JUDGMENT : TARUN AGARWALA, J. 1. The Plaintiff was appointed as a Head Mistress w.e.f. 11.7.1972 in the Defendant No. 2 school, which was managed by the Defendant No. 1 Committee. The Plaintiff was confirmed on the said post in 1974. The Plaintiff alleged that she made a complaint to the Defendant No. 1 about the working of Ashok Kumar Gupta, who was working as a clerk. The Defendant No. 1 did not like this, and the services of Plaintiff were terminated w.e.f. 18.10.1981. The Plaintiff alleged that no enquiry was made nor was she provided a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Plaintiff contended that her services could not be terminated upon the sweet will of the Defendants and the alleged termination of the Plaintiff's services was illegal and without jurisdiction and that the Plaintiff continued to be in the service of the Defendants with all the benefits. Accordingly, she filed a suit for a declaration praying that the enquiry proceedings and the order of the termination of the Plaintiffs services be declared illegal, invalid and void and that the Plaintiff continued to be in the services of the Defendants as a Head Mistress with all the rights and privileges attached to the said post and that the Plaintiff was further entitled to the all emoluments. 2. The Defendants in their written statement denied the plaint allegations and contended that the Plaintiff was negligent in her duties and did not obey the directions and orders of the manager of the Defendant No. 1 Committee. The Plaintiff was charge-sheeted and an enquiry was made and thereafter the Defendant No. 1 in its meeting resolved to terminate the services of the Plaintiff w.e.f. 18.10.1981. The Defendants contended that the services of the Plaintiff are not governed by any Act, Regulations or Rules of the Government and that the Defendants had full power to terminate the services of the Plaintiff even without holding an enquiry and that the principle of master and servant was applicable. The Defendants further stated that the employee could not be forced to continue the service of the Plaintiff. 3. The Plaintiff in her replication reiterated the averments made in the plaint and further contended that the Government Rules and Regulations are applicable and that her services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. The Defendants further stated that the employee could not be forced to continue the service of the Plaintiff. 3. The Plaintiff in her replication reiterated the averments made in the plaint and further contended that the Government Rules and Regulations are applicable and that her services were terminated in violation of the principles of natural justice. 4. The trial court, after framing the issues, decreed the suit of the Plaintiff and declared that the order dated 18.10.1981 terminating the services of the Plaintiff was illegal and void and that the Plaintiff continued to be in the service of the Defendants. The trial court further declared that she was entitled to her salary along with interest @ 10% per annum. 5. The trial court held that the Defendants' educational institution was a recognised institution and is governed by the U.P. Recognised Basic Schools (Recruitment and Conditions of Services of Teachers and Other Conditions) Rules, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules). The trial court further held that in view of Rule 11 of the Rules, the Defendants could be terminate the services of the Plaintiff without seeking prior approval from the Basic Education Officer. The trial court held that since the order of the termination of the Plaintiffs services was in violation of Rule 11 of the Rules, the order of termination of the Plaintiff's services was null and void and that she continued to be in the services of the Defendants. 6. Aggrieved by the decree of the trial court, the Defendants filed an appeal, which was dismissed. The appellate court held that no opportunity of hearing was given to the Plaintiff and that the order of termination of the services of the Plaintiff was passed in gross violation of the rules of natural justice. The appellate court further held that the principle of master and servant relationship was not applicable and that the Rules of 1975 squarely applied and that the Defendants could not terminate the services of the Plaintiff without any cause. 7. The Defendants have now preferred the present second appeal u/s 100, CPC At the time of the admission of the appeal, the following substantial question of law were formulated, namely: (a) As to whether the institution which is not recognised under the provisions of U.P. Basic Education Act, the approval of District Basic Education Officer is needed for termination of services of a teacher. (b) As to whether the civil court has jurisdiction to enforce its verdict upon the employer who has terminated the service of an employee and simple rule of master and servant is applicable. (c) As to whether a person after having been given full opportunity of being heard, can approach the Court for reinstatement in service by way of suit and such a suit is maintainable in civil court. 8. Heard Sri. R.N. Bhalla, the learned Counsel for the Defendants and Smt. Kanti Pandey, the Plaintiff, who appeared in person. 