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2004 DIGILAW 817 (AP)

Mohd. Shamim-ul-Haq v. Mohd. Khaja Moinuddin

2004-08-10

L.NARASIMHA REDDY

body2004
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J. ( 1 ) THIS CRP is filed under section 22 of the A. P. Buildings, (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as "the Act" ). ( 2 ) THE respondent is the owner in respect of residential premises bearing no. 16-9-830, Old Malakpet, Hyderabad. The same was let out to the petitioner in October, 1997 on a monthly rent of rs. 600/ -. The respondent filed R. C. No. 32 of 1999 before the III Additional Rent controller, Hyderabad, seeking eviction of the petitioner on several grounds. The R. C. was allowed and the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed R. A. No. 455 of 2000 in the Court of Chief-Judge, City Small Causes court, Hyderabad, under Section 20 of the act. ( 3 ) IN that appeal, the respondent filed la. No. 800 of 2001 under Section 11 (1) and (4) of the Act, read with Section 151 c. P. C. , for a direction to the petitioner herein to deposit a sum of Rs. 23,400/-, being arrears of rent from April 1998 to June 2001 (39 months ). The petitioner pleaded that he made certain payments; incurred certain expenditure for restoration of power supply and for undertaking repairs to the premises. It was his case that, if those amounts are taken into account, there is no necessity for him to pay any rents, and on the other hand, excess amount is with the respondent. On a consideration of the contentions of the parties, the Appellate authority passed an order dated 24-1-2003, directing the petitioner herein to pay a sum of Rs. 31,800/-, which became due by that date, on or before 27-2-2003. A further direction was issued to the petitioner to deposit the rents, in future, by the 10th day of every month. The respondent was permitted to withdraw 75% of the deposited amount, without furnishing security. ( 4 ) THE respondent filed LA. No. 345 of 2003 under Section 11 (4) of the Act, alleging that the petitioner failed to comply with the orders dated 24-1-2003, and in that view of the matter, he may be required to vacate the premises and put him in possession. ( 4 ) THE respondent filed LA. No. 345 of 2003 under Section 11 (4) of the Act, alleging that the petitioner failed to comply with the orders dated 24-1-2003, and in that view of the matter, he may be required to vacate the premises and put him in possession. The petitioner pleaded that if the various amounts paid by him and the expenditure incurred, in relation to the building, is taken into account, the order in i. A. No. 800 of 2001 can be said to have been complied with. The Appellate Authority rejected the plea of the petitioner, and through order dated 1-4-2004, allowed the la. No. 345 of 2003. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Appellate Authority did not take into account the various amounts paid by the petitioner, or spent by him, for the premises and came to an incorrect conclusion, that the order in LA. No. 800 of 2001 was not complied with. He submits that even after receiving substantial amounts, the respondent moved applications in LA. No. 800 of 2001 and 345 of 2003, with a mala fide intention. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner did not pay the rents ever since April 1998, and even after filing of the r. C. He submits that in I. A. No. 800 of 2001 the plea of the petitioner that he paid certain amounts or incurred expenditure for the premises, was not accepted by the appellate Authority, and that once the order passed in that application is not complied with, the consequences provided for under sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act have necessarily to follow. ( 7 ) THE respondent initiated proceedings for eviction of the petitioner mainly on the ground of wilful default. The R. C. was allowed. The petitioner carried the matter in appeal and obtained stay of eviction. The respondent filed LA. No. 800 of 2001 under section 11 (1) of the Act, for depositing of the rents. In fact, such deposit is a requirement under section 11 (1 ). The petitioner pleaded that if the amounts paid and deposited by him, from time to time, and the expenditure incurred by him, in relation to the premises, is taken into account, there would not be any arrears of rent. In fact, such deposit is a requirement under section 11 (1 ). The petitioner pleaded that if the amounts paid and deposited by him, from time to time, and the expenditure incurred by him, in relation to the premises, is taken into account, there would not be any arrears of rent. After taking rival contentions into account, the Appellate Authority passed an order dated 24-1-2003, directing the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 31,800/- by 27-2-2003. This order was not challenged by the petitioner, in any Court, and it has become final. He has not deposited any amount, subsequent to the order. Therefore, the respondent was compelled to file LA. No. 345 of 2003 under Section 11 (4) of the act, with a prayer to direct the petitioner herein to vacate the premises and put the respondent into possession. ( 8 ) BEFORE the Appellate Authority as well as this Court it is pleaded that the petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 10,200/-, vide 17 challans; deposited another