ORDER K. Govindarajan, J. The claimants filed the above appeal aggrieved by the order dated 6.10.1994 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, Salem in W.C.No.164 of 1993, rejecting the claim in toto. 2. One Kumar, the husband of the 1st appellant and father of the 2nd appellant was an employee under the 2nd respondent, who entered into a contract with the 1st respondent to construct a roof of a godown in the Spinning Mills of the 1st respondent When the said Kumar was working for the purpose of construction of the roof of the godown, on 19.1.1993 he fell down and sustained injuries. In spite of treatment he died on 12.4.1993. The claimants filed a claim petition in W.C.No.164 of 1995 claiming a compensation of a sum of Rs.10,00,000 as the deceased Kumar was aged about 26 years at the time of death. 3. The 1st respondent-management filed a counter denying the fact even with respect to the contract with the 2nd respondent and the construction work carried on 19.1.1993. On that basis, the 1st respondent denied their liability. 4. The 2nd respondent remained ex parte. 5. The Deputy Commissioner of Labour, (Workmen's Compensation), Salem considering the said pleading and evidence available on record dismissed the claim petition filed in W.C.No.164 of 1993 holding that the employer and employee relationship between the claimants and respondents was not established and that the claimants have not established that the accident took place in the course of employment. Ultimately, the Deputy Commissioner found that the deceased Kumar is not a workmen employed under the respondents and has not sustained injuries in the accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment on 19.1.1993. On the basis of the said findings, the claim petition was dismissed. Hence, the claimants preferred the above appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that P.W.4, the co-worker deposed about the accident but the Deputy Commissioner has not even dealt with the said evidence while rejecting the case of the claimants. Referring to the documents, learned counsel further submitted that had the Deputy Commissioner dealt with those documents seriously, he could have come to a conclusion that the accident took place as alleged by the claimants. Referring to the documents, learned counsel further submitted that had the Deputy Commissioner dealt with those documents seriously, he could have come to a conclusion that the accident took place as alleged by the claimants. While this Court referred to the decision in Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu (2004)1 L.L.J. 741, to put a question as to how the 1st respondent-management is liable to pay the compensation when the 1st respondent is not carrying construction as a trade or business, learned counsel for the appellants referred to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, hereinafter called ‘the Act’ and cited a number of decisions in support of his submission that though construction of building is not a trade or business, it is for and incidental to the main trade or business and so the 1st respondent-management cannot escape from their liability to pay the compensation. 7. Learned counsel for the Official Liquidator though argued on merits, he has not made any submission with respect to the second limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. According to him, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has dealt with the matter on merits, examining all the materials available on record and so this Court may not interfere with the said order. Same argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent. 8. The substantial questions of law that arise for determination in this appeal are: (1) Whether the 1st respondent-management which was running the Spinning Mills is liable to pay the compensation to a workman engaged by a 2nd respondent-contractor for the purpose of constructing the roof of the godown of the building in the 1st respondent-management millse (2) Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Labour is correct in rejecting the claim petition without even dealing with the oral and documentary evidence available on record which speak about the employment and accident as alleged by the claimantse 9. We would like to deal with the second question first. According to the claimants, the deceased Kumar was engaged by the 2nd respondent for the purpose of construction of a roof of the 1st respondent management-mills. On 19.1.1993 when the deceased Kumar was in employment, he fell down, sustained injuries and died on 12.4.1993. We would like to deal with the second question first. According to the claimants, the deceased Kumar was engaged by the 2nd respondent for the purpose of construction of a roof of the 1st respondent management-mills. On 19.1.1993 when the deceased Kumar was in employment, he fell down, sustained injuries and died on 12.4.1993. It is specifically stated in the claim petition that the 2nd respondent himself brought the deceased to Sriram Hospital at about 3.30 p.m. Due to the advice of the Doctor, the deceased was admitted at Kovai Medical Centre hospital, Coimbatore on 20.1.1993 and he was discharged on 7.4.1993 and thereafter he died on 12.4.1993. 