9. The learned Counsel for the Defendants submitted that the Defendant No. 1 educational institution is not a recognised institution, nor aided by the Government and that the said institution is managed by a private body. He further submitted that since the Defendant institution is not a recognized institution, the Rules of 1975 are not applicable and therefore, the Defendants were not required to seek prior approval from the Basic Education Officer before terminating the services of the Plaintiff. The Defendants further submitted that the principle of master and servant relationship was applicable and that the Defendants had full power to terminate the services of the Plaintiff at their own sweet will even without holding an inquiry, even though in the present case, it was argued, that a charge-sheet was given and an enquiry was held and that the Plaintiff was given an opportunity of hearing before passing the order of termination. The learned Counsel further argued that no issue was framed on the question as to whether the Defendants' institution is a recognised institution or not and in the absence of non-framing of the aforesaid issue, the courts below could not have given a finding on the aforesaid point. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has placed a judgment of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation Vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, , in which it was held that a contract of personal service could not be interfered and that the reinstatement in service could not be granted since it had no statutory status. The learned Counsel has also relied upon various decisions of the High Courts, namely Bibi Rehana Khatun vs. Iqtidar Uddin Hasan, AIR 1943 All 184 , Shanti vs. Surta and Others, AIR 1973 P&H 387 , Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. The learned Counsel has also relied upon various decisions of the High Courts, namely Bibi Rehana Khatun vs. Iqtidar Uddin Hasan, AIR 1943 All 184 , Shanti vs. Surta and Others, AIR 1973 P&H 387 , Vanguard Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sarla Devi, AIR 1959 P&H 297 and Pandu Dhondi Yerudkar and Another vs. Ananda Krishna Patil, AIR 1975 Bom 52 , to support his contention that no finding can be given on a point which was not a point in issue, and that the Court should refuse to frame an issue on a point in a suit where no specific averment was taken in the pleadings. 10. In my view, the contentions raised by the learned Counsel for the Defendant Appellants are devoid of any merit and are liable to be rejected. 11. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Defendants that the institution was not a recognized institution and that the Rules of 1975 were not applicable is devoid of any merit. It may be stated here that the Defendants had taken a stand in their written statement to the effect that their institution was not governed by any Act, Regulations or Rules framed by the Government. Thus, the burden was upon the Defendants to prove and justify their stand. 12. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact to the effect that the Defendants institution was a recognised institution and that the Rules of 1975 was applicable. This Court in a second appeal cannot interfere in the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. This Court cannot reappraise the evidence on record. The learned Counsel has vehemently argued that the findings of the court below are not based on evidence. In order to test this contention this Court sifted through the record of the lower court and some of the evidence that has been brought on record are as under: (a) Statement of DW-Kunj Behari Gupta, President of the Managing Committee, wherein he admitted that instructions were being received by the institution from the Basic Education Officer. In order to test this contention this Court sifted through the record of the lower court and some of the evidence that has been brought on record are as under: (a) Statement of DW-Kunj Behari Gupta, President of the Managing Committee, wherein he admitted that instructions were being received by the institution from the Basic Education Officer. (b) Letter dated 14.5.1977 written by the Manager of the Defendants institution to the District Inspector of Schools and Basic Education Officer in which it was stated that the Defendants institution would comply with all the requirements contemplated under the Basic Education Act and that the teachers will be paid the salary as per the wages fixed by the State Government. The letter further indicates that the appointments and retrenchment of teachers would be done as per the Basic Education Act and that the management will not take any arbitrary decisions. (c) Letter dated 9.9.1977 written by District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur in which it was stated that the Defendants institution was a recognized institution, recognised by the Education Department and that the Basic Education Act was applicable to the Defendants institution. The said letter further indicated that three teachers had been removed from the service of the Defendants institution without seeking prior approval from the Basic Education Officer. The District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur directed the Defendants to take the three teachers back in service. (d) Letter dated 11.10.1977 written by the Plaintiff to the President of the Managing Committee informing him that the three teachers had been taken back in service. (e) A copy of the accounts of the Defendants institution showing that a sum of Rs. 4,500 was deposited for obtaining recognition from the Basic Education Department. 