Judgment N.P. Gupta, J.-This revision has been filed by Gopal Lal against the order of the learned Addl. Dist. Judge No. 1, Bikaner dt. 4-5-2004 passed in Execution Case No: 9 of 2004. 2. By this order two matters were decided; one taken by the learned trial Court, to be the objection of the petitioner-judgment-debtor Gopal Lal under Section 47 read with Section 151. C.P.C.. objecting about the excitability of the decree, or in the alternative praying for partition, along with an application under Section 5/14 of the Limitation Act, while the other one was taken to be the Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 17 of 2004, said to be the application filed by the four sons of the present petitioner, under 0. 21, Rules 20 and 97, C.P.C. 3. Since, this revision is confined to the order passed in relation to Execution Case No. 9 of 1984 (sic), I need not deal with the aspect regarding Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 17 of 2004. 4. The facts of the case are, that the parties to this revision are real brothers. A suit for partition was filed by the non-petitioner Babu Lal on 9-4-1980, and in that suit. on 31-10-81, a compromise was arrived at by the parties, and formally the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. The precise terms of the compromise decree are as under :- (Vernacular matter omitted Ed.) 5. Thus, according to para 4 of the decree, certain property covered by this para was agreed to be kept joint between the parties, each having 1/4th share, each of the parties was to remain in possession for a period of one year, by rotation, and was free to any on business therein during that period. In accordance with the rotation, to start with, the possession was physically handed over to the plaintiff Babu Lal, who was to remain in possession thereby, upto 1-11-1982, then he was to deliver possession to the non-petitioner Kishan Lal, who was to remain in possession from 1-11-1982 to 31 -10-1983. and on 1-11-1983 Kishan Lal was to hand over the possession to the present petitioner-Gopal Lal, who was to remain in possession from 1-11-1983 to 3 1-10-1984. and on 1-11-1983 Kishan Lal was to hand over the possession to the present petitioner-Gopal Lal, who was to remain in possession from 1-11-1983 to 3 1-10-1984. and on 1-11-1984 Gopal Lal was to deliver possession to Moda Ram, who was to remain in possession from 1-11-1984 to 3 1-10-1985, and Moda Ram was to again deliver possession to Babu Lal on 1-11-1985, and according to this cycle, each party was to remain in possession for one year, and was to deliver possession to the next in turn. During the period of possession, the person in possession was responsible for all profits and losses. It was further stipulated, that thereafter, if it is not possible to keep the property Joint, the parties will be free to have it partitioned, 6. It further appears that since the petitioner was to remain in possession upto 3 1-10-1984, and was supposed to deliver possession to non-petitioner Moda Ram on 1-11-1984, the trouble started from that point, inasmuch as, on 31-10-1984 itself the present petitioner filed a suit for cancellation of the decree, and for injunction, on various grounds, including it being fraudulent. That suit was dismissed on 3-8-1988, against which decree a Regular First Appeal was filed, which was dismissed on 6-12-1995, and then D. B. Civil Special Appeal was filed, which was also dismissed on 9-3-2004. It was informed by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, that a Special Leave Petition was filed against the decree, which too was dismissed, This suit was dismissed on the ground, that the suit was not maintainable on the face of the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3-A read with Order 43, Rule 1-A. C.P.C. It is in this sequence, that on 4-2-2004. i.e. Just before disposal of the D.B. Civil Special Appeal, which was decided on 9-3-2004, the petitioner filed a suit for partition. In that partition suit, he also filed an application for temporary injunction, seeking to restrain defendants from dispossessing the petitioner. That temporary injunction application was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 1-4-2004. Against that order a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 453/2004 was filed by the petitioner before this Court, which was dismissed by me on 13-4-2004. 7. Tocontinue sequence of narration of facts, it may also be noticed, that I am informed by the counsel for the non-petitioners. That temporary injunction application was dismissed by the learned trial Court on 1-4-2004. Against that order a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 453/2004 was filed by the petitioner before this Court, which was dismissed by me on 13-4-2004. 7. Tocontinue sequence of narration of facts, it may also be noticed, that I am informed by the counsel for the non-petitioners. that after passing of the decree dt, 31-10-1981, Moda Ram appears to have moved an application before the learned Court below on 2-3-1985, for being delivered possession, and that application was dismissed by the learned Court below on 12-2-1987. on the ground, that the decree passed was only preliminary decree, and therefore, that application could not be entertained, and can be filed only after a final decree is prepared. 