JUDGMENT - PALSHIKAR V.G., J.:-By this petition, the petitioner, which is a company called Tata Motors Limited have challenged certain demands issued by the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation in relation to certain dues of octroi duty which according to the respondent Corporation was payable for last several years by the petitioner. 2. The petitioner basically contests these demands as wholly without jurisdiction because according to it, the demand itself id void, having been raised under entry not applicable to the items imported by the petitioner company. 3. The petitioner has factories amongst other places at Pimpri Chinchwad and in its Pimpri plant the petitioner manufactures commercial and passenger vehicles for which a number of components such as FIPs, radiators, wheel rims, cross members, batteries, wind shield glasses etc. are required. These items which are components of the vehicles manufactured by the petitioner are purchased and brought into the local limits of Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the Corporation, for the purposes of being used or consumed as components in the motor vehicles manufactured by the petitioner. 4. The Corporation was established in the year 1970, prior to which it was Municipal Council under the provisions of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965. Since then the Corporation and the Municipality which was entitled to, did levy octroi on goods imported for consumption and use etc. by any person or company within the local limits of the Municipality as it then was, and for that purpose Maharashtra Municipalities Octroi Rules of 1968 were framed and used by the Municipality under that provision. Those Rules of 1968 as scheduled in it, were mentioned various classes of goods which can be brought into municipal limits and the duty of octroi leviable on each such classes. Even after the establishment of the Municipal Corporation in the year 1970 these Rules were operative and they continued to be operated even now. 5. Under the Maharashtra Municipalities Octroi Rules of 1968 the municipality had the power to levy the octroi duty at its components. The duty shall be levied by the Corporation or the Municipality as the case may be, between the minimum and the maximum which were fixed by the Maharashtra State from time to time in those Rules. 6. 5. Under the Maharashtra Municipalities Octroi Rules of 1968 the municipality had the power to levy the octroi duty at its components. The duty shall be levied by the Corporation or the Municipality as the case may be, between the minimum and the maximum which were fixed by the Maharashtra State from time to time in those Rules. 6. In the year 1968 the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipality charged octroi on motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and lorries and spares thereof at the rates prescribed then. It also charged octroi duty on import of bicycles, perambulators, carriages, all kinds of vehicles and their components and spares at the rates specified in the schedule then existed. 7. In the year 1971 the rates were changed by the Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Council. According to this change, vehicles at caption-I head was divided in two sub-heads viz. (a) motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and lorries, and spares thereof at the rates specified in the schedule then existed. The second category of vehicles was bicycles, permambulators, carriages, all kinds of vehicles and their components and spares, to be charged at the rates mentioned in the schedule then existed. The Corporation thereafter in 1981 with effect from 16th March, 1981 again amended the rates at which octroi duty shall be paid for imports of goods done under the category of vehicles. This time the main entry was Entry 75 in the Rules of 1968. By the 1981 Rules Entry 75 continued to be those of vehicles and the sub categories were increased to three being marked A, B and C. A was motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and lorries and spares thereof. B was bicycles and their spare parts and C was perambulators, carriages, all kinds of vehicles and their components and spares. Thus as and from 16th March, 1981 vehicles were divided into pieces of classes or categories. A continues to be same which exceeded in 1968 or 1971. Bicycles and their spare parts were made separate category. Perambulators and carriages and all kinds of vehicles and their components and spares were made third category. It was done to separate bicycles from other vehicles whether auto vehicles or otherwise emerges. Duty was to be paid at the rates mentioned in the schedule then existed. 8. These rates was again revised by the Corporation with effect from 1st April, 1989. Entry 75 continued to be vehicles. It was done to separate bicycles from other vehicles whether auto vehicles or otherwise emerges. Duty was to be paid at the rates mentioned in the schedule then existed. 