JUDGMENT Vikramaditya Prasad, J. 1. The substantial question of law to be answered in this second appeal preferred by defendant-appellant- appellants is :--Whether in view of the fact that the deed of adoption was executed in the year 1950, a suit filed in the year 1981 was barred under the law of limitation. No liberty had been granted to raise another substantial questions of law but it has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in fact the questions to be answered are whether Section 2 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act bars adoption by Schedule Tribes and whether the Hindu Succession Act 1956 is applicable to the plaintiff who is a Munda (a schedule tribe)? 2. The question aforesaid arose out of the following short facts:-- The plaintiff Paku Mundan (who was subsequently substituted by Khaintu Munda) was the daughter of Ghuran Munda. The pleading is that the plaintiff as also her ancestors were sufficiently Hinduised and they were governed by Hindu Mitkashara Law in the matters of succession and inheritance. The father of the plaintiff held and possessed lands under Khata Nos. 20 and 101 of Village Turidih. P.S. Raidih of R.S. as his raiyati lands fully described in schedule B of the plaint. He was also in possession over the same till he died in the year 1973 as the sole owner. The father of the plaintiff Ghuran Munda sold the lands of Plot Nos. 988, 990, 996 and 987 of Khata No. 20 and Plot Nos. 269, 270 and 275 of Khata No, 101 to Bahira Munda by a registered deed of sale dated 11.2.1946 and the purchaser came and remained in possession and he was still in possession thereof. The father of the plaintiff had no heir excepting the plaintiff his own daughter, she all along lived in the house of her father and even after her marriage her husband was also adopted as Ghardamad who rendered all services and helped and cultivated all lands belonging to his father till he was alive and after the death of his father he performed his last rites according to Hindu rituals. After the death of her father the plaintiff being the class I heir inherited the properties of her father and came in possession in her own right as the sole surviving heir under the Hindu Law and remained in peaceful possession of the suit lands described in Schedule B of the plaint. 3. Further case of the plaintiff is that the defendants No. 1 and .2 after the death of the plaintiffs father lay false claims over the suit properties. This necessitated a 144 Cr PC proceeding bearing No. 112 of 1981 where the defendants No. 1 and 2 produced a forged adoption deed allegedly executed on 6.6.1950 by the father of the plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1. According to the plaintiff that deed of gift is a completely false and fabricated document as it was not known to any person in the village, it was behind the back of the plaintiff as she had no knowledge of existence of such deed. The plaintiff was paying rent though some receipts was also produced by defendant but no mutation order was filed. It was further pleaded that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 were strangers to the family of her father and defendant No. 1 was never adopted nor there was any occasion for the same nor it was according to law and custom. The defendant No. 1 was a Dhanger of the plaintiffs father and during that period he stealthily removed some papers and rent receipts and he was turned out more than five of six years ago and since then he was residing in village at Sakari in the district of Ranchi. It appears that there was a miscellaneous case between the parties but according to the plaintiff it was decided on conjectures consequently that is not binding on her. 4. The contesting defendant Nos. 1 and 2 filed a written statement, according to them the suit was barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, law of limitation and adverse possession and the plaintiff had no right to challenge it. The deceased plaintiff was the wife of one Sukar Munda of Village Sikoy P.S. Raidih, District Gumla. They pleaded that the father of the plaintiff and his ancestors were never Hinduised and they were never governed by Hindu Law. The deceased plaintiff was the wife of one Sukar Munda of Village Sikoy P.S. Raidih, District Gumla. They pleaded that the father of the plaintiff and his ancestors were never Hinduised and they were never governed by Hindu Law. The defendants are agnates of the father of the plaintiff and are governed by their own custom and according to the said custom female claiming through males are excluded from inheritance. When a Munda dies sonless his properties are inherited by his agnates. Daughters and widows are only entitled to maintenance till marriage. A Munda can adopt a person and if he adopts from his agnates his property is inherited by the poshputra. The father of the plaintiff died immediately after he registered a deed of poshputra and poshputra is in exclusive possession in his own rights to the knowledge of all concerned. Therefore, it was incorrect to say that the father of the plaintiff remained in possession till he died in 1973 as sole owner and that he was paying rent. It was further pleaded that defendant No. 1 always paid rent as he was a recognized raiyat and defendant No. 1 was also brought up by Ghuran since his childhood. The claim of the plaintiff that Ghuran had sold plot to Bahira Munda on 11.1.1946 was denied, the possession of Bhaira Munda over the said land was also denied. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff was married much before 1945 and lived at her husbands place and Ghuran Munda duly adopted a son according to the custom and a deed was also executed and defendant No. 1 was in possession and defendants are in possession since then. The plaintiffs husband have been adopted as Ghardamad was denied and also the claim of the plaintiff that the last rites of Ghuran Munda was performed according to Hindu rituals was also denied. There was no occasion prior to the proceeding under Section 144 Cr PC to produce the document and therefore it could not be said that the deed appeared for the first time in that proceeding. 5. The learned trial Court framed the following nine issues :-- 1. Is the suit as framed maintainable ? 2. Has the plaintiff got cause of action for the suit ? 3. Is the suit property valued and costs fee paid sufficiently ? 4. 5. The learned trial Court framed the following nine issues :-- 1. Is the suit as framed maintainable ? 2. Has the plaintiff got cause of action for the suit ? 3. Is the suit property valued and costs fee paid sufficiently ? 4. Is the suit barred under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act ? 5. Is the suit barred by the Law of Limitation, waiver, estoppel, acquiescence and adverse possession ? 6. Is the deed of adoption dated 6.6.1950 executed by Ghuran Munda in favour of Ram Nath Munda void, forged and fabricated one ? 7. Are the defendants agnates of Ghuran Munda ? 8. Where the father of the deceased plaintiff or the deceased plaintiff or their ancestors governed by Hindu Law ? 9. Has the plaintiff got title and possession over the suit lands and if he is in possession of the same whether he is entitled to get possession of the same ? On consideration of evidence, on contest, the suit, was decreed by the trial Court and it was held that plaintiff and his father were sufficiently Hinduised and the deed of adoption was void. 6. Being aggrieved by the trial Court judgment the defendant preferred title appeal No. 9 of 1988 and the learned appellant Court formulated two points for determination :-- 1. Whether Ghuran Munda and his daughter Paku Mundain had been sufficiently Hinduised so as to attract the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ? 2. Is Ramnath Munda defendant No. 1 the agnatic relation of the recorded tenant Ghuran Munda and if so whether he had been adopted by Ghuran as his son in the year 1950 as claimed by him ? 7. The first appellate Court also held that the plaintiff and her father were sufficiently Hinduised and Hindu Succession Act, 1956 applied to them and the deed of adoption was not valid. It also held that the defendant-appellant had no title by adverse possession. It also held that defendant No. 1 was not a Bhaiyad of Ghuran and he was not an agnate of Ghuran. Therefore the point No. 2 (supra) was decided against the defendant-appellant. The first appellant Court also found that the defendant-appellant had acquired no title by adverse possession. Thus the consistent finding of two Court below on fact are :-- (i) The plaintiff and her father were sufficiently Hinduised. Therefore the point No. 2 (supra) was decided against the defendant-appellant. The first appellant Court also found that the defendant-appellant had acquired no title by adverse possession. Thus the consistent finding of two Court below on fact are :-- (i) The plaintiff and her father were sufficiently Hinduised. (ii) The defendant-appellant was not an agnate (Bhaiyad) of the father of the plaintiff-respondent. Consistent findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence do not warrant any re-appreciation in this S.A. 8. Therefore the only thing remained to be examined is whether Munda (undisputedly a S.T.) being sufficiently Hinduised will be governed by Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and the plaintiff-respondent will become Class 1 heir of her father under the aforesaid Act ? 