8. Likewise, when the proceedings were taken by the learned trial Court for preparation of final decree, by the present non-petitioner. submitting necessary non-Judicial stamp on 20-3-1987 i.e. soon after the rejection of Moda Ram’s prayer, which was rejected on 12-2-1987, the matter was taken up by the learned trial Court, and then the order dt. 7-10-1987 was passed. By the order dt. 7-10-1987 it was noticed, that on 11-2-1986 non-petitioner Babu Lal filed an application, to the effect, that in the order dt. 31-10-1981, stamps were directed to be furnished, where on the decree would be scribed, but then the order recorded passing of the preliminary decree, instead of recording it to be a final decree, which was required to be corrected. This application was registered as Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 14 of 1986, and after notice to the parties, vide order dt. 12-2-1987, exercising powers under Section 152, C.P.C., necessary amendment was made, and it was directed that on submission of stamps the decree be scribed on the stamp. Thereafter on 20-3-1987 stamps were submitted as noticed above, thereafter, on 16-4-1987 the present petitioner filed an application, contending that he has learnt that application has been filed for preparation of decree, and stamps have been submitted which are deficit, Another objection raised was, that the decree covers certain property, which is his personal property, and which could not be made subject-matter of partition, and that after passing of the preliminary decree dt. 31-10-1981, he has spent substantial amount on the property, and that his consent has not been obtained for preparation of final decree, and therefore, the application for preparation of final decree be rejected. It was also contended, that correction could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 152, C.P.C. The learned trial Court noticed, that the petitioner has not challenged the order dt. 12-2-1987, and that, the filation of the suit for cancellation of decree, also is of no obstruction in preparing the final decree. It was also observed, that in view of the fact, that the petitioner has filed a suit for cancellation of decree, the objection about property being wrongly included as part of compromise, is also of no consequence. Inter alia with these findings, vide order dated 7-10-87. the objection of the present petitioner was dismissed, and final decree was ordered to be prepared. 9. Thisorder dt. 7-10-1987 was challenged by the petitioner in this Court by way of S. B. Civil Revision No. 578/87, and thereafter the order dt. 12-2-1987, passed under Section 152, C.P.C. was also challenged by the petitioner vide S. B. Civil Revision No. 23/1988, and both those revisions were dismissed by this Court on 2-12-1988. as withdrawn; some further directions were also given, in the order dt. 2-12-1988, which will be considered, at appropriate place. I am informed that as the proceedings for preparation of final decree were stayed in these two revisions, after disposal of the revisions, the final decree was prepared by the learned trial Court on 3-4-1989. by scribing it on necessary non-Judicial stamps. It is thereafter i.e. on 5-4-1989 itself , that an application for execution was filed by Moda Ram, for execution of the final decree dt. 3-4-1989. I am told. that since dismissal of Suit No. 49 of 1987, mentioned above, was assailed by the petitioner in appeal before this Court, in that first appeal stay was granted, staying dispossession of the petitioner, which stay continued during pendency of that appeal, and again during pendency of that special appeal, which as noticed above, was dismissed on 9-3-2004, in the meantime the aforesaid suit for partition was filed, wherein temporary injunction application was also filed on 5-2-2004, which was finally dismissed by this Court on 13-4-2004. It is thereafter, that the petitioner, on 16-4-2004, submitted before the learned Executing Court, purportedly a reply to the execution application, and in the alternative, making a prayer for partition, which was replied, and it is this 16-4-2004 document, which has been adjudicated, and dismissed by the Executing Court, by the impugned order dt. 4-5-2004. 10. It also appears from the record, as supplied to me. that on 10-4-1989. the present petitioner filed an application before the learned Executing Court, alleging that the execution application has been filed after two years of the order dt. 12-2-1987. whereby the decree was declared to be final decree, and therefore, notice under 0. 