( 1 ) APPLICATION Nos. 496 to 500 of 1989 are filed by Five Co-operative Housing Societies, seeking temporary injunction against the respondents, who are common to all the applications, restraining them from interfering with the possession, or undertaking any construction in the lands in Survey No. 1 of Hashmatpet village, being Item No. 2 of Schedule IV-A of C. S. No. 14 of 1958. An order of ex parte injunction was granted by this court way back on 4. 10. 1989. The fourth respondent in the said applications filed application No. 379 of 2004 to vacate the order of ex parte temporary injunction. C. C. No. 1330 of 2002 is filed alleging that despite the orders of temporary injunction, respondents are interfering with the possession. ( 2 ) THE applicants contended that they have purchased the land in an extent of ac. 64. 00, in all, in Survey No. l of hashmatpet Village, and that their ownership has been recognized by various proceedings of the Government as well as this Court. According to them, the land in Survey no. l was also the,subject-matter of the partition of the suit, C. S. No. 14 of 1958, a preliminary decree passed therein and thereafter, it was allotted to the share of several parties to the suit. It is urged that the entire land in that survey number was purchased by defendants 157 and 206 in that suit from the concerned parties and they, in turn, sold an extent of Ac. 64. 00 of land to the applicants herein. It is stated that in Application Nos. 7,11,15,19 and 23 of 1988 filed by them, the assignments in their favour were recognized by this Court, and ever since then, they are in possession of the land. They alleged that though valid title had passed on to them, the respondents are interfering with their possession, on one pretext or the other. ( 3 ) THE fourth respondent filed counter- affidavit stating, inter alia, that no survey number of Hashmatpet Village was referred to in the schedule to C. S. No. 14 of 1958 and the question of it being allotted to any of the parties of that suit does not arise. It is contended that the extent of land in Survey No. l is Ac. 123. 00 and the fourth respondent is in possession of Ac. 28. It is contended that the extent of land in Survey No. l is Ac. 123. 00 and the fourth respondent is in possession of Ac. 28. 27 guntas, which is covered by archaeological monuments. They state that when the applicants were attempting to destroy the monuments, they prevented them from doing so. It is pleaded that in the absence of any final decree, allotment of identified extent of land and delivery of possession through legal process, the applicants cannot derive any title to the land. ( 4 ) SRI E. Madan Mohan Rao, learned counsel for the applicants, submits that the assignment of Ac. 64. 00 of land was recognized by this Court way back in the year 1987, and that it is not open to the respondents to deny the right and title of the applicants in the land. He contends that through the various proceedings in C. S. No. 14 of 1958, the land in Survey No. l came to be allotted to some of the parties to the suit and they, in turn, transferred their share in favour of defendants 157 and 206. Learned Counsel submits that the transfer in favour of Defendants 157 and 206 as well as the assignment of the rights, in relation to the land in favour of the applicants herein, was recognized by this Court. Reference is also made to some orders passed by this Court- in certain writ petitions and the proceedings issued by the revenue authorities. ( 5 ) LEARNED Government Pleader for Arbitration. appearing for the fourth respondent, on the other hand, submits that the land in Survey No. l of Hashmatpet village, cannot be said to have constituted the subject-matter of C. S. No. 14 of 1958, since it was not specifically referred to in the Schedule. He contends that unless and until a final decree is passed and final allotment of shares is undertaken, neither the parties in the suit nor anybody claiming through them can be said to have acquired title, in relation to any specified item of property. ( 6 ) C. S. No. 14 of 1958 had a career of its own spread over the past several decades. The suit was initially filed against 62 defendants. The number rose to 135, as on 28. 6. 1963 when a preliminary decree was passed. At present, it is said to be above 800. ( 6 ) C. S. No. 14 of 1958 had a career of its own spread over the past several decades. The suit was initially filed against 62 defendants. The number rose to 135, as on 28. 6. 1963 when a preliminary decree was passed. At present, it is said to be above 800. ( 7 ) THE suit was originally filed by only one plaintiff, seeking partition of lands, in schedule IV and certain other properties. The properties in Schedule IV comprised of certain bungalows and open places within the city, and agricultural lands in surrounding revenue villages. The plaintiff and some of the defendants filed appl. No. 264 of 1961 under Order XXIII rule 3 C. P. C. with a prayer to pass a preliminary decree in terms of the compromise contained in the memorandum of compromise. Since the compromise was not total, both as regards parties and properties, this Court proceeded to adjudicate the matter on merits. Ultimately, a preliminary decree was passed, which incorporates the terms of compromise as well as the result of adjudication. ( 8 ) THE preliminary decree defined the sheria-shares of all the parties and identified the properties that are available for partition. The important items of immovable property are contained in schedule IV comprising 54 items. Out of them, Items 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 related to lands. Rest of the properties are buildings. Under the preliminary decree, a Commissioner-cum-Receiver was appointed to undertake the division of properties. In schedule IV-A, the agricultural lands of certain other revenue villages were included. The agricultural lands were not in possession of any of the parties to the suit. Neither the survey numbers nor the extents are mentioned. In fact, there was serious dispute as to whether the lands stood vested in the Government by operation of A. P. (Telangana Area) Jagirs Abolition Act. ( 9 ) EVEN before the properties were divided by metes and bounds, most of the parties sold their undivided shares in favour of one Nawab Kazim Nawaz Jung and H. E. H. Nizam in two equal shares. They, in turn, were impleaded as defendants 156 and 157 respectively to the suit. One of the items so purchased is the land in survey No. 1 of Hashmatpet Village. The nizam, in turn, sold his share in favour of m/s Cyrus Investments Limited. They, in turn, were impleaded as defendants 156 and 157 respectively to the suit. One of the items so purchased is the land in survey No. 1 of Hashmatpet Village. The nizam, in turn, sold his share in favour of m/s Cyrus Investments Limited. This was impleaded as Defendant No. 206. The petitioners claim that they have purchased different extents of land, totalling Ac. 64. 00, from Defendants 157 and 206 through deeds of assignment dated 28. 11. 1987. Application no. 139 of 1971 filed for the purpose of taking necessary steps to give effect to the preliminary decree is pending. At one stage, the District Collector, Hyderabad was directed to take necessary steps as required under Section 54 C. P. C. , since the agricultural lands were part of estate and were assessed to revenue. No final order was passed there in so far. ( 10 ) THE petitioners filed Application nos. 7, 11, 15, 19 and 23 of 1988 for the reliefs of (A)IMPLEADING them as defendants in the suit; (b)Recognizing the assignments in their favour; (c) Delivery of possession of the lands said to have been assigned to them; and (d) Direction to the revenue authorities to make necessary entries. The applications were ordered on 13. 1. 1988. In this background, it becomes necessary to examine whether the applicants are entitled to be granted an order of temporary injunction. ( 11 ) IT is not in dispute that all these applications are filed in a suit for the relief of partition, simplicitor. The scope of adjudication in such a suit is restricted to the ascertainment of the shares of the respective parties, finding out the properties that are available for partition and taking necessary steps for division of the same by metes and bounds. Except in rare cases, a preliminary decree is passed deciding the shares of the parties and enlisting the properties that are available for partition. In the final decree proceedings, steps are taken to divide the properties by metes and bounds and allocation of shares. After the final decree is drafted on the requisite stamp papers, the same is given effect to, if necessary, on initiation of execution proceedings. Till a final decree is passed in accordance with law, no party to a partition suit can claim right or title in respect of a specified item of property or part thereof. After the final decree is drafted on the requisite stamp papers, the same is given effect to, if necessary, on initiation of execution proceedings. Till a final decree is passed in accordance with law, no party to a partition suit can claim right or title in respect of a specified item of property or part thereof. The distinction between a preliminary and final decree was aptly pointed out by the Supreme Court in Renu Devi v. Mahendra Singh and others, 2003 (2) ald 74 (SC) = (2003) 10 SCC 200 , in the following terms:"a preliminary decree declares the rights or shares of parlies to the partitioa Once the shares have been declared and a further inquiry still remains to be done for actually partitioning the property and placing the parties in separate possession of divided property then such inquiry shall be held and pursuant to the result of further inquiry a final decree shall be passed. A preliminary decree is one which declares the rights and liabilities of the parties leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings. Then, as a result of the further inquiries conducted pursuant to the preliminary decree, the rights of the parties are finally determined and a decree is passed in accordance with such determination, which is, the final decree (See CPC by Mulla, Vol. 1, 1995 Edn. , P. 21 ). The distinction between preliminary and final decree is this: a preliminary decree merely declares the rights and shares of the parties and leaves room for some further inquiry to be held and conducted pursuant to the directions made in the preliminary decree which inquiry having been conducted and the rights of the parties finally determined a decree incorporating such determination needs to be drawn up which is the final decree. " ( 12 ) THE nature of decree to be passed in a suit for partition is provided for under rule 18 of Order XX C. P. C. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 provides for reference of the matter to the Collector for necessary steps under Section 54 C. P. C. , in case the partition relates to landed property, which is part of estate and assessed to revenue. In Ningappa v. Abashkhan, AIR 1956 bom. In Ningappa v. Abashkhan, AIR 1956 bom. 345 , a Division Bench of the Bombay high Court took the view that where a preliminary decree is passed in a partition suit and the matter is referred to the Collector under Section 54 C. P. C. , there cannot be any execution, in relation to such a decree. A Division Bench of Madhya Pradesh High court, in Bhagwansingh v. Babu Shiv prasad, AIR 1974 MP 12 , went a step further and held that once a decree in a partition suit is transmitted to the Collector under Section 54 C. P. C. , the Court becomes junctus officio. The Supreme Court in khemchand Shankar Choudhari v. Vishnu Hari Patil, (1983) 1 SCC 18 , took the view that the Collector can take note of any pendente lite transfers etc. , where there are no serious disputes about it. If no steps are required to be taken further, either on account of the agreement between the parties or the divisibility of the properties etc. , the suit may be disposed of at one stroke, without there being any necessity to pass a preliminary decree. ( 13 ) BEFORE the final decree is passed or the same is executed in a partition suit, it is open to the parties to the suit to assign their rights or interests in favour of third parties. Such assignment, however, shall invariably be, the one of the undivided share and not in relation to any identified definite extent of property. The assignment of right by a party to a partition suit, in relation to a definite extent of property before the final decree is passed, would, in fact; be a contradiction in terms. Even where the assignment is in respect of definite extents of property, which is the subject-matter of a suit, is permissible, having regard to the nature of suit etc. , it stands on a different footing. Assignment of undivided share of a party in a suit for partition may not need registration. However, if the assignment is in relation to an identified item of property, forming part of schedule in a suit for partition, it is to be registered. , it stands on a different footing. Assignment of undivided share of a party in a suit for partition may not need registration. However, if the assignment is in relation to an identified item of property, forming part of schedule in a suit for partition, it is to be registered. In Surjit Singh and others v. Harbans Singh and others, 1996 (1) ALD (SCSN) 3 = (1995) 6 SCC 50 , the Supreme court held as under:"as said before, the assignment is by means of a registered deed. The assignment had taken place after the passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam Singh has been allotted l/3rd share. His right to property to that extent stood established. A decree relating to immovable property worth more than hundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be registered. "another important aspect, which needs to be taken note of, in relation to partition suits, is that the question of delivery of possession of a property would arise only after the final decree is passed, as regards the properties which are in possession of the parties, who in turn shall be a sharer. Delivery of possession of properties, which are not in possession of any of sharers, or any parties to the suit claiming through sharers, is not at all within the contemplation of a decree in a partition suit. Such contingency would arise only where a decree is passed under Rule 12 of Order XX c. P. C. , which, in turn, shall be in a suit for possession. ( 14 ) AFTER the items of movable or immovable properties are identified for partition, the parties are required to accept and receive the same as per the shares divided by the Court in the same position in which they are placed. For instance, if an item of property is subjected to encumbrance of any nature, or is in possession of the third parties, removal of encumbrance or recovery of possession is not within the scope of a suit for partition. Even if a person, who is not a sharer, is a party to the suit, possession cannot be recovered from him on the strength of the preliminary or final decree. Separate proceedings have to be initiated for adjudication of such disputes or recovery of possession from persons other than the sharers or those claiming through them in a partition suit. Even if a person, who is not a sharer, is a party to the suit, possession cannot be recovered from him on the strength of the preliminary or final decree. Separate proceedings have to be initiated for adjudication of such disputes or recovery of possession from persons other than the sharers or those claiming through them in a partition suit. ( 15 ) RVERTING to the facts of the case, the record discloses that even as on today, no final decree has been passed in relation to agricultural lands, which are roughly to the extent of Ac. 20,000. 