ELIPE DHARMA RAO, J. ( 1 ) AGGRIEVED of the judgment and decree dated 17-11-2000 passed in A. S. No. 42 of 1996 by the learned Senior Civil Judge, sompeta, confirming the judgment and decree dated 11-7-1996 passed in O. S. No. 131 of 1984 by the learned Junior Civil judge, Palasa, the unsuccessful defendants preferred this Second Appeal. ( 2 ) THE respondent herein filed the suit for; perpetual injunction. The case of the respondent-plaintiff is that he is the exclusive owner of the property to an extent of Ac. 1. 85 cents in Sy. No. 233 admeasuring Ac. 8. 35 cents and joint patta was issued in the name of one Nityananda panda, father of plaintiff instead of his name and pattedar pass book was issued in his name. Subsequently, he made an application on 11-8-1983 to taluk office by paying the requisite amount for sub-division of entire land and for issuance of separate patta in his name. , but though no action was taken he continued to enjoy the property in his own right. While so, the defendants who are sons of one Lokanadha Panda, natural brother of plaintiff, without any manner of rights are threatening to interfere with the plaintiff s possession. Therefore, the plaintiff filed the above suit. ( 3 ) THE case of defendants, put forth in the written statement is that the suit property is the absolute property of Lokanadha Panda and after his demise, his widow and the defendants, who are his sons, are in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule land. It is averred that the sy. No. 233 was sub-divided and the suit land is covered in Sy. No. 233/2, patta no. 929 but not patta No. 114. The tahasildar, on an application of the first defendant to incorporate their name in respect of the suit land, passed orders in PIR no. 10 of 1992 TS dated 26-5-1983 subdividing the land and separate pattedar pass books were issued to the defendants. It is averred that the suit property is in their possession from the time of their predecessor and they have been paying the land revenue. ( 4 ) ON these rival pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entiled for permanent injunction, as prayed for? (2) Whether the court fee paid is not correct? (3) To what relief? ( 4 ) ON these rival pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entiled for permanent injunction, as prayed for? (2) Whether the court fee paid is not correct? (3) To what relief? ( 5 ) TO substantiate his case, the plaintiff examined P. Ws. 1 to 3 and got marked exs. A-1 to A-8 and the defendants- appellants herein examined D. Ws. 1 to 3 and got marked Exs. B-1 to B-14. Ex. X-1 certified extract of sale deed dated 1-1-1975 was also marked through P. W. 3. ( 6 ) THE learned Junior Civil Judge, on an appraisal of both oral and documentary evidence, placing heavy reliance on the boundary recitals in Ex. X-1 and on the evidence of P. W. 1 decreed the suit. ( 7 ) AGGRIEVED of the same, the appellants herein preferred appeal being A. S. No. 42 of 1996, before the lower appellate court, which by the impugned judgment and decree, dismissed the appeal with costs, confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED of the same, the defendants preferred this Second Appeal contending inter alia that the documents relied on by the plaintiff do not pertain to the suit land, the court below ought to have seen that the suit land is not in Sy. No. 233 but is in 233/2, as evidenced by Ex. B-3, the proceeding of the tahsildar and this document coupled with exs. B-1, 2, 4 to 14 establish that the appellants alone have title to the suit property and they have been in possession as on the date of suit and earlier thereto, that the courts below ought not to have eschewed Ex. B-3 from consideration in the absence of any order from the competent authority setting aside the same. It is vehemently contended that the courts below ought not to have ignored the admission of p. W. 3 that the suit land stands sub-divided and that the appellants were in possession and enjoyment thereof and, therefore, in view of this admission by the plaintiff s own witness, Ex. X-1 and the oral evidence of p. W. 3 have to be eschewed from consideration, to the extent that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. It is also contended that Exs. X-1 and the oral evidence of p. W. 3 have to be eschewed from consideration, to the extent that the plaintiff was in possession of the land. It is also contended that Exs. A-7 and 8 are of no avail to the plaintiffs inasmuch as they do not establish that the b schedule property of os No. 43 of 1972 is not the same as the suit property, that the courts below ought not to have shifted the burden on the defendants to disprove that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit land on the date of filing of the suit, inasmuch as it is a settled law that a party should succeed or fail on its own strength and not on the weakness of the defence pleaded by the other party, and the fact that the appellants were in possession of the suit land can well be evidenced by the factum of dismissal of injunction petition and consequential dismissal of C. M. A. holding that bare injunction suit is not maintainable without seeking the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession. Apart from these grounds, the appellants raised