ORDER 1. Three accused persons were tried by the Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad alleging that they caused the death of one Ran Veer Singh and caused injury to his brother Sukh Veer Singh. There was another accused also in the company of these accused persons and as he was a juvenile he was tried separately by the Juvenile Court. All the three accused persons - Lakshman Singh, Kirtan Singh and Surendra alias Bablu were convicted by the Sessions Court for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. All of them were found guilty of offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC for having caused injuries to Sukh Veer Singh. Though there was conviction also under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC, no separate sentence was awarded to them. These accused persons filed appeal before the High Court and the Division Bench of the High Court held that the prosecution was not successful in proving that there was any common intention on the part of all the accused and there could only be conviction and d sentence based on their individual acts. First accused Lakshman Singh was, thus, found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC for having caused the death of Ran Veer. The second accused Kirtan Singh was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC for having caused injury to PW 2 Sukh Veer and he was also found guilty of offence punishable under Section 324 IPC for causing injury to Ran Veer, the deceased. The conviction of the second accused Kirtan Singh for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC was set aside. The third accused Surendra @ Bablu was acquitted of all the charges filed against him. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court PW 2 Sukh Veer Singh, brother of the deceased Ran Veer has filed this appeal. 2. Therefore, in this appeal, we are only concerned with the acquittal of f third accused Surendra @ Bablu and the failure of the Division Bench in convicting second accused Kirtan Singh for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC. 3. We heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents. 4. The incident happened on 1-6-1995 in Village Atuta within the jurisdiction of Police Station Babugarh, District Ghaziabad. The accused persons and the deceased had adjacent fields wherein they were raising sugarcane cultivation. 3. We heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondents. 4. The incident happened on 1-6-1995 in Village Atuta within the jurisdiction of Police Station Babugarh, District Ghaziabad. The accused persons and the deceased had adjacent fields wherein they were raising sugarcane cultivation. There was a dispute between the parties and it was alleged that the deceased had lowered the ground level of his field and the accused persons were annoyed by this conduct of the deceased. According to h the prosecution, all the accused came armed with weapons and attacked deceased Ran Veer and PW 2 Sukh Veer. First accused Lakshman Singh who was armed with a country-made pistol, fired 4-5 shots at deceased Ran Veer. The other accused persons caused injury to the deceased and PW 2. The second accused Kirtan Singh was alleged to have been armed with "farsa" and the third accused Surendra was alleged to have been armed with "ballam". The Sessions Judge held that there was common intention on the part of these accused persons in causing the death of deceased Ran Veer and all of them were found guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302/34 IPC. The learned Sessions Judge has not made any specific discussion as to the applicability of Section 34 IPC. However, when the matter came up in appeal, the High Court considered that question in detail and held that in the background of the facts proved in the case, it was difficult to hold that all the accused shared common intention to cause the death of Ran Veer and the High Court further held that these accused could be made liable only for their individual acts. 5. It may be noticed that the incident happened in the agricultural field where these persons apparently came for their agricultural work. It is true that the accused were armed with weapons but that by itself is not sufficient to hold that all the persons had come there with the intention of causing death of Ran Veer. The evidence in the case only disclosed that the accused persons came in a group and first accused Lakshman Singh fired at deceased Ran Veer. It is true that the accused were armed with weapons but that by itself is not sufficient to hold that all the persons had come there with the intention of causing death of Ran Veer. The evidence in the case only disclosed that the accused persons came in a group and first accused Lakshman Singh fired at deceased Ran Veer. It is also important to note that the deceased Ran Veer had sustained one more injury which is incised in nature and the same is alleged to have been caused by the second accused Kirtan Singh who was armed with a "farsa". This injury was not grievous and the second accused was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC for having caused grievous injury to PW 2. The fact that the second accused did not cause any grievous injury even though he was armed with deadly weapon, was also taken note of by the High Court for convicting him rather than holding that he shared the common intention to cause the death of the deceased. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant made reference of the cases of this Court in Raju Ram v. State of Bihar1, Joginder Singh v. State of Haryana2, State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan3, State of U.P. v. Harban Sahai4 and Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar5. 7. In State of U.P. v. Iftikhar Khan3 this Court considered in detail the nature of vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC. It was held that to convict a person for offence applying Section 34 IPC, it is necessary to establish that the criminal act was done in concert, pursuant to a prearranged plan and it is also to be borne in mind that it is difficult, if not impossible, to procure direct evidence to prove the intention of a person. Therefore, courts, in most cases, have to infer the intention from the act or the actual conduct of a particular person or from the other relevant circumstances of the case. Such inference of common intention within the meaning of Section 34 IPC should never be a reached unless the necessary inference is deducible from the circumstances of the case. The cases referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant turned on the facts of that case. Such inference of common intention within the meaning of Section 34 IPC should never be a reached unless the necessary inference is deducible from the circumstances of the case. The cases referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant turned on the facts of that case. The complicity of the accused could be decided under Section 34 IPC only on the basis of facts of each case. 8. Coming to the facts of the present case, the High Court has taken the view that the second accused Kirtan Singh and the third accused Surendra did not share the common intention of causing death of Ran Veer. On a close scrutiny of the facts discussed in this case, it cannot be said that the High Court had taken a perverse view and the finding of the High Court cannot be said to be unreasonable. Therefore, this Court cannot interfere with that finding of the High Court and the acquittal of the second accused Kirtan Singh for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC is only to be confirmed. 9. Coming to the acquittal of third accused Surendra @ Bablu, the High Court has given certain specific reasons. There was a dispute as to the nature of injury sustained by the deceased Ran Veer Singh and PW 2. The doctor who gave evidence before the Sessions Court said that these injuries could have been caused by "hallam". The doctor was a witness before the Juvenile Court in the trial of the co-accused Jitendra who was a juvenile. The evidence given by this doctor previously was confronted when he was examined before the Sessions Court. In the Juvenile Court, the doctor said that these injuries could not have been caused by ballam-blows. The third accused Surendra was alleged to have been armed with "hallam". It was in this background that there was serious doubt regarding the participation of the third accused e Surendra. 10. The counsel for the appellant contended that there was direct evidence regarding the overt act allegedly committed by the third accused and, therefore, the Court should not place reliance on this expert evidence which is only an opinion evidence. The High Court has given reasons as to f why dispute arose and has given certain reasons for the acquittal of the accused Surendra. 11. The High Court has given reasons as to f why dispute arose and has given certain reasons for the acquittal of the accused Surendra. 11. We do not think that it is a perverse finding warranting interference by this Court. 12. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.