13. From the aforesaid, it is crystal clear, that the Defendants' institution is a recognised institution under the Basic Education Act, 1972, and the said Act and the Rules of 1975 are fully applicable to the Defendants' institution. 14. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the original documents were not filed and therefore, the copies of these documents were inadmissible in evidence and the same could not be relied upon or taken into consideration is wholly untenable. These documents have been admitted by the DW-1 in his statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC Further, the original documents were in the custody of the Defendants. These documents have been admitted by the DW-1 in his statement under Order X, Rule 2, CPC Further, the original documents were in the custody of the Defendants. This submission is therefore, devoid of any merit and is rejected. 15. The learned Counsel for the Appellant next contended that no issue was framed as to whether the Defendants institution was a recognised institution or not and in the absence this issue being framed, the court below could not decide this point. This submission of the learned Counsel is not correct. Issue Nos. 1 and 4, as framed by the trial court reads as under: Issue No. 1. Whether the Defendants had a valid power to terminate the services of the Plaintiff? Issue No. 4. Whether the order of termination of the services of the Plaintiff is invalid, null and avoid. If so its effect? 16. The stand taken by the Defendants was that their institution was not governed by any Act, Rules or Regulations framed by the Government and that their institution being a private institution, the principle of master and servant relationship was applicable and that the Defendants had full authority to terminate the services of the Plaintiff without holding an enquiry and without seeking prior approval from the educational authorities The validity of the order of the termination of the Plaintiff's services is dependent upon the fact as to whether prior approval was required to be taken under the Rules of 1975 or not. If the Act and Rules were not applicable, in that case issue No. 1 would have been decided in favour of the Defendants and issue No. 4 would have been decided against the Plaintiff. Therefore, the issue with regard to the status of the Defendants' institution was not required to be separately adjudicated by framing a separate issue. This point could be decided while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 4. The judgments cited by the counsel are therefore, of no avail and are not helpful to the Defendants' case. Thus, this contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant also fails. 17. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants was that full opportunity of hearing was given to the Plaintiff before terminating her services. This submission is also devoid of any merit. Thus, this contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant also fails. 17. The next submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellants was that full opportunity of hearing was given to the Plaintiff before terminating her services. This submission is also devoid of any merit. Both the courts below have given concurrent findings of fact that the principles of natural justice was violated and no opportunity of hearing was provided to the Plaintiff. This finding of fact cannot be interfered in this appeal. However, from the record, I find that pursuant to the charge-sheet, the Plaintiff submitted her reply and thereafter, the managing committee resolved to terminate her services. If the committee was not satisfied with the explanation submitted by the Plaintiff, the committee ought to have appointed an Enquiry Officer and conducted a domestic enquiry. In the present case, no such enquiry was held. The charges levelled against the Plaintiff were never proved. 18. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 , the Supreme Court in para 64, held: In the case of a private institution, the relationship between the management and the employees is contractual in nature. A teacher, if the contract so provides, can be produced against, and appropriate disciplinary action can be taken if the misconduct of the teacher is proved. Considering the nature of the duties and keeping the principle of natural justice in mind for the purposes of establishing misconduct and taking action thereon, it is imperative that a fair domestic enquiry is conducted. It is only on the basis of the result of the disciplinary enquiry that the management will be entitled to take appropriate action. 