8. These rates was again revised by the Corporation with effect from 1st April, 1989. Entry 75 continued to be vehicles. Sub categories continued to be A, B and C as mentioned earlier and the charge was only in the rates. 9. From 1st April, 1993 what was again changed is the schedule and the entry continued to be 75. Sub-categories continued to be A, B and C with little clarifications added. Sub-category A was further classified into 1 and 2. One was motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and lorries and (2) was spares thereof. Thus from 1-4-1993 onwards import of vehicles mentioned in 75-A1 was chargeable at a particular rate and spare parts of those vehicles under Category 2 were chargeable at another rates. Categories B and C continued to be the same as in the year 1989. Dispute arose thereafter between the industries constituted within the Corporation limits of Pimpri Chinchwad. One such dispute was brought to this Court by Bajaj Auto Limited. In this petition, bearing Writ Petition No. 3066/88, the petitioner Bajaj Auto Limited contended that what they did import for the purposes of manufacturing vehicles were components, which was necessary for that manufacture and therefore the components are liable to be charged as components. The Corporation having charged it under Entry 75-C which reads thus: "75-C: Perambulators, Carriages, all kinds of vehicles and their components and spares." According to the Corporation, spare parts of motor cars, motor cycles , chassis and lorries mentioned in 75-A1 were liable to levy of octroi duty under the vehicles mentioned in A-1 or spare parts thereof mentioned in (2). For all other components of all kinds of vehicles, it is Entry C which was liable and accordingly levy was made. This dispute therefore come up for adjudication before this Court in the aforesaid writ petition. This Court decided the same on 31st July, 1997 and by its judgment which was reported in (Bajaj Tempo Limited another v. Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation others)1, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. 745 held interpreting Entry 75-A and Entry 75-C in 1968 Rules, that for the purposes of octroi all components and spaes, Entry 75-C is the entry applicable. 10. This Court decided the same on 31st July, 1997 and by its judgment which was reported in (Bajaj Tempo Limited another v. Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation others)1, 1998(1) Bom.C.R. 745 held interpreting Entry 75-A and Entry 75-C in 1968 Rules, that for the purposes of octroi all components and spaes, Entry 75-C is the entry applicable. 10. The contention of the petitioner that Entry 75-A would be applicable and it does not speak of components and therefore components would fall under another entry, was stated and considered to an extend but not decided. It was specifically observed by the Division Bench of this Court while considering the rival contentions, and in para 6 of the judgment the Division Bench noted the contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner in that petition, which reads thus : "In any event, according to Mr. Dawarkadas the components would fall under the residuary Entry 86 and liable to be charged at the rate of 1.25 percent. Mr. Dwarkadas next urged that the stable of rates published by the Municipal Council on 6th February, 1981 is contrary to the Resolution passed on 30th January, 1981." 11. Thus the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that proper entry applicable to the components of motor vehicles covered by Entry 75-A would be Entry 86. This was sought to be repealed by the Counsel for the Corporation in para 7 which was also considered. In para 8, the Division Bench of this Court went on to observe that the definition of vehicle occurred in section 2(50) of the Municipalities Act is very wide and it covers within its sweep all types of vehicles. Entry 75-A deals with only certain types of vehicles like motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and lorries and spares thereof. The Division Bench then went on to observed what is covered by Entry 75-C and then in para 9 it observed thus: "In our opinion, the words "all kinds of vehicles" are extremely wide in their application and cover all the vehicles other than the vehicles falling under Entry 75-A. They will have to be read in the light of definition of vehicle under section 2(50) and so that they would cover within their ambit all kinds of vehicles other than those covered by Entry 75-A. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of Mr. Walavalkar that the intention of the rule makers was to give restrictive meaning to the express "all kinds of vehicles". Thus the vehicles manufactured by the company and their components and spares would fall under Entry 75-C and will be liable to be charged at the rate of 0.5 percent. Entry 75-A speaks only of vehicles and spare parts and not of components." 