JUDGMENT - VAZIFDAR S.J., J.—The petitioner has sought a writ of certiorari to quash and set aside the order dated 28-6-2002 passed by respondent No. 4 i.e. the Industrial Court. The impugned order rejected the petitioners Revision Application against the order of the Labour Court dated 29-2-1997. The order of the Labour Court in turn rejected the petitioners Complaint (ULP) No. 38 of 1990 seeking a declaration that respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 had engaged in unfair labour practices under Items 1(a), (b) and (f) of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, a direction that respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 cease and desist from engaging in the unfair labour practices complained of and a direction against the said respondents to reinstate the petitioner with full back wages and continuity of service with effect from 17th March, 1990 and to pay the back wages with interest. 2. The facts have been dealt with in considerable detail by the order of the Labour Court. As I intend confirming the order of the Labour Court as well as the order of the Industrial Court impugned in this petition, I will state the facts only briefly and during the course of considering the arguments of the learned Counsel. 3. The petitioners case in the complaint was that he was employed by respondent No. 1 respondent No. 2 i.e. M/s. Jenco Valves and respondent No. 1 are the proprietary concerns of respondent No. 3, Janardan G. Chavan. The respondents carried on business of manufacturing pneumatic, hydranlic cylindrical valves. The respondents conducted business in three different names viz. in the names of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and in the name of M/s. Umesh Engineering. The services of the workmen were freely transferred from one concern to the other inter se; respondent No. 3 carried on business in three different names only as a subterfuge, without maintaining any records such as E.S.I., Provident Fund and Leave and Wage records of the workmen. The petitioner was employed by respondent No. 1 in October, 1978 as a Turner. His last drawn wages was Rs. 48/- per day. His initial employment was with respondent No. 1 but was frequently transferred to respondent No. 2. The petitioner was employed by respondent No. 1 in October, 1978 as a Turner. His last drawn wages was Rs. 48/- per day. His initial employment was with respondent No. 1 but was frequently transferred to respondent No. 2. The petitioners grievance is that when on 17th March, 1990 he reported for duties as usual at 7.30 a.m., respondent No. 3 without any rhyme or reason started abusing him, attempted to physically assault him, told him that his services are no longer required and drove him out of the factory premises. It is contended that the respondents have thus illegally and arbitrarily terminated the petitioners services with effect from 17th March, 1990. 4. The respondents case is that the filing of the complaint was mala fide and an abuse of the process of law, solely with an intention of seeking monetary benefits with no intention whatsoever to work. The respondents case is that they never terminated the services of the petitioner, that it was not even their case that they terminated the services on the ground of any alleged abandonment of work on the petitioners part and that the petitioner had wilfully remained absent from work. In fact, it was stated that before the respondents could even ask him to come to work the petitioner filed the complaint within four days from the alleged incident. The incident of course is strongly denied by the respondents who contended that the petitioner did not even report for work on 17th March, 1990 which was a Saturday. He merely filed the complaint the following Wednesday i.e. within four days. The main controversy between the parties therefore is whether the incident as alleged by the petitioner is true or whether the petitioner abstained from reporting for work altogether. 5. Mr. Shetty, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner challenged the finding of the Labour Court which was based inter alia upon the muster roll maintained by the respondents. Before the Labour Court, the original muster roll was produced by the respondents in which the petitioner was marked absent from 17th March, 1990 onwards. His name was continued on the muster roll even after 17th March, 1990. Before the Labour Court, the original muster roll was produced by the respondents in which the petitioner was marked absent from 17th March, 1990 onwards. His name was continued on the muster roll even after 17th March, 1990. In the circumstances, it was held that the original muster roll established that the petitioners name was continued at least upto November, 1992, that though the complainant was absent, his name was not struck off from the muster roll, which was checked and counter-signed by the E.S.I. shop Inspector. It was held that the complainant was not reporting for work and was therefore marked absent in the muster roll. The Labour Court accepted the respondents contention that the petitioners services were not terminated with effect from 17th March, 1990 or even thereafter. 6. The finding in this regard is well founded. There is nothing on record to suggest that the muster roll is unreliable. It was checked and counter-signed by the E.S.I. Shop Inspector. The cross-examination does not even remotely indicate that the muster roll is suspicious. Indeed, in the cross-examination, it was not even a suggestion put to the respondents witness that the muster roll was fabricated. 7. Mr. Shetty however submitted that the name of the petitioner did not appear in the wage register of the respondents with effect from 1st April, 1990. The wage register is a more reliable document than the muster roll, he contended. The contention was on the basis that the wage register always contains the signature of the employees evidencing receipt of payment of their wages. Therefore, it cannot be easily fabricated. The muster roll on the other hand merely contains the endorsement "P" or "A" indicating the presence or absence of the concerned worker. The signature of the worker does not appear on the muster roll. The absence of the name of the petitioner on the wage register he submitted, indicates that the petitioners services were terminated by the respondents. The argument is not well founded for more than one reason. 