Judgment Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. 1. The appellant-defendant challenges the decree granted by the courts below for possession by way of redemption in favour of respondent-plaintiffs. 2. Case of the respondent-plaintiffs is that one Boor Singh was original owner of the suit land (allotted in lieu of land left in Pakistan). The suit land was mortgaged on 10.3.1994 for Rs. 3,700/-. Original mortgagee defendant No. 9 sold his rights to Fauza Singh, defendant No. l on 20.7.1957 by a registered deed. Original mortgagor sold his rights of redemption to the plaintiff and defendant No. 24 vide sale deed dated 25.1.1960. 3. The plaintiffs filed an application for redemption before the Assistant Collector under the provisions of the Redemption of Mortgage Act, 1913 (hereinafter referred to as 1913 Act) and the same was dismissed on 1.4.1969 on the ground that complicated question of law was involved. 4. The suit was contested by the appellant-defendant No. l mainly on the ground of limitation which plea gave rice to issue No. 2. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit subject to the payment of mortgage amount. It was held that since the Collector had not decided the issue of right of redemption on merits, the limitation of filing suit within one year was not applicable. Objection that Collector dismissed the application on 1.4.1969 while the suit was filed on 16.11.1973 beyond the period of one year, was, thus, rejected following the decisions of the Apex Court in Sheo Lal and Ors. v. Sultan and Ors., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 93. 6. Shri Munishwar Puri, learned counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted that the appeal involved the following substantial question of law:- "Whether the suit beyond 30 years from the date of mortgage and beyond one year from the date of rejection of application for redemption by the Collector was barred by limitation ?" 7. Shri M.S.Rakkar, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff submitted that the question of limitation was settled by the decision of the Apex Court and thus, no. substantial question of law arose for consideration. 8. In support of his submission, Shri Puri relied on decision of the Apex Court in Sampuran Singh and Ors. Shri M.S.Rakkar, learned counsel on behalf of the respondent-plaintiff submitted that the question of limitation was settled by the decision of the Apex Court and thus, no. substantial question of law arose for consideration. 8. In support of his submission, Shri Puri relied on decision of the Apex Court in Sampuran Singh and Ors. v. Niranjan Kaur and Ors., (1991-1)99 P.L.R. 831 holding that under Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation for redemption started from the date of mortgage itself and suit filed beyond 30 years thereof would be barred by limitation. Shri Puri also relied on judgments reported as Pradhu Mal v. Chandan (1938)40 P.L.R. 886, Bachan Singh and Ors. v. Arjan Singh and Ors. 1972 P.L.J. 431, and Chanan Singh v. Smt. Mojo and Anr. (1976)78 P.L.R. 726 to submit that under Section 12 of the 1913 Act, order of the Collector dismissing application for redemption will become final if suit challenging the said order is not filed within one year. He also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Prem Kaur v. Prem Singh and Ors., 1984 P.L.J. 402 to submit that plaintiff could not take benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to exclude time spent before the Collector. 9. Shri Rakkar placed reliance on a judgment of the Apex Court in Sheolals case (supra) to submit that since order of Collector was not on merits, the same could not be held to have become final on expiry of period of one year. He submitted that decisions relied upon by Shri Puri in Prabhu Mal, Bachan Singh and Chanan Singhs case (supra) also supported his plea. He also relied upon following observations in the judgment of the Apex Court in Panchanan Sharma v. Basudeo Prasad Jagnani, A.I.R. 1995 S.C. 1743:- "The usufructuary mortgagor does not lose his title to the property or right to redemption by lapse of time. By operation of the last para of Section 76, the mortgagor is entitled to the accounting of the loss occasioned, to it." He further relied upon decision of this Court in Ajit Singh and Ors. v. Kirpal Singh (deceased) by LRs and Ors. (2003-1)133 P.L.R. 192; 2003(l) P.L.J. 199, and Gurbachan Singh v. Inder Singh and Ors. By operation of the last para of Section 76, the mortgagor is entitled to the accounting of the loss occasioned, to it." He further relied upon decision of this Court in Ajit Singh and Ors. v. Kirpal Singh (deceased) by LRs and Ors. (2003-1)133 P.L.R. 192; 2003(l) P.L.J. 199, and Gurbachan Singh v. Inder Singh and Ors. (2002-3)132 P.L.R. 721:2003(l) P.L.J. 324 to submit that sale of mortgagee rights by the defendant on 25.5.1957 constituted an acknowledgement and limitation had to be counted from the said date i.e. 25.5.1957. He also submitted that time spent before the Collector and in earlier suit filed on 13.3.1973 which was dismissed as stated on 14.6.1973 ought to be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. He sought support from observations made in para 10 of the judgment in Gurbachan Singhs case (supra). He also relied upon decision of this Court in Samadh Baba Narain Dass Ba-Ihaman Swami Ram Tirath v. Surta and Ors.,(2002-2)131 P.L.R. 330 wherein it was observed that a usufructuary mortgage was a self-liquidating mortgage wherein the mortgagee recovered the amount of debt from the produce of the land and if not accounted