Judgment Chandramauli Kr.Prasad, J. 1. In allthese writ applications, common questions of law with little variation of facts arise and as such they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Petitioners, in all these writ applications, are the Life Insurance Corporation of India which is a statutory body created under the Life Insurance Corporation Act. The employees of the Life Insurance Corporation (for short the Corporation) made various grievance before the Assistant Labour Commissioner in regard to their service conditions and on that basis conciliation proceedings were initiated. In some of the writ application after the conciliation had failed the appropriate Government had made reference of the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. Petitioners plea is that the condition of the service of the employee being governed by the rules framed by it, the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act shall not be applicable. 3. Mr. Umesh Prasad Singh, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that in view of Section 48(2C) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act shall not be applicable. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of A.V. Nachane & Anr. V/s. The Union of India and Anr. (AIR 1982(2) SCC 1126), M. Venugopal V/s. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, A.P. and Anr. (A.I.R. 1994 SC 1343) and Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi and Ors. V/s. The State of Bihar and Ors. (A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3657). 4. Mr. Alok Kumar Sinha, however, appearing on behalf of the workmen in some of the writ applications, contends that by virtue of the aforesaid provision in the Act, the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act, so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under Section 48(2cc) of the Act, shall be excluded and not the entire provision of the Industrial Disputes Act. 5. Having appreciated the rival submission, I do not find substance in the submission of Mr. Singh. Section 48 (2C) of the Act shall exclude the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under section 48(2cc) of the Act. 6. The view which I have taken finds support from the decision relied on by Mr. Singh. Section 48 (2C) of the Act shall exclude the provision of the Industrial Disputes Act so far as they are in conflict with the rules framed under section 48(2cc) of the Act. 6. The view which I have taken finds support from the decision relied on by Mr. Singh in the case of M. Venugopal (supra) in which it has been held as follows:- "14. The amendments introduced in S. 48 of the Corporation Act have clearly excluded the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, so far they are in conflict with the rules framed under S. 43(2)(oo). The result whereof will be that termination of the service of the appellant shall not be deemed to be a "retrenchment" within the meaning of S. 2(oo), even if sub-sec. (bb) had not been introduced in the said section. Once S. 2 (oo) is not attracted, there is no question of application of S. 25-F on basis of which the termination of service of the appellant can be held to be invalid. The termination of the service of the appellant during the period of probation is in terms of the order of appointment read with Regulation 14 of the Regulations, which shall be deemed to be now Rules u/S. 48(2)(oo) of the Corporation Act." (Underlining mine) 7. In my opinion, the matter stands concluded by the judgment of the Supreme Court passed in Special Leave Petition (C) No. 974 of 1992 (The National Life Insurance Employees Associations (INTIC) V/s. L.I.C. of India and Ors.) on 17th February, 1992 in which it has been observed as follows: Mr. Rao for respondents relied upon the decision of this Court in A.V. Nachane & Anr. V/s. Union of India & Anr. ( 1982(2) SCR 246 ) to contend that since the rules are made on the subject, the Industrial Disputes Act will not be applicable to the present dispute raised by the petitioner. We are of the view that the observations made in the case cited by Shri Rao have been made in connection with the subject matter covered by the rules. They have no application to the present dispute which relates to the violation of the rules made on the subject. Hence the adjudicating machinery under the Industrial Dispute Act will have jurisdiction over the present dispute. In this view of the matter, the appeal has to be allowed which is, accordingly, allowed. They have no application to the present dispute which relates to the violation of the rules made on the subject. Hence the adjudicating machinery under the Industrial Dispute Act will have jurisdiction over the present dispute. In this view of the matter, the appeal has to be allowed which is, accordingly, allowed. We make it clear that this order has no reflection whatsoever on the merits of the dispute. The conciliation officer will proceed with the dispute according to law. There will be no order as to costs." 8. In the result, I do not find any merit in these applications and they are dismissed accordingly. No cost.