10. It is relevant to mention here that the 2nd respondent did not file any counter nor contested the claim petition. Only the 1st respondent-management filed a counter stating that he has not even engaged the 2nd respondent as contractor nor done any construction work as alleged. The 1st claimant deposed as P.W.1. She has deposed reiterating the averments mentioned in the claim petition. The 3rd claimant deposed as P.W.2. The Doctor who issued the certificate Ex.A-11 deposed as P.W.3. He has, on the basis of the records, deposed that the accident took place due to fall and on the basis of the other records he deposed that such an injury was caused when the deceased Kumar was in the course of employment as alleged by the claimants. P.W.4, one Kandasamy, is a painter working under the 2nd respondent. He is a co-worker of the deceased and he deposed about the work done for the roof of the building in the 1st respondent-management mills. He specifically deposed that the deceased had worked as alleged in the claim petition and P.W.4 also had spoken to about the incident occurred on 19.1.1993. He denied the suggestion that no incident had occurred on 19.1.1993. Ex.A-1 certificate was given by the Doctor of Sripuram Nursing Home. According to the same, on 19.1.1993 at about 3.30 pm the deceased was brought to the hospital in an unconscious state. In the said letter, it is specifically stated that the 2nd respondent-contractor accompanied the deceased workman and the history was recorded as stated by the 2nd respondent. According to the same, the deceased Kumar fell from a height of 60 ft., while working on the roof of the building in the 1st respondent-management mills. In the said letter, it is specifically stated that the 2nd respondent-contractor accompanied the deceased workman and the history was recorded as stated by the 2nd respondent. According to the same, the deceased Kumar fell from a height of 60 ft., while working on the roof of the building in the 1st respondent-management mills. Ex.A-2 dated 7.4.1993 is marked to show that the deceased was taking treatment at Kovai Medical Centre and Hospital Limited. To establish the death, the claimants marked Ex.A-4 death certificate. Ex.A-10 is marked to show that the father of the deceased gave a complaint to the police narrating the accident due to which the said Kumar died. One Dr. D. Ganesan, the consultant of Kovai Medical Centre and Hospital Limited gave the certificate, marked as Ex.A-11 stating that the deceased sustained injuries due to the accident occurred on 19.1.1993 and was admitted on 20.1.1993 and discharged on 7.4.1993. The intimation given to the police by the Hospital has been marked as Ex.A-12. In the said intimation which was acknowledged as Ex.A-13, it is stated that the injury was due to the fall from a height of 25 ft., while working in a building construction of the 1st respondent-management mills. 11. In spite of these oral and documentary evidence, the Deputy Commissioner of Labour has simply rejected Exs.A-12 and A-13 on the ground that R.W.1 had totally denied that the deceased Kumar was not an employee and no such accident had occurred. While accepting such evidence of R.W.1, the Deputy Commissioner has not appreciated the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 4, the Doctor and the co-worker respectively. They speak about the cause of the injuries and the alleged incident occurred on 19.1.1993 due to which the deceased sustained injuries. The Deputy Commissioner without even appreciating the evidence of P.W.3 in entirety as he had explained in the later portion of his evidence what is “RTA”, simply relied on the answer given by the Doctor for a vague question what is “RTA”. As stated already, when there is a specific evidence of P.W.4, the co-worker and the eye-witness, the same was not at all considered and rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. It is the case of the 1st respondent-management that the deceased was not their workman. The 2nd respondent-contractor remained ex parte without even denying the averments made in the claim petition. As stated already, when there is a specific evidence of P.W.4, the co-worker and the eye-witness, the same was not at all considered and rejected by the Deputy Commissioner. It is the case of the 1st respondent-management that the deceased was not their workman. The 2nd respondent-contractor remained ex parte without even denying the averments made in the claim petition. When there is a direct witness who is the eye-witness to the accident to establish that the deceased was employed by the 2nd respondent-contractor in the construction of the roof of the godown in the 1st respondent-management mills, the learned Deputy Commissioner without even appreciating that evidence erroneously has come to the conclusion that the claimants have not even established their case regarding the relationship of employer-employee with the 1st respondent-management to claim compensation under the Act. Hence, the findings given by the learned Deputy Commissioner is that the deceased Kumar is not a workman under employment of the opposite party and sustained injuries in an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment on 19.1.1993. Normally, this Court is not expected to deal with the factual position but in this case, the conclusion had been arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner without even application of mind with respect to the oral and documentary evidence of the claimants which establish the case of the claimants regarding the employment and the alleged accident. 