sum of rs. 12,000/- in State Bank of Hyderabad; paid the dues of electricity consumption charges in respect of the previous tenant, of a sum of Rs. 14,948/-, and incurred a sum of Rs. 10,000/-, for carrying out repairs. The memo filed before the Appellate authority, subsequent to the passing of the orders in LA. No. 800 of 2001, is placed before this Court also. It is not as if this plea was not raised before the Appellate authority, while it was dealing with i. A. No. 800 of 2001. Such a plea was rejected, and a specific direction was given to the petitioner to deposit a specified amount of Rs. 31,800/- by 27-2-2003. Therefore, it was not open to the petitioner to plead that he need not pay any amount. The respondent was so fair in his approach, that he pleaded before the Appellate authority that in case the arrears are paid, the appeal itself may be allowed. The petitioner did not avail such an opportunity. He appears to have been determined, some how or the other, to continue to be in occupation of the premises, without paying rents. The Act was not enacted to encourage such practices. The lack of bona fides, on the part of petitioner, are evident from his conduct. ( 9 ) HE did not furnish the particulars of the amount said to have been deposited. The Act was not enacted to encourage such practices. The lack of bona fides, on the part of petitioner, are evident from his conduct. ( 9 ) HE did not furnish the particulars of the amount said to have been deposited. Any deposits could have been only with the specific permission of the Court. No reference is made to any orders passed in this regard. The plea, as regards incurring of expenditure for clearing the arrears of electricity consumption charges is totally untenable. In the lease deed, it was specifically mentioned that if the petitioner incurs any expenditure for restoration of power supply, the same shall not be liable to be adjusted towards monthly rent. Clause 3 of the lease deed reads as under:"there is no light in the said malgi and the electricity department disconnected electricity light due to non-payment of electricity charges by the previous tenant. If the lessee is anxious to restore electricity connection, he is at liberty to get it restored at his own expense, after making payment of dues to the concern department. No amount whatsoever paid by the lessee towards dues, shall be liable to deducted or adjusted in monthly rent. " ( 10 ) THE contention, as regards expenditure for repairs, also deserves to be rejected, for the simple reason that the petitioner was not authorised by the respondent to incur such expenditure. It is true that the object of the Legislature in enacting the Act, was to protect the interests of the tenants, in respect of a particular category of buildings, situated in corporations and municipal areas. However, such a protection can never be to the extent of encouraging indiscriminate tenants to enjoy the possession of the premises without payment of rent. It is for that reason, that the Legislature insisted that no tenant shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Controller or pursue the proceedings before the Appellate Authority, unless all the arrears of rent due, in respect of the building, are paid, and he continues to pay or deposit such rents. Even in the absence of an application by the owner under Section 11 (1), the obligation to pay the rents, operates against the tenant. When a specific direction is granted for depositing of the rents, in a particular manner, the mandate operates in a more vigorous manner. Even in the absence of an application by the owner under Section 11 (1), the obligation to pay the rents, operates against the tenant. When a specific direction is granted for depositing of the rents, in a particular manner, the mandate operates in a more vigorous manner. A tenant cannot have a privilege of contesting the application filed under section 10, or pursuing the appeal, filed by him, under Section 20, without paying the rents. The consequences provided for under Section 11 of the Act have necessarily to follow, in the event of non-compliance with mandate under Section 11 (1) of the act. ( 11 ) UNDER sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the Act, if the tenant is able to show for his failure to comply with the direction, the court can show a semblance of indulgence by enlarging the time for payment, instead of requiring him to vacate the premises. Where however, the tenant is consistent in his failure, or refusal to deposit the rent, it is obligatory on the part of the Rent Controller, or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, to require the tenant to vacate the premises and put the owner into possession of the property. ( 12 ) THE record of this case discloses that the petitioner proceeded as though the order passed by the Appellate Authority under sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the act, has no impact on him. He continues to plead the same grounds, which were rejected by the Appellate Authority, while passing orders in IA No. 800 of 2001. In a way, it can be said that the petitioner had compelled, it, to pass an order for his eviction. Hence, no exception can be taken. Therefore, this court does not find any basis to interfere with the order under revision. The CRP is accordingly dismissed. No costs.