21, R. 22 were required to be issued, but suppressing those mandatory provisions, order has been obtained, to the effect, that warrant for possession be issued, if necessary by police assistance, and breaking open the locks, which is wholly without Jurisdiction. Then, it was alleged, that the decree is not executable, being unworkable, and that, since at the time of the passing of the decree, possession has been delivered to Babu Lal, warrant for possession cannot be issued over again for delivery of possession to Babu Lal. 11. Since, in this revision I am not required to adjudicate upon the another part of the order, disposing of the Civil Miscellaneous Case No. 17 of 2004, I need not notice facts, as informed to me, about the petitioner’s sons having filed the suit for partition, and cancellation of .the decree, and for permanent injunction on 25-8-1988, and therein having moved an application for temporary injunction. which having been dismissed by the learned trial Court on 3-4-1989, against which order Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 62 of 1989 having been filed before this Court, and the same also having been dismissed by this Court way back on 6-12-1995. .12. Assailingthe, impugned order, it is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that in the very nature of things, the compromise is only a contract, superimposed with the seal of the Court, and is not enforceable, in absence of any stipulation being there in it to that effect. It was then contended, that in any case the compromise decree is not executable, being only a declaratory decree. The other submission made was, that the decree exhausts after delivery of possession being made once, and cannot be executed again and again. It was then contended, that in any case the compromise decree is not executable, being only a declaratory decree. The other submission made was, that the decree exhausts after delivery of possession being made once, and cannot be executed again and again. The next submission made was, that in the petition dt. 16-3” 2004, the petitioner had also made a prayer for partition of the property, and since according to para 4 of the decree, mentioned above, it is clearly stipulated, that if it is not possible to keep the property joint, the parties will be free to partition it. and since according to contents of para 4, it is not in dispute that the property was kept Joint, it is also clearly stipulated that each of the parties has 1/4th share, and therefore, if at all the decree is said to be executable. It also contemplates effecting of partition, therefore, the petitioner’s request for partition was required to be allowed, in which event, the petitioner need not be dispossessed, and in view of the recital of para 4 of the decree, since there is no impediment in the way of the partition, the impugned order is required to be set aside. It is also contended, that the learned Court below has proceeded under the obsession, about the petitioner being said to have deprived the other parties of the possession for 20 years, and labouring under that obsession, the objections of the petitioner have been rejected, by not giving appropriate judicial considerations, which also vitiates the impugned order. In this regard, it was contended, relying upon the Judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, in (2000) 8 SCC 532 : (2000 AIR SCW 3967) that, the past conduct of the petitioner is not required to be seen for the purpose of adjudicating his right, in praesenti. In other words, the mere fact that, for some reason or the other, the petitioner could not be dispossessed for a period of 20 years, or more, it can be no ground for rejection of his legitimate objections, if they are otherwise sustainable. Another submission made was. that the Executing Court is bound to interpret the decree. as to whether it is merely declaratory, or is executable. Another submission made was. that the Executing Court is bound to interpret the decree. as to whether it is merely declaratory, or is executable. Next submission made was, that the petitioner was never given possession of the property by Kishan Lal, rather he was already continuing in possession of the property, since before passing of the decree, and according to the learned counsel, this fact was never controverted on the side of the respondents, inasmuch as, to his application dt. 16-4-2004, reply was filed by Babu Lal only, and not by Kishan Lal, nor any affidavit of Kishan Lal has been filed, to the effect that he delivered possession to petitioner Gopal Lal, in accordance with the terms of the decree. Thus, the compromise decree was never acted upon, and therefore, also it could not be executed. 13. Yet, another argument made was. that in execution application, request is made by Moda Ram for delivery of possession, but he did not mention, as to whether the petitioner ever denied to deliver the possession to him, when it became due in the year 1984, and since Moda Ram was entitled to keep possession only upto 3 1-10-1985, he could not file application for execution in the year 1989. The argument about unworkability, and in-excitability of the decree was elaborated. by submitting, that by this decree, the property was declared to be joint, and each of the parties were declared to be having 1/4th share, and only arrangement was made as to how the respective parties would remain in possession. It was also pointed out, that in the decree there is no provision that the person entitled to possession, will be entitied to take possession. It is also contended, that the arrangement made is wholly unworkable. and not executable, as it cannot be conceived, that one person will remain in possession for one year. and then he will hand over possession to the other person, and the rotation will continue, apart from the fact, that the decree does not amount to decree for possession. 