12. Therefore, we find that the claimants have established that the deceased Kumar was employed by the 2nd respondent-contractor for the construction of the roof of a godown in the building of the 1st respondent-management mills and the alleged accident took place on 19.1.1993 in the course of such employment. 13. Now we have to decide whether the 1st respondent-management mills are liable to pay the compensation as claimed by the claimants. Pending appeal, the 1st respondent-management has been liquidated and the Official Liquidator took charge of the management and so he has been impleaded as 3rd respondent. As stated already, the learned Official Liquidator did not answer the argument of the learned counsel that since the claimants established the employment of the deceased Kumar under the 2nd respondent-contractor and the accident also took place as alleged, the 1st respondent-management mills are liable to pay the compensation. 14. As stated already, the learned Official Liquidator did not answer the argument of the learned counsel that since the claimants established the employment of the deceased Kumar under the 2nd respondent-contractor and the accident also took place as alleged, the 1st respondent-management mills are liable to pay the compensation. 14. If the decision in Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S. Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S. Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S. Sakilabanu (2004)1 L.L.J. 741, is applied to the present case as it is, the appeal has to be dismissed insofar as the 1st respondent is concerned, though the appellants are entitled to succeed as against the 2nd respondent. 15. The Division Bench of this Court in Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu (2004)1 L.L.J. 741, came to the conclusion that the claim under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot be made against the principal employer as the activity for which the workman was employed by the contractor is not part of the business of the employer. In the said case, the Agricultural College and Research Institute wanted to construct a ladies hostel and the said work was given to Public Works Department. The Public Works Department in turn employed a contractor for construction of the work. The contractor engaged a sub-contractor to carry out the work. The mason engaged by the sub-contractor passed away in the accident that occurred while he was working. The Commissioner found that the said Institute was the principal employer and therefore liable to pay the compensation. The learned Judges in the said decision took the view that the contractor to whom the work was entrusted by the P.W.D. to construct ladies hostel is liable to pay the compensation to the workman as they are the principal employer and they have to recover the same from the sub-contractor who is the immediate employer. Having decided so, in the appeal filed by the Institute, the Division Bench has further dealt with the matter to decide the issue whether the Institute is liable to pay the compensation. Having decided so, in the appeal filed by the Institute, the Division Bench has further dealt with the matter to decide the issue whether the Institute is liable to pay the compensation. While deciding the said issue the Division Bench following the decision reported in Lakshminarayana Shetty v. Shantha (2002)3 L.L.J. 523 of the Apex Court, held that in so far as the Institution is concerned, the claim does not fall within the Act as the construction activity is not part of its business. On that basis, the order of the Commissioner was set aside in so far as the appellant-institution is concerned. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the said decision was decided on the basis of the facts available in that case and so it cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. Though the learned Judges have given finding in para 19 to the effect that the contractor under the Public Works Department in the said case was the principal employer and the sub-contractor was the immediate employer and so the principal employer, namely, the contractor is liable to pay the compensation, the Division Bench went further and decided about the liability of the Institute at whose instance the construction was put up. The Division Bench while rejecting the claim against the Institute as it is not maintainable, assigned the reasons to the effect that as the business of the Dean of the Institute is not the construction activity and so the claim against the institute on the basis of the accident occurred during the course of employment for construction will not fall within the Act. In view of the said finding in the later portion of the decision, the said decision does apply to the present case. But, the Division Bench came to such a conclusion only on the basis of the pronouncement of the Apex Court in Lakshminarayana Shetty v. Shantha (2002)3 L.L.J. 523. To appreciate the same, we are inclined to re-prodcue the entire judgment, which is as follows: “Leave granted. We have heard the counsel for the parties. 2. The respondents are the daughter and wife of the deceased Ramu who was engaged by the appellant to paint the house. While he was doing this work, he unfortunately fell down and died. To appreciate the same, we are inclined to re-prodcue the entire judgment, which is as follows: “Leave granted. We have heard the counsel for the parties. 