JUDGMENT 1. - This criminal appeal under section 374 by appellants-Rajendra Prasad and 3 others arises out of the judgment and order dated 2.8.2000 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 1, Sikar whereby the learned Addl. Sessions Judge has convicted appellants-Sardara Ram, Sunil and Mst. Parmeshwari under section 304B Indian Penal Code and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. Appellant-Rajendra Prasad has been convicted under section 120-B and has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. 2. On 2.6.1999 at 9.30 a.m., Subhash Chandra (PW-1) submitted a report, Ex.P/1, thereby informing the police that his sister Manju has been done to dowry death by the accused-appellants. In the report,the complainant has pin pointedly narrated the entire events with dates as regards the demand of dowry and harassment caused to deceased-Manju, who was married to appellant-Sunil only on 28.4.1999 i. e. Hardly 34 days prior to her death. It was, inter alia, alleged that Rs. 51,000/- along with house hold articles were given to the appellants at the time of wedding. On 29.4.1999, complainant-Sidbhash accompanied by his sister visited the house of her in-laws, where appellants-Sunil, Sardara Ram and Mst. Parmeshwari misbehaved with him and has sister Manju and demanded Rs. 50,000/-. Thereupon, the complainant asked them to send his sister back and assured them to talk to his mother and maternal uncle Deen Dayal. On 30.4.1999, he brought back his sister to village Udansar and informed his mother of the situation. His mother asked him not to disclose this fact to his father as he is weak hearted and get nervous even on petty matter. On the next' day, he went to meet his maternal uncle Deen Dayal. Having come to know of the situation, Deen Dayal agreed to talk to the in-laws of Manju. On 27.5.1999, appellant-Sunil came to his village to take Manju back on the pretext of attending some marriage on 1.6.1999 in village Godu-ka-Bas. His mother asked appellant-Sunil about the demand of Rs.50,000/- raised. The appellant was permitted to take his wife Manju back only when appellant-Sunil assured them that he would sent his father to get the matter solved. While leaving the place, appellant-Sunil threatened the complainant that either they should fulfill their demand of Rs. 50,000/-, else none would be able to see the face of Manju. The appellant was permitted to take his wife Manju back only when appellant-Sunil assured them that he would sent his father to get the matter solved. While leaving the place, appellant-Sunil threatened the complainant that either they should fulfill their demand of Rs. 50,000/-, else none would be able to see the face of Manju. On 1.6.1999 when complainant alongwith his uncle Birju went to the house of Manju's in-laws and requested them to send Manju, the appellants, namely Sardara, Sunil and Parmeshwari reiterated their demand of Rs. 50,000/-. Deceased-Manju who was present there started beseeching and requested them to take her along, else the accused will kill her. They misbehaved her even in his presence and in the presence of his uncle. Thereafter, appellants-Sardara Ram, Sunil and Parmeshwari pushed her and confined her inside a room. They also misbehaved with the complainant and his maternal uncle and told them that they will send Manju only when their demand of Rs. 50,000/- is fulfilled. Thereafter, complainant returned hostile and spoke these facts to his mother. Later-on the complainant learnt that his sister Manju has been done to death. 3. On the basis of above report, Police registered a case vide FIR No. 49/99 (Ex.P/2) for offence under sections 498-A and 304-B Indian Penal Code and proceeded with the investigation. 4. It may be noted that onl.6.1999 at 4.15 p.m., accused-appellant-Rajendra had submitted a written report, Ex.P/10 at Police Station Ramgarh Sethan, district Sikar stating therein that all family members except Manju had gone to attend some marriage in village Godu-ka-bas and Manju, who was alone in the house died of fire injuries. 5. On the above report of accused-Rajendra Kumar, proceedings under section 174 Criminal Procedure Code came to be initiated vide Ex.P/11. The SDM visited the place of incident, inspected the site, prepared the site plan Ex.P/4, inquest report Ex.P/3 and recorded the statements of witnesses. 6. In the course of investigation, the police got conducted autopsy on the dead body and collected the post-mortem report, Ex.P/7, which indicates that the cause of death may suffocation as burns present on the body were of 1st grade and were not sufficient to cause death. In these circumstances, clarification as to the cause of death was sought for from the Medical Jurist. In these circumstances, clarification as to the cause of death was sought for from the Medical Jurist. The Medical Jurist vide his letter dated 25.6.1999, Ex.P/8 clarified that the deceased was not died of suffocation due to fire smoke, as there were no stains of smoke present in respiratory system like larynx, trachea and both the lungs. 7. On completion of investigation, the police submitted a charge-sheet against the accused-appellants. The learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation and placed before it and after hearing arguments of counsel for the parties, framed charges against the appellants under section 302, in the alternative 302/34, 304-B, 498-A and 120-B Indian Penal Code. The appellants denied the charges and claimed trial. 8. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as may as 15 witnesses and got exhibited some documents. After the prosecution evidence was over, the accused were examined under section 313 Criminal Procedure Code In their explanation, the accused denied the charges and pleaded alibi. In their defence, the accused examined as many as 14 witnesses. 9. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge did not find the charges under sections 302 and/or 302/34 Indian Penal Code proved against the appellants and accordingly acquitted them of the said charges. However, the learned Judge found the charge under section 304-B established beyond doubt against appellants-Sunil Kumar, Sardara and Parmeshwari and under section 120B Indian Penal Code against appellant-Rajendra Prasad and accordingly convicted and sentenced them in the manner stated hereinabove. Hence the present appeal against conviction. 10. As regards acquittal of the appellants from Section 498-A Indian Penal Code, it may be stated that the trial Judge was of the view that since the ingredient of cruelty under sections 498-A and 304-B Indian Penal Code is common and Section 498-A Indian Penal Code being a minor office vis-a-vis Section 304-B Indian Penal Code, therefore, the accused should be acquitted. However, it appears that the trial Judge has recorded finding that it stands established from the evidence on record that deceased was subjected to harassment in connection with demand of dowry. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment and the evidence and material on record. 12. In assailing the conviction, Mr. However, it appears that the trial Judge has recorded finding that it stands established from the evidence on record that deceased was subjected to harassment in connection with demand of dowry. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment and the evidence and material on record. 12. In assailing the conviction, Mr. Bajwa, senior counsel appearing for the appellant has vehemently contended that since the learned trial Court has acquitted the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased from the offence under section 498-A, therefore, their conviction under section 304B Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in the eye of law. 13. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the above argument. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code provides that whoever, being husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Section 304-B of the Code provides that where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with any demand of dowry such death shall be called dowry death and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. A convict under section 498-A shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, whereas a convict under section 304B Indian Penal Code is liable to be punished with imprisonment for term which shall not be less than 7 years. It is thus evident that Sec.304-B Indian Penal Code is a major offence and it be divided in two parts. It is thus evident that Sec.304-B Indian Penal Code is a major offence and it be divided in two parts. The first part deals with causing of death of a woman by burns or bodily injury or the death occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and the second part deal with such death occurring as a consequence of cruelty or harassment being caused to her by her husband or any relative of her husband for or in connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death, while Section 498-A deals with only cruelty and harassment being caused to a woman by her husband or the relative of her husband. As already stated above, the trial Court acquitted the appellants of the charge under section 498A Indian Penal Code only on the ground that Section 304-B Indian Penal Code is a major offence and that the offence under section 498-A is a minor offence vis-a-vis Section 304-B Indian Penal Code. However, on perusal of judgment it appears that the trial Court has concluded that the prosecution has been able to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment soon before her death in connection with demand of dowry, by the appellants, namely, her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law and hence the offence under section 498A Indian Penal Code stands established. It is true that the trial Court should not have acquitted the appellants from the offence under section 498A Indian Penal Code. But the fact remains that the trial Court has ordered acquittal of the appellants under section 498-A under mistaken belief. The trial Court ought to have convicted the appellants under section 498-A without passing separate sentence as the appellants were already convicted for the major offence under section 304B Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter, the argument of the learned counsel, at the first blush appears to be attractive but it is merely technical one and the appellants cannot be extended the benefit of the same. 14. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution in order to prove its case as regards demand of dowry and subjecting deceased-Manju to cruelty by the appellants are highly partisan witnesses. 14. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution in order to prove its case as regards demand of dowry and subjecting deceased-Manju to cruelty by the appellants are highly partisan witnesses. None of such witnesses by any standards of appreciation of evidence can be placed in the category of a wholly reliable witness. Referring the statement (Ex.D/7) of PW-13 Rameshwar, learned counsel argued that this was the basic document being foundation of the prosecution case. According to him, all preliminary investigations were completed in the presence of Rameshwar and during this interval, neither he made any allegation of demand of dowry by the appellants nor did he raise any suspicion of causing death of Manju by them on that account. Learned counsel argued that in the course of proceedings u/s.174 Criminal Procedure Code The statement (Ex.D/7) of Rameshwar was recorded, wherein he has no where stated anything against the appellants as regards demand of dowry and cruelty or harassment being caused to his daughter at any point of time. On the contrary, Rameshwar stated that he has no grudge against the appellants nor did he complain anything in regard to dowry etc. In this back-ground, learned counsel argued that the conviction of the appellants under section 304B Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. In support of his argument, learned counsel has relied upon a decision in State of Haryana v. Rajinder Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 77 : 1996 Cr. L.R. (SC) 180 . 15. I have given my anxious consideration to the above argument. Undisputedly, deceased-Manju was married to appellant-Sunil Kumar on 28.4.1999 according to Hindu rites and she was found dead on1.6.1999 in the house of her in-laws in otherwise than under normal circumstances. Appellant-Rajendra Prasad is the uncle-in-law of the deceased, while Sunil Kumar is her husband, Sardara Ram is her father-in-law and Mst. Parmeshwari is the mother-in-law. According to PW-1 Subhash Chandra, his sister deceased-Manju was married to appellant-Sunil on 28.4.1999. On the next day of her marriage i.e. on 29.4.1999 when he accompanied with his sister went to the house of her in-laws, her husband, father-in- law and mother-in-law demanded Rs. 50,000/- in connection with dowry and abused them. Parmeshwari is the mother-in-law. According to PW-1 Subhash Chandra, his sister deceased-Manju was married to appellant-Sunil on 28.4.1999. On the next day of her marriage i.e. on 29.4.1999 when he accompanied with his sister went to the house of her in-laws, her husband, father-in- law and mother-in-law demanded Rs. 50,000/- in connection with dowry and abused them. Thereupon, he requested them to send back Manju with him and told them that he will inform his mother and maternal uncle about their demand. On 30.4.1999, he brought back his sister and informed his mother about the said demand. His mother asked him to inform his maternal uncle Deen Dayal and warned him not to disclose this fact to his father as he was a man of weak heart. On 27.5.1999, appellant-Sunil came to his house and asked to send his wife on the pretext of attending some marriage on 1.6.1999. PW-8 Mst. Rampyari, his mother refused to send her daughter because of demand of Rs. 50,000/-. However, on insistence by appellant-Sunil, she permitted her daughter to go with her husband. At the time of leaving the place, appellant-Sunil warned them to send Rs. 50,000/-, else they would not be able to see the face of Manju. The witness stated that on 1.6.1999 when he along with his uncle Brija Ram, PW-3 went to the village of appellant-Sunil, the accused-appellants namely, Sunil, Sardara and Mst. Parmeshwari demanded Rs. 50,000/-. Deceased-Manju who was present there came weeping and asked them (brother and uncle) to take her along, otherwise her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law will kill her. The witness stated that thereafter all the three accused pushed her in a room and closed the door of the room. They were also threatened and directed to send the father of Manju along with Rs. 50,000/-, otherwise Manju will not remain alive. The witness returned home and informed his mother. He also informed his father, PW-13 Rameshwar that they have called him. Accordingly his father Rameshwar went to the village of appellant-Sunil on the same day where he learnt about the death of his daughter. Even in cross-examination, the witness has very categorically stated "YAH SAHI HE KI MANJU KI SHADI SE LEKAR MARNE TAK 50, 000 / - RUPAYE MANGNE KI BAAT MERE PITA SE NAHIN BATAYEE KNYOKI WE KAMJOR DIL KE THE". 16. Even in cross-examination, the witness has very categorically stated "YAH SAHI HE KI MANJU KI SHADI SE LEKAR MARNE TAK 50, 000 / - RUPAYE MANGNE KI BAAT MERE PITA SE NAHIN BATAYEE KNYOKI WE KAMJOR DIL KE THE". 16. PW-2 Om Prakash who had got settled the engagement of deceased-Manju with appellant-Sunil has also supported the fact of demand of Rs. 50,000/- having been made by the appellants. He deposed that on 25.5.1999 when he went to meet his sister at village Tihawali, he also visited the house of appellant-Sardara where all the four accused were present. He stated that all the four appellants had demanded Rs. 50,000/- and asked him that he should made them available Rs. 50,000/-, otherwise they will not bring Manju. 