19. Thus, it is clear that the rules of natural justice has to be followed even for a private institution, and where the institution is a recognized institution, and statutory rules and regulations govern the institution, in that case, the institution is required to seek prior approval of their actions from the appropriate authority. In the present case, the rules of natural justice were not followed. Further, previous permission was not obtained from the authority. Thus, the order of termination was invalid and a nullity in the eye of law. 20. In the present case, the rules of natural justice were not followed. Further, previous permission was not obtained from the authority. Thus, the order of termination was invalid and a nullity in the eye of law. 20. The learned Counsel for the Appellant next contended that the Defendants institution was a private body and had full authority to terminate the services of the Plaintiff without assigning any reason and that the principle of master and servant relationship was applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. No doubt, the Defendants' institution is a private body, but is governed by certain Rules and Regulations framed by the State. Imparting education is a noble occupation, but while doing so a public duty is cast upon the Defendants. This public duty cannot be performed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The principle of natural justice has to be adhered and the rules of master and servant will not be applicable. In the present case, the Plaintiff was appointed in 1972 and was confirmed in 1974. She worked for 9 years and thereafter, her services were terminated on account of an alleged misconduct. The services of a confirmed teacher could not be terminated in an arbitrary manner. The minimum requirement of the principle of natural justice is required to be followed. Thus, the rule of master and servant is not applicable in the present case, especially; when the action of the Defendants was governed by the Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government. 21. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , the Supreme Court held: In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carried with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with. 22. 22. In Indra Pal Gupta vs. Managing Committee, Model Inter College, AIR 1984 SC 1110 , the College was an educational institution recognised under U.P. Intermediate Education Act and was governed by the provisions of the said Act. The Supreme Court held that the procedure for imposing the punishment of dismissal or removal from service are normally the same as provided by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the principles to be applied will be the same as those given in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court held: That if the order of termination carried a stigma it has to fall to the ground unless it is preceded by an enquiry as contemplated by law. A reading of the letter of termination of the service and the resolution which forms part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark of disgrace or infamy and that the Appellant is visited with evil consequences as explained in Parshottam Lal Dhingra's case. 23. The Supreme Court in para 72 of T.M.A. Pai Foundation's case (supra) held that once aid is granted to a private professional education institution, the Government can put fetters on the freedom in the matter of administration and management of the institution. In my view, the same principle will equally apply to a private institution, which is recognised under the Act. Private institutions discharge public duties like Government institutions by way of imparting education to students. These private institutions are subject to the Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government. Employment in such institutions are therefore, not devoid of any public character. The service conditions of teachers are not purely of a private character but are of a public character protected by Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government. 24. These private institutions are subject to the Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government. Employment in such institutions are therefore, not devoid of any public character. The service conditions of teachers are not purely of a private character but are of a public character protected by Rules and Regulations framed by the State Government. 24. The Supreme Court in Air India Statutory Corporation vs. United Labour Union and Others, (1997) 9 SCC 377 , held: Though, right to employment cannot, as a right, be claimed but after the appointment to a post or an office, be it under the State, its agency instrumentality, jurisdic person or private entrepreneur it is required to be dealt with as per public element and to act in public interest assuring equality, which is a genus of Article 14 and all other concomitant rights emanating therefrom are species to make their right to life and dignity of person real and meaningful. 25. In the present case, the termination of the service was not founded on the right flowing from the contract of service. The termination of the service of the Plaintiff was issued on the ground of misconduct. Since the order of termination carried a stigma, it was necessary for the Defendants to hold an enquiry and prove the charges and further provide an opportunity to the Plaintiff to defend herself. In the present case, it has already been held that no enquiry was held, nor an opportunity of hearing was given to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the order of the termination of the services of the Plaintiff was void and non est. The principles evolved by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases (supra) equally applies to the Plaintiff's case. 26. The learned Counsel contended that the declaration granted by the courts below tantamounts to an enforcement of a contract of personal service, which could not be granted in view of the bar raised under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1976) 2 SCC 58 . 27. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1976) 2 SCC 58 . 