2. The respondents are the daughter and wife of the deceased Ramu who was engaged by the appellant to paint the house. While he was doing this work, he unfortunately fell down and died. The claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act was denied, but on writ petition being filed the High Court has allowed the same. 3. No reasons have been given by the High Court for coming to the conclusion that this was a case which fell within the domain of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4. There was apparently a contract between the appellant and Ramu whereby Ramu had undertaken the work of painting the house. Whether the action of the appellant by engaging a person in this manner makes him employee or a workman of the appellant was a question to be decided. The case did not fall within the four corners of the said Act and, therefore, the decision of the High Court was incorrect. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the High Court.” From the above said decision in Lakshminarayana Shetty v. Shantha (2002)3 L.L.J. 523, it is clear that the appellant before the Apex Court constructed the house and for painting the same, the appellant entered into a contract with the deceased Ramu. While he was engaged in painting the house, he died. While dealing with the said facts, the Apex Court found that the action of the appellant therein in engaging the said Ramu for painting a house by entering into a contract, he cannot be construed as an employee/workman of the appellant. In view of the above, the Apex Court has come to the conclusion that the said case did not fall within the four corners of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In view of the above, the Apex Court has come to the conclusion that the said case did not fall within the four corners of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Since the said decision in (2002)3 L.L.J. 523 is not the answer to decide the issue to be decided by the learned Judges in the case decided in Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu Agricultural College and Research Institute v. S.Sakilabanu (2004)1 L.L.J. 741 and they have not referred to or dealt with the scope of any provision of the Act, the conclusion arrived at that the Dean of the Institute is not liable to pay compensation on the basis of the said decision in (2002)3 L.L.J. 523 cannot be taken as a precedent to be followed. As the conclusion of the learned Judges in the above said decision of the Division Bench is not based on the relevant decision of the Apex Court on the issue, we are not expected to follow the same especially when the Division Bench has not even considered the relevant provisions of the Act by which alone we can come to a correct conclusion with respect to the liability of the industry which engaged the contractor for the purpose of doing certain work which is different from the regular business. 17. In view of the above, notwithstanding the said decision, we are inclined to deal with the said issue with reference to the relevant provisions in the Act and on the basis of the decided cases. 17. In view of the above, notwithstanding the said decision, we are inclined to deal with the said issue with reference to the relevant provisions in the Act and on the basis of the decided cases. Sec.2(1)(n) of the Act, as it stood during the relevant period, deals with “workman”, which reads as follows: “‘workman’ means any person (other than a person whose employment is of a casual nature and who is employed otherwise than for the purposes of the employer's trade or business) who is- (i) a railway servant as defined in Sec.2(34) of the Indian Railways Act, 1989 (24 of 1989), not permanently employed in any administrative, district or sub-divisional office of a railway and not employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, or (ia)(a) a master, seaman or other member of the crew of a ship, (b) a captain or other member of the crew of an aircraft, (c) a person recruited as driver, helper, mechanic, cleaner or in any other capacity in connection with a motor vehicle, (d) a person recruited for work abroad by a company, and who is employed outside India in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II and the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle, or company, as the case may be, is registered in India, or; (ii) employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, whether the contract of employment was made before or after the passing of this Act and whether such contract is expressed or implied, oral or in writing; but does not include any person working in the capacity of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union; and any reference to a workman who has been injured shall, where the workman is dead includes a reference to his dependents or any of them.” 18. The above said definition clearly lays down that in order to exclude a person from the category of “workman”, two ingredients must be present. Those ingredients are that the employment of such a person should not only be of casual in nature but also for a purpose otherwise than for the purposes of employer's trade or business. Both these qualifications must be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of “workman” under the Act. There is a catena of decisions bearing on this point. Both these qualifications must be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of “workman” under the Act. There is a catena of decisions bearing on this point. All the decisions have taken note of a similar provision in Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 in England. This Court has laid down the said proposition in Arumugam v. Nagammal (1948)2 MLJ. 639 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 462; Vinayak Mudaliar v. Mundala Pottiamma (1952)2 MLJ. 774 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 432 and T.N.Sitharama Reddiar v. A.Ayyaswami Gounder T.N.Sitharama Reddiar v. A. Ayyaswami Gounder T.N. Sitharama Reddiar v. A.Ayyaswami Gounder (1955)2 MLJ. 768: A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 212. A plain reading of the definition of ‘workman’ in the Act shows that the word used as conjunction is “and” and therefore it will have to be held that both the ingredients mentioned above would have to be satisfied in order to exclude a person from the category of the said definition. Thus if a person is employed for the purpose of a trade or business, the employer is liable even if the work is of a casual nature. Similarly, if a person is employed in a work which is not of casual nature, the employer is liable even if the work is not for the purpose of a trade or business of the employer. 19. The question of casual labourer under the Act has been subjected to judicial decisions. Casual employment is not used in contradiction to “permanent or constant” employment. The dictionary definitions of the word “casual” are as follows: “Depending on chance; depending on or produced by chance; occurring or coming at uncertain times; not to be calculated on; unsettled; coming without design or premeditation; casual labourer; one who does casual or occasional jobs”. - (Murray) “Happening to come without being foreseen; coming without regularity”. - (Webster) “Happening without design on the part of the agent, or as a mere coincidence; coming at uncertain times or without regularity; a labourer or artizan employed only irregularly”. - (Century). “Arising from chance; not certain”. - (Johnson). “coming at times; without regularity”. - (Imperial).” 20. In Thaver Bros. v. Muthu Mariammal A.I.R. 1933 Rang. - (Webster) “Happening without design on the part of the agent, or as a mere coincidence; coming at uncertain times or without regularity; a labourer or artizan employed only irregularly”. - (Century). “Arising from chance; not certain”. - (Johnson). “coming at times; without regularity”. - (Imperial).” 20. In Thaver Bros. v. Muthu Mariammal A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 208, it is held that a person who is employed for one or more days in each week to do work it must be done, or which it is known it will be advisable to do all these times, is not casually employed. whenever the same person is under a contract that an employer to do work at recurring times which must, or which it is known beforehand, it will be convenient to do such recurring times, the employment of such person is also not of a casual nature. On the other hand, although the work must be done at recurring times, if different persons are employed to do such work, it is most probable that such persons are not within the Act, for it must be noticed that it is the employment of the” person “ which is to be of a casual nature. 21. In the decision in Hill v. Begg (1908)2 K.B. 802, it is held that” a casual nature “ are to the effect that it is a chance employment based on no contract to employ, even though there be a reasonable expectation of being employed. For example, that of a window-cleaner who is only employed at irregular intervals when the lady of the house may think the windows need cleaning. 22. In the decision in Varadarajulu Naidu v. Masaya Boyan (1955)2 MLJ. 590 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 1113, the Division Bench of this Court, where the employer was a contractor for the formation of a road, that the deceased was employed as a cooly maistry under him, that the deceased brought four coolies with him and along with them was engaged in breaking stones and that the deceased was being paid a lump sum of money every fortnight and that he was a regular and continuous worker and not a casual labourer, held that the deceased was a” workman” within the meaning of the Act. 23. In the decision in Vinayak Mudaliar v. Mundala Pottiamma (1952)2 MLJ. 774 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 23. In the decision in Vinayak Mudaliar v. Mundala Pottiamma (1952)2 MLJ. 774 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 432, the learned Judge of this Court while construing the scope of the abovesaid provision, held that an employer cannot escape his liability to compensate the workman engaged in a construction merely because construction of house was only his subsidiary business and his main business was something else. The same learned Judge, Mack, J., took similar view in the decision in Arumugam v. Nagammal (1948)2 MLJ. 639 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 462. 