17. PW-3 Brija Ram has stated in his examination-in-chief that on 1.6.1999 at about 8.00 a.m. he and Subhash reached the house of in-laws of Manju. Appellant-Sardara Ram (father-in-law), Parmeshwari (mother-in-law) and Sunil, her husband asked them whether they have brought Rs. 50,000/-. They replied in negative. In the meantime, Manju came weeping and asked them to take her along, otherwise the appellants will beat her. Accused-Sunil, Sardara and Parmeshwari abused them and pushed Manju in a room and closed the door. These accused threatened them to bring Rs. 50,000/- else Manju will be done to death. The witnesses stated that they returned back and Subhash disclosed this fact to his mother. 18. PW-8 Smt. Rampyari, mother of the deceased has deposed fully supported the statement of her son PW-1 Subhash. He has categorically asked his son Subhash not to disclose the fact of demand of Rs. 50,000/- and the threat given by the appellants to his father as he was a man of weak heart. Instead, he may disclose this fact to his maternal uncle Deen Dayal. 19. PW-13 Rameshwar, father of the deceased has deposed that other than house hold articles he had given Rs. 5 1,000/- in cash at the time of marriage of his daughter Manju which was beyond his capacity. He categorically stated that his family members did not inform him of the fact of demand of Rs. 19. PW-13 Rameshwar, father of the deceased has deposed that other than house hold articles he had given Rs. 5 1,000/- in cash at the time of marriage of his daughter Manju which was beyond his capacity. He categorically stated that his family members did not inform him of the fact of demand of Rs. 50,000/- having been made by the in-laws of his daughter for the reason that he was a man of weak heart.All these witnesses were cross-examined at length but nothing could be elicited from them so as to discard or disbelieve their testimony. 20. From what has been discussed above, it is evident that appellants-Sunil, Sardara and Smt. Parmeshwari were persistently making demand of Rs. 50,000/- in connection with dowry right from the second day of marriage of Manju with appellant-Sunil when Subhash PW-1 went along with his sister to her in-laws' house. The fact that there is no allegation as regard demand of dowry by the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased-Manju in the statement of PW-13 Rameshwar, father of deceased-Manju recorded in the course of proceedings under section 174 Criminal Procedure Code is obvious for the reason that he was not aware of any demand of dowry or cruelty or harassment being caused to his daughter in connection therewith as has been established from the statements of his son, wife and brother. It has come in evidence that since Rameshwar was a man of weak heart and used to get nervous even on paetty matters, none of his family members/relations informed him of the demand and threat extended by the appellants. Even according to the statement Rameshwar himself he was not aware of any demand etc. from the side of appellants till he returned home after his statement under section 174 of the Code was recorded. Rajinder Singh's case (supra) cited by the counsel for the appellant has no application to the facts of the present case. In this case, the father of deceased-Vidya having received the information as to the death of his daughter Vidya sent his two sons Chotu and Tara Chand. Her body was recovered from a well and her two brothers were present during the time of inquest. Their statements were recorded on 28.3.1989 wherein they deposed that cause of death of their sister was her falling in the well and no body was at fault. Her body was recovered from a well and her two brothers were present during the time of inquest. Their statements were recorded on 28.3.1989 wherein they deposed that cause of death of their sister was her falling in the well and no body was at fault. Further statement of Tara Chand, brother of deceased was that there was no ill will earlier between the parties. It was only on 31.3.1989 that the father of deceased lodged an FIR. In this fact situation, their Lordships accepted the defence version that a false case was got instituted on3l.3.1989, the death being on 27.3.1989, on which date the FIR was filed stating about causing of death of Vidya on failure to meet the demand of dowry. Their Lordships held that "though PWs 2 and 5 who are parents of Vidya have mentioned about this demand, we are not inclined to place reliance on this piece of evidence on the face of what Tarachand, a brother of deceased, had stated on 28.3.1989 about their being no ill will between the two families. It is because of this that the parents had first accepted the death due to accident, as mentioned in the inquest report, which was prepared by police which came to the scene pursuant to the information given by the respondent himself on the morning of 28.3.1989". Here, in the case at hand, deceased-Manju was married to appellant-Sunil hardly a month prior to her death. It is true that her father happened to be present during the course of inquest and the FIR came to lodged by his son Subhash even before he returned home after his statement was recorded. He did not state anything against the appellants as regards demand of dowry or harassment in connection therewith and it was obvious for the simple reason that her father was not at all aware of any demand of dowry or harassment caused to his daughter by the appellants during this short span, inasmuch as there is specific evidence that none of his family members did inform him about the demand of Rs. 50,000/- by the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Manju right from the second day of her marriage and cruelty and harassment having been caused to her on failure to fulfill their demand. 