27. In Aley Ahmad Abidi vs. District Inspector of Schools, Allahabad and Others, AIR 1977 All 539 , it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that the Committee of an Inter College is not a statutory body, nevertheless a writ petition filed against it is maintainable if such petition is for enforcement of performance of any legal obligatory duties imposed on such committee by a statute. 28. The question whether the Appellant's committed is a statutory body or not is not relevant to the grant of a relief in a civil suit. A civil court is bound to enforce the law. The provision of Rule 11 of 1975 requiring that prior approval has to be taken from the Basic Education Officer before terminating the services of the Plaintiff are statutory provisions. These Rules were framed by the State Government in exercise of its powers conferred on it by Section 19 (2)(c) of the U.P. Basic Education Act, 1972. It cannot be therefore, disputed that the said Rules have statutory force and were clearly applicable upon the Defendants institution. Rule 11 of the Rules states: 11. Dismissal and Removal of Teachers. No order dismissing, removing or terminating the services of a teacher or other employee of a recognised school shall be passed save with the prior approval in writing of the Basic Shiksha Adhikari. 29. It is clear that the services of the Plaintiff could not be terminated by the management unless and until prior approval was taken from the Basic Education Officer, which was not done in the present case. Thus, the order of termination passed by the Defendant was invalid, null and void. 30. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, U.P. Warehousing Corporation vs. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1969) 2 SCC 838 is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the regulations in question in that case were framed by the Central Warehousing Board in exercise of its powers of regulating, the conditions of service of its employees which was not legislative in character. In the present case the Rules of 1975 are statutory provision and has the force of law and were applicable to the Defendants' institution. 31. In the present case the Rules of 1975 are statutory provision and has the force of law and were applicable to the Defendants' institution. 31. In the present case, the civil court, which has granted the declaration did not enforce any contract of personal service, but was only enforcing the conditions of service prescribed by statutory rules for teachers of recognised institutions. 32. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act gives a discretion to the Court to give a declaration where a person is entitled to a legal character. In the present case the discretion exercised by the court below was sound inasmuch as in the present case awarding damages was not an adequate remedy. The declaration granted by the trial court was properly made. 33. In Malloch vs. Aberdeen Corporation, 1971 (2) All ER 1278, it was held that where an employer failed to take the preliminary steps which the law regarded as essential he had no power to dismiss an employee and any purported dismissal was a nullity. In Vine vs. National Dock Labour Board, 1956 (3) All ER 939, it was held that since damages was not an adequate remedy, the discretion exercised by the trial court granting the relief of declaration was properly made. 34. Thus, where a status is given to an employee and there has been a violation of a provision of the statute while terminating the services of an employee, the latter will be eligible to get the relief of a declaration that the order is null and inoperative and that he continues to be in service, as it will not be a mere case of master terminating the services of a servant. 35. In Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and Others vs. Lakshmi Narain and Others, (1976) 2 SCC 58 , P.N. Bhagwati, J. in its separate judgment held that there are two distinct classes of cases, which might arise while considering the relationship between an employer and employee. The relationship may be governed by a contract or it may be governed by a statute or statutory regulations. In the former case, if the employer repudiates the contract of employment by dismissing his employee, such wrongful repudation of a contract of employment by employer effectively terminates the employment and in such cases the employee is only entitled to claim damages for wrongful breach of contract. In the former case, if the employer repudiates the contract of employment by dismissing his employee, such wrongful repudation of a contract of employment by employer effectively terminates the employment and in such cases the employee is only entitled to claim damages for wrongful breach of contract. However, in the latter case where the relationship between the employer and the employee is governed by a statute or a subordinate legislation and where such is the case, the termination may be declared as null and void and in that context it would not have the effect of putting an end to the contract and the employee would be entitled to a declaration, that his service is continuing. Justice P.N. Bhagwati went on to say at page 904: The doctrine that a contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced would not stand in the way of the employee, because the termination being null and void, there being no repudiation at all in the eye of the law, there would be no question of