AKSHAY H. MEHTA, J. ( 1 ) RULE in Special Civil Application No. 1717 of 2004. Mr. Kamal Trivedi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General and Mr. K V Shelat, Ld. Advocate for respondents waive service of rule. These two petitions have been placed before us in view of the order passed by the learned Single Judge [coram : M R Shah, J. ] dated 11th August, 2004. By said order the learned Judge has directed that these petitions be placed before the Division Bench since the controversy involved in these petitions is identical to the controversy that forms subject matter of Special Civil Application No. 5742 of 1984, which is already referred to the Division Bench by the learned Single Judge [ Coram : A N Divecha, J. as he then was] by order dated 4th April, 1996. The reference has been made by the learned Single Judge by framing the question to be decided as under :-"can inordinate delay come in the way of authority acting under the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 in declaring some sale transaction to be invalid on the ground of contravention of the relevant provisions contained therein? The reference has been made in view of two conflicting decisions of this Court on the same point. According to the reference there is conflict between decisions rendered in the case of Koli Nagjibhai Varjan v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 1992 (1) G. L. R. p. 14 [coram : R. K. Abichandani, J. ] and in the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 (2) G. L. R. p. 1255 [coram : S. B. Majmudar, J. ]. The view taken in Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patels case is that power for annulling a transaction in contravention of the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 [hereinafter referred to as the Act] cannot be exercised after inordinate delay; whereas the view taken in the case of Koli Nagjibhai Varjan is that normally the power should be exercised within a reasonable time where by law no period of limitation is prescribed. However, where transaction is statutorily void and non-est, the Court cannot validate the transaction by holding that due to inordinate delay power of annulment cannot be exercised. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in short can be stated as under :-2. However, where transaction is statutorily void and non-est, the Court cannot validate the transaction by holding that due to inordinate delay power of annulment cannot be exercised. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in short can be stated as under :-2. 1 it is the case of the petitioners that the land bearing survey no. 1084 of village Vejalpur, Taluka City [now survey no. 410 of village Jodhpur] District Ahmedabad was owned and possessed by one Nathiben, widow of Atmaram Mulajibhai. Nathiben intended to sell the said land. At that time the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 was in force and, therefore, she applied for requisite permission from the competent authority to sell the land. The said permission was granted to her vide order dated 18th April, 1981. Since her way to sell the land got cleared, she entered into a sale transaction with the petitioners and sold the land to them as a compact block by executing 8 different registered sale-deeds, all dated 29th June, 1981. Nathiben received the total consideration of Rs. 3. 5 lacs for the same. It is the say of the petitioners that they had purchased the entire area of survey no. 1084 without effecting any division or creating any fragment in any manner whatsoever. 2. 2. Subsequently the petitioners took steps to enter their names in the revenue records. It is their say that the revenue authorities, after examining in detail the transactions, effected the mutation entry in the revenue record as one compact block of survey no. 1084. It is also the say of the petitioners that the mutation entry was certified by the competent authority on the ground that no fragment was created at any point of time. Record of the petition shows that pursuant to the registered sale-deeds mutation entries nos. 4413 to 4419 and 4422 came to be effected in village form no. 6 on 6th July, 1981. These entries were certified on 11th August, 1981. It also appears that inquiry was made in accordance with section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act [hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act] to ascertain whether the petitioners were agriculturists. The inquiry was held by Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Daskroi, who ultimately found that no breach of provisions of section 63 of the Tenancy Act had taken place. 2. 3. The inquiry was held by Mamlatdar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Daskroi, who ultimately found that no breach of provisions of section 63 of the Tenancy Act had taken place. 2. 3. It is the say of the petitioners that Nathiben expired some time in the year 1995-96 and during her lifetime she had never challenged the transaction entered into by her with the petitioners on any ground whatsoever. It is further averred by the petitioners that after purchasing the land they have invested around Rs. 28,24,600/= for its development. It is also averred by the petitioners that the said land came within the Town Planning Scheme No. 51 of Bodakdev-Vejalpur and about 40% of the land has been taken over by the town planning authority. The balance land has been allotted to the petitioners as final plot no. 79. It is further averred that as per the town planning scheme the purpose of the land is now changed from agriculture to residential under the provisions of the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act. 2. 4. It is the case of the petitioners that more than seven years after the death of Nathiben, one of her heirs Maheshbhai Baldevbhai Patel, in the month of July 2003, applied to the Deputy Collector to annul the transaction and at his instance the Deputy Collector initiated the proceedings under section 9 of the Act by issuing show cause notice in the month of September 2003 to the petitioners. The notice was given on the ground of petitioners having violated the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act [hereinafter referred to as the Act]. The petitioners approached this Court by way of filing a petition to challenge the said notice but the petition was ultimately withdrawn. However, this Court gave direction while permitting the withdrawal that the City Deputy Collector, if passed any order adverse to the interest of the petitioners, the said order should not be implemented for a period of two weeks from the date of its communication to the petitioners. It appears that the City Deputy Collector decided the proceedings against the petitioners and held that there was violation of the provisions of the Act and directed summary eviction by his order dated 5th January, 2004. 2. 5. It appears that the City Deputy Collector decided the proceedings against the petitioners and held that there was violation of the provisions of the Act and directed summary eviction by his order dated 5th January, 2004. 2. 5. The petitioners being aggrieved by the said order, preferred Revision Application challenging the order of the Deputy Collector alongwith the application for interim relief. It further appears that according to the petitioners, respondent no. 2 did not pass any order in the Revision Application though its hearing had already concluded long back, they approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 1717 of 2004, which is also before us. In the said petition, this Court on 10th February, 2004 granted interim relief and shortly thereafter respondent no. 2 pronounced his judgment dated February 10-16, 2004, whereby the Revision Application was dismissed and order passed by the City Deputy Collector was confirmed. Special Civil Application No. 2418 of 2004 is filed to challenge the said decisions of the City Deputy Collector and the respondent no. 2. ( 3 ) WE have heard Mr. A J Patel, learned advocate for the petitioners, Mr. K V Shelat, learned advocate for respondents nos. 3/1 and 3/2 and Mr. K B Trivedi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General for respondent no. 1 - State of Gujarat. Mr. A J Patel has submitted that by now the proposition of law on the issue under consideration of this Court has been crystallized and it is to the effect that the authority cannot quash and set aside or annul the transaction which is made contrary to the provisions of the Act and restore the status-quo ante after inordinate delay. According to him, in the present case the power conferred upon the Collector by provisions of section 9 has been exercised at a belated stage to annul the transaction and during intervening period number of developments have taken place. Such order if allowed to exist, it would create chaos. Hence it is required to be quashed and set aside. He has further submitted that after the purchase of the land from original vendor, the petitioner has made substantial investment that is to the extent of Rs. 28 lacs and now with the introduction of the Town Planning Scheme half of the land has become part of the said scheme and possession has been taken over by the Town Planning Authority. 28 lacs and now with the introduction of the Town Planning Scheme half of the land has become part of the said scheme and possession has been taken over by the Town Planning Authority. The petitioner, therefore, cannot be now evicted from the said land and he cannot be now called upon to hand over the land to the original vendor. According to him, even if the provisions of the Act are applicable, the petitioner being owner of the adjoining land, there is no breach of section 7. He has also submitted that there is no notice served on the original owner under section 6 (2) of the Act. He has placed reliance on several decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court which will be referred to in the course of the judgment. 3. 1. Mr. K V Shelat has adopted the submissions of Mr. Patel. 3. 2. Mr. K B Trivedi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General has, however, vehemently contested the petition and has submitted that when the provisions of section 9 are so clear the State cannot shut its eyes to the transaction which is made in contravention of the provisions of the Act and allow the illegality to persist. He has submitted that sub-section (1) of section 9 provides that any transaction which is made contrary to the provisions of the Act would be void. He has submitted that when the transaction or the act is statutorily void, it has no legal existence and such transaction can be annulled at any point of time, even at much belated stage. Thus, according to him, when any such transaction is prescribed void no amount of delay can prevent the Collector from exercising power vested in him by section 9. Lastly he has submitted that all the decisions referred to by Mr. Patel are dealing with the provisions of the statute wherein no provision similar to section 9 of the Act is made. In other words, in the present Act section 9 specifically prescribes any transaction which is made contrary to the provisions of the Act void; whereas in other statute such provision is not to be found. When that be so, according to Mr. Trivedi, the decisions referred to and relied on by Mr. Patel would not help to resolve the controversy. In support of his contention, Mr. When that be so, according to Mr. Trivedi, the decisions referred to and relied on by Mr. Patel would not help to resolve the controversy. In support of his contention, Mr. Trivedi has relied on several decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court wherein it has been laid down that any void act or action can be invalidated at any point of time since it has no legal existence. ( 4 ) WE have carefully gone through the record of the petition as well as the decisions cited at the bar and the provisions of the relevant law. We have also considered the submissions made by the learned advocates in support of their cases. It is an admitted position that the transaction was sought to be annulled and declared void after a lapse of 23 years. No serious dispute is made with regard to the statement made by the petitioner that nearly half of the land has now become subject matter of the town planning scheme and by now the petitioners have spent approximately Rs. 28 lacs on it. The question, that requires to be decided is whether after lapse of considerable period whether the transaction which is found to be contrary to the provisions of the Act can be annulled and the possession of the land be restored to its original vendor by the competent authority while exercising power under section 9 of the Act or even such power has to be exercised within reasonable period. According to Mr. Trivedi, apart from the facts of the present case, the Court will be required to decide the real controversy to the effect that whether irrespective of the subsequent developments or events the State Government can set aside the transaction by exercising power under section 9, even at the belated stage. ( 5 ) TO appreciate the main controversy involved in this petition, it is better to first refer to certain provisions of the Act. The objects for which the Act has been enacted can be had from the statement of the objects and reasons as published in Bombay Government Gazette 1946 Part V page 139 :"agriculture in this Province suffers seriously from the evils of excessive fragmentation and sub-division of holdings. The objects for which the Act has been enacted can be had from the statement of the objects and reasons as published in Bombay Government Gazette 1946 Part V page 139 :"agriculture in this Province suffers seriously from the evils of excessive fragmentation and sub-division of holdings. Cultivation of fragments or sub-divisions- (1) involves waste of time and labour in moving implements, seed, bullocks and equipment from one fragment or sub-division to another, (2) leads to waste of a substantial area which has to be left uncultivated as boundary strips, and (3) prevents permanent improvements like bunding, fencing, etc. being undertaken, as the fragment or the sub-division so protected is too small in area to make the undertaking of the improvement economically worthwhile and thus leads to progressive deterioration of the fragmented or sub-divided holdings and to reduction in productive capacity. 2. This Bill is proposed to be enacted to remedy these evils as far as possible by preventing further fragmentation and by providing for consolidation of sub-divided holdings. "section 2 of the Act provides for definitions. Certain definitions relevant for this case are reproduced below:- (4) "fragment" means a plot of land of less extent than the appropriate standard area determined under this Act, (5) "land" means agricultural land, whether alienated or unalienated, (10) "standard area" in respect of any class of land means the area which the State Government may from time to time determine under section 5 as the minimum area necessary for profitable cultivation in any particular local area, and includes a standard area revised under the said section. chapter II of the Act contains provisions with regard to determination of local and standard areas and treatment of fragment. Section 6 deals with entry in the record of rights, which is as under :-"6. Entry in the record of rights.- (1) On notification of a standard area under sub-section (3) of section 5 for a local area all fragments in the local area shall be entered as such in the Record of Rights or where there is no Record of Rights in such village record as the State Government may prescribe. (2) notice of every entry made under sub section (1) shall be given in the manner prescribed for the giving of notice under the relevant Code, of an entry in the register of mutations. (2) notice of every entry made under sub section (1) shall be given in the manner prescribed for the giving of notice under the relevant Code, of an entry in the register of mutations. "section 7 deals with transfer and lease of fragments, which is as under :-"7. Transfer and lease of fragments.- (1) No person shall transfer any fragment in respect of which a notice has been given under sub-section (2) of section 6 except to the owner of a contiguous survey number or recognised sub-division of a survey number. Provided that the holder of such fragment may mortgage or transfer it to the State Government or a land mortgage bank or any other cooperative society as security for any loan advanced to him by the State Government or such bank or society, as the case may be. (2) notwithstanding anything contained in ay law for the time being in force or in any instrument or agreement, no such fragment shall be leased to any person other than a person cultivating any land which is contiguous to the fragment. "section 8 prohibits fragmentation. It provides as under:-"8. Fragmentation prohibited.- No land in any local area shall be transferred or partitioned so as to create a fragment. "sub-section (1) of section 8aa provides for restriction on partition of land. The rest of the provisions of that section prescribe the procedure to be adopted where the partition is made by the Court or the Collector. Section 9 provides for penalty for transfer or partition contrary to provisions of the Act. Since this section is the subject matter of the main controversy, it is required to be quoted fully. "9. Penalty for transfer or partition contrary to provisions of Act. (1) the transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act shall be void. (2) the owner of any land so transferred or partitioned shall be liable to pay such fine not exceeding Rs. 250 as the Collector may, subject to the general orders of the State Government, direct. Such fine shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. (3) any person unauthorizedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. Such fine shall be recoverable as an arrear of land revenue. (3) any person unauthorizedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of any land, the transfer or partition of which, either by the act of parties or by the operation of law, is void under the provisions of this Act, may be summarily evicted by the Collector. "chapter III of the Act deals with procedure for consolidation. Section 35 of the Act confers revisional power on State Government. It is as under :-"35. Power of State Government to call for proceedings.- The State Government may at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by any officer under this Act call for and examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer and may pass such order in reference thereto as it think fit :provided that no order shall be varied or revised until the parties interested have been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed variation of revision of the order. "section 37 confers on the State Government the power to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. 5. 1. The State has tried to make out a point that since there is specific provision contained in section 9 (1) of the Act, the transaction which is entered into in contravention of the provisions of the Act is void and the power vested under sub-sections (2) and (3) of the said section can be exercised by the authority irrespective of the time factor. As seen above, sub-section (1) prescribes any transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of this Act to be void. It is true that when the statute itself prescribes the effect of transaction which is entered into and completed in contravention of the relevant provisions of the Act as void, there would not be any necessity to interpret the effect of contravention of the said provision. However, the question is whether the existence of section 9 on the statute would entitle the authority named therein to exercise power and take action as prescribed under sub-sections (2) and (3) at any point of time, even after inordinate delay. However, the question is whether the existence of section 9 on the statute would entitle the authority named therein to exercise power and take action as prescribed under sub-sections (2) and (3) at any point of time, even after inordinate delay. The petitioners main submission is that even when no limitation is prescribed under the statute, such powers is required to be exercised within a reasonable time and not at a belated stage. In support of the submission, Mr. Patel has cited before us several decisions of the Apex Court, first of which is a decision rendered in the case of State of Punjab v/s. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar reported in AIR 1992 S. C. p. 111. The case arose resultant to order of dismissal or termination from service passed against the respondents of that case. The counsel had laid stress on the contents of paras. 6 and 7, which are as under :-"6. But nonetheless the impugned dismissal order has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or Court. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 736 at p. 769 Lord Racliffe observed :"an order even if not made in good faith is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears no brand of invalidity upon its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders"7. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states : "the principle must be equally true even where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible; for their also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the Court (See : Administrative Law 6th Ed. p. 352 ). Prof. Wade sums up these principles :"the truth of the matter is that the Court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiffs lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the Court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiffs lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the void order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another, and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. "the aforesaid quotations made by the Apex Court clearly show that an order even if it is not made in good faith, could still be an act capable of legal consequences and till such time it is not set aside after establishing in the proceedings taken at law the cause of its invalidity, it remains effective. It seems that even the Court has a power to refuse to quash the order which is hypothetically a nullity on the ground that the person complaining of such act did not deserve a discretionary remedy because he had waived his right or for some other reason. It is also stated that in such cases the void order remains effective and it is in reality valid. ( 6 ) WE may further discuss this decision on the aspect of void orders. In the instant case two respondents were the Government servants. One was serving as ad-hoc Sub Inspector in the District Food and Supply Department of Punjab State. He remained absent from duty with effect from September 1975 and his services were thereafter terminated on 27th January, 1977. He instituted suit to challenge the order of termination on 18th April, 1984. The second respondent was serving as Constable with Railway Police. He was appointed on 14th November, 1977. On 15th March, 1979 he was discharged from service for some misconduct. His appeal was rejected on 15th June, 1979 and on 30th November, 1979 his revision petition was dismissed by the Inspector General of Police [igp]. He filed a suit on 12th February, 1985. In the first case the declaration was sought that termination order was against principles of natural justice, terms and conditions of employment, void and inoperative and hence the said respondent continued to be in service. He filed a suit on 12th February, 1985. In the first case the declaration was sought that termination order was against principles of natural justice, terms and conditions of employment, void and inoperative and hence the said respondent continued to be in service. In the second case, it was pleaded that since the said employee was discharged from service in contravention of the mandatory provisions of the rules, such termination had no legal effect. In the suit, the order passed by the IGP, Punjab and the order of AIG, Railway, Patiala, passed in appeal were challenged alongwith the order of termination on the ground of it being ultra vires, unconstitutional and against the principles of natural justice. In these appeals, the State had raised the plea of limitation and had submitted that the suits were barred by limitation. However, in the proceedings before the Civil Court and ultimately before the High Court that contention was not accepted and the High Court held that when the order of dismissal or discharge is void and inoperative, there is no limitation for instituting suit for declaration by the dismissed employee. In the opinion of the High Court, if the dismissal, discharge or termination of service of an employee was illegal, unconstitutional or against the principles of natural justice, the employee could approach the Court any time seeking declaration that he remained in service. The suit for such relief was not governed by any of the provisions of the Limitation Act. 6. 1. While deciding this issue in para. 5 of the judgment the Apex Court has stated as under :-"5. In the instant cases, the respondents were dismissed from service. May be illegally. The order of dismissal has clearly infringed their right to continue in the service and indeed they were precluded from attending the office from the date of their dismissal. They have not been paid their salary from that date. They came forward to the Court with a grievance that their dismissal from service was no dismissal in law. According to them, the order of dismissal was illegal, inoperative and not binding on them. They wanted the Court to declare that their dismissal was void and inoperative and not binding on them and they continue to be in service. They came forward to the Court with a grievance that their dismissal from service was no dismissal in law. According to them, the order of dismissal was illegal, inoperative and not binding on them. They wanted the Court to declare that their dismissal was void and inoperative and not binding on them and they continue to be in service. For the purpose of these cases, we may assume that the order of dismissal was void, inoperative and ultra vires, and not voidable. If an act is void or ultra vires it is enough for the Court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. It need not be set aside. The aggrieved party can simply seek a declaration that it is void and not binding upon him. A declaration merely declared the existing state of affairs and does not quash so as to produce a new state of affairs. " [emphasis supplied]. Thus while considering the issue of limitation with regard to void orders, the Apex Court has very specifically stated that it would be dealing with order which was void, inoperative and ultra vires and not voidable. It has further observed that if an act is void or ultra vires, it is enough for the Court to declare it so and it collapses automatically. Thus, the Apex Court was dealing with an order which was inherently and fundamentally void and hence void-ab-initio since, according to Punjab and Haryana High Court orders were against mandatory provisions, ultra vires, unconstitutional and they violated the principles of natural justice, etc. Even then the Apex Court, while relying on the aforesaid passages of the English law, held that such order of dismissal had atleast a de-facto operation unless and until it was declared void or nullity by a competent body or Court. It further held that even a suit challenging such order was subject to the law of limitation and in its opinion it would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act. The States submission with regard to suits being barred by limitation was duly accepted by the Apex Court and its appeals were allowed. It may be noted here that so far the nature of the said impugned orders, terminating the services as found by the High Court is not disturbed by the Apex Court. It has interferred only on the ground of limitation. 6. 2. It may be noted here that so far the nature of the said impugned orders, terminating the services as found by the High Court is not disturbed by the Apex Court. It has interferred only on the ground of limitation. 6. 2. Similar view has been expressed by the Apex Court in the case of State of Kerala v/s. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar reported in 1996 AIR SCW p. 301. The Apex Court has observed that the void orders could be effective inter partes till set aside by higher forum. It has observed as under :-". . . . Even a void order or decision rendered between parties cannot be said to be non-existent in all cases and in all situations. Ordinarily, such an order will in fact be effective inter parties until it is successfully avoided or challenged in higher forum. Mere use of the word "void" is not determinative of its legal impact. The word "void" has a relative rather than an absolute meaning. It only conveys the idea that the order is invalid or illegal. It can be avoided. There are degrees of invalidity depending upon the gravity of the infirmity as to whether it is fundamental or otherwise. "in this decision the Apex Court has placed reliance on the passage from the Halsburys Law of England, which can be quoted as under :-"if an act or decision, or an order or other instrument is invalid, it should in principle, be null and void for all purposes; and it has been said that there are no degrees of nullity. Even though such an act is wrong and lacking in jurisdiction, however, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction. Until its validity is challenged, its legality is preserved. "further the Apex Court has quoted what Lord Racliffe and Prof. Wade have said. ( 7 ) THUS, it can be seen that while rendering the aforesaid decisions the Apex Court has referred to and relied on the principle enunciated under English law. The passage from the Halsburys laws of England makes it clear that if any act or decision or order or instruction is invalid, it should in principle, be null and void for all purposes. The passage from the Halsburys laws of England makes it clear that if any act or decision or order or instruction is invalid, it should in principle, be null and void for all purposes. It further says that even if such act is wrong and lacking any jurisdiction, it subsists and remains fully effective unless and until it is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction. As already seen Lord Racliffe and Prof. Wade have also propounded such principle. It shows that even if the act or order is not made in good faith, it is still an act capable of legal consequences. It is also clear from the above quotations that it would be applicable to a case when such act does not bear brand of invalidity upon its forehead and it would be applicable even to the case where the brand of invalidity is plainly visible. So far the Act is concerned, any act of transfer or partition of land contrary to the provisions of the Act, its brand of invalidity or voidity is plainly visible by virtue of section 9 (1) of the Act. However, such act has its own effect because it puts the transferee into occupation or possession of the land in question; may be unauthorized or wrongful one. The transferee remains there till the transaction or the act is annulled and he is consequently evicted by the competent authority by resorting to provision of section 9 (3) of the Act. ( 8 ) MR. Patel also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v/s. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 S. C. C. p. 71. In that case by two registered sale-deeds dated 11th December, 1972 and 28th December, 1972 the appellant of the case had purchased certain land. The same was mutated in the name of the appellant in the record of rights on 14th February, 1973. Mamlatdar vide order dated 29th April, 1977 declared the sale as invalid on the ground that the said appellant was not an agriculturist belonging to the State of Gujarat. The same was mutated in the name of the appellant in the record of rights on 14th February, 1973. Mamlatdar vide order dated 29th April, 1977 declared the sale as invalid on the ground that the said appellant was not an agriculturist belonging to the State of Gujarat. The Apex Court after referring to decisions rendered in the case of State of Gujarat v/s. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah and State of Gujarat v/s. Patel Raghav Natha held that the suo-motu inquiry by the Mamlatdar under section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 should be initiated within a reasonable time. It also held that where no time limit is prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. In that case the sale which took place in December 1972 was inquired into by the Mamlatdar in the proceedings initiated suo-motu in September 1976. The initiation of inquiry was held to be at a belated stage and hence not permitted. ( 9 ) IT is therefore, clear from the foregoing discussion that even inherently or fundamentally void orders are amenable to law of limitation to the extent they are required to be declared as such, and they have not been granted absolute immunity. In the instant case, any transfer or partition made contrary to the provisions of the Act is void as per the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 9 of the Act. However, before declaring it void the concerned authority will have to find out by following requisite procedure that the transfer or partition is contrary to the provisions of the Act. In light of these decisions of the Apex Court, it can as well be said that the proceedings which may have to be initiated either by the aggrieved party or by a competent authority, either to assert its right or to exercise the power conferred upon it by the statute respectively, it will have to do so within the prescribed period of limitation or if no period is prescribed by the law of limitation, within reasonable time. ( 10 ) THE Full Bench of this Court had also an occasion to deal with a null and void action or act taken under the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 in the decision rendered in the case of Jadav Prabhatbhai Jethabhai v/s. Parmar Karsanbhai Dhulabhai reported in 2000 (3) G. L. H. p. 703. While deciding the question, the Full Bench has placed heavy reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v/s. Gurdev Singh [supra]. It has also placed reliance on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Madhukar Vishwanath v/s. Madhao (1999) 9 SCC p. 446. The Full Bench has not accepted the submission that to set aside the alienation made by de facto guardian, the suit can be filed at any time and it is not subjected to law of limitation since such alienation being against the provisions of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, is void-ab-inito. In the opinion of the Full Bench, suit for declaration that the alienation is null and void has to be filed by the minor, within the period of limitation, which is three years, after attaining the age of majority. 10. 1. Thus, even the void order or act has its existence and it will remain effective till it is quashed and set aside or annulled by the competent forum. It is, therefore, obvious that there are two points so far the time factor is concerned, viz. the point of time at which such order or act has been brought into existence and the second is the point of time at which it is quashed or it is annulled. If the distance between them is small, the proceedings to bring end of the existence of such order or act can be entertained. But if the initiation of the proceedings is delayed and if it travels beyond the point where the period of limitation prescribed under the law of limitation ends or if that is not provided for, it travels beyond the point where in the facts and circumstances of the case, the reasonableness ends, in our opinion, the competent forum would be precluded from initiating any proceedings. 10. 2. We may also now turn to decision rendered by this Court supporting our view on the issue under consideration. 10. 2. We may also now turn to decision rendered by this Court supporting our view on the issue under consideration. In the case of Nanji Mulji Thumar v/s. State of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 4583 of 1985 decided on 29th February, 1988, the learned Single Judge [coram : R C Mankad, J. as he then was] has held that when transaction had taken place in 1960 and the mutation entry was made in the year 1966 and the transaction was sought to be annulled in the year 1984, the concerned authority cannot be permitted to exercise power at such a belated stage. 10. 3. In the case of Ranchhodbhai Lallubhai Patel v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 1984 (2) G. L. R. p. 1255 it is held that when the authorities did not initiate proceedings for 7 long years, during which the purchaser even constructed house on the land in question, initiation of proceedings at that stage was grossly belated. It was decided that exercise of power after inordinate delay would be ex-facie unreasonable, unjust and illegal. 10. 4. In the case of Sarvagna Navinchandra Godiawala v/s. The State of Gujarat reported in 2003 (2) G. L. R. at p. 1266 the learned Single Judge [coram : P B Majmudar, J. ] has after considering several decisions of the Apex Court and this Court including the State of Gujarat v/s. Patel Raghan Natha reported in 1970 (1) S. C. R. 335, has eventually decided as under :-"18. Considering the aforesaid aspects, in my view, initiation of proceedings, after such a long time, cannot be permitted and the Collector has committed an error of law in setting aside the transaction on the basis of the application made by respondent no. 3, who, after having received the full consideration thought it fit to challenge the said transaction after 17 years. In my view a void order is also required to be challenged, as it is submitted by Mr. A. J. Patel that the petitioners have also become owners by way of adverse possession. It is also not in dispute that even the Revenue Authorities were aware about the said transaction in view of the entry which was posted in 1981, but the authorities had not thought it fit to take any proceedings for about 17 years. A. J. Patel that the petitioners have also become owners by way of adverse possession. It is also not in dispute that even the Revenue Authorities were aware about the said transaction in view of the entry which was posted in 1981, but the authorities had not thought it fit to take any proceedings for about 17 years. " ( 11 ) AT this juncture it would be worthwhile to refer to certain decisions cited by Mr. Kamal Trivedi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General taking contrary view, which may enable us to make comparative study of both the sets of cases. The first decision relied on by Mr. Trivedi is rendered in the case of State of Orissa v/s. Brundaban Sharma reported in 1995 Suppl. (3) S. C. C. p. 249. It is a case under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act and Orissa Estate Abolition Act, 1951. In the said decision it has been observed that non-est order being a void order, it cannot confer any title and its validity can be challenged at any stage. The second decision which has been relied on is in the case of Koli Nagji Varjan v/s. State of Gujarat [supra]. In this decision the learned Single Judge of this Court [ Coram : R K Abichandani, J. ] has drawn the distinction between the exercise of power as contained in section 9 and the revisional powers under section 35 of the Act. The learned Judge has held that when the action is void ab initio it cannot be validated by the Court inspite of the fact that there is delay in exercise of powers by the concerned officer. According to the learned Judge, a transaction which is void is non-est and cannot get life merely because the powers of summary eviction were not exercised immediately. According to the learned Judge, the revisional powers, even where no period of limitation is prescribed, has to be exercised within a reasonable time. According to the learned Judge, a transaction which is void is non-est and cannot get life merely because the powers of summary eviction were not exercised immediately. According to the learned Judge, the revisional powers, even where no period of limitation is prescribed, has to be exercised within a reasonable time. In the decision rendered in the case of Dhulabhai C. Kotwal v/s. Bhikhabhai K Prajapati reported in 2000 (3) G. L. H. p. 130 another learned Judge of this Court [ Coram : R. R. Tripathi, J. ] has held that when the transfer or partition of any land is made contrary to the provisions of the Act, it is void as declared under section 9 (1) of the Act and as a result the Collector has to take further action as prescribed under section 9 (2) and (3) of the Act. In yet another case, namely Patel Jividas Trikamdas v/s. District Collector reported in 1996 (2) G. L. R. p. 688 the learned Single Judge of this Court [coram : J. N. Bhatt, J. ] has rendered decision and has held that sale transaction in respect of land which was a fragment is void and such declaration could be made at any time. According to the learned Judge proceedings to declare the same void initiated even after 20 years of the transaction will not render it invalid. on the ground of mere lapse of time. Similar view has been taken by other learned Judges of this Court [coram : Miss R M Doshit, J. ] in the case of Manilal M Patel v/s. Gelaji Kanaji in Special Civil Application No. 1735 of 1987 dated 16/01/2002, wherein it has been held as under :-"as regards the time factor, this Court has time and again held that no limitation has been prescribed for taking such transfer in revision. The principle of initiating action within the reasonable time cannot be invoked in case of transfers which are statutorily void. The reference can be had to the judgments of this Court in the matters of KOLI NAGJIBHAI VARJAN v. STATE [ 1992 (1) GLR 14 ] and PATEL JIVIDAS TRIKAMDAS and ORS. v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, MEHSANA and ORS. [1992 (2) GLR 688]. The reference can be had to the judgments of this Court in the matters of KOLI NAGJIBHAI VARJAN v. STATE [ 1992 (1) GLR 14 ] and PATEL JIVIDAS TRIKAMDAS and ORS. v. DISTRICT COLLECTOR, MEHSANA and ORS. [1992 (2) GLR 688]. In view of the above referred judgments, the action initiated in the year 1984 with respect to the transfer made in the year 1975 in contravention of the provisions of the Act cannot be invalidated merely on the ground of lapse of a considerably long time. "another learned Judge of this Court [coram : D C Srivastava, J. as he then was] in the decision rendered in the case of Saburbhai Hemabhai Chauhan v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 2000 (1) G. L. H. p. 580 has dealt with provisions of section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 and has held that when the sale transaction is found to be void, mere lapse of time would not make the action of authorities invalid. According to the learned Judge, any action, transaction, decision or order which is illegal and void ab initio has to be treated as non-est, validity of such an illegal non-est order could be questioned in any proceedings at any stage by anybody. It creates no right, title or interest nor it confers any status or right. ( 12 ) IN these decisions the learned Single Judges of this Court did not have an opportunity to consider Apex Courts decision rendered in the case of State of Punjab v/s. Gurdev Singh [supra]. Case of Dhulabhai C Kotwal has been decided on different point, whereas in the case of Saburbhai Hemabhai Chauhan the learned Single Judge has referred to decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Mahamad Kavi Mohamad Amin [supra] which is directly on sec. 84-C of the Tenancy Act, but has not explained why different view than the one taken by the Apex Court, has been taken. The Apex Court, as already seen above, has laid down that under section 84-C, the Mamlatdar has to exercise suo-motu power within reasonable time, whereas the learned Single Judge has decided that void order being non-est can be quashed at any time and no amount of delay would come in the way of authority in doing so. 12. 1. The Apex Court, as already seen above, has laid down that under section 84-C, the Mamlatdar has to exercise suo-motu power within reasonable time, whereas the learned Single Judge has decided that void order being non-est can be quashed at any time and no amount of delay would come in the way of authority in doing so. 12. 1. So far Madhegowda v/s. Ankegowdas case reported in (2002) 1 S. C. C. p. 178 and relied on by Mr. Trivedi is concerned, the Apex Court has held that alienation of minors property by de facto manager/guardian is against the clear statutory mandate of sec. 11 and hence it is per-se invalid and void-ab-initio. In the opinion of the Apex Court such invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. However, the Division Bench comprising two learned Judges of the Apex Court, in the case of Madhukar Vishwanath Munje v/s. Madhao reported in (2001) 10 S. C. C. p. 460 made a reference to the Larger Bench by making following observation :-"1. In the instant case, a suit had been filed by the appellant for possession in respect of a property which his de facto guardian, during the time when the appellant was a minor, had transferred. The case of the appellant was that such transfer was void ab initio being in contravention of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and, therefore, a suit could be filed within 12 years of his attaining majority under Article 65 read with Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 2. During the course of discussion, a question arose whether Article 59 or Article 60 and/or Section 8 of the Limitation Act would not be appropriate provision of law which would be applicable in the instant case. While Mr. Lalit relied upon a decision reported as Kisan Ganpat Nimbale v. Pandurang Nathu Wankhade in support of his contention that it is Article 65 which will apply to a case like the present, Mr. While Mr. Lalit relied upon a decision reported as Kisan Ganpat Nimbale v. Pandurang Nathu Wankhade in support of his contention that it is Article 65 which will apply to a case like the present, Mr. Sanghi on the other hand submitted that this Court in R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer (SCC at p. 13), has held that even a void order has to be held to be void by a court and, therefore, the appropriate article would not be Article 65 because without getting the sale deed set aside the relief of possession cannot be granted to the appellant. 3. In our opinion, important questions arise in the present case and it would be more appropriate that this case is decided by a larger Bench. Papers may be placed before Honble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. "12. 2. The Larger Bench comprising three learned Judges decided the case and the decision has been reported in (1999) 9 S. C. C. p. 446. The Larger Bench has ofcourse observed, after going into the facts that reference was not necessary. It has, however, held that for getting back the possession of the land alienated by de-facto guardian of a minor first declaration will have to be sought that it was void being alienation by a de-facto guardian without any legal necessity and hence against prohibition imposed under section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Decision in Madhegowdas case is rendered by the Division Bench consisting of two Judges of the Apex Court; so also is the decision rendered in the case of state of Orissa v/s. Brundaban Sharma [supra]. 12. 3. It is decided by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v/s. Raghubir Singh reported in AIR 1989 S. C. p. 1933, that decision of a Division Bench will be binding on the Bench of same or smaller number of Judges. ( 13 ) WE may now turn to the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh v/s. Jai Prakash University reported in AIR 2001 S. C. p. 2552, which has been heavily relied on by Mr. Trivedi. In the said case the Apex Court has explained the distinction between void and voidable. It has done so in the following way :-"21. Trivedi. In the said case the Apex Court has explained the distinction between void and voidable. It has done so in the following way :-"21. Thus the expressions "void and voidable" have been subject matter of consideration on innumerable occasions by Courts. The expression "void" has several facets. One type of void acts, transactions, decrees are those which are wholly without jurisdiction, ab initio void and for avoiding the same no declaration is necessary, law does not take any notice of the same and it can be disregarded in collateral proceeding or otherwise. The other type of void act, e. g. , may be transaction against a minor without being represented by a next friend. Such a transaction is good transaction against the whole world. So far the minor is concerned, if he decides to avoid the same and succeeds in avoiding it by taking recourse to appropriate proceeding the transaction becomes void from the very beginning. Another type of void act may be which is not a nullity but for avoiding the same a declaration has to be made. Voidable act is that which is a good act unless avoided, e. g. if a suit is filed for a declaration that a document is fraudulent and/or forged and fabricated, it is voidable as apparent state of affairs is real state of affairs and a party who alleges otherwise is obliged to prove it. If it is proved that the document is forged and fabricated and a declaration to that effect is given, a transaction becomes void from the very beginning. There may be a voidable transaction which is required to be set aside and the same is avoided from the day it is so set aside and not any day prior to it. In cases, where legal effect of a document cannot be taken away without setting aside the same, it cannot be treated to be void but would be obviously voidable. " ( 14 ) NOW it is required to be seen whether the transfer or partition made contrary to the provision of the Act will fall in the first category where no declaration is necessary for setting aside it. So far section 9 is concerned, with a view to find out whether transfer or partition is covered by section 9 (1) of the Act, certain factual aspects will have to be scanned or scrutinised. So far section 9 is concerned, with a view to find out whether transfer or partition is covered by section 9 (1) of the Act, certain factual aspects will have to be scanned or scrutinised. Though a transaction may prima-facie appear to be against the provisions of the Act but then parties may have valid ground to show that it was not so. The parties to the transaction may plead that the entire block of the land was sold and no fragment was created or that the transferee of the land was an agriculturist owning contiguous survey number or recognized sub-division of a survey number. Such fact finding exercise will have to be done by the authority in a proceedings wherein show cause notice will have to be given to the parties calling upon them to show cause why transaction in question should not be declared to be contrary to provisions of the Act and hence void under section 9 (1) of the Act. In the case of Govindsingh v/s. G. Subbarao reported in 1970 G. L. R. at page 897 the Division Bench, while holding that power conferred by section 9 of the Act is not legislative power but adjudicative only, has prescribed the procedure required to be followed by the authority named therein before taking action under section 9 (3) of the Act :"21. RE. GROUND (H) : This ground is available only in Special Civil Application No. 97 of 1968 since in this case the show cause notice issued by the Assistant Collector did not give any opportunity to the petitioner to show cause why he should not be summarily evicted and possession restored to respondents nos. 3 to 5. The opportunity to show cause given by the show cause notice was limited only to two matters, namely, why the sale should not be declared void and why penalty to the extent of Rs. 250/= should not be imposed. The argument of the petitioner was that since the impugned order of possession was made by the Assistant Collector without giving any opportunity to the petitioner of being heard in his defence, there was breach of audi alteram partem rule and the impugned order of possession was, therefore, null and void. 250/= should not be imposed. The argument of the petitioner was that since the impugned order of possession was made by the Assistant Collector without giving any opportunity to the petitioner of being heard in his defence, there was breach of audi alteram partem rule and the impugned order of possession was, therefore, null and void. Now on this argument the first question which arises for consideration is whether audi alteram partem rule has application when the Collector proposes to make an order of summary eviction under sec. 9 sub-sec. (3 ). To determine this question we must turn to the provisions of sec. 9. That section declares in sub-sec. (1) that the transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of the Act shall be void and then in sub-secs. (2) and (3) it proceeds to constitute the Collector an authority for imposition of fine and summary eviction. When the Collector proposes to impose fine on the owner of any land under sec. 9 sub-sec. (2), he will have to adjudicate whether the transfer or partition is contrary to the provisions of the Act and if he so finds, he will then have to determine what fine should be imposed on the owner of the land. This process is clearly an adjudicatory process and there can be no doubt or dispute that in this process the Collector must follow the principles of natural justice and observe the audi alteram partem rule. That was admittedly done in the present case. Then the Collector would have to determine under sec. 9 sub-sec. (3) whether the person in possession of the land should be summarily evicted. The Collector can make an order of summary eviction only if he finds that such person is unauthorizedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of the land. It is clear from the nature of this power that the Collector is under a duty to act judicially in determining whether an order of summary eviction should be made and the Collector must, therefore, before making an order of summary eviction, comply with the principles of natural justice and give an opportunity of being heard to the person who is sought to be summarily evicted. No such opportunity was admittedly given to the petitioner in the present case. No such opportunity was admittedly given to the petitioner in the present case. The argument of the respondents was that on the facts of the case no such opportunity was necessary, for there were no other facts than those set out in the show cause notice on which the order of summary eviction was founded and if the sale was void, the petitioner was indisputably a person unauthorizedly occupying or wrongfully in possession of the land. But in our view this is no answer to a breach of audi alteram partem rule. When there is a breach of audi alteram partem rule, the question of prejudice is irrelevant. As pointed out by Vakil J. and myself in a judgment delivered on 25th June, 1969 in Original Jurisdiction Appeals Nos. 1 and 2 of 1969 : [east India Co. v. Off. Liquidator Raj Ratna Mills, XI G. L. R. 447]. "the audi alteram partem rule is indeed so vital and fundamental as a basic concept of justice that where it is infringed, the Courts do not pause to inquire whether there has been any miscarriage of justice as a result of its breach. The breach of natural justice is itself miscarriage of justice which entitles the applicant to succeed. " The impugned order made by he Assistant Collector in Special Civil Application No. 977 of 1968 must, therefore, be held to be null and void in so far as it directs summary eviction of the petitioner and restoration of possession of the land to the respondents Nos. 3 to 5. " [emphasis supplied]. ( 15 ) THE aforesaid procedure clearly prescribes that before taking action under section 9 (2) and 9 (3) the Collector will have to first declare the sale void and thereafter impose appropriate fine on the owner of the land and thereafter he will have to issue show cause notice to person in unauthorized occupation or wrongful possession that why he should not be summarily evicted. Naturally, at both these stages the parties to the sale will have to be granted full opportunity of hearing. Naturally, at both these stages the parties to the sale will have to be granted full opportunity of hearing. May be this cannot be said to be a legislative or judicial proceedings and it may be adjudicatory process, but nonetheless the Collector will have to act judicially and find out whether the transaction is contrary to the provisions of the Act; if it is found to be so, the Collector will declare it void under section 9 (1) of the Act. In our opinion when the declaration is required to be made, the transaction of transfer or partition of land will not fall in the first category of void. As already discussed above, the inquiry and the proceedings which are necessary for such declaration are required to be initiated, if the period of limitation is prescribed within that period and when no such period is prescribed within reasonable time. ( 16 ) A comparative study of the aforesaid decisions cited by counsels of both the sides would show that so far the present Act is concerned, there are two different views taken by this Court. One view is that so far the revisional powers under section 35 are concerned, since there is no limitation prescribed under the concerned statute, these powers are required to be exercised within reasonable time. However, when the action is required to be taken, as in the present case under section 9, the impugned act cannot be validated only on the ground of lapse of considerable time. In other words, the act which is void ab initio is non-est and it can be declared as such at any point of time. Such act cannot be validated only on the ground that it has remained as such, without being disturbed, for considerably long period. The other view is that even power under section 9 of the Act is required to be exercised within reasonable time. However, as already stated, in this Courts decisions cited by Mr. Trivedi the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of (1) The State of Punjab v/s. Gurdev Singh and Ashokkumar (2) The State of Kerala v/s. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar (3) Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v/s. Fatmabai Ibrahim has not been taken into consideration. However, as already stated, in this Courts decisions cited by Mr. Trivedi the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of (1) The State of Punjab v/s. Gurdev Singh and Ashokkumar (2) The State of Kerala v/s. M. K. Kunhikannan Nambiar (3) Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v/s. Fatmabai Ibrahim has not been taken into consideration. Over and above this, one cannot overlook the fact that in respect of section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, in the case of Madhegowda v/s. Ankegowda [supra] the Apex Court has held that "in view of the clear statutory mandate, there is little scope for doubt that any transfer in violation of the prohibition incorporated in Section 11 of the Act is ab initio void. " In para. 25 of its judgment the Apex Court has held "such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. " This is irrespective of the fact that there is no provision like or similar to section 9 (1) of the Act in Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. According to Blacks Law Dictionary statutory means "relating to a statute, created or defined by a statute, required by a statute, conforming to a statute". Hence act of such transfer would be statutory void. Despite that in the case of Madhukar Vishwanath Munje v/s. Madhao [supra] a three Judge Bench has decided that a minors suit challenging the disposal of his or her property by a de facto guardian has to be brought within prescribed period of limitation. In that case minors suit for this purpose was dismissed on the ground of limitation. These decisions lend considerable support to the second view i. e. under section 9 of the Act power has to be exercised by the Collector within reasonable time. In latter two cases listed above administrative actions and adjudicatory process were under consideration and not judicial proceedings. There is one more decision of the Apex Court on this line which is rendered in the case of Situ Sahu v/s. Jharkhand reported in 2004 AIR SCW p. 5189. We will refer to it little later. 16. 1. In latter two cases listed above administrative actions and adjudicatory process were under consideration and not judicial proceedings. There is one more decision of the Apex Court on this line which is rendered in the case of Situ Sahu v/s. Jharkhand reported in 2004 AIR SCW p. 5189. We will refer to it little later. 16. 1. For considering, from different angle, the submission that even to the provisions like section 9 of the Act, the proposition of law that the steps annulling such act or transaction are required to be taken within reasonable time can be made applicable; again we have to turn our attention to certain provisions of the Act. As stated above, Chapter II of the Act deals with the determination of local and standard areas and treatment of fragment. Section 5 (1) deals with determination of standard areas by the State. Sub-section (3) of section 5 deals with publication of notification in the Official Gazette giving public notice of any standard area determined under sub-section (1) or revised under sub-section (2) of section 5. Section 6 of the Act envisages entry to be made in the record of rights of all the fragments in the local area upon issuance of notification of standard area under sub-section (3) of section 5 and where there is no record of rights maintained in such in such village the record as the State Government may prescribed. Sub-section (2) of section 6 requires notice to be given in the manner prescribed for the giving of the notice under relevant Code, of an entry in the register of mutations. It would be also necessary at this juncture to refer to rule 4 of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Rules, 1959 [hereinafter referred to as the Rules], which prescribes that all the fragments in the village where no record of rights is maintained shall be entered as such as required by sub-section (1) of section 6 in the following form :- Inam Serial No. Serial No. or name of field Class & No in how long Land continuable Alienation Register & Tenure & Decision if any. Survey No. Alienation Ordinary Area speci. Assessment and Judi. Sub-Division No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 (a) 3 (b) 3 (c) Area Assessment Judi. Survey No. Alienation Ordinary Area speci. Assessment and Judi. Sub-Division No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 (a) 3 (b) 3 (c) Area Assessment Judi. or special or N. A. assessment payable Owner of land Nature and origin of title Other rights or encumbrnces with name of right holder or encumbrances. Ref. To mutation diary Remarks 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 these provisions enable the revenue authorities to have complete details of the land which is entered as fragment in the record of rights or in absence of it, the record which is maintained in accordance with section 6 (1) of the Act, in any local area. It is, therefore, presumed that whenever change in the ownership is required to be entered into the revenue records after a sale transaction between two parties in respect of such land is over, the revenue authority would be able to find out whether the sale was legal or it was made in contravention of any of the provisions of the Act. No need to say that when the sale transaction is found to have been made contrary to the provisions of the Act, no change in the mutation entry would be effected. Naturally when the fragment is sought to be sold or is actually sold, it is against the provisions of section 7, as transfer by partition or in any other way of a fragment is in contravention of provisions of sections 7, 8, 8aa, etc. This is illustrative and not exhaustive. 16. 2. So far section 9 is concerned, as seen above, sub-section (1) thereof declares any act of transfer or partition of any land contrary to the provisions of the Act void and also prescribes the resultant actions that can be taken by the Collector, namely imposition of fine on the owner of the land as per sub-section (2) and the summary eviction of the unauthorized occupant or a person in wrongful possession of the land in question on account of any transfer or partition either by the act of parties or by operation of law. Though specifically it is not provided for, under section 9 the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govindsingh v. G. Subbarao [supra] has prescribed the procedure in detail to be followed by the Collector. Though specifically it is not provided for, under section 9 the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Govindsingh v. G. Subbarao [supra] has prescribed the procedure in detail to be followed by the Collector. It is true that by virtue of section 9 (1) there is no need to find any negative effect of the transaction of land which is, after inquiry, found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Act. 16. 3. So far section 35 of the Act is concerned, the State Government is empowered to examine the record of any case pending before or disposed of by such officer for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order that may have been passed by such officer. The proviso thereto requires grant of hearing to the concerned party. For exercise of aforesaid revisional powers, section 35 prescribes that it could be at any time. However, it is a well settled proposition of law by now that such power should be exercised within reasonable period. Ofcourse the general principle of law that has been laid down by the Apex Court and this Court is that in every case reasonableness is required to be determined in the facts and circumstances of that case and considering other similar legal provisions of the concerned statute. 16. 4. There is no-doubt that provisions of section 9 are not related to or connected with section 35 of the Act. They are exclusive and independent of provisions of section 35. It is very clear that for exercising powers under section 9 sub-sections (2) and (3) there need not be any case pending before or disposed of by any officer. Meaning thereby that upon coming to know of such transaction from any source the Collector may initiate the proceedings and resort to powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 9. Exercise of power under section 35 is slightly on different line as could be seen from the aforesaid provisions. Meaning thereby that upon coming to know of such transaction from any source the Collector may initiate the proceedings and resort to powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 9. Exercise of power under section 35 is slightly on different line as could be seen from the aforesaid provisions. However, it clearly appears that after exercise of powers under section 35 of the Act if the State Government came to the conclusion that the order in question or under scrutiny was not legal, it could quash and set aside such order and in the process if it related to any sale transaction or partition involving transfer of land, which is ultimately found to be in contravention of the provisions of the Act, such transaction would be declared void. If that be so, then the illegality would not be allowed to persist and the unauthorized possession and occupation of the purchaser would be required to be discontinued forthwith. When such situation arises, it appears that the Act does not contain any other provision but the Government will have to direct the Collector to resort to powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 9. 16. 5. At this juncture, it would be worthwhile to refer to the case of Chhaganbhai v/s. Vallabhbhai reported in 1976 G. L. R. p. 464, because facts of that case show that such situation can arise. In this case owner of the agricultural block had sold it to one Chhaganbhai Jivabhai, the petitioner of that case, after obtaining permission from the Prant Officer under section 31 of the Act. Respondent thereafter applied under section 35 of the Act to the State Government to revise the order of Prant Officer and staked his claim that he was eligible to purchase the land in question from the owner because he was the owner of contiguous land. The State Government entertained the application and directed that the petitioner of the said case should be evicted from the land on the ground that respondent no. 1 was more eligible to purchase it since he was the owner of the contiguous land. The State Government also directed the Prant Officer to evict the petitioner from land in question by resorting to provisions of section 9 of the Act. 1 was more eligible to purchase it since he was the owner of the contiguous land. The State Government also directed the Prant Officer to evict the petitioner from land in question by resorting to provisions of section 9 of the Act. Ofcourse, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court held that it was difficult to sustain the order passed by the State Government under section 35 of the Act. It also held that the petitioner was not served with show cause notice for summary eviction, which was another serious infirmity. However, these facts clearly show that even after exercise of power under section 35, the State Government is required to direct the appropriate authority to take steps under section 9 if the order of the lower authority validating the transaction is set aside; but if for sufficiently long time powers under section 35 are not exercised, the State Government then would be precluded from doing so, and the illegality would remain forever. ( 17 ) THE aforesaid discussion would show that for taking the ultimate action of eviction, there is no other provision but to resort to sub-section (3) of section 9. May be that there are two different routes available to the authority namely under section 9 and under section 35, after declaring the transaction contrary to the provisions of the Act, but without trading on either of the routes, the Collector cannot resort to taking action under section 9 (2) and 9 (3) of the Act. Procedure required to be adopted by the Collector is described in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment. When any illegal transaction is made subject matter of litigation is initially found to be legal or valid by a lower authority for one reason or the other; the higher authority would not be allowed to exercise power of revision at a belated stage on the ground that it ought to have been exercised within reasonable time. But if such transaction is brought or it comes to the notice of the Collector, say after 20 years, he can set it aside. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of different provisions of the revenue laws including some of provisions of the Act already stated in this judgment the authorities have ample scope to know about the illegal transaction. It is pertinent to note that by virtue of different provisions of the revenue laws including some of provisions of the Act already stated in this judgment the authorities have ample scope to know about the illegal transaction. It is not that for getting the information about it the Collector will have to depend on some outside agency. When such illegal transaction is sought to be challenged, say by the transferor, he will have to file suit for declaration which will be subject to law of limitation. However, when the Collector who is clothed with sufficient power for the purpose of safeguarding the object of the Act, sits quiet for years together and all of a sudden intends to initiate the proceedings, he can do it even after inordinate delay. It does not appeal to us at all. In the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Situ Sahu v/s. Jharkhand [supra] the suo-motu powers to annul the transaction were exercised by the Deputy Commissioner in pursuance of the provisions of section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act. The said powers were sought to be exercised after lapse of 40 years since the provisions of section 71-A of this Act envisage that such powers could be exercised "at any time". Powers under section 71-A of this Act conferred upon Deputy Collector are somewhat similar to powers conferred upon the Collector under section 9 of the Act. It prescribes that if at any time it comes to the notice of Deputy Collector that transfer of land belonging to a raiyat who is member of the Scheduled Tribes has taken place in contravention of section 46 or section 48 or section 240 or any other provisions of this Act or in fraudulent method, he can after giving reasonable opportunity to the transferee, who is proposed to be evicted, to show cause and after making necessary inquiry in the matter, evict the transferee from such land and restore its possession to transferor. The Apex Court in para. 11 of its judgment has held as under :-"11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words at any time in section 71 A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. The Apex Court in para. 11 of its judgment has held as under :-"11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words at any time in section 71 A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71a it would be futile to content that the period of limitation under Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonable long time during which third party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay. "when officer of the State is conferred upon such power, in the opinion of the Apex Court, the same has to be exercised within reasonable time. Here also view similar to one taken in the case of Mohamad Kavi is taken by the Apex Court. 17. 1. The aforesaid discussion shows that there is sufficient scope for the revenue authorities of the State to know about illegal transaction which can be termed void under section 9 (1) of the Act, inspite of that, if such void transaction is allowed to exist for years together, it is difficult to hold that the competent authority, even then would be within its bounds to initiate proceedings to declare such transaction void and annul it. It is also difficult to envisage that when two routes are available for reaching the ultimate destination under section 9 (2) and (3) of the Act, on the route prescribed under section 35, the authority named therein will not be permitted to travel and the shutters will be drawn at the point where reasonableness ends. It is also difficult to envisage that when two routes are available for reaching the ultimate destination under section 9 (2) and (3) of the Act, on the route prescribed under section 35, the authority named therein will not be permitted to travel and the shutters will be drawn at the point where reasonableness ends. Whereas the other route i. e. under section 9 of the Act will remain open for all time to come. To lay down proposition of law, in relation to section 9 of the Act, that the Collector can exercise power thereunder even after inordinate delay, irrespective of the fact that there is scope for him to know about illegality committed cannot only be dangerous because it can give ample opportunity to some crafty seller to exploit the situation to his advantage, as we will presently discuss, but it can also be against the principle that one cannot sleep over his right for unreasonable period. It has to be pursued vigilantly. ( 18 ) IT may also be kept in view that even after exercise of power under section 9 sub-section (3) the Collector will not be able to pass any other order except restoring the possession of the land back to the original owner. In the case of Govindsingh v/s. G Subbarao [supra] the Division Bench of this Court has taken the