8. Firstly, as I have already observed the genuineness and authenticity of the muster roll has not been successfully challenged. The muster roll establishes beyond doubt that petitioners services were never terminated by the respondents. 9. Further, Mr. The argument is not well founded for more than one reason. 8. Firstly, as I have already observed the genuineness and authenticity of the muster roll has not been successfully challenged. The muster roll establishes beyond doubt that petitioners services were never terminated by the respondents. 9. Further, Mr. Joshi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that the mere absence of the name of an employee from the wage register would not ipso facto indicate that his services were terminated. The wage register was maintained on a monthly basis. If an employee did not report for work in the entire month, there would be no question, Mr. Joshi submitted, of his name appearing on the wage register for that month as no wages for that would be payable to him. Mr. Shetty on the other hand submitted that the wage registers would always contain the name of all the employees irrespective of whether they were absent for months together. In such cases, against their names, under the column "Number of days worked" the figure " would be inserted. 10. I am afraid there is nothing on record to indicate this practice. It is not a requirement of law. In the absence of any practice or procedure or requirement of law, it is difficult to accept Mr. Shettys submission in this regard. In the circumstances, the reliance upon the muster roll to establish the falsity the petitioners case cannot be said to be perverse or unfounded. 11 (a) Mr. Shetty went a step further. He submitted that the absence of the name of an employee from a wage register ipso facto constitutes a termination of his employment. Mr. Shetty relied upon the following sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Delhi Cloth General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee Ors.)1, 1978 (I) L.L.J. 1 :- "15. Striking off the name of the workman from the rolls by the management is termination of his service. .................." (b) The above sentence however must be read in the context of the entire judgment. So read, it does not support Mr. Shettys contention. In that case, the workman was appointed as a labourer. After about six months he was promoted as a fitter-helper and after about one and a half years he was promoted to the post of a motion-setter. So read, it does not support Mr. Shettys contention. In that case, the workman was appointed as a labourer. After about six months he was promoted as a fitter-helper and after about one and a half years he was promoted to the post of a motion-setter. In 1964 there was a re-organisation of the management and the post of motion-setter was abolished. The management however did not retrench any of the employees and agreed to offer the work at any other suitable post. The workman was therefore offered a post of a trainee on probation without loss of wages. Finding him unsuitable for this post even after extending the period of probation upto nine months, the management offered him the post of fitter on the same pay which he drew as a motion-setter. The offer was made by a letter dated 3-7-1965 which concluded stating that if within two days the workman did not respond it would be presumed that the proposal was not acceptable to him and as a consequence he would be retrenched. The workman was apparently on leave when the letter was delivered. Subsequently, he requested the management to give him a further chance to show his efficiency in his job and if he failed to improve he would be voluntarily tender his resignation. The management did not reply to this letter and the workman did not report to the management. Thereafter, the management wrote a letter dated 19-1-1966 stating: "your name has been automatically struck off the rolls under the provisions of the Standing Orders with effect from 24-8-65, for continued absence without any intimation." (c) The document referred to in the judgment was "rolls" and not a wage register. I have presumed however that, as submitted by Mr. Shetty, it may refer to a wage register. It would make no difference. The fallacy in Mr. Shettys submission arises from his calling a single sentence from the judgment and reading it in isolation from the rest of the judgment. It is clear after reading the entire judgment of the Supreme Court that the workers name had been struck off the rolls not merely with the intention of terminating his services but as a direct consequence of the termination of his services. It is clear after reading the entire judgment of the Supreme Court that the workers name had been struck off the rolls not merely with the intention of terminating his services but as a direct consequence of the termination of his services. I do not read the judgment of the Supreme Court as having laid down as a proposition of law that the striking of the name of a workman from the wage register ipso facto constitutes in all cases a termination of his services. That question did not even fall for the consideration of the Supreme Court. 12. Mr. Shetty then submitted that the respondents did not even write to the petitioner asking him to report for work before terminating his services. The respondents wrote a letter terminating his services. The respondents wrote a letter calling upon him to report for work only after they were served with a copy of the complaint. 13. The argument is not only unfounded but an analysis of the dates exposes the petitioners true intentions. The petitioners case is that his services were terminated by the respondents on 17th March, 1990. 