in which despite relief being granted by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, the Petitioner has been deprived of the fruits of the order on mere technical ground raised by the Tribunal viz., that the order which is sought to be executed is the order of the High Court upsetting the order passed by the Tribunal and not an order passed by the Tribunal. Technically speaking the writ proceedings cannot be taken as continuance of original proceedings but in view of the fact that the same very termination was under challenge before the Tribunal which was in question before the High Court and that the matter has arisen from the proceedings before the Tribunal the order passed by the High Court, would attain finality subject to any order being passed by the Supreme Court. On finality being attained on orders being passed by the Supreme Court or that by the High Court, the Tribunal would be under a legal duty to implement the order or to get its execution done. The view expressed by the Tribunal that because the Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition and the High Court has quashed the said order, therefore, no certificate u/s 5(7) of the Public Services (Tribunal) Act could be issued, is palpably erroneous. 7. The learned Counsel for the State has, however, submitted that after the amendment of the Tribunal Act, the proceedings for execution of the judgment and order passed by the Tribunal, through, the Court of District Judge, on issuance of certificate, are no more available, therefore, the only course, which is a available to the Petitioner, is to initiate proceedings for contempt against the Respondent for giving effect to the order passed by the High Court. 8. 8. We are not addressing ourselves on the propriety of making the provisions for contempt as a substitute for execution of the judgment passed by the Tribunal but we would like to observe that the order passed by the High Court as upheld by the Supreme Court, cannot be allowed to be flouted nor it can be allowed to go unexecuted either on mere technicalities or on the whims of the State but rather the same has to be implemented. 9. Once the orders were set aside by the High Court and the SLP preferred by the State was rejected by the Supreme Court, it was the legal duty and the obligation of the State to execute and implement the said order and to give full effect to the orders passed by the High Court. 10. We, therefore, cut short the controversy and without requiring the Petitioner to seek any other remedy for execution or implementation of the order passed by the High Court allow the writ petition by issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Respondent to comply with the terms of the aforesaid order and reinstate the Petitioner in service. 11. We are informed that the Petitioner has also crossed the age of superannuation and therefore, we direct that he would be paid all the salary and other monetary benefits to which he would have been entitled in case he had been in service in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court till he reached the age of superannuation. 12. The learned Counsel for the State has made a half-hearted attempt in defence of non-execution of the order on the ground that the High Court's order does not specifically quash the termination order but quashes the order passed by the Tribunal only and therefore, the termination order still stands. 13. 12. The learned Counsel for the State has made a half-hearted attempt in defence of non-execution of the order on the ground that the High Court's order does not specifically quash the termination order but quashes the order passed by the Tribunal only and therefore, the termination order still stands. 13. A bare reading of the aforesaid order passed by the High Court reveals that the High Court has considered the validity of the termination order and has recorded categorical finding that the termination order was bad in view of law propounded by the Apex Court in the case of Smt. Kusum Gupta v. Haryana State Small Industries and Export Corporation AIR 1986 SC 6905, and also that short recovery, could not have been a ground for termination of service, but that being so, the order of termination was passed by way of punishment and that too without giving any opportunity of hearing. The High Court allowed the writ petition and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal dated 7.11.1986 but it appears that in the operative portion of the judgment the fact that the termination order is also quashed was missed from being incorporated. A bare reading of the order leaves no room of doubt that the High Court has declared the termination order bad in law. We, therefore, find that the Petitioner shall be entitled for the entire benefits, which would be paid by the Respondent within a maximum period of four months from the date the certified copy of this order is produced before the authority concerned. 14. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.