14. It is also contended, that the arrangement made is wholly unworkable. and not executable, as it cannot be conceived, that one person will remain in possession for one year. and then he will hand over possession to the other person, and the rotation will continue, apart from the fact, that the decree does not amount to decree for possession. 14. Then it was contended, that in any case, at best, the decree can be said to be one for mandatory injunction, obliging one party to deliver possession to another party, and since there is different procedure prescribed for execution of decree for mandatory injunction, which having not been followed, the decree cannot be executed/Regarding right of partition, it was contended that the expression (“Badme”) appearing in para 4 of the decree only means, “after the compromise”, and the petitioner has already made a prayer for partition, which prayer was not denied, and there is no reason, as to why the property cannot be partitioned, and no reason has been given by the learned Executing Court either. 15. Onthe authority of decision of Orissa High Court, in Khalli Rath vs. Eppili Ramachandra, reported in AIR 1953 Orissa 74, it was contended, that in absence of any stipulation in the decree about entitlement of the party to have the decree executed through the Court, the decree like the present one, cannot be executed. Reference was also made to Bhavan Vaja vs. Solanki Hanuji Khodaji Mansang, reported in (1973) 2 SCC 40 : ( AIR 1972 SC 1371 ) to contend, that the Executing Court is to find out the true effect of the decree by construing it. 16. Another submission made was, that since the petitioner did not receive possession of the property under the decree, the fact of petitioner’s present possession of property, by itself , cannot furnish any ground to dispossess him, by purported execution of the decree. 17. Then it was submitted, that the Executing Court is to execute the decree as it is, and nothing can be supplied in a decree. According to the learned counsel, when a cyclic order has been prescribed in the decree, if the particular period of cycle has passed, that cannot be deferred by the Executing Court. 17. Then it was submitted, that the Executing Court is to execute the decree as it is, and nothing can be supplied in a decree. According to the learned counsel, when a cyclic order has been prescribed in the decree, if the particular period of cycle has passed, that cannot be deferred by the Executing Court. In other words, whatever time has passed, the’ operation of that part of cyclic rotation automatically stands lapsed, and it was to be seen, as to whether the petitioner could be ordered to be dispossessed now, and since if calculated according to the rotation. the period from 1-11-2003 to 3 1-10-2004 comes to the rotation of the petitioner, he cannot be dispossessed in execution of the decree, in the moment. Since there is no stipulation in the decree, as to what will be the effect, if the cyclic rotation is not followed, it is not open to the parties to arrest the cyclic operation of the decree, and claim to it operate now, w.e.f 1-11-1984, in the year 2004. .18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents narrated, the sequence of events, right from the date of the passing of the decree, till the date, and submitted, that it is not in dispute, on the face of averments made in para 5 of the petitioner’s application dt. 10-4-1989. that at the time of the decree, Babu Lal was delivered possession. It is obvious that the petitioner received possession according to the cyclic rotation on 1-11-1983, and was required to deliver possession to the non-petitioner Moda Ram on 1-11-1984. and precisely at that point of time. on 3 1-10-1984. suit was filed by the petitioner, being Suit No. 49 of 1987 (though the suit was filed in 1984, by the time it was decided, suit happened to be transferred from Court to Court, and therefore, the suit happened to be decided as Suit No. 49/87), and that suit was dismissed on 3-8-1988, and the appeal filed against that decree dated 8-8-88 was dismissed on 6-12-1995, and D. B. Civil Special Appeal was dismissed on 9-3-2004. and just before dismissal of that .appeal, on 4-2-2004, the .petitioner had already filed a suit for partition. and just before dismissal of that .appeal, on 4-2-2004, the .petitioner had already filed a suit for partition. In that view of the matter, the petitioner having opted the remedy of partition, by filing, a regular civil suit, wherein he made an application for temporary injunction, which was dismissed on 1-4-2004. and after appeal against that order had been dismissed on 3-4-2004, it was not open to the petitioner, in the present execution proceedings, on 16-4-2004, to make a request for partition. .19. Regarding nature of the decree being executable, or declaratory, it was contended, that the petitioner had filed Revision Petitions Nos. 578/87 and 23/88, against the order of learned trial Court dt. 7-10-1987, and 12-2-1987, respectively, which came up for hearing on 2-12-1988. and on that day the petitioner was present in person, and with eyes open, he not only withdrew both the