JUDGMENT : B.P. Das, J. - This First Appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 72 of 1984. The aforesaid suit was filed for partition of suit Scheduled 'A' property into two equal shares and allotment of one share to the plaintiff and for declaration of plaintiff's right, title and interest over Schedule 'B' property and recovery of possession of the same. 2. The case of the plaintiff in short is as follows : One Padmolochan Beriha had three sons : Nitai, Abhi and Krushna (Defendant No. 1 in Court below and appellant before this Court). Abhi died issueless and his line extinguished. Nitai, the father of the plaintiff, was murdered on 6.4.1984 leaving behind the plaintiff as his only issue. At the time of death, Nitai was in jointness with his brother Krushna-Defendant No. 1 and the Scheduled 'A' property was their joint family property. Apart from that, Nitai, who was working as a Mate in the P.W.D. Department, had constructed a pucca house out of his own income, which is Schedule 'B-1' property. Nitai, while working as a Mate, came across defendant No. 2, took fancy on her and brought her to his house which was protested by his wife Ichhabati. Ultimately Ichhabati was driven out of Nitai's house and Nitai started living with Nura- the present appellant No. 2. According to the plaintiff, by the time Ichhabati was driven out of Nitai's house, she had already born to Nitai through Ichhabati. The plaintiff was brought up by Nitai and he performed her marriage in the year 1966. The further case of the plaintiff is that Nitai had other suit properties along with the Stridhana property of the plaintiff at the time of his death and defendant No. 2 in conspiracy with defendant No. 1 was trying to deprive the plaintiff of the said property. Therefore, the suit was filed for the above reliefs. 3. The defendants, who are the appellants before this Court, filed a joint written statement before the trial Court denying the status of the plaintiff as the daughter of late Nitai saying that Nitai had never married Ichhabati and defendant No. 2-Nura is the married wife of late Nitai. The allegation that Nura is the wife of Dukhu Seth of village Khirapali was also denied. The allegation that Nura is the wife of Dukhu Seth of village Khirapali was also denied. The further claim of the defendants was that the present plaintiff is not related to the family of Nitai Beriha and she is the daughter of Ichhabati through her husband Sankirtan Naik of Golabandha. It was also contended that the suit is not maintainable due to the fact that the consolidation proceeding was on in that area. The further case of the defendants was that as Nitai had no issue, he had adopted Raghubir and Nalini, the children of the appellant No. 1 as his son and daughter. 4. As many as 8 issues were'framed. So far as the questions as to whether Ichhabati is the legally married wife of Nitai and whether the plaintiff is their daughter are concerned, the trial Court concluded that Ichhabati is the married wife of Nitai and the plaintiff is their legitimate daughter. Regarding the status of defendant No. 2, the trial Court disbelieved the plea taken by the defendants and declared that Nura is not the legally married wife of Nitai Beriha. So far as adoption of the children of appellant No. 1 is concerned, the trial Court disbelieved the story advanced by the defendants. Regarding the claim that the Schedule 'B-1' and Schedule 'B-2' properties are the self-acquired properties of Nitai Beriha, the trial Court disbelieved the contentions of the plaintiff that Nitai had built his house out of his own income and further held that the suit Schedule 'B' properties are joint family properties of late Nitai and his brother, i.e., appellant No. 1. Deciding the question of bar of Civil Suit under the provision of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972, the trial Court concluded that the suit does not come under the prohibitory provision of Section 4 of the said Act. It was further held that the feasibility of partition, if prohibited by the Consolidation Act, can be considered at the time of final decree in a suit for partition. 5. Let me first decide whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit due to starting of consolidation operation in the area. If the answer would be in the affirmative, then only I shall enter into the other contentions raised by the counsel for the parties. 6. 5. Let me first decide whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit due to starting of consolidation operation in the area. If the answer would be in the affirmative, then only I shall enter into the other contentions raised by the counsel for the parties. 6. Section 51 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 (for short "the Act") reads as follows : Section 51 of the Act which is of a primary importance in the case reads as follows : "51. Bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts : Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, but subject to the provisions contained in Clause (3) of Section 4 and Sub-section (1) of Section 7. (1) All questions relating to right, title, interest and liability in land lying in the consolidation areas, except those coming within the Jurisdiction of Revenue Courts or authorities under any local law for the time being in force, shall be decided under the provisions of this Act by the appropriate authority during the consolidation operations; and (2) no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of any matter which an officer or authority empowered under this Act is competent to decide. 7. In this regard, I may refer to the decision of this Court in Jairam Samantray Vs. Baikuntha Samantaray and Others, wherein this Court held as follows : "... The question which do not necessitate interpretation of the Civil Court for the removal of the obstacle and can be ancillarily and incidentally decided and on the resolution of which would depend the decision as to right, title, interest and liability in land, are within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities, seeking a declaration simpliciter as to legal character as contemplated by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and not within the competence of the consolidation authorities. Except in case where title is claimed on the basis of transactions inter vivos in most cases title is claimed on the basis of relationship, say as son, father, mother, husband or wife etc. Each such question of relationship is a question pertaining to legal character or status. Don't the consolidation authorities decide such question of legal character in cases after cases day in and day out ? Each such question of relationship is a question pertaining to legal character or status. Don't the consolidation