Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2004 DIGILAW 772 (PNJ)

Manjit Singh v. State Of Haryana, Through Collector

2004-07-28

G.S.SINGHVI

body2004
Judgment G.S.Singhvi, J. 1. These appeals are directed against common award dated 9.5.1988 passed by Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra in Land Acquisition Cases No. 43/4 to 45/4 of 1987. The facts: 2. Vide notification dated 27.2.1980 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act), the Government of Haryana acquired the land of the appellants for construction of link road connecting Grain Market, Shahabad with Ladwa- Shahabad road. The Land Acquisition Collector vide his award dated 11.9.1980 determined the market value of the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per acre. 3. On 16.12.1980, the appellants filed reference applications under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement of the compensation by contending that the market value of the land is not less than Rs. 50/- per square yard. They also claimed compensation on account of severance of their holdings. 4. In the identical replies filed on behalf of the respondent, it was averred that the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector was just and proper. It was further pleaded that the reference applications were barred by time, inasmuch as, the same had been filed after expiry of the limitation prescribed under Section 18 of the Act. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Additional District Judge framed the following issues:- "(a) What was the market value of the acquired land at the time of issue of notification Under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act? OPP (b) Whether the claimants are entitled to any compensation on account of severance of their holdings? OPP (c) Whether the objections are time barred? OPR (d) Relief." 6. The learned Additional District Judge decided issue No. 1 in favour of the appellants and assessed the market value of the land at the rate of Rs. 17,000/- per acre. However, he rejected their claim for award of compensation on account of severance. On the issue of limitation, the learned Additional District Judge referred to Section 18 of the Act, the alleged admission made by Shri Manjit Singh (appellant in R.F.A. No. 1264 of 1988) that he had come to know about the award on 8.10.1980 and held that the reference applications were barred by time. On the issue of limitation, the learned Additional District Judge referred to Section 18 of the Act, the alleged admission made by Shri Manjit Singh (appellant in R.F.A. No. 1264 of 1988) that he had come to know about the award on 8.10.1980 and held that the reference applications were barred by time. For the sake of reference, paragraph 20 of the award passed by the Additional District Judge, which contains discussion on the issue of limitation is reproduced below: "The award by the Collector was announced on 11.9.1980. At that time, the objectors were not present. Therefore, notice under Sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act was issued to them. According to the case set up by the State, this notice was served upon the objectors on 8.10.1980. Manjit Singh-AW1 admitted in his cross-examination that he came to know of the award on 8.10.1980. He, therefore, admits the plea raised by the respondent - State. The claim petition was drafted on 16.12.1980 and as per the objection taken by the State, it reached the Collector on 17.12.1980. However, this plea remained totally unsubstantiated. No evidence was led by them to show that they acquired the knowledge of the award on 13.12.1980. Rather, Manjit Singh-AW1 conceded in the cross-examination that he came to know of the award on 8.10.1980. The plea raised in the claim petition, has therefore, to be rejected and it is the objection raised by State which prevails." 7. Shri C.B. Goel, learned counsel for the appellants assailed the impugned award and argued that the finding recorded by the learned Additional District Judge on the issue of limitation is vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record. He referred to Section 18(2) of the Act to show that limitation of 6 weeks is applicable only if the person filing reference application is present or represented before the Collector at the time of award or he received notice issued by the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act, else the limitation of six months is applicable within which the claimant can file reference application and argued that the learned Additional District Judge erred in relying on the statement of Manjit Singh for holding that the reference applications were barred by time. Shri Goel further argued that the so-called admission made by Manjit Singh about the knowledge of award cannot be equated with the receipt of notice issued in terms of Section 12(2) of the Act and as such, the shorter period of limitation of six weeks is not applicable to the cases of the appellants. In support of his argument, Shri Goel relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and Anr.? AIR 1961 SC 1500 and Orissa Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation v. Supai Munda and Ors., 2004(1) RCR 311 and of this Court in Gian Chand v. The Addl. District Judge, Hoshiarpur and Ors., 1986 P.L.J. 311 and Jaswant Rai v. Land Acquisition Collector, Punjab Urban Land Development, Mohali and Anr., A.I.R. 1989 P&H 261. 8. Ms. Geeta Sharma representing the State could not put forward any tangible argument to controvert the submission of Shri C.B. Goel. 9. I have considered the submission of the learned counsel in the light of the record of the Reference Court and agree with Shri Goel that the finding recorded by the learned Additional District on the issue of limitation is vitiated by a patent error of law and the impugned award is liable to be set aside. Section 18 of the Act, which provides remedy of reference to the person aggrieved by the award of the Land Acquisition Collector and also prescribes the limitation for filing of reference application, reads as under: "18. Reference to Court.- (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. 2. The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. 2. The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken. Provided that every such application shall be made.- a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collectors award; b) In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2), or within six months from the date of the Collectors award, whichever period shall first expire." 10. A bare reading of the above quoted provisions makes it clear that the limitation of six weeks is attracted only if the persons making the application is present or is represented before the Collector or notice under Section 12(2) issued by the Collector is received by him. In all other cases, an application for reference can be filed within six months from the date of the Collectors award. The expression "the date of Collectors award" was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singhs case (supra) and the following proposition was laid down: "Where the rights of a person are affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the enforcement of the remedy by the person aggrieved against the said order by reference to the making of the said order, the making of the order must mean either actual or constructive communication of the said order to the party concerned. So the knowledge of the party affected by the award made by the Collector under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 either actual or constructive is an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore, the expression "the date of the award" used in proviso (b) to Section 18(2) of the Act must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. It will be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collectors award used in the proviso to S.I8 in a literal or mechanical way." 11. The same view has been expressed in Supai Mundas case (supra). 12. It will be unreasonable to construe the words from the date of the Collectors award used in the proviso to S.I8 in a literal or mechanical way." 11. The same view has been expressed in Supai Mundas case (supra). 12. In Gian Chands case (supra) and Jaswant Rais case (supra), this court applied the ratio of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singhs case (supra) and held that dismissal of the reference application as barred by time was legally unsustainable. 13. In the present case, the respondent had neither pleaded nor any evidence was adduced on its behalf before the learned Additional District Judge to prove that the appellants were present or were represented at the time of pronouncement of the award or that the Collector had issued notice to the appellents under Section 12(2) of the Act and the same had been served upon them on 8.10.1980 or on any other date which fell within the period of six weeks counted from the date of the award. In my view, the statement made by Manjit Singh that he had come to know of the award on 8.10.1980 cannot be equated with receipt of notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act. Therefore, the same could not have been made basis for applying shorter period of limitation of six weeks specified in clause (b) of proviso to Section 18(2). As a corollary to this conclusion, it must be held that the learned Additional District Judge gravely erred in dismissing the reference application as barred by time. 14. For the reason mentioned above, the appeals are allowed. The award passed by learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra is set aside and the case is remanded for fresh adjudication of the claim of the appellants for award of enhanced compensation on merits. 15. While disposing of the appeals in the manner indicated above, I deem it proper to make it clear that the learned Additional District Judge shall decide the reference ap- plications afresh without being influenced by the finding recorded in the impugned award on issues No. 1 and 2. 16. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra on 16.8.2004. 17. Copy of the judgment be given dasti on payment of the fee prescribed for urgent application.