C. Y. SOMAYAJULU, J. ( 1 ) ON a complaint filed by the second respondent-S. H. O. , Karimnagar I town P. S. registered a case against the petitioners for offences under Section 498-A IPC and sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition act as Cr. No. 375 of 2003. This petition is filed to quash the said F. I. R ( 2 ) THE case of the second respondent is that petitioners (her husband, mother-in-law and sister-in-law respectively), who have been harassing her for additional dowry had thrown her out of the house. ( 3 ) THE main ground on which the petitioners seek quashing of the F. I. R. is the first petitioner divorcing the second respondent on 02-09-2003 and obtaining a certificate from the Qazi to the effect that the marriage between the first petitioner and second respondent stood dissolved. The case of the petitioners is that the dowry amount due and payable to the second respondent was sent through a demand draft by registered post and that the second respondent, after receiving the said draft had, with a view to harass the petitioners, lodged a false complainant against them. ( 4 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that since in Syed Hyder hussain Alias Sanovar v. State ofa. P. a learned single Judge held that there cannot be an offence under Section 498-A IPC after divorce and since in Rajaram Venkatesh v. State of a. P. 2, it was held that the place of residence of the wife would not give jurisdiction to lodge a private complaint for an offence under Section 498-A IPC when the offence did not take place in the jurisdiction of the court at which offence is allegedly committed and since the allegations in the FIR only show that the petitioners harassed the second respondent at Hydreabad but not at karimnagar, the FIR is liable to be quashed. It is his contention that second respondent left the society of the first petitioner on her own, by leaving her seven year old son in the custody of first petitioner and so first petitioner filed a petition to appoint him as the guardian of his minor son and that the family Court allowed that petition and appointed the first petitioner as the guardian of the minor son. ( 5 ) IN State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal and State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa the Apex court held that if the allegations in the complaint, when taken to be true, prima facie do not disclose any cognizable offence, or if the allegations therein are so absurd that no ordinary prudent man would believe them to be true, or when the complaint prima facie is an abuse of the process of law and the like, and FIR or a complaint can be quashed. The allegations in the complaint given by the second respondent show that her husband, mother-in-law and her sister (i. e. , petitioners) who have been harassing and persistently demanding her to bring additional dowry of rs. 1,00,000/- from her father had on 21-12-2002 assaulted and used filthy words against her, and had ultimately driven her out of their house on 25-02-2003 with an ultimatum that she would be allowed into their house only if she were to come with rs. 1,00,000 / - cash as do wry, and had retained the custody of her son aged seven years. ( 6 ) IN my considered opinion, even if the appointment of the first petitioner as the guardian of his minor son, by the Family court, is true, the same is not very relevant for the purpose of a decision of this case, because, this petition has nothing to do with the maintenance or custody of the minor son of the first petitioner and second respondent. ( 7 ) FIRST petitioner, as per the version of petitioners, pronounced the triple Talak on 22-08-2003 and obtained a certificate on 02-09-2003. The allegations in the FIR show that the second respondent was harassed and ill-treated for more dowry between 21-12-2002 and 22-05-2003, on which day she was driven out of the petitioners, with an ultimatum that she would be allowed entry into the house only if she brings cash of one lakh rupees. Thus the incidents of illtreatment and harassment for dowry by the petitioners of the second respondent, are long prior to the first respondent pronouncing triple talak and obtaining a divorce certificate. It should be kept in view that divorce is not a panacea of matrimonial offences. Therefore, merely because the husband divorces his wife marital offences committed by him prior to the divorce would not get wiped out. It should be kept in view that divorce is not a panacea of matrimonial offences. Therefore, merely because the husband divorces his wife marital offences committed by him prior to the divorce would not get wiped out. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in Syed Hyder Hussain s case (supra) is held that by divorcing the wife, husband would be absolved of the offence under Section 498-AIPC committed prior to the divorce. In fact in that case Shia Muslim couple started living together even after the husband pronouncing triple Talak subsequently wife complaint of harassment for dowry and so case under Section 498-A ipc was registered against the husband. The learned Judge while considering the question whether a Shia Muslim can remarry his divorced wife immediately after divorce held that since there cannot be a valid second marriage of a divorced wife, in Shia Muslim community, such husband committing an offence under Section 498-A IPC does not arise because there is no valid marriage. The facts in that case disclose that the incidents of harassment took place after divorce and after remarrying the divorced wife. So the facts in that case are entirely different from the facts in this case. That apart it is obvious that the attention of the learned Judge was not drawn to a Division Bench decision of this court in vungarala Yedukondalu v. State of Andhra pradesh, where it was held that there need not be a valid marriage for a woman to invoke Section 498-AIPC and it is enough if a man and woman live like husband and wife and so mistress also can invoke Sec. 498-A ipc. Therefore, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for petitioner is of no help to the petitioners. ( 8 ) THE facts in Rajaram Venkatesh s case (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are entirely different from the facts of this case. In this case, police have to investigate and find out if the allegations in the complaint are true or not. If the police, after the investigation, find that petitioners have committed offence alleged against them, they would file a charge sheet. If they find the allegations against the petitioners are not true, they would refer it as a mistake of fact. If the police, after the investigation, find that petitioners have committed offence alleged against them, they would file a charge sheet. If they find the allegations against the petitioners are not true, they would refer it as a mistake of fact. If the police find that the offence did not take place in territorial jurisdiction of that police station they would transmit the FIR to the police station in whose jurisdiction the offence is committed the fact that the FIR is lodged in a police station which has no territorial jurisdiction, is not and cannot be a ground for quashing the FIR, more so because in dowry harassment cases the wife necessarily has to get the amount demanded by the husband and in-laws from her parents. So, the place where the parents of the wife live also would get jurisdiction, because demand for payment in fact is to the parents of the wife. May be if the wife is a working woman having separate income, and need not go to her parents, the place where her parents stay may not be treated as the place of demand for payment. In any event the question whether any demand for dowry is made and where it was made are matters to be investigated into by the police. Suffice it to say that since the allegations in the FIR prima facie disclose harassment of the second respondent by the petitioners, I find no grounds to quash the FIR. ( 9 ) IN the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed.