Judgment 1. The three letters patent appeals have been filed against a common judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 19.4.2001, by which he has quashed the order of Chancellor of the Universities dated 8.4.2000, whereby the Chancellor has held that no further action should be taken by the Patna University after notification stated to have been issued on 31.3.2000 and further the agenda item dealing with promotion of teachers to the post of University Professor should be stayed till further orders. A copy of the said order has been annexed as Annexure 1 to the writ application. 2. The factual matters lie in a narrow compass. The matter relates to promotion of teachers to the post of Professor. The question as to whether promotion is good or bad and shifting of their dates for the purpose of promotion are good or bad, is not the question before this Court. The only question which falls for determination in this case is as to whether the Chancellor has power to stay the proceedings of the University before passing final order in terms of section 10(4) of the Patna University Act. To appreciate the points it is necessary to quote section 10(4) of the Patna University Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act".). Section 10(4) of the Act: "The Chancellor may by order in writing annul any proceeding or orders of the University, which are not consistent with this Act, Statutes, Ordinance or Regulation or for which there are not sufficient reasons. Provided that before issuing any such order or directives, he shall call upon the University to show cause within the period specified by him why such order or directive should not be issued and if any cause is shown within the specified period he shall consider the same." 3. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision will show that the Chancellor has power to annul the proceeding or order of the University which is in contravention of the provision of the Act, statutes, ordinance and regulation for which there are no sufficient reasons. However, condition precedent for exercise of such power is to notice before passing the said order. 4. There is no specific provision under section 10(4) of the Act authorising the Chancellor to pass interim orders before passing final order in exercise of powers conferred under section 10(4) of the Act. However, condition precedent for exercise of such power is to notice before passing the said order. 4. There is no specific provision under section 10(4) of the Act authorising the Chancellor to pass interim orders before passing final order in exercise of powers conferred under section 10(4) of the Act. According to the writ petitioner-respondents, once this power is missing in the Act, the Chancellor cannot stay the proceedings of the University before passing the final order under section 10(4) of the Act. Any such exercise of power by the Chancellor will fall in the zone of arbitrariness. 5. The stand of the appellant (Chancellor) on the other hand is that once power is vested in the Chancellor to annul the proceedings etc. of the University that power itself carries incidental or ancillary powers to make the provision effective. There may be a situation where without passing interim or ex-parte order the very object of section 10(4) of the Act will be frustrated. 6. It is well settled law that when the Legislature vests power to the authorities to do particular act, then even in absence of any provision the authority is vested with ancillary and incidental powers to do the act to achieve the object for which power has been conferred on the authority. In this connection it is relevant to refer Maxwell Interpretation on Statute (11th Edition), wherein at page 350 it has been observed that where an Act confers jurisdiction it impliedly grant power for doing all such acts or doing such actions which are necessary to its execution. 7. The Apex Court has occasioned to deal with the matter in a catena of decisions, but few are referred to here: In the case of Income Tax Officer V/s. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, reported in A.I.R. 1969 (S.C.) page 430 the Apex Court held that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. Again in the case of Reserve Bank of India & Ors. V/s. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd & Anr., reported in A.I.R. 1996 (S.C) page 646, the Apex Court held that power to make a law with respect to any subject carries with it all the ancillary and incidental powers to make the law effective and workable and to prevent evasion. 8. V/s. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd & Anr., reported in A.I.R. 1996 (S.C) page 646, the Apex Court held that power to make a law with respect to any subject carries with it all the ancillary and incidental powers to make the law effective and workable and to prevent evasion. 8. In the light of the said law, now it has to be considered as to whether the Chancellor can pass order of stay during pendency of the proceeding for annulment under section 10(4) of the Act. 9. Power has been conferred on the Chancellor to see that the University acts within the bounds of law. There is no deviation from the statutes, regulations etc. In exercise of that power circumstances may arise whether interim orders are required to be passed to prevent the mischief, otherwise the very object of the provision will be frustrated. So power to call for records, power to stay proceedings, or to issue such other directions during pendency of enquiry under section 10(4) of the Act is implied power vested in the Chancellor or in other words, this is incidental or ancillary power vested in the Chancellor to carry out the object conferred by section 10(4) of the Act. 10. Thus, we hold that the Chancellor has incidental and ancillary power to pass interim orders, sometime even ex-parte orders to achieve object of section 10(4) of the Act, though there being no specific provision in the said Act conferring such power. 11. Coming to the facts of the case, when the matter came to the notice of the Chancellor with regard to certain promotions, he has only directed the University not to proceed further in the matter till further order. At the time when the order was passed it cannot be said that the Chancellor passed an order for indefinite period, in other words, the order was passed in an emergent situation to prevent the University from proceeding further in the matter so that the matter may be decided by the Chancellor. 12. In the meantime, matter was brought before this Court as a result of which the Chancellor has not taken any decision in the matter. When order is passed till further order that does not mean that the order is for indefinite and long period. 12. In the meantime, matter was brought before this Court as a result of which the Chancellor has not taken any decision in the matter. When order is passed till further order that does not mean that the order is for indefinite and long period. Till further orders means only that order is interim in nature and it can be reconsidered at subsequent stage depending upon the facts of the case. However, if there is unreasonable delay in disposing of the matter, this Court may issue direction to the Chancellor to dispose of the matter expeditiously, but when order of stay has been passed till further orders, it cannot be said that the order has been passed for indefinite and endless period. Thus, the submissions advanced by Mr. Mukherjee that the power exercised by the Chancellor is arbitrary one does not stand to reason. Once we have held that he has ancillary and incidental power to achieve the object of section 10 (4) of the Act, the order of stay cannot be held to be arbitrary. 13. Accordingly, we do not agree with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the order is vitiated because of the fact that it was passed till further orders. The Chancellor is fully justified in passing the order in exercise of power under section 10(4) of the Act. 14. However, as the matter is pending since long before the Chancellor, the Chancellor is well advised to dispose of the matter within six weeks when the matter is brought to his notice by the counsel appearing for the Chancellor. 15. In the result appeals are allowed.