21. 50,000/- by the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased Manju right from the second day of her marriage and cruelty and harassment having been caused to her on failure to fulfill their demand. 21. Undisputedly, the death of deceased-Manju occurred in the house of her in-laws otherwise than under normal circumstances within few months of her marriage. Section 304B Indian Penal Code comes into operation when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with demand for dowry. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is also relevant for the case at hand, which was inserted by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act 43 of 1986 with a. view to combat the increasing menace of dowry deaths. Thus it would be profitable to reproduce Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which reads as under : "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death." 22. A combined reading of definition of "dowry death" in Section 304-B Indian Penal Code and the words used in presumptive Section 113-B of the Evidence Act shows that one of the essential ingredients in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death for or in connection with demand of dowry. On proof of essentials as stated above, it becomes obligatory on the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. In view of Section 4 of the Evidence Act, the Court has no option but to presume that the accused had caused dowry death. It is a statutory compulsion on the Court. 23. In the case at hand, as noted above, the marriage of deceased- Manju was solemnized with appellant-Sunil on 28.4.1999 and her death occurred on 1.6.1999 i.e. only on 34th day of her marriage otherwise than under normal circumstances. It is a statutory compulsion on the Court. 23. In the case at hand, as noted above, the marriage of deceased- Manju was solemnized with appellant-Sunil on 28.4.1999 and her death occurred on 1.6.1999 i.e. only on 34th day of her marriage otherwise than under normal circumstances. From the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 8, the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the demand of Rs. 50,000/- from the side of husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of deceased-Manju was persisting till her death and therefore, presumption has to be drawn that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with demand of dowry by these three appellants and her death was caused by these three appellants. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Apex Court in Shamnsaheb B. Multtani v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 577 , wherein their Lordships have observed : "The postulates needed to establish the said offence are (1) the death of a wife should have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage, (2) soon before her death she should have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by the accused in connection with any demand for dowry. Now reading Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, as a part of the said offence, the position is : If the prosecution succeeds in showing that soon before her death she was subjected by him to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry and that her death had occurred (within seven years of her marriage) otherwise than under normal circumstances "the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death." 24. For the reasons therefore, it must be concluded that the learned trial Court has rightly held the appellants, namely Sunil, Sardara Ram and Parmeshwari guilty of having committed offence under section 304B Indian Penal Code and hence the conviction of these three appellants deserves to be maintained. 25. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court has committed grave error in convicting appellant-Rajendra Prasad alone under section 120B Indian Penal Code. According to him, unless there are more than one person, there cannot be a conspiracy. A person alone cannot hatch conspiracy. 25. Lastly, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court has committed grave error in convicting appellant-Rajendra Prasad alone under section 120B Indian Penal Code. According to him, unless there are more than one person, there cannot be a conspiracy. A person alone cannot hatch conspiracy. Even otherwise, as per the prosecution case appellant-Rajendra Prasad was residing separately from remaining three appellants and there is no evidence against him. As such the conviction of appellant- Rajendra Prasad is not legally sustainable and he is entitled to acquittal. 26. I have considered the above argument. A glance at the judgment under appeal shows that the trial Court has recorded a finding that appellant-Rajendra Prasad hatched conspiracy with 'co-accused and, therefore, he is convicted for offence u/s.120-B Indian Penal Code. It further appears that acquittal of co-accused under section 120B Indian Penal Code has been recorded only on the ground that offence under section 498-A is included in Section 304-B Indian Penal Code and therefore, the co-accused deserve to be acquitted of the charges under sections 498-A and 120-B Indian Penal Code. Be that as it may, the question which still requires consideration of this Court is, whether there is any evidence available on record to convict appellant-Rajendra Prasad under section 120B Indian Penal Code. 27. No doubt, the direct evidence of conspiracy is almost an impossibility and it is in a rare case only that there is direct evidence of the place where the conspiracy was entered into. In the circumstances therefore, almost in every case conspirators have to be inferred from the conduct of the parties. In the case at hand, there is no direct evidence to prove that appellant-Rajendra and other co-accused had at any point of time agreed to cause the death of deceased on account of failure of her parents to satisfy the demand of dowry. The sole circumstance relied upon by the trial Judge is the subsequent conduct of appellant-Rajendra in lodging a false report (Ex.P/10) of the incident, wherein he misdirected the police authorities by informing that deceased-Manju died due to fire injuries and deceased was alone in the house at the time of incident. The sole circumstance relied upon by the trial Judge is the subsequent conduct of appellant-Rajendra in lodging a false report (Ex.P/10) of the incident, wherein he misdirected the police authorities by informing that deceased-Manju died due to fire injuries and deceased was alone in the house at the time of incident. True it is that medical evidence and the statement of PW-10 Bhagwandas Khandelwal, Assistant Engineer of the Electricity Department and his report Ex.P/9 are sufficient to falsify the contents of the report, Ex.P/10 lodged by appellant-Rajendra Prasad. The medical evidence on record is to the effect that deceased died of suffocation, but suffocation was not as a result of smoke of fire. That apart, the Assistant Engineer has categorically deposed that there was no electric connection in the house of accused. The witness made it clarified that it was wrong to suggest that accused had taken illegal electric connection from the main electric line/pole. The medical evidence further proves that the cause of death was not drowning. 28. It is well settled that an offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion and surmises or inferences which are not supported by cogent evidence. It is true that appellant-Rajendra Kumar was a close relation of the co-accused but he was residing with his family in a separate house and there is no evidence of direct demand of dowry by him either to the parents or brother or any other relatives of the deceased. In these circumstances, the conduct of the accused after the commission of offence in lodging a false report (Ex.P/10) may be to screen the real culprits from punishment, but no conclusive inference can be drawn that he hatched conspiracy with co-accused, thereby connecting him with the offence of hatching conspiracy. The conduct of accused after the incident may be very unnatural and creating suspicion against him, but in my considered view that itself is not sufficient to convict the accused. As such appellant-Rajendra Prasad is entitled to be acquitted of the charge under section 120B Indian Penal Code. 29. The conduct of accused after the incident may be very unnatural and creating suspicion against him, but in my considered view that itself is not sufficient to convict the accused. As such appellant-Rajendra Prasad is entitled to be acquitted of the charge under section 120B Indian Penal Code. 29. Before parting with the judgment, it need be observed that the trial Judge has ordered acquittal of appellants-Sunil, Sardara and Mst: Parmeshwari under section 120B Indian Penal Code and in doing so, the trial Judge has observed that since the offence under section 120B Indian Penal Code is included in Section 304-B Indian Penal Code, therefore, they are acquitted of the charge. In my considered view, the learned trial Judge has fallen into serious error of law in arriving at this conclusion. This Court is not concerned with the acquittal of above three appellants under section 120-B, inasmuch as there is no appeal against their acquittal, by the State. However, the fact remains that observations of the trial Court to the effect that Section 120-B Indian Penal Code is included in Section 304-B Indian Penal Code are per se illegal. Conspiracy to commit an offence is itself an offence and a person can be separately charged with respect to such a conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy to commit a crime is entirely a different offence from the crime that is the object of the conspiracy because the conspiracy precedes the commission of crime and is complete before the crime is attempted or completed, equally the crime attempted or completed does not require the element of conspiracy as one of its ingredients. 30. In the result, this appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of appellants-Sunil, Sardara Ram and Smt. Parmeshwari under section 304B Indian Penal Code and the sentence awarded thereunder are maintained, while conviction of appellant-Rajendra Prasad under section 120B Indian Penal Code is set aside. He is acquitted of the charge. Rajendra Prasad is already on bail. He need not surrender to his bail bonds, which stand cancelled. -Appeal partly allowed. *******