24. The Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Madurai District Co-operative Spinning Mills Limited v. P.Pandian Madurai District Co-operative Spinning Mills Limited v. P.Pandian Madurai District Co-operative Spinning Mills Limited v. P.Pandian (1998)3 L.L.N. 416, while considering the scope of Sec.2(1)(n) of the Act held that so long as there is evidence that the employment of a person is regular even for doing work which may be irregular or occasional, the employment cannot be construed to be casual. It is further held that the words "a person whose employment is of casual nature" have to be understood to mean that the employment of persons must be of casual nature and not work in which the person employed. While appreciating the facts, namely, engaging a person for construction work even for 15 days in a month and there will be no work for some months and he was doing gardening, the Division Bench found that even such a person has to be construed as a workman. 25. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Moideen v. Gopalan (1996)3 L.L.N. 195 holding as follows: “8. Even otherwise, we cannot hold that the claimant's employment was of casual nature as envisaged in the definition clause. The word “casual” must be given its normal meaning in the context in which the definition is formulated. The word “casual” here only means just informal or a happening by chance or undesignated, etc. Way back in 1936 Beaumnont, C.J., was not inclined to give a different meaning to the term “casual” in the definition vide: N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 199. The word “casual” here only means just informal or a happening by chance or undesignated, etc. Way back in 1936 Beaumnont, C.J., was not inclined to give a different meaning to the term “casual” in the definition vide: N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala N.H.Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 199. Learned Judge has observed that even in England the expression casual employment was not given any straight - jacket definition as there are some cases in which employment is not casual. Taking cue from the said observation Ghangani, J., has held in Madanlal v. Magali A.I.R. 1961 Raj. 145, that the term “casual” in the definition of workman "in the Act is not a matter of precision, but is a colloquial term and is not capable of being exactly defined." At any rate, we are not disposed to treat the employment of the claimant for cutting down the tree as one of casual nature on the facts of this case.” 26. Coming to the present case, evidence is available to come to the conclusion that the deceased was engaged for construction of the roof of the building in the 1st respondent-management mills. No evidence is available to come to the conclusion that such employment is of casual in nature and the employment of the deceased, is not regular one. P.W.1 in his cross-examination has specifically stated that the deceased was working for the last one year under the 2nd respondent-contractor. P.W.4 in his chief-examination deposed that the deceased was working under the 2nd respondent-contractor for a period of three months. The 2nd respondent-contractor has not filed any counter denying the case of the claimants regarding the employment of the deceased. In view of the above, it cannot be said that the employment of the deceased under the 2nd respondent-contractor is of casual in nature so as to exclude him from the definition of "workman" as defined under Sec.2(1)(n) of the Act. In the present case, the building was constructed in which the deceased was constructing the roof and to be used as a godown for the purpose of the business of the 1st respondent-management mills. 27. Now we have to decide the question whether the casual labourer was employed "for the purpose of the employer's trade or business” so as to bring himself within the definition of “workman”. 27. Now we have to decide the question whether the casual labourer was employed "for the purpose of the employer's trade or business” so as to bring himself within the definition of “workman”. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Moideen v. Gopalan (1996)3 L.L.N. 195, while considering Sec.12 of the Act, has held as follows: “7. Even assuming that claimant's employment on that day was of a casual nature, that by itself is not enough to push him out of ambit of the definition of workman. If a person has to be ousted out of the contours of the definition, the casual nature of his engagement must couple with the succeeding postulate in the definition that such employment should not be for the trade or business of the employer. The word "and" used in the definition is for the conjunction of the two postulates together in one person. No interpretation to make the two postulates disjunctive is warranted on the context. There is a catena of decisions which adopted the said view. (vide: Arumugam v. Nagammal Arumugam v. Nagammal Arumugam v. Nagammal (1948)2 MLJ. 639 : A.I.R. 1949 Mad. 462; Vinayak Mudaliar v. Mundala Pottiamma (1952)2 MLJ. 774 : A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 432; T.N.Sitharama Reddiar v. A.Ayyaswami Gounder T.N.Sitharama Reddiar v. A.Ayyaswami Gounder T.N.Sitharama Reddiar v. A.Ayyaswami Gounder (1955)2 MLJ. 768: A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 212 and Chodaka and Sons v. Mahboob Sab 1974 Lab.I.C. 290).” 