the following substantial cuestion of law: (A) Is the suit for permanent injunction simpliciter maintainable without seeking declaratory relief of title especially in view of Ex. B-3? (B) Is not the finding of the trial court as well as lower appellate court that the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of permanent injunction vitiated by not giving effect to the evidence of p. W. 3 in cross-examination and it is as a result of surmises and conjectures? (C) Are the trial court and the lower appellate court justified in throwing the burden of proof on the appellants and passing the judgments on certain weaknesses of the appellants case? (D) Is a suit maintainable in the form in which it was presented? ( 9 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants contended that both the courts below have not properly appreciated the evidence, both oral and documentary, which culminated into injustice to the appellants. He further contends that the first appellate court is duty bound to examine the entire evidence on record in correct perspective and then arrive at a just conclusion and since, the lower appellate court has overlooked important aspects of the evidence, this court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under sec. He further contends that the first appellate court is duty bound to examine the entire evidence on record in correct perspective and then arrive at a just conclusion and since, the lower appellate court has overlooked important aspects of the evidence, this court, in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under sec. 100 CPC is authorized to upset the concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below. Contending so, he relied on a decision of the Apex Court in Iswar Dass jain (dead) through LRs. , v. V. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs ( 10 ) WHEREAS it is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that both the courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff has proved his possession over the land and since it is a finding of fact, this court in exercise of its appellate powers under Sec. 100 shall not re-appreciate the evidence and since there is no question of law involved in the Second Appeal, it may be dismissed. ( 11 ) I shall now proceed to scrutinize the evidence, both oral and documentary, available on record, so as to examine as to whether both the courts below have appreciated the evidence in correct perspective. ( 12 ) IN this Second Appeal, the question of law is whether the suit for bare injunction is maintainable and in deciding this question, incidentally, the courts are expected to probe into the question whether the plaintiff was in lawful possession of the plaint schedule property, as on the date of filing of the suit. ( 13 ) AS stated earlier, the case of the plaintiff is that during the Survey and resettlement operations, the schedule topes and other adjacent land, admeasuring ac. 8. 35 cents was surveyed under sy. No. 233 in Kasibugga village a joint patta no. 114 was issued in favour of Loknath panda, i. e. the father of the defendants, instead of in the name of plaintiff; whereas it is the contention of the appellant-sdefendants the land in question is situated in s. No. 233/2 and patta No. 929 and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. 114 was issued in favour of Loknath panda, i. e. the father of the defendants, instead of in the name of plaintiff; whereas it is the contention of the appellant-sdefendants the land in question is situated in s. No. 233/2 and patta No. 929 and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the same. Having regard to these facts and circumstances, the temporary injunction petition filed by the plaintiff was dismissed, holding that the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit schedule land and the appeal preferred therefrom was also dismissed and thus the finding that the plaintiff-respondent herein was not in possession as on the date of filing of the suit has become final. ( 14 ) IT is needless to add that a party should either stand or fall on his own evidence, but it cannot take advantage of the alleged weakness of his opponent. Therefore, I shall now proceed to examine the documents filed by the plaintiff- respondent herein. Ex. A-1 pattedar passbook, does not contain the seal of the office or the signature of Tahsildar. Admittedly, Exs. A-2 to A-4 are the land receipts in respect of patta No. 114, which is not the subject matter of the suit and do not relate to the suit schedule property. Exs. A-5 and A-6, No. 2 adangals show the possession of plaintiff over an extent of ac. 1. 