enforcing specific performance of the contract of employment. What the employee would be claiming in such a case is not enforcement of a contract of personal service but declaration of statutory invalidity of an act done by the employer. Further at page 906 it was held: However, I must hasten to make it clear that ordinarily an employee whose termination of service is found to be null and void or ineffective by reason of a statutory provision and that would include subordinate legislation which has the force of law, should be awarded a declaration that he continues in service and it should be no ground for refusing him such declaration that before his purported termination of service, he was in employment only for a short period. That would be denying him security of tenure, which the law seeks to give him in clear and unambiguous terms. 36. Thus, in the present case, in questioning the termination of the Plaintiff's service, the Plaintiff was not enforcing any contract of personal service but was only enforcing the conditions of service prescribed by statute for teachers of a recognised institution. The civil court in the present case, while granting the declaration did not enforce any contract of personal service, but only enforced the condition of service prescribed by statutory rules for teachers of a recognised institution. The civil court in the present case, while granting the declaration did not enforce any contract of personal service, but only enforced the condition of service prescribed by statutory rules for teachers of a recognised institution. Thus, the condition of the learned Counsel for the Defendant-Appellants that the declaration granted by the court below amounted to an enforcement of a contract of personal service is wholly incorrect. 37. Assuming, that there was a contract of personal service between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants and that in the given circumstances, the Plaintiff could only seek a relief of damages. In my view, in the present case, awarding damages would be wholly inadequate. The relief of damages for wrongful termination of service was adequate at a time when an employee could find other employment without any difficulty, but in the conditions prevailing in our country, it is difficult to get an employment and damages would be a poor substitute for reinstatement and to deny reinstatement in such a case would be to throw the Plaintiff to the mercy of the employer. However, from the record, I find that the Plaintiff has crossed the age of superannuation and therefore, the question of reinstatement does not arise. Thus, in the present case, the Defendants would not be forced to employ the Plaintiff any longer. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to all the emoluments had she continued to be in service. In the present case, the Plaintiff's services were confirmed, which gave her a security of a proper livelihood and to live in a dignified manner. The removal of the Plaintiff after she had worked for nine years in an arbitrary manner and in violation of the statutory rules makes the termination of the services of the Plaintiff's null and void. The result would be that the Plaintiff continue to be in service. The Defendants had earlier terminated the services of three other teachers without seeking prior approval from the authorities concerned and were forced to take them back in service. There was no reason for the Defendants not to take prior permission seeking approval of the termination of the services of the Plaintiff from the Basic Education Officer. Further, the order of termination was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. The Defendants are themselves to be blamed. There was no reason for the Defendants not to take prior permission seeking approval of the termination of the services of the Plaintiff from the Basic Education Officer. Further, the order of termination was passed in violation of the rules of natural justice. The Defendants are themselves to be blamed. Therefore, in my view, the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed. She is entitled to the arrears of wages and other emoluments, which goes to the post from the date of her termination till the date of her retirement along with 10% interest per annum as decreed by the trial court. The discretion exercised by the trial court was sound and proper, which requires no interference by this Court. 38. In view of the aforesaid, this Court holds that the Defendants institution is a recognised institution under the provisions of the U.P. Basic Education Act and that the Rules of 1975 are clearly applicable to the Defendants institution. The services of the Plaintiff could not be terminated without complying with the statutory Rules and Regulations, which have the force of law and without following the rules of natural justice. The principle of master and servant relationship was not applicable in the present case. The suit of the Plaintiff was maintainable and the civil court was bound to enforce the law. The civil court had jurisdiction to declare that the order of the termination of the Plaintiffs services was invalid; null and void and that the Plaintiff continued to remain in service. The civil court rightly exercised its direction in granting the Plaintiff the relief of arrears of salary along with the interest @ 10%. 39. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, which is assessed at Rs. 10,000.