following view :"the power given to the Collector to summarily evict a person when it is found that by reason of the transfer being void, he is unauthorisedly in occupation or wrongfully in possession of the land and to restore possession of the land to the original owner is obviously conferred upon the Collector to secure enforcement of the salutary and beneficent provisions of the Act. The Collector cannot, in the absence of specific provision to that effect, retain possession as against the owner of the land. The Collector cannot, in the absence of specific provision to that effect, retain possession as against the owner of the land. "in such circumstances, one can easily visualize the situation wherein some unscrupulous seller with his eyes open, enters into transaction of sale of a fragment and ultimately completes that transaction and puts bonafide purchaser in possession of the land and after inordinate delay when he realises that the prices of the land have gone up considerably, he may just whisper into the ears of the Collector regarding illegal transaction as it has happened in the present case, and the Collector having found the transaction to be such, would only penalize the owner by imposing nominal fine. However, he will at the same time almost ruin the bonafide purchaser by taking back his possession of the land and restoring it to the seller. This can be dangerous and it is difficult to reconcile to such situation. Such situation does not appeal to the common-sense and legislature also would not have intended to encourage such dishonesty. On this aspect our Court has taken very strict view. ( 19 ) IN the case of Sarvagna Navinchandra Godiawala v/s. State of Gujarat [supra] the learned Single Judge of this Court [ Coram : P. B. Majmudar, J. ] has held as under :-"17. The well-known maxim "in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis" [in a case of equal or mutual fault between two parties, the condition of the party in possession (or defending) is the better one, and where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it, in my view, is applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. Considering the aforesaid aspects, in my view, initiation of proceedings, after such a long time, cannot be permitted and the Collector has committed an error of law in setting aside the transaction on the basis of the application made by respondent no. 3, who, after having received the full consideration, thought it fit to challenge the said transaction after 17 years. In my view, a void order is also required to be challenged, as it is submitted by Mr. A. J. Patel that the petitioners have also become owners by way of adverse possession. 3, who, after having received the full consideration, thought it fit to challenge the said transaction after 17 years. In my view, a void order is also required to be challenged, as it is submitted by Mr. A. J. Patel that the petitioners have also become owners by way of adverse possession. It is also not in dispute that even the Revenue Authorities were aware about the said transaction in view of the entry which was posted in 1981, but the authorities had not thought it fit to take any proceedings for about 17 years. "the facts of this case would reveal that the Collector after 17 years had passed the order under section 9 which was challenged by the aggrieved party in appeal before the Additional Chief Secretary, who remanded back the proceedings for the purpose of giving an opportunity of hearing. ( 20 ) IN the case on hand, the heir of Nathiben has complained about the illegal transfer 23 years after the transaction. The transaction had taken place in the year 1981, mutation entries were effected on 6th July 1981 and entries were certified on 11th August, 1981. The petitioners had made investment worth more than Rs. 28 lacs and with the introduction of Town Planning Scheme, substantial portion of the land was covered under the scheme and the land was converted into non-agriculture. Nathiben expired in the year 1996 and the complaint has been made to the Collector in the year 2003. The complaining party was, therefore, equally responsible for allowing the transaction to remain as it was for long since the transfer that was made by Nathiben, even after her demise, for 7 years, it was not challenged by him. The annulment of the action sought at the instance of such heir of the transferor cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in the case of Sarvagna Navinchandra Godiawala [supra]. The learned Judge has held that the vendor was equally at fault and when the fault was mutual and the well-known maxim "in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis" i. e. in a case of equal or mutual fault between two parties, the condition of the party in possession (or defending) is the better one and where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it. In the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai v/s. State of Gujarat reported in 2003 (1) G. L. R. p. 562 the Division Bench of this Court has held that exercise of writ jurisdiction is not warranted in favour of the transferor who had violated the law in entering into transaction. Thus, in the instant case, on this count alone, no action is required to be taken under section 9 of the Act by the competent authority. ( 21 ) IT may also be kept in view that the Collector not taking any action under section 9 for years together after illegal transfer may lead to change of circumstances. There is every possibility that the purchaser may invest sizeable amount for the development of the land or the said land at some point of time may get converted into non-agricultural land and its price may shoot up considerably on account of it being available for raising construction thereon or in fact the land is converted into non-agricultural and the construction has come upon it with the passage of time. Despite such events having taken place and even after the authorities had the opportunity to notice the illegality of the transaction, the Collector would be in a position to exercise power under section 9 sub-section (3) of the Act. It is difficult to swallow such proposition of law. It is also difficult to accept that the Collector would be in a position to extinguish the rights and title of several persons, who had no role to play in the original transaction nor even in getting such land converted into non-agricultural one. It will be too much to expect an ordinary bonafide purchaser to follow the principle of buyer beware to such an extent that he would be able to know that the plot of the land, which once was an agricultural land and was sold to its first purchaser as a fragment about 20 years ago. Though one has to stretch the imagination to a certain extent, the aforesaid possibility cannot be totally ruled out. ( 22 ) AT this juncture it may be also remembered that unlike the Gujarat Agricultural Land and Tenancy Act or Rural Debtors Relief Act, this is not purely a benevolent legislation. Though one has to stretch the imagination to a certain extent, the aforesaid possibility cannot be totally ruled out. ( 22 ) AT this juncture it may be also remembered that unlike the Gujarat Agricultural Land and Tenancy Act or Rural Debtors Relief Act, this is not purely a benevolent legislation. In other words it is not enacted with any particular measure or object to protect any illiterate, ignorant rustic farmer but it is made mainly with a view to prevent the evil of waste of land, waste of labour, waste of seeds, implements, etc. as can be seen from its objects and reasons. Thus, when the things are to be evaluated vis-a-vis the seller and the purchaser, the scale has to be maintained equally and no handicap can be imposed on the purchaser. ( 23 ) LOOKING to the aforesaid different situations, there is no-doubt in our mind that even the void transaction under section 9 (1) if allowed to remain effective for considerably long period, the authority named therein will be precluded from initiating proceedings to annul it. The ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the decisions cited by Mr. Patel clearly states that even the void transaction cannot be said to be nonexistent in all cases and in all situations. It can remain effective and in existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is allowed to remain for a considerable period and with the passage of time it brings about several changes, creating valuable rights in favour of considerable section of people, it is difficult to accept the proposition that despite the change the Collector would be entitled to exercise power under sub-section (3) of section 9 of the Act. Similar observations can also be made with regard to the land wherein no change is brought about, but number of years have passed after the transfer against the provisions of the Act has taken place. In our opinion when the things have been allowed to remain as such for years together, the purchaser cannot be deprived of his possession so as to render indirect benefit to the seller who was equally responsible for entering into such illegal transaction. In our opinion when the things have been allowed to remain as such for years together, the purchaser cannot be deprived of his possession so as to render indirect benefit to the seller who was equally responsible for entering into such illegal transaction. Thus, in our view, when the authority had considerable opportunities to know about the transaction and despite that, has not taken any action thereon for years together, such authority cannot be allowed to exercise powers conferred upon it at a belated stage. The concept of reasonableness of time will equally apply in such cases. We, therefore, hold that even powers conferred upon the Collector under sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 9 are required to be exercised within a reasonable time. ( 24 ) IN the result, orders dated 5/1/2004 and 10-16/2/2004 passed by the City Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad and respondent no. 2 at Annexures - F and K respectively are quashed and set aside. Special Civil Application No. 2418 of 2004 is allowed. Rule made absolute. In view of this judgment, Special Civil Application No. 1717 of 2004 does not survive and it is disposed of accordingly. Rule discharged. ** at this juncture Mr. A J Patel requests that it may also be observed that the revenue authorities be given direction to give necessary effect in the revenue record pursuant to the view taken by this Court in this judgment and the result of the petition. Accordingly, the same direction is given to the concerned authorities. Ms. Sangeeta Vishen, Ld. AGP for Mr. Kamal Trivedi, Ld. Addl. Advocate General requests for stay of the operation of the judgment for a period of eight weeks from today. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there is no need to accede to her request. Her request is, therefore, turned down. .