N.V.Balasubramanian, J.: The above writ appeal is directed against the order of a learned single Judge rendered in Writ Petition No.10071 of 1989 dated 30.7.1998. 2. The first respondent herein has preferred the abovesaid writ petition directing the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, to delete the name of the Dayaldas the appellant herein in the property tax assessment register maintained by him relating to the assessment of property tax in respect of door No.107, Santhome High Road, Madras-28. 3. The facts that are necessary for disposal of the writ appeal are as under: There is no dispute that the first respondent viz., O.Dhanapal, is the owner of the property bearing door No.107, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Madras-4 and he had let out the ground floor of the said premises to the original appellant Dayaldas. The said Dayaldas died during the pendency of the appeal and after his death, a partnership firm was constituted in the name of Garments Cleaners and the firm represented by its Partner Manikandan has been impleaded as the appellant, by order of this Court dated 12.8.2003 in C.M.P.No.504 of 2002. The first respondent herein entered into an agreement of lease with the said Dayaldas on 19.10.1968 and Clause 8 of the lease deed reads thus: "The lessor permits the lessee to put up a temporary shed of the dimension of 57’ x 16’ (912 sq.ft.) and height of about 12 feet, in the space between the garages and the rearside of the bungalow and construct an underground sump of suitable dimension on the southern side after getting the necessary sanction from the Corporation of Madras, if necessary. The cost of putting up the temporary shed and constructing an underground sump of suitable dimensions on the southern side, well, boring pump, motor fittings, tank and other fittings for the laundry purpose will be completely borne by the lessee. The lessee shall remove at his cost the temporary shed, the underground sump, including their foundations, restoring to the original condition at the time of termination of the tenancy without causing any damage to the lessor’s property and shall not claim any compensation in respect thereof or claim any right to the space covered by the temporary shed, underground sump, well, tank or any portion of the demised portion by reason of such temporary shed, underground-sump, well, tank that may be so put up. The lessee shall surrender peaceful vacant possession of the demised portion to the lessor in tact at the termination of the tenancy. It is an admitted fact that the original lessee Dayaldas on the basis of authorisation granted to him in the deed of lease had put up a temporary shed and also constructed a sump. The learned single Judge has also noticed in the order that the original lessee has constructed the shed and the sump. The Corporation of Chennai, on the basis of the requisition made by the said Dayaldas, levied property tax separately in respect of the superstructure put up by Dayaldas allotting separate door No. viz. 107-A, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Chennai. It is the case of the appellant that the Corporation has been levying separate property tax for the door No.107-A, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, for nearly 20 years and it is only after 20 years, the first respondent has filed the writ petition for a mandamus directing the Commissioner of Corporation of Madras to delete the name of Dayaldas in the property tax assessment register maintained by the Corporation relating to assessment of property tax in respect of door No.107, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Madras. The learned Judge proceeded on the basis that the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, has illegally subdivided the property belonging to the first respondent herein in favour of the said Dayaldas when the first respondent herein is the owner of the property and he has never applied for sub division of the property bearing door No.107, Santhome High Road, Mylapore and therefore, held that the sub division of the property into door Nos.107 and 107-A done by the Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai was not legally correct as the original lessee Dayaldas was only a tenant and he can by no stretch of imagination be regarded as the owner of the property. It is seen that before the learned Judge, on behalf of the appellant herein, the learned counsel has placed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in M/s.Park View Enterprises v. State, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251, but the learned Judge held that the said decision does not in any way help the appellant herein. It is seen that before the learned Judge, on behalf of the appellant herein, the learned counsel has placed the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in M/s.Park View Enterprises v. State, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251, but the learned Judge held that the said decision does not in any way help the appellant herein. In that view of the matter, the learned Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the Corporation of Chennai to delete the name of the original appellant herein in the property tax assessment register maintained by the Corporation of Chennai relating to assessment of property tax in respect of door No.107, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Madras. It is as against the said order of the learned Judge, the present writ appeal has been preferred. 4. We heard Mr.Satish Parasaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr.N.S. Varadachari, learned counsel for the first respondent and Mrs.P.Bagyalakshmi, learned counsel for the Corporation of Chennai. 5. We have already noticed clause 8 of the deed of lease, under which, the lessor-first respondent herein permitted the original lessee to put up a temporary shed of the dimension mentioned in the lease deed and he has also given permission to construct underground sump at the cost of the lessee. The original lessee Dayaldas was also permitted to remove at his cost the temporary shed, the underground sump, including their foundations, restoring to the original condition at the time of termination of the tenancy without causing any damage to the lessor’s property. There is no dispute that the Corporation of Chennai has levied the property tax on the property belonging to the first respondent bearing door No.107, Santhome High Road, Mylapore, Chennai and made a separate property tax assessment for the shed put up by Dayaldas. The question that arises for consideration is whether it is permissible for the Corporation of Chennai to make two separate property tax assessment with reference to the same property. 