revisions, while dismissing the revision as withdrawn, this Court made a positive direction. granting three months’ time to hand over vacant possession of the shop, in terms of the compromise, to the other brothers. The petitioner never objected to making of such direction, on the ground of decree being merely declaratory, or not capable of entailing such a direction. Thus, till that date, the parties were ad idem, that the decree is executable and the petitioner is required to deliver vacant possession of the property, in terms of the compromise, to other brothers. Thus, it being clear to the petitioner, that the decree is neither declaratory, nor is unworkable, and that the vacant possession is required to be delivered, now these objections are not maintainable, and are not maintainable even on the principles of res judicata/ constructive res Judicata. It was also contended, that operation of the cyclic rotation was arrested by the activities of the petitioner only, and in the order of this Court dt. 13-4-2004, passed in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 453/ 2004, which is an order inter-parties, and in relation to this very property, and on the question of entitlement of the non-petitioners to get possession under the decree, it was positively found, firstly, that in the suit filed on 31-10-1984, there was no averment to the effect, that compromise was not acted upon, rather it was also noticed, that till then. it is nowhere the averment of the present petitioner, that he did not receive amounts, mentioned in para 5 of the compromise decree, and it was clearly held. that this Court did not find any sufficient ground to grant injunction to the appellant (present petitioner), restraining the respondents from dispossessing him, during pendency of the partition suit moreso, when they are seeking to dispossess through due process of law (the present execution proceedings). This finding was given after noticing the findings of the learned trial Court, and concurring therewith, whole hog. Thus, when this Court, in order dt. 13-4-2004, passed inter-parties, clearly adjudicated upon the rights of the petitioner, finding him to be not entitled to restrain the respondents, from dispossessing him during pendency of the partition suit, through due process of law. even on the considerations of res judicata/constructive res judicata. the present objections, filed by the petitioner on 16-4-2004, are clearly not maintainable, as the execution is pending since 1989, and it was way back on 10-4-1989, that the petitioner had already filed some objections, including objection about excitability, and non-workability of the decree. It was contended, that in para 4 of the decree, it is clearly recited, that after completion of the cyclic rotation, if the parties feel, that it is not possible to keep the property Joint, it will be open to have the property partitioned. The precise words used have already been quoted above, wherein the word (“Badme”) is significant. According to the learned counsel, therefore, simply because, the parties were given right to have the property partitioned, till it is partitioned, the operation of the cyclic rotation cannot be arrested. It was pointed out, that in reply to the objections dt. 16-4-2004. It was categorically pleaded, that the decree had worked, and it was workable, as the petitioner had come into possession of the property, thereunder only, and that, the stand of the petitioner. about his being in possession of the property since beginning, has repeatedly been turned down. According to him, the objection of the petitioner, that his objections having not been decided, were replied, by making reference to para 14 of the impugned order, and various other paras. about his being in possession of the property since beginning, has repeatedly been turned down. According to him, the objection of the petitioner, that his objections having not been decided, were replied, by making reference to para 14 of the impugned order, and various other paras. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, being reported in (2000) 8 SCC 532 : (2000 AIR SOW 3967); AIR 1953 Orissa 74, and (1973) 2 SCC 40 : ( AIR 1972 SC 1371 ) were distinguished, and reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners, on Parkash chand Khurana vs. Harnam Singh, reported in AIR 1973 SC 2065 (paras 16 and 18); Devdutta Dheer vs. Janki Vallabh, reported in AIR 1986 Raj170; V. N. Sreedharan vs. Bhaskaran, reported in AIR 1986 Ker 49 . and Haji T. J. Abdul Shakoor vs. Bijai Kumar Kapur. reported in AIR 1964 SC 874 (paras 3, 4 and 5), and it was submitted, that in view of this consistent legal position, it cannot be said, that the decree is not executable, or that it is merely a declaratory decree, here the intention of the parties is clearly manifested in para 4 of the decree, that each party was entitled to be in possession for one year by cyclic rotation, and till the property gets partitioned, none of the parties, who may simply have happened to come in possession, can be allowed to arrest the cyclic rotation of the decree, rather inview of the order of this court dt. 2-12-1988. mentioned above, the petitioner was clearly required to deliver possession