28. While considering whether the construction of “cooli-lines” for the estate workers is part of business of tea estate, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Superintendent, Lockhart Estate v. Kaliappan (1976)1 L.L.J. 354, held as follows: “4…… It is necessary, in order to render a person, who has not directly employed the workman or workmen concerned, liable to answer the claim for compensation, to show the existence of various requisites which would attract Sec.12(i) and one of them is that the principal employer has, in the course or for the purpose of his trade or business contracted with any other person for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the trade or business of the principal. It is said that the trade or business of the principal here is that of producing tea in the Estate, manufacturing it, preparing if for the market and marketing it and any work which is ordinarily part of this work could alone fall within the scope of Sec.12(i). Consequently, it is said that if the workmen were engaged in such activities as construction of cooli-lines when they met with the accident, even the purposes of the Estate, that would not enable a claim to be made against the Estate as the principal employer. This contention calls for examination of what the trade or business of the principal is. The term “trade” or “business” would not have been used in Sec.12(i) to mean the same, though in certain contexts they may bear the same meaning. The very fact that both these terms are employed in the section would indicate that they connote different ideas and they do not cover the identical field, “trade” as generally understood means activities of buying and selling and the business which is related to such buying and selling whereas “business” is a term of such larger import. All categories of business need not be trade, since there are many categories in which there is no element of trade at all. Taking for instance, the case of a tea estate, the trade may refer to the activities of buying and selling, buying for the purpose of the business of the tea estate and selling the products of the tea estate. Business is a concept which takes in all the activities including the running of a hospital for the Estate, the maintenance of cooli-lines, providing such amenities as are agreed to between the management and the labour and all other incidental activities. It goes without saying that in the assessment to income-tax, if the Estate is to claim deduction for expenses of business, expenses such as those incurred for the purpose of running a hospital for the benefit of the Estate will be claimed as business expenses though they are not to be treated as trading expenses. 5. In a different context the question of the distinction between business and trade was considered by the Chancery Division in the decision in A Debtor IN RE. (1927)1 Chancery 97. Sir Scrutton, L.J., said in that case: “The word ‘trade’ is often confined to buying and selling commodities. 5. In a different context the question of the distinction between business and trade was considered by the Chancery Division in the decision in A Debtor IN RE. (1927)1 Chancery 97. Sir Scrutton, L.J., said in that case: “The word ‘trade’ is often confined to buying and selling commodities. Where to draw the line between what is a profession and what is a trade is a matter which it is not possible to deal with by any general definition. ‘Business’ is a much wider term than ‘trade’. The word ‘business’ at least covers a continuous occupation involving liabilities to others.” We cannot agree with the counsel for the principal employer that the construction of cooli-lines in the estate is not part of the business of the principal. Sec.15 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951 obliges every employer to provide and maintain for every worker and his family residing in the plantation necessary housing accommodation. It is a statutory duty. In discharge of such duty, the employer may himself construct houses for residence of the workers or such work may be done through a contractor. If he does such work by himself, it cannot be said that it is not part of his business, for, the business is not concerned merely with growing tea and selling it. Tea can be grown only in the tea estate and a tea estate could be run only in accordance with certain regulations and one of the regulations is that quarters are to be provided. Even if there be no statutory obligation if it is the usual requirement of the business or a term of the employment, then work such as construction of cooli-lines would be part of the business of the employer……” 29. Similarly, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in the decision in Malankara Rubber and Produce Company v. Hameed (2001)4 L.L.N. 373, while considering the claim of the claimants, the parents of the deceased workman, who died while erecting a structure close to their existing factory, the Division Bench held as follows: “9. We find no merit in the contention raised by the appellant that the appellant company cannot be treated as the principal employer. The word business used in Sec.12 has various shades of meanings. The work undertaken by the contractor was in respect of the expansion of the factory building in the premises to the appellant. We find no merit in the contention raised by the appellant that the appellant company cannot be treated as the principal employer. The word business used in Sec.12 has various shades of meanings. The