6. Sec.100 of the Chennai City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) provides for the method of assessment of property tax and under the said Section, every building shall be assessed together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as appurtenances thereto unless the owner of the building is a different person from the owner of such site or premises. In our view Sec.100 of the Act envisages levy of property tax on the owner of the building if he is also the owner of the site and also permits the levy of property tax on the superstructure if he is not the owner of the site on which the building is constructed. In other words, it recognises a dual ownership with reference to the site as well as the building and where the owner of the building is different from the owner of the site, the building alone be assessed to property tax and the owner of the same would be liable to pay property tax. The definition of ‘owner’ is found in Sec.3(17) of the Act which includes the person for the time being receiving or entitled to receive whether on his own account, or as an agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver for another person or for any religious or charitable purpose the rent or profits of the property in connection with which the word is used. The expression ‘owner’ is defined in an inclusive manner and in so far as the construction put up by the original lessee is concerned, the lessor will not be entitled to receive rent as the original lessee Dayaldas has put up the superstructure on the site belonging to the first respondent and the said Dayaldas must be regarded as the owner within the meaning of the Act. We are of the view that once he is found to be the owner of the superstructure, the Corporation of Chennai is entitled to levy property tax on the temporary shed constructed by Dayaldas. It is also relevant to refer to the definition of ‘building’ found in Sec.3(4) of the Act. The word ‘building’ has been defined to include not only a house or out-house, but also a shed, hut or a wall and any other structure whether of masonry bricks, mud, wood, metal or any other material whatsoever. In our view, the definition of ‘building’ would encompass with itself the temporary superstructure put up by Dayaldas on the basis of authorisation granted to him under the deed of lease. In our view, the definition of ‘building’ would encompass with itself the temporary superstructure put up by Dayaldas on the basis of authorisation granted to him under the deed of lease. The scheme of levy of property tax also shows that it is open to the Commissioner of Corporation of Chennai to assess the property tax having regard to the annual value fixed for a building on the date of general revision of the property tax; the property tax payable by the owner or the occupier on the basis of the particulars filed in the return. Part I-A of Schedule IV provides that the Commissioner of Corporation after giving necessary notice by publicity in the local newspapers, may require the owner of the building or the occupier of the building to furnish the particulars which are mentioned in Rule 1-C of Schedule 4 of the Taxation Rules framed under the Act. A conjoint reading of Sec.100 with the expressions used in the definition of ‘owner’, ‘building’ and the Taxation Rules show that it is open to the Commissioner of Corporation to levy separate property tax on the superstructure though the site may belong to another person. 7. We are of the view that the original lessee Dayaldas can be regarded as owner for the purpose of levy of property tax as under the terms of lease, he has been permitted to put up superstructure on the site belonging to the first respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the first respondent has not brought to our attention any terms in the lease deed which stipulates that the first respondent will be the owner of the building put up by Dayaldas, the original lessee. Even under the law, we find that the law in India is slightly different from the law in England and the question whether whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in M/s.Park View Enterprises v. State, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251 and the Division Bench of this Court, after considering the earlier decisions, held that the land and superstructure can be owned by two different persons also. 251 and the Division Bench of this Court, after considering the earlier decisions, held that the land and superstructure can be owned by two different persons also. We are of the view that it would be profitable to refer to the following passage from the judgment of the Division Bench which reads as under: “...Whether the superstructure is of a temporary or permanent character, it is immaterial relating to its ownership and merely because it gets erected on the land of another, automatically the owner of the land does not become the owner of the superstructure; if the intention of the parties is otherwise. Sec.8 of the Transfer of Property Act only deals with a right which the transferor had and when capable of passing in the property on the date of transfer which would get transferred to the transferee, if no contra intention is expressed or necessarily implied. When the owner of the land is not the owner of the building, this section cannot be relied upon.” The passage extracted above shows that even when a superstructure whether of temporary nature or permanent character is put up on the land belonging to another, the owner of the land does not automatically become the owner of the superstructure. Learned counsel for the first respondent also has not pointed out before us that there is either an express provision or implied intention in the lease deed that the ownership of the superstructure put up by the original lessee Dayaldas would vest with the first respondent automatically. Considering the matter either from the terms of the lease deed or from the position of law laid down by this Court in Park View Enterprises’s case, we hold that the Commissioner of Corporation of Chennai was perfectly justified in levying property tax on the temporary shed put up by the original lessee. We are of the view that it cannot be said that the said Dayaldas has put up the said construction illegally, as he was permitted under the deed of lease to put up a temporary shed. We are therefore unable to agree with the reasonings of the learned Judge that there was a sub division of the property by levying property tax on the shed put up by Dayaldas assigning a separate door number. We are therefore unable to agree with the reasonings of the learned Judge that there was a sub division of the property by levying property tax on the shed put up by Dayaldas assigning a separate door number. We are of the view that it has been done only for the purpose of convenience to maintain separate register in the office of the Commissioner of Corporation and for the purpose of collection of property tax from the original lessee and it does not involve any sub division of the property. Consequently, we are unable to sustain the order of the learned Judge and it is set aside and the writ appeal stands allowed. No costs. C.M.P.No.13420 of 1998 for stay is closed. It is made clear that separate door No. is assigned by the Corporation of Chennai only for the purpose of making separate assessment of property tax and it is open to the parties to agitate and establish their rights before the appropriate forum, in accordance with law.