of the property to the brothers, and therefore, any of the brothers could continue in execution. It was also contended, that the stand taken by the petitioner, to the effect, that at each point of time, when a warrant of possession is sought to be issued, or enforced, it is required to be ascertained, as to. It was also contended, that the stand taken by the petitioner, to the effect, that at each point of time, when a warrant of possession is sought to be issued, or enforced, it is required to be ascertained, as to. on that particular date, according to the cyclic rotation, which party would be entitled to remain in possession, irrespective of the fact, that for all times in the past, all other parties have been deprived of the possession, in other words, according to the learned counsel, when the .warrant happens to be required to be issued, the petitioner maybe claimed to be entitled to retain possession on the ground of that time being of his turn in rotation, and on completion of that turn. when the warrant is required to be issued, and for one reason or the other, he may again obstruct the enforcement of the other parties’ rights tor three years, and then may again put the boggy about his entitlement of the possession, such an attempt, to bring about this situation, is just preposterous, and not only makes the mockery of the Judicial System, rather is a gravest abuse of the process of the court, and thus the contention of the petitioner is not required to be sustained at all. 9.20. In rejoinder learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated, that any of the orders passed in the past, could not have the effect of amending the decree, therefore, the petitioner cannot be dispossessed during the period 1-11-2003 to 3 1-10-2004, and since the petitioner had already laid a claim for partition, the cyclic rotation comes to an end. and the property can be partitioned any time The cases cited on behalf of the respondents. were attempted to be distinguished on facts. 10.21. I have considered the submissions and have gone through the impugned order. so also the various documents, made available to me for perusal, by either side, with consent of each other. 122. The above narration of rival contentions. In my view, can be summed up, in the manner, that according to the petitioner the decree is not executable because: 1. It is a compromise decree, not incorporating stipulation of excitability, in the event of .non-compliance by any of the parties. 2. 122. The above narration of rival contentions. In my view, can be summed up, in the manner, that according to the petitioner the decree is not executable because: 1. It is a compromise decree, not incorporating stipulation of excitability, in the event of .non-compliance by any of the parties. 2. Isonly a declaratory, about the status of the property being joint, each party having 1/4th share, and only makes arrangement as to how each of the Joint owners will remain in possession. 3. The arrangement made in para 4 of the decree is wholly unworkable. 4. That the petitioner was in possession since before the decree, and is continuing till the date, and thus the decree was never acted upon. 23. The other objection is, that since para 4 contemplates a right of the parties to have the property partitioned, and since the petitioner had made a prayer for partition, in his petition dated 16-4-2004, the Executing Court was required to partition the property. as there is no reason why the properly should not be partitioned. 24. Thenext objection, is that in absence of any provision to that effect in the decree, even if the cyclic rotation is to be followed. It is to be strictly followed, in the sense, that if for any reason, including any of the acts of any of the parties, the possession for a particular period of time, as contemplated by the decree, does not happen to be enjoyed by any of the parties, it does not entitle that party to claim retrospective right of possession, and since, according to the rotation, during the period 1-11-2003 to 31-10-2004, it comes to the turn of the petitioner, he cannot be ordered to be dispossessed, simply because, according to the non-petitioners, they stood deprived of the possession for the last about two decades. As a limb of this argument, the submission appears to be, that since Moda Ram was entitled to keep possession only upto 3 1-10-1985, he could not file the execution petition in the year 1989. 25. The other contention appears to be in the alternative, that the decree, at best, can be said to be one for mandatory injunction, for execution whereof , different procedure has been prescribed. 26. 25. The other contention appears to be in the alternative, that the decree, at best, can be said to be one for mandatory injunction, for execution whereof , different procedure has been prescribed. 26. The submissions made on the side of the respondents are substantially controversion of the contentions, and in support thereof reliance has been placed on certain circumstances, and Judgments, as noticed above. 27. Taking up the first contention about excitability of the decree, so far as the first part thereof is concerned, as noticed above, reliance is placed on Khalli’s case (AIR 1953 Oris