17th March, 1990 was a Saturday. The petitioner filed the complaint within four days, on 21st March, 1990. The complaint was served on the respondents on 23rd March, 1990. On 24th March, 1990 the respondents wrote to the petitioner advising him to resume his duties. In these circumstances the respondents cannot be faulted at all for not writing earlier. Surely, the respondents could not have been expected to write to the petitioner within a day or two of his remaining absent. This is even more so in the case of the petitioner who had even in the past remained absent. For instance, he had remained absent between 1-11-1989 and 26-11-1989 and between 6-1-1990 and 17-1-1990. Indeed, when he remained absent from 1-11-1989 to 26-11-1989 the respondents by their letter dated 11-11-1989 asked him to report for work. They did not write a letter very next day or even after merely a day or two. 14. There is an inherent improbability in the petitioners case about what transpired on 17th March, 1990. He does not give any explanation for the allegedly unusual behaviour of respondent No. 3. They did not write a letter very next day or even after merely a day or two. 14. There is an inherent improbability in the petitioners case about what transpired on 17th March, 1990. He does not give any explanation for the allegedly unusual behaviour of respondent No. 3. It is not the petitioners case that anything had transpired between the petitioners case that anything had transpired between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 which prompted respondent No. 3 to abuse him on 17th March, 1990 and ask him to leave the premises. This kind of conduct would surely result from some antecedent circumstances that transpired between the petitioner and the respondents. If indeed nothing had transpired, then the normal course of conduct I would have expected was an enquiry by the petitioner with the respondents as to the reason of his oral termination. Admittedly, there was nothing. There was not even an Advocates notice stating these facts. Nor was there even a oral enquiry by the petitioner. The petitioner simply filed a complaint within four days. 15. These facts strongly establish the respondents case that the petitioners sole intention was to try and seek a monetary benefit without ever intending to discharge his duties. It is not even the petitioners case that he was forced to file the complaint due to any urgency. No application for interim reliefs was even pressed when the complain was filed. This is a strong indication of the mala fides of the complaint. 16. The respondents bona fides on the other hand are established by the fact that on the very first occasion in Court they offered the petitioner to resume duties. The same was recorded by the Court. The petitioners allegation now was that on 6-4-1990 when he reported for work the respondents son abused him and did not permit him to work. This case too is difficult to accept. Surely, had this been true, the petitioner would have adopted some steps before the Labour Court. Had the petitioner genuinely wanted to work, he would have made an application in the Labour Court for necessary directions. Indeed, it was the respondent who as recorded in the order of the Labour Court, offered the appointment of an Investigating Officer to ascertain whether the respondents were preventing him from working. They recorded the same by their letter dated 10th April, 1990. Indeed, it was the respondent who as recorded in the order of the Labour Court, offered the appointment of an Investigating Officer to ascertain whether the respondents were preventing him from working. They recorded the same by their letter dated 10th April, 1990. The petitioner did not take up the offer. This establishes quite clearly that the petitioner never intended working with the respondents. On the other hand, the conduct of the respondents establishes clearly that they never terminated the services of the petitioner. 17. The petitioner by his letter dated 17th May, 1990 stated that what transpired on 6th April, 1990 was witnessed by his grandmother and the employees of the respondent. He further stated that he would file affidavits before the Court. He did no such thing. He did not summon them either. Mr. Shetty stated that the workers refused to depose in his favour. That may well have been so. However, the petitioner himself has not said so. 18 (a) Mr. Shetty relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in (Gaurishankar Vishwakarma v. Eagle Spring Industries Pvt. Ltd. ors.)2, 1988 (I) C.L.R. 38, not in support of any proposition of law but for the similarity of facts appearing in paragraph 3 thereof. In that case, the Division Bench found it difficult to accept the managements case that the workmen had abandoned the service by refusing to come and to resume work. The Division Bench held that it was well settled that even in the case of abandonment of service, the employer has to give a notice to the workman calling upon him to resume his duty and also to hold an enquiry before terminating his service on that ground. It was observed that the employer has done neither and that it was for the employer to prove that the workman had abandoned the service. 18 (b) In the present case that question does not arise. The respondents could not be expected to give any notice before the complaint was filed, calling upon him to resume the work, for the complaint was filed, calling upon him to resume the work, for the complaint was filed within four days of the alleged incident. It is not the respondents case that they terminated the services of the petitioner for his abandoning his job. In fact, they expressed a desire throughout to permit him to continue working. It is not the respondents case that they terminated the services of the petitioner for his abandoning his job. In fact, they expressed a desire throughout to permit him to continue working. In the circumstances, the judgment is of no assistance to the petitioner. 19. The petition is therefore dismissed. The petitioner shall pay the cost of this petition fixed at Rs. 2500/- within eight weeks from today. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this duly authenticated by the Associate/Court Stenographer. Petition dismissed. -----