JUDGMENT N.N. Tiwari, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing of (he Award dated 15.10.1996 rendered by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court. Ranchi in Reference Case No. 2 of 1990. By the said impugned Award the Presiding Officer held that the concerned workman is not a workman under the definition of I.D. Act. of the management of HEC, Ltd, and it is not an industrial dispute between the concerned man and management and that the reference is bad in law. 2. The petitioners case is that he was appointed as an Assistant Grade-Ill by the management of M/s. Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited, Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the H.E.C.) and was posted at Turn Key Project Division of the HEC. The petitioner became permanent after working continuously for one year. The job of the petitioner was perennial in nature. According to him. from the very beginning he was not paid the admissible scale of pay. When the petitioner demanded, the same was refused by the management of the HEC. Petitioner had then filed a writ application in Patna High Court, Ranchi bench as then was being C.W.J.C. No. 434 1986(R). According to him since thereafter, the management became biased and on 1.4.1986 terminated his service without any notice. The petitioner then filed M.J. Case No. 1/77 before the Labour Court, Ranchi for a direction to the H.E.C. management to pay difference of his wages from 20.7.1982 to 31.3.1986. That petition was allowed on 14.2.1988. The management then Implemented the aforesaid order but only part payment was made. According to petitioner he was given pay scale of Rs. 481-751 which was revised to Rs. 750-1067 w.e.S. 1.1.1986 and thereafter again revised to Rs. 1141-1705. According to Binod Kumar Report the petitioner was deemed to have been promoted after seven years to Assistant Grade-11. But in the meanwhile he was terminated on 31.3.1986 by a verbal order in violation of Section 25F of the Industrial Dispute Act (thereafter to be referred as the I.D, Act), No notice of termination was served, nor the notice pay was given to him as required under the provisions of I.D. Act. 3. The petitioner then raised Industrial dispute against the illegal termination of his services by the H.E.C. management. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ranchi on failure of the conciliation submitted the failure report to the Govt. 3. The petitioner then raised Industrial dispute against the illegal termination of his services by the H.E.C. management. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ranchi on failure of the conciliation submitted the failure report to the Govt. of Bihar and thereafter this industrial dispute was referred by the Govt. of Bihar on 14.3.1990 for adjudication to the Labour Court. Ranchi. The term of the reference was : "Whether termination of services of Shri Gajendra Kumar Singh is justified? If not, what relief he is entitled to ? 4. The said reference was registered as Reference Case No, 2 of 1990. The petitioner as well as the respondent H.E.C. management appeared and filed their respective written statements. The main contention of the H-E.C., inter alia, was that the petitioner was not an employee of the HEC. According to the respondents, the HEC entered into a contract with M/s. Adibasi Engineering Audoyogic Sahyog Samitti (hereinafter to be referred as Samitti) for supply of labour and the petitioner was engaged by the said Samitti. HEC never paid any salary to the petitioner at any point of time save and except discharging its the duties as provided under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. The petitioner was not appointed by the H.E.C. and there was no relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the HEC. Since the services of the petitioner were not required after 31.3.1986 he was accordingly informed through the contractor. 5. The said Samitti was also subsequently added as a party and the Samitti filed its written statement stating therein that it had entered into an agreement with the H.E.C. to supply unskilled workers. That agreement came to an end in the year. 1983. According to the Samitti there was no relationship of employer and employee between the Samitti and the petitioner. 6. In the said Reference case, the petitioner filed document and also examined two witnesses. The H.E.C. management had also filed document and examined one witness. The Labour Court formulated three points for determination : (i) Whether concerned workman is a workman under the I.D, Act of H.E.C. Ltd. (ii) Whether H.E.C. management terminated Shri Gajendra Kumar and if so whether it was justified? (iii) What relief the concerned workman is entitled to? 7. The H.E.C. management had also filed document and examined one witness. The Labour Court formulated three points for determination : (i) Whether concerned workman is a workman under the I.D, Act of H.E.C. Ltd. (ii) Whether H.E.C. management terminated Shri Gajendra Kumar and if so whether it was justified? (iii) What relief the concerned workman is entitled to? 7. The Labour Court thereafter recorded its finding that the concerned workman is a contractors man and was supplied to the management of the H.E.C. He was not directly appointed by the management of H.E.C. and as such is not a workman under the definition of the I.D. Act and the dispute is not an industrial dispute between the concerned workman and the management of H.E.C. and that the reference is bad in law. Further it was held that there is no termination of the concerned workman by the management of the H.E.C. and hence question regarding justification of the alleged termination does not arise. Labour Court lastly held that workman is not entitled to any relief. 8. Aggrieved by the said Award, the workman has filed this writ application challenging the said award. 9. Mr. T.K. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submitted that the impugned Award is not in accordance with law and the same is not sustainable. According to learned counsel, the H.E.C. has never disputed that the petitioner was not working with them. The Labour Court has also found that the petitioner was working in the H.E.C. management. Once the same was admitted the onus was on the H.E.C management to prove that he was not a workman. According to Mr. Das, the workman has been defined under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act. The said definition runs thus "Workman means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or Implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act, in relation to an Industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute....." 10. According to the learned counsel, a person who has been engaged for hire or reward and employed to do the work of the management as manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational or clerical, whether the term of employment be expressed or Implied, becomes the workman within the meaning of Section 2(s), In the instant case since the petitioner was admittedly employed for hire or reward to do the work of H.E.C., he becomes the workman under the H.E.C. management. The petitioner worked under the H.E.C. management for more than one year before his removal, the said retrenchment is against the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act which, inter alia. provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one months notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the notice period. According to Mr. Das, the said retrenchment without complying with the requirement of law is wholly illegal and Award of the Labour Court rendered without properly considering the said legal provisions is wholly arbitrary and vitiated in law. 11. Mr. R. Mukhopadhaya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of H.E.C. management on the other hand, supported the Award. According to him, there is no infirmity in theemployed by the H.E.C. management as a contract labourer through Adibasi Engineering Audoyogic Sahyog Samitti and payment was also made though the said Samitti. The concerned workman was appointed as Assistant Grade-ill In Turn Key Project Division of the H.E.C. Ltd. Since he was not employed directly by the management there was no relationship of employer and employee. The petitioner is thus not a workman under the definition of the I.D. Act under the management of H.E.C. The Labour Court rightly held that the dispute raised by him cannot be brought under the ambit of the I.D. Act. He further submitted that the petitioner was engaged in a project through the said Samitti. The said project was completed by 1.4.1986 and his services since thereafter was not required. He further submitted that the petitioner was engaged in a project through the said Samitti. The said project was completed by 1.4.1986 and his services since thereafter was not required. According to the learned counsel it does not amount to termination under the provision of I.D. Act and there was no violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. 12. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Mishra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of State supported the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the H.E.C. management and submitted that the Award is valid and legal and warrants no interference by this Court. 13. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and thoroughly considered the documents and materials on record, I find that there is no denial of the H.E.C. Management that the petitioner was working with them. It is also not denied that the payment of wages was made to the petitioner out of the fund of the management and from time to time his pay scale was revised. According to them, the payment of wages was made to the petitioner through the contractor, which has been denied by the contractor. The petitioner denied that the payment was made through the contractor. Admittedly the petitioner was stopped from working after 31.3.1986 by the H.E.C. management. It was not disputed that the petitioner was engaged to perform the work of the H.E.C on 20.7.1982 and was allowed to continue till 31.3.1986. Therefore, it is an admitted case that the petitioner worked under the H.E.C. management continuously for more than one year. Since the petitioner was employed to work for hire, even though there may not be an express or implied term of employment he comes within the ambit of the definition of workman under Section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, The Act defines "Retrenchment" under Section 2(oo) Analysing the definition of Retrenchment the Supreme Court, in Punjab Law Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682 , held that Retrenchment is termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. Retrenchment actually means discharge of surplus labour. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 682 , held that Retrenchment is termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. Retrenchment actually means discharge of surplus labour. Under the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D, Act, no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until the workman has been given one months notice In writing indicating the reasons for trenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. In the instant case, the management has not complied with the said legal requirement before stopping the petitioner from attending his work or before discharging him as a surplus labour and as such there is violation of the provision of Section 25F of the I.D. Act. 14. In the case of The Workman of the Food Corporation of India v. M/s. Food Corporation of India, reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court 670 the Supreme Court has held that if the workers authorized a man to receive payment from the employer and distribute the same to the workmen, the person so authorized for distribution cannot be held to be a contractor or intermediary and the workmen become the direct employee of the management. Further in the case of H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India and others. reported in (1985) 4 SCC 201 , the Apex Court held that the workmen worked for more than 240 days continuously in a year, their removal amounts to retrenchment and in that case Industrial Disputes Act, held to be attracted. Contrary to the said proposition of law. the Labour Court has held that the petitioner was not a workman under the H.E.C. management and there was no violation of Section 25F. It has been further held that the retrenchment was not illegal and the dispute in question is not an industrial dispute under the Act. 15. The said findings of the Labour Court are against the legal provisions and the same are vitiated in law. 16. It has been further held that the retrenchment was not illegal and the dispute in question is not an industrial dispute under the Act. 15. The said findings of the Labour Court are against the legal provisions and the same are vitiated in law. 16. In view of the above, the impugned Award dated 15.10.1996 rendered in Reference Case No. 2 of 1990 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi is quashed. This writ application is allowed. However, there will be no order as to costs.