ORDER 1. The defendant in the original suit is in appeal before us. It arises out of a judgment and decree passed by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in RSA No. 876 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as also the first appellate court were reversed. 2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The plaintiff-respondent obtained a money decree against the defendant-appellant for a sum of Rs 8865. It initiated an execution proceeding for executing the aforementioned decree. In the said proceeding, a piece of land measuring 5 acres 61 guntas was put on auction. The plaintiff decree-holder himself purchased the suit property in the year 1972. The auction-sale was confirmed in the year 1973. It, however, appears that the appellant herein preferred an execution appeal there against, which was dismissed in 1974. The sale certificate in relation to the aforementioned land was issued in favour of the plaintiff-respondent on 28-11-1980. The respondent did not however take any step to obtain delivery of possession of the said property within a period of one year in terms of Order 21 Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). In the year 1998, the plaintiff-respondent filed a suit praying for declaration of title and possession of the suit property, which was dismissed by the trial court. 3. Before the trial court an objection was raised by the appellant to the effect that the suit was barred under Section 47 whereupon a specific issue was framed to the trial being Issue 3, which is in the following terms: "3. Whether he proves that Section 47 CPC is a bar for this suit?" The said issue was determined in favour of the defendant-appellant and against the plaintiff-respondent. The aforementioned finding was affirmed by the first appellate court. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment relying on and on the basis of the decision in the case of Nandarani Mazumdar v. Indian Airlines1 as also the decision in the case of M.C. Subbanna v. Nanjamma2 held that even if the suit was not maintainable, the Court had ample power to direct that the plaint be treated as an application filed by the plaintiff under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 4. 4. Mr Balakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would raise a short question in support of this appeal. The learned counsel would contend that the High Court despite noticing the binding C decision of this Court in Harnandrai Badridas v. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad3 sought to distinguish the same, inter alia, relying on the decision in Subbanna case2 although the basis for decision of the Mysore High Court was the minority judgment of Cuming, J. in the case of Kailash Chandra Tarafdar v. Gopal Chandra Poddar4 without considering that this Court in Harnandrai case3 has clearly affirmed the majority decision. 5. It was further pointed out that this Court in Nandarani Mazumdar v. Indian Airlines1 distinguished Harnandrai case3 only to the effect that although the ratio laid down therein is correct but in an appropriate case the court can exercise its inherent jurisdiction to direct that the plaint be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC. 6. Mr Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the suit being governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the High Court cannot be said to have committed an error in passing the impugned order inasmuch as the sale certificate had been issued on 28-11-1980 and the suit having been filed within eight years therefrom, the same was within the prescribed period of limitation. 7. Order 21 Rule 95 CPC reads thus: "95. Delivery of property in occupancy of judgment-debtor.-Where the immovable property sold is in the occupancy of the judgment-debtor or of some person on his behalf or of some person claiming under a title created by the judgment-debtor subsequently to the attachment of such property and a certificate in respect thereof has been granted under Rule 94, the Court shall, on the application of the purchaser, order delivery to be made by putting such purchaser or any person whom he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf in possession of the property, and, if need be, by removing any person who refuses to vacate the same." 8. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provisions would leave no manner of doubt and in particular having regard to the amendments carried in CPC by reason of the CPC Amendment Act, 1976 that the steps for obtaining delivery of property in occupancy of the judgment-debtor is required to be taken by the auction-purchaser in terms of Order 21 Rule 95 CPC and, thus, a separate suit to enforce such a right would, therefore, be not maintainable. 9. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that when the decree is satisfied, the execution case comes to an end. Once a decree is satisfied, the question of invoking the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not arise, inasmuch as a bare perusal thereof would clearly go to show that the same would be attracted only when an application is filed for executing the decree. Article 136 of the Limitation Act is, therefore, not attracted when an application is required to be filed in the execution proceedings for a purpose other than for execution of the decree. Once a decree stands satisfied, the execution proceedings come to an end and, in that view of the matter, a proceeding in the nature of one contemplated under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC is required to be initiated for the purpose of obtaining delivery of possession of the property purchased in court auction by the decree-holder. Such an application must be filed within the prescribed period of limitation as provided for under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963 having provided for a specific provision prescribing limitation for filing an appropriate application for recovery of possession of any property in possession of the judgment debtor, it is idle to contend that Article 136 of the Limitation Act would apply even in relation thereto. The law enunciated by the majority opinion of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kailash Chandra Tarafdar v. Gopal Chandra Poddar4 has been approved by this Court in Harnandrai case3 in the following terms: (SCC pp. 470-71, para 5) "5. As we have already said, the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court. 470-71, para 5) "5. As we have already said, the appellant relied on the Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court. We have carefully gone through the various decisions cited before us and we find ourselves in agreement with the opinion of the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Kailash Tarafdar case4. If a confirmation of thl sale would finally terminate all questions as to execution of the decree it is difficult to appreciate why the legislature would frame such rules as Rules 95 to 102 under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We are in respectful agreement with G.K. Mitter, J., that the legislature must have thought that the duty of the executing court should not end with the confirmation of the sale and it is because the legislature thought that the auction-purchaser should have the right of applying for possession under the provisions of Rules 95 and 96 that proceedings for obtaining possession were included in the catena of rules relating to the execution of the decree." 10. In Subbanna case2 the Mysore High Court, on the other hand, preferred to follow the dissenting minority opinion of Cuming, J. in Kailash Chandra Tarafdar case4 and not the majority one. The High Court, therefore, a committed a manifest error in relying upon the judgment of the Mysore High Court despite the fact that the majority opinion of the Calcutta High Court in Kailash Chandra Tarafdar case4 has been approved by this Court in Hamandrai Badridas v. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad3. 11. In Nandarani Mazumdar v. Indian Airlines1 this Court held, thus: (SCC p. 462, para 4) "We indicated to the counsel for the respondents that even if there be some force in the plea that a separate suit did not lie (though the argument advanced by Mr Govindan Nair for the appellant in support of the stand that a separate suit for the reliefs claimed lay was forceful), the suit could as a measure of ex debito justitiae be treated as an execution petition. There is good authority for converting an execution application into a suit and there could, in our opinion, be no valid objection to the counter-process of converting a suit into an execution proceeding .... " 12. There is good authority for converting an execution application into a suit and there could, in our opinion, be no valid objection to the counter-process of converting a suit into an execution proceeding .... " 12. A bare perusal of the said judgment, therefore, would clearly go to show that although it was held therein that a separate suit would not be maintainable for the purpose of recovery of possession of a property which d was in possession of the judgment-debtor, but, Their Lordships proceeded to grant relief to the decree-holder ex debito justitiae by directing that the plaint be treated as an application under Order 21 Rule 95 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 13. Such a course could have been taken recourse to if a finding could have been arrived at by the trial court that the suit filed by the e plaintiff-respondent was within the prescribed period of limitation. Keeping in view the fact that the sale was confirmed in the year 1973 and the execution appeal filed by the respondent judgment-debtor was dismissed in the year 1974, in terms of Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC was required to be filed by the respondent herein within a period of one year thereafter. 14. Having regard to our findings abovementioned, that in a case of this nature Article 134 of the Limitation Act will- apply and not Article 136, the question of exercising this Courts power ex debito justitiae does not arise as the same would result in futility. 15. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment. It cannot, therefore, be sustained and is accordingly set aside. This appeal is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.