JUDGMENT Swatanter Kumar, J. - Exercising the powers of Commissioner under the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Director, Rural Development and Panchayats, Punjab, vide his order dated 31.1.2003 dismissed the appeal preferred by Shri Daya Singh against the order dated 9.8.1983 passed by the Collector, Patiala. Vide this order, the Commissioner, while adopting the reasoning given by him in another connected appeal being Appeal No. 171 of 1985 titled as Didar Singh v. Gram Panchayat, Naulakjha, also held that the petition under Section 11 was maintainable and the appellant had no right and that the petition of the Gram Panchayat was maintainable. Aggrieved from this order, the petitioners have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. We may notice at this stage that vide order dated 24.8.1987, the relief claimed by the persons similarly situated like the petitioners and in fact including the petitioners was declined by the authorities concerned. This was challenged in the High Court by filing, amongst others, C.W.P. No. 8148 of 1987. The bunch of these writ petitions was disposed of by the High court vide its order dated 13.11.2002, wherein the matter was remanded to the Director, Rural Development and Panchayats, Punjab, with the direction to finally pass the orders after considering the evidence referred to therein, by 16.12.2002. Upon remand, the detailed order was passed by the Commissioner. In this order, the authority inter alia considered the merits or otherwise of the contentions raised before him and held as under :- "From the above table it is clear that in the jamabandi for 1948-49, the kind of land was Banjar Qadim and it has been first entered as Chahi in the year 1955-56. Shri Niranjan Singh came in the cultivators column for the first time in the year 1955-56. Didar Singh s/o Sh. Niranjan Singh came in the cultivators column in the year 1979-80 for the first time. The counsel for the appellant failed to justify how the appellant was in possession of the land before 26.1.1950, the cut off date to decide the matter. Didar Singh s/o Sh. Niranjan Singh came in the cultivators column in the year 1979-80 for the first time. The counsel for the appellant failed to justify how the appellant was in possession of the land before 26.1.1950, the cut off date to decide the matter. The Section 2(g) of sub-section 5(iii) explains that the shamlat deh does not include land which have been partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual land holders before 26th January, 1950, whether the land being Banjar Qadim needs to be excluded from shamlat deh, the counsel for respondent cited PLJ 1979 page 150-151 which seems to be relevant in this case. The next important issue to be settled is the mutation of the land. The mutation was sanctioned in 1956 and since then the appellant made no efforts to get the entries corrected in his favour. The counsel for the appellant argued on this point that the appellant moved the court of Director Consolidation under Section 42 of the Consolidation Act. The appropriate and competent authority in such cases is the Assistant Collector, Grade-I, Collector and the Commissioner to decide the case of mutation about which even the illiterate farmer of the village knows very well. The Honble High Court did not feel it appropriate to interfere with the orders of the consolidation department and remanded the case to Collector in one case and Commissioner in the other case to decide the matter. The appellant wants to enjoy the cultivation of land without paying anything to Panchayat of the village the rightfull owner of the land. The intention of the appellant to prolong the litigation is clear from the argument of the learned counsel as it is in his interest not to decide the matter. Instead of putting arguments about his claim and getting the decision, he stressed that this court should not decide the matter as it would prejudice the mind of the lower court in case the decision goes against the appellant knowing fully well that the arguments are being heard under the directions of Honble Punjab and Haryana High Court." While adopting this reasoning in the case of the petitioners, the Commissioner vide order dated 31.1.2003 held that the appellants were liable to be evicted being unauthorised occupants and were also liable to pay charges for the use and occupation of the land in terms of the provisions of the Act. Despite the above, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate evidence on record particularly in light of the judgment of this Court in CWP No. 8148 of 1987. He also contended that in terms of Section 2(g) of the Act land did not vest in the Gram Panchayat as it was not in possession of the land on the relevant date i.e. 26.1.1950. 3. Both these contentions are without any merit. Firstly Gram Panchayat has been recorded as owner as even shown in the jamabandis mentioned in Annexure P/10 to the writ petition. In the jamabandi for the year 1948-49 under the ownership column the land was shown to be Shamlat Deh Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat in cultivating possession of Makbooja Malkan, while in the year 1955-56 and onwards Nagar Panchayat has been shown to be owner of the land. The mere fact that the petitioners were in unauthorised possession of the land, would not vest them with any legal right to hold possession of the property or claim ownership thereupon. 4. Another important aspect of this case is that against the impugned order and the order dated 16.12.2002, Annexure P/10 to the present writ petition, other two writ petitions being C.W.P. No. 1948 of 2003 titled as Didar Singh v. The Director, Rural Development and Panchayats and others and C.W.P. No. 2286 of 2003 titled as Amarjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab and others, 2003(2) RCR(Civil) 664 (P&H), were dismissed on merits by another Division Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 17.2.2003. In that order the Panchayat discussed the merits of the case and even the factual aspects. With respect and in addition to the above, we would adopt the reasoning given by the Bench in those two writ petitions as well and dismiss this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further contended that certain other writ petitions, against the same impugned order, have been admitted for regular hearing. This would not further the cause of the petitioners inasmuch as the other Bench has already dismissed the writ petitions on merits and even we do not find any reason to admit this petition. 5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further contended that certain other writ petitions, against the same impugned order, have been admitted for regular hearing. This would not further the cause of the petitioners inasmuch as the other Bench has already dismissed the writ petitions on merits and even we do not find any reason to admit this petition. In the circumstances afore-noticed, the admission of other cases per se would not entitle the petitioners for any relief particularly when the judgments of the other Division Bench in C.W.P. No. 1948 of 2003 and CWP No. 2286 of 2003 are fully applicable on ratio decidendi to the present case and are good precedents to be followed. For the reasons afore-stated, this writ petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.