00 in various villages. It would be surprising to note that the lands are referred to in the Schedule by naming the villages without even referring to the survey numbers or extents. Hashmatpet occurs as Item No. 2 in Schedule IVA, It was described in the Schedule as under; si. NO. Name and nature of property house No. or survey No. Name of Mohalla place in whole possession approximate value 1. Hasmatpet Patta lands, area not known not known village Hasmatpet, Tq. Garbi, District Hyderabad. N. B. Himayat Nawaj Jung 1,000/- while discussing this and other similar items, in the judgment passed at the time of passing the preliminary decree, this Court observed as under: "now I proceeded to consider the other items in Schedule IVA. It is not claimed by the first defendant that Item No. 1 of this Schedule belongs to the Government or that it was taken possession of at the time of the Jagir Abolition. He has not also produced any enquiry is going on what they are makta lands. As shown in the plaint, they are patta lands. He no doubt averred in his written statement that Items 2 to 9 of this Schedule are in the possession of tenants. But that would not make any difference for the purpose of this suit. The occupation by tenants is no bar for partition of the properties by the share- holders. " ( 16 ) HENCE, it is clear that neither the extent was known nor was the property in the possession of any of the parties to the suit. It is not at all the duty of the Court, in a suit for partition, to ascertain such extents or to identify the lands. " ( 16 ) HENCE, it is clear that neither the extent was known nor was the property in the possession of any of the parties to the suit. It is not at all the duty of the Court, in a suit for partition, to ascertain such extents or to identify the lands. Endlessly, hundreds of applications were filed by strangers to the suit, claiming that they have been assigned different extents of land and seeking recognition of such assignments. In none of the applications, all the parties to the suit are impleaded. The assignees and in some cases beneficiaries of further assignments, filed applications in relation to vast extent of agricultural lands. In majority of the cases, orders were passed in one line, to the effect that the applications are ordered, since the respondents did not oppose them. Further applications were also filed seeking delivery of possession and recording of their names in the revenue records. Such applications were also ordered in the same manner. Some of the aggrieved parties have approached the supreme Court in the recent past, in relation to some of the items of the properties in this very suit. In N. S. S, Narayana Sharma v. Goldstone Exports (P) Ltd, AIR 2002 sc 251 , the Supreme Court had set aside such orders and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. ( 17 ) THE present effort is not to pronounce upon the validity or otherwise of the orders passed so far. The endeavour is only to indicate the scope of adjudication in a suit for partition and the nature of rights that can be acquired by the parties to the same. Even at the cost of repetition, it needs to be observed that no party in a suit for partition can acquire absolute title in relation to any property, which is the subject-matter of partition, till a final decree is passed, much less he can convey title to others. ( 18 ) THE petitioners claim to be the assignees from the purchasers of undivided shares from some of the parties to the suit. In the light of the discussion undertaken above, it is rather difficult to imagine that any title can be said to have accrued to them. ( 18 ) THE petitioners claim to be the assignees from the purchasers of undivided shares from some of the parties to the suit. In the light of the discussion undertaken above, it is rather difficult to imagine that any title can be said to have accrued to them. Even assuming that there was a threat of dispossession by the respondents herein in relation to the lands referred to above, the original parties to the suit themselves could not have sought for injunction against the respondents, in a suit for partition. The remedy lies elsewhere. Learned Counsel for the petitioners has drawn the attention of this Court to several proceedings that have ensued in this Court as well as before various authorities. For the limited purpose of these applications, it is sufficient to observe that till a final decree is passed in the suit, no party can acquire absolute right in relation to any item of property or part of it. If the parties acquire any rights independent of the suit, it shall always be open to them to protect such rights in accordance with law. Since the scope of the suit itself is very limited, it is impermissible to grant any reliefs of delivery of possession, grant of temporary injunction etc. ( 19 ) HENCE, this Court is of the view that the petitioners are not entitled for any temporary injunction in their favour restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession. The orders of temporary injunction granted in Application Nos. 496, 497, 498,499 and 500 of 1989 are therefore vacated. Contempt Case No. 1330 of 2002 ( 20 ) THE contempt case is filed alleging that the respondents have interfered with the possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the land. As observed earlier, the property in question has not yet been divided by metes and bounds, since there was no final decree. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioners have an exclusive right in relation to any property. Further, the respondents seriously dispute about the possession of the petitioners. At any rate, the extent of land is Survey No. 1 Ac. 123. 00, whereas the petitioners claim the right in respect of Ac. 64. 00. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the petitioners have an exclusive right in relation to any property. Further, the respondents seriously dispute about the possession of the petitioners. At any rate, the extent of land is Survey No. 1 Ac. 123. 00, whereas the petitioners claim the right in respect of Ac. 64. 00. Unless there was a clear division and demarcation by a competent authority in appropriate proceedings, it cannot be said that there was any violation on behalf of the respondents. Hence, the contempt case is closed.