authorities decide such question of legal character in cases after cases day in and day out ? If then the consolidation authorities have jurisdiction to decide the question as to whether a person is son by birth, by what logic or law are they denied jurisdiction to decide if a person is son by way of adoption ? Sonship is acquired either by birth or by way of adoption. They are the different modes of acquisition. If title to property as son by birth can be adjudicated upon by the consolidation authorities, we fail to understand why adjudication of claim to title as son by way of adoption should be out of bounds to them. We are, therefore, of the view that the statement of law that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, that being a question of status, is not correct. In almost every case, consolidation authorities are deciding the question of status but a declaration of the law to the effect that the consolidation authorities have no jurisdiction to decide the question of adoption, if such question arises ancillarily or incidentally for adjudication of right, title and interest in property, is insupportable. We, therefore, hold that though Puni Bewa's case (supra) having regard to the declaration specifically sought has been correctly decided, the other two decisions, referred to above, where question of adoption was to be gone into ancillarily, have been correctly decided." 8. I may also refer to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Panchei Bewa (deceased) and after her Kunamani Sahoo and Others Vs. Iswar Chandra Sahoo and Others, wherein after quoting the provisions of Section 51 of the Act, this Court held as follows : "Having regard to the objects and purpose of the enactment and the unambiguous words of wide multitude, it is not open to constrict the field of operation by any pre-conceived notions. Questions relating to right, title, interest and liability in respect of the land which forms subject matter of adjudication by the Consolidation authorities, are to be decided by the said authorities except those which can be decided only by the Civil Court and are therefore not adjudicable by them. Questions relating to right, title, interest and liability in respect of the land which forms subject matter of adjudication by the Consolidation authorities, are to be decided by the said authorities except those which can be decided only by the Civil Court and are therefore not adjudicable by them. In deciding questions of right, title, interest and liability in land, questions and issues relatable thereto arise for decision. Such decisions depend to a great extent on the decision on the connected questions, which have to be decided ancillary and incidentally. Sometimes, hurdles are created by judgment or orders of the Court or a document, to secure relief. The suitor has to clear these hurdles and impediments. So long as the hurdles stand on the way of suitor, grant of relief is not possible and permissible. The Civil Court alone has jurisdiction to remove those hurdles by setting aside the judgment or order or a document of transfer. It has to be borne in mind that a distinction has to be drawn between documents of transfer, which are void, and those, which are voidable. The former category being non est can be ignored. But transactions, documents, judgment or orders, which are not void ab initio, are to be avoided. To set aside such documents, transactions, judgments or decrees which are voidable and need avoidance, jurisdiction vests only in Civil Court and not in consolidation authorities except in cases where title is claimed on the basis of transactions inter vivos. Questions of relationship assume great importance in such cases. Such questions relate to and pertain to legal character or status. These questions have to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities who have jurisdiction. Adoption is one of the modes by which sonship is acquired. If a person claims to have title to the property as a son by adoption, the adjudication of such claim has to be by consolidation authorities." 9. In yet another decision of this Court in Haramani Mohanty and Others Vs. Smt. Sushila Kumari Mohanty and Others, this Court relying upon the decision of the Division Bench in Jairam Samantray's case (supra) held as follows : "In the suit the petitioners have not prayed for any declaration of right, title or interest in any land. They have prayed for a declaration of their status as the widow and children of late Banshidhar Mohanty and a consequential permanent injunction. They have prayed for a declaration of their status as the widow and children of late Banshidhar Mohanty and a consequential permanent injunction. In view of the express provisions of Sections 4(4) and 51 of the Consolidation Act, it appears that the petitioners' suit being a suit for simpliciter declaration of status was not hit by the said provisions. *** *** *** If an adjudication has already been made by a competent Civil Court the incidental or collateral jurisdiction of a special forum cannot affect the effect of the said judgment and decree declaring the status simpliciter particularly when the suit was filed before any notification u/s 3 of the Consolidation Act was issued and such suit is not hit by the prohibition contained in any of the provisions of the said Act. When an adjudication made by a competent Civil Court is under appeal in any higher forum any determination of status by the Consolidation authorities in exercise of its incidental or collateral power will be subject to the ultimate decision of the general Civil forum. Accordingly, an appeal against judgment and decree of a competent, Civil Court declaring status/legal character simpliciter in a suit filed before the notification u/s 3 of the Consolidation Act does not abate u/s 4(4) of the Consolidation Act." 10. In view of the legal position as narrated above, the suit is not maintainable as the provisions of Section 51 of the Orissa Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation of Land Act, 1972 (for short "The Consolidation Act') bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. There is no material on record to indicate that the consolidation operation in the area where the suit property is situated was long since over, as observed by the trial Court, as the notification u/s 41 of the Consolidation Act was not filed before the trial Court. Thus, the suit being one for partition ought to have abated. 11. In view of the aforesaid finding as regards the maintainability of the suit, there is no necessity to go into the merits or otherwise of other contentions raised by the parties. 12. The First Appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside. Parties shall bear their own costs. Final Result : Allowed