for, the mortgage will be automatically redeemed thereby giving cause of action to the mortgagor to recover the suit property by adjusting the debt paid. In para 12, it was observed:- "Relevant case law may now be seen. In Sita Ram Singh v. Gaya Prasad A.I.R. 1953 All. 620 (para 5) (dealing with Article 148 of the old Limitation Act corresponding to Article 61 of the new Act) it was held that the period of limitation begins from the date of the mortgage but in a self-liquidating mortgage, right to recover possession by a mortgagor accrues when mortgage money is fully liquidated i.e. a fresh cause of action accrues to the mortgagor on discharge of mortgage money and a mortgage which may not be self-liquidating under its own terms, may so become self-liquidating by virtue of a statutory provision. Reference was made to Debt Redemption Law reducing rate of interest and providing that usufruct in excess of rate of interest will be taken in satisfaction of the principal amount. It was observed that Debt Relief Law had effected a revolutionary change in the subsisting mortgagees by making themselves liquidating mortgagees. Reference was made to Debt Redemption Law reducing rate of interest and providing that usufruct in excess of rate of interest will be taken in satisfaction of the principal amount. It was observed that Debt Relief Law had effected a revolutionary change in the subsisting mortgagees by making themselves liquidating mortgagees. It was, however, required that the mortgage should be substituting on the date on which the Debt Redemption Law came into force. In Kidar Nath v. Mangat Rai, 1969(3) S.C.C. 588 (para 11 and 13), it was held that liability of mortgagor to pay money was a debt and provisions of Section 30 of the Punjab Relief of Indebtness Act were applicable and amount received by the creditor in excess of interest specified under Section 3(2)(e) of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, was liable to be deducted from the mortgage money which could not be more than twice the original advanced amount. In Vaideswara Iyer v. Kamakshi Animal 1994 Supp.(2) S.C.C. 524 (para 4) it was observed that right to recover possession by the mortgagor where mortgage was of the year 1923 accrued in the year 1953 on wiping out of the mortgage debt. In Prithi Nath Singh v. Suraj Ahair, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1041 (para 5), it was held that mortgagees right to continue in possession comes to an end if the mortgage money was paid. In para 14, it was observed that once the mortgagee had recovered the mortgage money, the mortgagor gets a right to recover possession which was in addition to his right to redeem. In Mhadagonda Ramgonda Patil v. Shripal Balwant Rainade, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1200, it was observed that under Order 34 Rule 5 C.P.C., right of mortgagor to redeem the mortgage continued till the confirmation of sale pursuant to a final decree and right to redeem will be extinguished only in accordance with order, 34, Rule 8(3)(a), C.P.C.. It was observed that right to redeem was a statutory right which could be defeated either by a decree of Court or by act of parties. It was also held in para 16 that rule of Damduput would apply. In Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 436, it was held that freedom of contract was subject to courts power to give relief against clog on equity of redemption. It was also held in para 16 that rule of Damduput would apply. In Pomal Kanji Govindji v. Vrajlal Karsandas Purohit, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 436, it was held that freedom of contract was subject to courts power to give relief against clog on equity of redemption. In Shivdev Singh v. Sucha Singh, (2000-2)125 P.L.R. D.4 it was observed that any unreasonable obstruction in terms of mortgage which obstructed redemption, could be struck down by the Court." 10 He submitted that in Sampuran Singhs case (supra), decisions of the Apex Court in Prithi Nath Singh and Panchanans cases (supra) which had bearing on interpretation of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, were not noticed and therefore, the said decision was distinguishable and decisions of the Apex Court in Prithi Nath Singh and Panchanans cases (supra), could not be ignored. 11. After considering the rival contentions, I am of the view that the view taken by the Courts below is in accordance with law. Suit filed by the respondent-plaintiff could not be held to be beyond limitation. Assuming right to redeem commenced from the date of mortgage itself, the effect of recovery of the debt from the produce of the land of which possession was given to the appellant-defendant had to be taken into account as held by the Apex Court in Prithi Nath Singh and Panchanans cases (supra). The order of the Collector rejecting the application for redemption could not have been held to have become final on account of suit having not been filed within one year of the said order since the said order was not on merits, in view of law laid down by the Apex Court in Sheo Lals case (supra). 12. There is also merit in the contention that limitation had to commence from the year 1957 when the mortgage was duly acknowledged in a registered deed. 13. In view of these aspects, I need not go into the question of exclusion of the period spent before the Collector or in the previous suit as there are contradictory observations on this aspect in judgments of this Court in Walaiti Ram and Gurbachan Singhs cases (supra). 14. For the above reasons, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.