work undertaken by the contractor was in respect of the expansion of the factory building in the premises to the appellant. The expansion of the factory building was a usual requirement incidental for the expansion of the business. The expansion of the factory being connected with the expansion of the business of the employer would have been done by himself or under his supervision if he had not contracted with another. As the work undertaken by the contractor was in respect of the expansion of the business of the company, and the accident occurred in the factory premises under the control of the appellant, where its business was carried on, the appellant was the principal employer liable to compensate the death of the worker, viz., Basheer under Sec.12(1) of the Act. The Workmen's Compensation Court was fully justified in holding that the appellant was the principal employer and that Sec.12 of the Act was applicable. Hence this appeal has only to be dismissed and the order of the Workmen's Compensation Court upheld.” 30. While construing the claim on the basis of the death of the workman while whitewashing the walls of the respondent-university, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision in Bala Mallamma v. Registrar, Osmania Unviersity (2001)2 L.L.N. 890, held as follows: “16. This judgment reiterates a principle of interpretation and the principle is that the meaning of the work must be gleaned from the context in which it is used. Meaning assigned to a word in a particular Act may mean one thing and the meaning of the same term may give a different meaning when used in a different Act. Therefore, the word” trade or business “ as used in this Act have to be understood in the context in which this Act has been enacted. Basically the act has been enacted to provide compensation to the workers suffering during the course of employment. Therefore, the word” trade or business “ as used in this Act have to be understood in the context in which this Act has been enacted. Basically the act has been enacted to provide compensation to the workers suffering during the course of employment. It is also the purpose of the Act that they should get speedy remedies and it appears that the intention of enacting the Sec.12 of the Act was only to ensure that compensation is paid by the principal expeditiously and if this purpose of the Act and the provisions are kept in mind, then the word” trade “ or” business “ may not have the same meaning which it would have, for instance, when used in interpreting a taxing statute. If the plea of the University is accepted that they are engaged in imparting education, conducting examinations and conferring degrees only and cannot be termed to be doing any business or trade and hence they are not liable to pay compensation, then any person engaged for similar activity by any Government department, any University, any hospital, if faced with an accident, would not be able to get compensation in terms of Sec.12 of the Act although such a person would be a workman under the Act. Similarly if an individual who wants to construct a residential house of his own engages a person for construction of the house and if such a person faces an accident during the course of the building of the house, he would be remediless under the Act. Even otherwise the normal activity of the University is imparting education, conducting of examinations and conferring degrees, this they cannot do without having proper buildings..…” 31. All the above said decisions dealt with the scope of Sec.12 of the Act in which provision also, the accident should occur in the course of or for the purpose of employer's trade or business to claim compensation. To attract Sec.12 of the Act, such work should be executed through a contractor. In the present case, the factual finding is that a godown was constructed in the 1st respondent-management mills through the 2nd respondent-contractor for constructing the roof of the building, and the deceased was engaged and in the course of his employment he died. In view of the said finding of the Deputy Commissioner, Sec.12 of the Act is applicable to the facts of the case. In view of the said finding of the Deputy Commissioner, Sec.12 of the Act is applicable to the facts of the case. According to Sec.12 of the Act, the 1st respondent-management mills, on whose instruction the godown was constructed for the purpose of their business, have to be construed as principal employer though the deceased was immediately employed by the 2nd respondent-contractor. 32. In view of the above, the 1st respondent-management mills are liable to pay the compensation to the appellants-claimants as fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, as no argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent disputing the quantum. In view of liquidation of the 1st respondent-management mills, the 3rd respondent/Official Liquidator is liable to pay the compensation to the appellants/claimants and the 3rd respondent is entitled to recover the same from the 2nd respondent-contractor as the 2nd respondent-contractor has to indemnify the liability under Sec.12(2) of the Act. 33. For the reasons stated above, the order dated 6.10.1994 passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Labour is set aside and this appeal is allowed on the above terms. No costs. V.S. ----- Appeal allowed.