12. There is the unequivocal findings given by this Court that all kinds of vehicles and components and spare parts thereof would be covered by Entry 75-C. It is also categorically found thereafter by the Division Bench that there is definitely a difference between the words components and spare parts cannot be equated to components. However the contention raised in para 6 by the learned Counsel for Bajaj Auto Limited that they are not covered by either Entry 75-A or by Entry 75-C but Entry 86, which was neither considered nor decided. 13. Thereafter the Corporation in 2001 framed Pimpri Chinchwad, Municipal Corporation Octroi Rules 2001. In that, again schedule contained 75 as the entry of vehicles and the were categorised in two parts. The categories reads as under: Vehicles (a) Motor cars, motor cycles, chassis and trucks, all types of vehicles, cars, buses, cranes, trailer, tempo rickshaw, forklift, excavators, all types of passenger vehicles road rollers, bull-dozers, tractors, concrete mixer, jeep motor cycles, scooters mopeds, chassis of all types of vehicles their components, accessories and spare parts, and all other indigenous and foreign vehicles, their components, spare parts and accessories. (b) All types of bicycles, perambulators carriages and their components, spare parts and accessories. 14. Thus making it abundantly clear and beyond doubt that vehicles of all kinds mentioned therein and their components and spare parts and accessories will be taxed in the schedule and Category B was again like earlier, "all types of bicycles, perambulators, carriages and their components spare parts and accessories. Thereafter, there is no dispute. 15. However the dispute continued between the present petitioner and the Corporation in relation to this very aspect and several demands for several years have been issued by the Corporation which collectively are impugned by the petitioner in this petition. Rule was granted. Detailed reply affidavits were filed and we heard the matter for considerable time. 15. However the dispute continued between the present petitioner and the Corporation in relation to this very aspect and several demands for several years have been issued by the Corporation which collectively are impugned by the petitioner in this petition. Rule was granted. Detailed reply affidavits were filed and we heard the matter for considerable time. Both the petitioner and the respondent Corporation heavily relied on the judgment of this Court passed in Bajaj Auto Limited quoted above. Heavy reliance is placed on by both in para 9 which is extensively quoted above. On hearing the arguments at some length and having heard the interpretation sought to be put on, what has been laid down by this Court in para 9, we are bound by what has been held by this Court in so far as defining what is meant by all kinds of vehicles and what is meant by that phrases occurred in Entry 75-C. The problem arises thereafter as the Bench has stated that there is definitely difference between the spare parts and components, what is the difference is also stated but which of the entries of the schedule then existing would apply to such components is not decided. According to the Corporation, it is covered by Entry 75-C. According to the petitioner it cannot be Entry 75-C. In the light of the observations made in para 9 there is distinction between spare parts and components. Prima facie we are of the view that the argument on behalf of the petitioner that components and spare parts being different, components of vehicles covered by Entry 75-A as held by this Court, cannot be brought in for levying of octroi under Entry 75-C as is contended by the Corporation. What exactly is the scope and ratio of this decision basically contained in para 9 is the issue. In our humble opinion, it is not free from doubt. Hence we are of the opinion that it may not be proper for us to lay down what has been made by the Division Bench in para 9. In so doing, this Bench may be taking a view which is contrary to what has been expressed by the Division Bench in para 9 cited above. In all humility again, we feel that adopting such a course may not be in the interest of judicial discipline. In so doing, this Bench may be taking a view which is contrary to what has been expressed by the Division Bench in para 9 cited above. In all humility again, we feel that adopting such a course may not be in the interest of judicial discipline. We are also of the view of great importance of the point of revenue of the Corporation. Such dispute can arise in relation to other municipality and Corporation also. Interest of justice would be met, in our humble opinion, if the matter be placed before a large Bench for adjudication of all questions arising out of the contentions raised in this petition. As spelt out by us above, we refrain from framing any question which may be referred to a larger Bench for adjudication as in our opinion the whole controversy should be kept open and decided one and for all by a larger Bench. We therefore direct that papers of this petition be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. Referred to large Bench. -----