85 cents covered in Sy. Nos. 233 patta no. 114 and, therefore, they do not relate to the plaint schedule lands. Similarly, Ex. A-7 certified copy of the decree in OS No. 43 of 1972 filed by late Lokanadha Panda against the plaintiff for partition of the ancestral properties, which do not relate to the plaint schedule property herein, cannot be looked into. On these documents, the lower appellate court has observed that it failed to understand as to how the defendants came to secure, Ex. B-3, Proceedings of the tahsildar for sub-division, conveniently forgetting the fact that initially patta was granted in the name of Loknath Panda. The plaintiff failed to give explanation as to how the patta came to be issued in the name of defendant s father, when the plaintiff was in possession. This aspect was not adverted to by the lower appellate court and was carried away by the weak piece of evidence. The plaintiff failed to give explanation as to how the patta came to be issued in the name of defendant s father, when the plaintiff was in possession. This aspect was not adverted to by the lower appellate court and was carried away by the weak piece of evidence. It is the specific case of appellants that in subdivision of Sy. No. 233, the suit land covered by Sy. No. 233/2 under patta No. 929 but not 114 and on application the Tahasildar passed orders dated 26-5-1983. It is apt to note here that the court below having held that the evidence of both the sides is shaky, ought not to have lost sight of the fact that ex. B-1 copy of the 10 (1) Account, stands in the name of defendants issued in respect of sy. No. 233/2 over an extent of Ac. 1. 90 cents. When the court below has held that this property is not tallying with the suit schedule property, it ought not to have probed into as to how the appellants procured Ex. B-1 and B-3. Nothing prevented the court from appointing a commissioner for the identification of the suit schedule property. ( 15 ) THAT apart, the court below has lost sight of the fact that P. W. 3, a neighbouring land holder and a witness of the plaintiff himself, has admitted that prior to his sale, lokanath Panda used to enjoy usufruct of the plaint schedule tope. The admission of p. W. 3 that the property covered under patta no. 114 and Sy. No. 233 is in the name of several persons; inasmuch as the extent is more and subsequently there was splitting of patta and sub-division was not adverted to by both the courts below. Besides these admissions, there is a specific admission by p. W. 3 that the property under Sy. No. 233 is sub-divided and assigned to the defendants and a separate patta was also issued to the defendants. The court below having held that the evidence of both sides is shaky, ought to have adverted to all these aspects of the evidence and then ought to have drawn a balance sheet of the same, instead of being carried away by weak documents produced by plaintiff. ( 16 ) THE documents Exs. The court below having held that the evidence of both sides is shaky, ought to have adverted to all these aspects of the evidence and then ought to have drawn a balance sheet of the same, instead of being carried away by weak documents produced by plaintiff. ( 16 ) THE documents Exs. B-1 to B-10 filed by the defendants are brushed aside by the courts below by a single stroke, observing that though they are revenue records, yet they are all issued only in the year 1983 and 1984 i. e. subsequent to the filing of the suit, ignoring Ex. B-11 whereunder the Mandal revenue Officer has endorsed that the old records are not available. Ex. B-11 is a public document. When the genuineness of the said document was doubted by the court or by the plaintiff, nothing prevented them from calling the said Mandal Revenue officer to the court as a witness. All these facts clinchingly show that both the courts have badly appreciated the evidence, which calls for an interference by this court in second Appeal. Therefore, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants in Iswar Dass Jain s case squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of this case. I am further supported in this view by a decision of Apex court in Deva (dead) through LRs. v. Sajjan kumar (dead) by LRs. , wherein their lordships have held that when a very important piece of evidence in the nature of admission of the defendant had been overlooked by the courts below and the suit was wrongly dismissed on the ground of limitation, the High Court is fully justified in reversing the concurrent judgments of the courts below in Second Appeal. ( 17 ) NOW I shall advert to the question whether, in the background of his case, a bare injunction suit is maintainable. It is admitted fact that there was Survey and settlement. P. W. 3 states that the extent of sy. No. 233 was large and during the said survey Operations, land to an extent of ac. 1. 85 cents in Sy. No. 233/2 was allotted to the defendants. In this background, a suit for bare injunction without seeking the relief declaration of title is not maintainable. P. W. 3 states that the extent of sy. No. 233 was large and during the said survey Operations, land to an extent of ac. 1. 85 cents in Sy. No. 233/2 was allotted to the defendants. In this background, a suit for bare injunction without seeking the relief declaration of title is not maintainable. When it is the case of plaintiff that the patta was issued in favour of the defendants mistakenly, he ought to have filed a suit for declaration of title instead of bare injunction suit without possession. ( 18 ) THE cumulative effect of the foregoing discussion is that both the courts below have not considered the evidence in proper perspective, more particularly the admissions made by P. W. 3 and Ex. B-11, on behalf of the appellants defendants. Therefore, the Second Appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed dismissing the suit of the plaintiff. No order as to costs.