9. The very fact that the plaintiff and her father were sufficiently Hinduised, as a necessary corollary, means that they were not observing the customs of the Tribe to which they did belong. Consequently the adoption could not have been made according to Munda custom particularly because as per the consistent finding the adopted one was not a Bhaiyad of the adopter which is necessary as per the Munda custom. Therefore the adoption being found invalid by the Courts below is not void of reasoning. Consequently the adoption deed is also invalid, though registered. When a deed is invalid the question of its being relied and considered by a Court is not required. Then the question of application of the period of limitation in respect of admissibility does not arise. The Law of Limitation will apply only when the document to be hit is a valid one. The question originally framed in this S.A. answered in this way. 10. The question of limitation may be examined in another way also. Article 57 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a period of limitation from the date of knowledge of adoption. The learned Courts below have simply given a finding that suit is barred by limitation but no categorical appreciation of evidence on that point is there. If, in order to settle the matter finally is being answered here on appreciation of evidence. The PW 4 in paragraph 4 says that he is a Panch and had there been an adoption it must have come to his knowledge, it confirms possession of the plaintiff. On this evidence he has not been cross-examined. If, in order to settle the matter finally is being answered here on appreciation of evidence. The PW 4 in paragraph 4 says that he is a Panch and had there been an adoption it must have come to his knowledge, it confirms possession of the plaintiff. On this evidence he has not been cross-examined. PW 5 who is a man of Turidih though he did not speak anything about the adoption or its deed but in cross-examination he says that he does not know that by a registered deed Ghuran had adopted Ramnath. PW 10 a witness of village Turidih aged about 62 years has denied that at any time adoption was made. He has also denied a suggestion that he has knowledge of adoption. Mangu Munda one of the appellant in paragraph 5 says that deed was executed and thereafter he came in possession thereon. On examination-in-chief he does not say whether this fact was known to the people of the locality or not, though he claims in the W.S. that this deed was known to everybody. In paragraph 19 he says that he does not remember that the deed of adoption was executed and who were the witnesses thereon. With respect to a Mutation on the basis of that adoption he says that its notice was sent but somebody had torn it away therefore he does not know in which year the notice was sent. In paragraph 25 he says that he does not remember in which year Ghuran Munda had executed sale deed in favour of Barha Munda but he admits that Barha Munda is in possession of that land. DW 4 a man of that village says that Ghuru Munda adopted Ramnath Munda and at that time Ramnath Munda was 12 years old and he says that at that time of Mutation he had found the possession of that plaintiff. He was examined in the year 1987 and says in cross-examination that he had seen Ghuran Munda for the last time in village 13 years ago meaning thereby sometime in the year 1976. This goes against the pleading of the defendant the immediately after the execution of the deed Ghuran Munda had died. In paragraph 8 he says that the adoption was made 12 years back whereas adoption was made in the year 1950. This goes against the pleading of the defendant the immediately after the execution of the deed Ghuran Munda had died. In paragraph 8 he says that the adoption was made 12 years back whereas adoption was made in the year 1950. DW 5 says that dispute over the land was initiated only for the last 8 years, meaning thereby according to him some time in the year 1980. This witness has stated in paragraph 10 that he has deposed on the suggestion on the defendant who has said that so far the possession is concerned he has to give evidence. 11. Thus it appears that the plaintiff pleaded that she came to know of the adoption in the year 1981 when the proceeding under Section 144 of the Cr PC was instituted therefore she has filed this suit for cancellation of that deed within a period of three years. The defendant-respondents though had denied and said that it was known to the entire village but it is found from the evidence that villagers were not at all knowing that there was an adoption deed. Even one of the villagers said that the adoption had taken place in the year 1986. Evidence has already come from the side of the defendant that the notice of 144 Cr PC proceeding was sent but that was torn. It appears that the plaintiff has not participated in that therefore it can not be said that at that time also, particularly because of the non-appearance of the plaintiff the factum of the adoption was known to her. When the plaintiff denies the knowledge of adoption prior to 1981 then the onus shifts upon the defendants that the plaintiff had knowledge of this from a particular relevant time therefore this cancellation is barred by limitation. On the basis of aforesaid evidence it is found that defendant has not discharged this onus consequently suit is not hit by limitation. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued relying on a decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 1864 (a judgment given by three Judges Bench) where it has been held by a majority view that neither Hindu Succession Act, nor Succession Act nor even Shariat Law is applicable to people governed by tribal and the plaintiff-respondents are tribal. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued relying on a decision reported in AIR 1996 SC 1864 (a judgment given by three Judges Bench) where it has been held by a majority view that neither Hindu Succession Act, nor Succession Act nor even Shariat Law is applicable to people governed by tribal and the plaintiff-respondents are tribal. To the contrary the learned counsel for the respondent relying on 2001 (2) (Supreme) 568 and also on the minority view of the above decisions (supra) has argued that if the parties have sufficiently been Hinduised then in that circumstances they were to be governed by Hindu Succession Act. The argument was raised on behalf of the appellant that the decision given in 2001 (Supreme) is a two Judges Bench decision whereas that of the 1996 is three Judges Bench decision and its majority view is binding. In the background of the aforesaid contention I have carefully gone through both the cases. In 1996 case a petition has been filed by certain voluntary organizations that the tribal women in the State of Bihar were being discriminated against male as they had no right to succeed the property though the tribals male has got such right and this was in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and certain provision of CNT Act were sought to be quashed. In that case some women were tribals and some were christen tribes. No where it was pleaded that any of the women had been sufficiently Hinduised and therefore that decision is to be understood only in the background of the fact that the ladies whose case were being espoused were tribals pure and simple, or Christian Tribal. Therefore, as the provision of the Hindu Succession Act bars application of the Act to tribal thus aforesaid decision was given. Thus in that case this aspect that what should happen to those tribal who have been sufficiently Hinduised was not at all considered whereas in 2001 cases this was a matter in issue. 13. Section 2 of the Act defines Hindu which is as follows :-- 2(1)(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. 13. Section 2 of the Act defines Hindu which is as follows :-- 2(1)(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj. (b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and (c) to any other person, who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by this Hindu Law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed. Clause (c) finds a negative definition of Hindu by excluding Muslims, Christian, Parsi or Jews, meaning thereby that if they are not Christian, Muslims, Jews they are Hindu provided they could not have been governed by Hindu Law or its custom. Section 2(1) of the aforesaid clause do not exclude the schedule tribes from the definition of Hindu. Section 2(2) only postpones the application of Hindu Succession Act till the notification as required under this provision is issued. This by implication means that S.T. are also Hindues only, the application of Hindu Succession Act is simply contingent to certain notification. A schedule tribe, pure and simple who is adhering to his custom is to be distinguished from that who has been Hinduised prior to commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and in my view such Hinduised tribal do fall within Section 2(1)(c) of the Act and may be treated as Hindu because there is no proving on the record that such tribals could not have been governed by the Hindu Law. Nothing has been shown that the custom bars the Munda from adopting any form of Hindu Religion. 14. Thus ones they are sufficiently Hinduised prior to commencement of the Act, I am of the considered view that Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will become applicable consequently the daughter of a schedule tribes (Munda) male who also had been sufficiently Hinduised leaving no son but a daughter will become his Class-I heir under Hindu Succession Act. Thus relying on 2001 decision this question answered accordingly and against the appellant. 15. There is no need of interference with the well discussed and well- reasoned judgments of the Court below. Thus relying on 2001 decision this question answered accordingly and against the appellant. 15. There is no need of interference with the well discussed and well- reasoned judgments of the Court below. Appeal dismissed without costs.