R. B. MISRA, J. ( 1 ) WITH the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, writ petition is decided finally at this stage in view of the Second proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Allahabad High Court rules, 1952. ( 2 ) IN this petition prayer has been made to quash the order dated 29. 3. 89 whereby the illegal appointment made by the formal Dy. Inspector of Schools, Mainpury was cancelled with immediate effect. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner he applied for the recruitment to the class IV post and after selection, appointment order was issued to him along with seven others. The petitioner claims that he had worked for 3-4 months and had not been paid salary. According to the petitioner he was appointed on 5. 1. 89 as a Class IV employee in Junior High School, Pratappur, Mainpuri absolutely on temporary basis. ( 4 ) COUNTER affidavit has been filed and in consonance to the counter affidavit it has been submitted on behalf of the respondent that no post was ever existence to the class IV employee and neither advertisement was published nor any selection was made. In fact the forged and fake appointment letters were issued by the then District Inspector of Schools Sri Ram Swaroop Sagar who was placed under suspension and inquiry was conducted against him and he made as many as 330 class-IV appointments between 15. 11. 1988 to 5. 1. 1989 sitting at his home. By virtue of forged and fake appointment order the petitioner however was not allowed to join and was not paid salary, However, after verification appointment orders were cancelled. The petitioner being out come of a forged, fake and defective selection has no right to the post and shall have no right to the principle of natural justice and his service has rightly been terminated by the impugned order. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it has been contended that the petitioner is innocent and has bonafidely participated in the selection and was given appointment order and joined and worked for 3-4 months and his legal right has accrued, which could not be taken back and in accordance with law his service could not be terminated. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioner it has been contended that the petitioner is innocent and has bonafidely participated in the selection and was given appointment order and joined and worked for 3-4 months and his legal right has accrued, which could not be taken back and in accordance with law his service could not be terminated. In the present facts and circumstances, it has to be seen whether the petitioner as an outcome of the spoiled system, detective system, forged, fake, irregular selection, without proper advertisement, in absence of vacancy and without observing procedure prescribed for the proper selection, if selected, whether he could be entitled to be given opportunity of hearing before termination of his service. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners in the facts and circumstances before cancellation of the appointment the opportunity of hearing was to be given in consonance to principle of natural justice and for this purpose the reliance has been placed by the petitioners on the following cases: (I) Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur, AIR 1990 SC 307 . (II) Shrawan Kumar Jha v. State of Bihar, AIR 1991 (Suppl) (1) SCC 330, (III) Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University and Ors. , AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3261. (IV) Pancham Ram and Ors. v. Chief Engineer, U. P. Jal Nigam and Ors. , 1999 (1) ESC 490 (All.); (1999) 1 UPLBEC 537 . (V) Sanjeev Kumar and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1999 (1) ESC 754 (All.): (1999) 1 uplbec 575 . , AIR 1998 Supreme Court 3261. (IV) Pancham Ram and Ors. v. Chief Engineer, U. P. Jal Nigam and Ors. , 1999 (1) ESC 490 (All.); (1999) 1 UPLBEC 537 . (V) Sanjeev Kumar and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 1999 (1) ESC 754 (All.): (1999) 1 uplbec 575 . ( 7 ) TO deal the issue involved in the present case it would be necessary to consider very important aspects in the interest of justice, rule of law and in the great interest of public, when any particular process or selection or appointment has suffered from legal and procedural improprieties, deficiencies, irregularities, illegalities, foul-play, corruption, dubious, malpractice, fraud, forgery, falsity scandal, misrepresentation, malaflde, favouritism, non-availability of post/ vacancy, illegal and erroneous constitution of selection committee, selection being bad for lack of proper sanction of competent authority or for lack of competency of appointing authority and the said selection is defective for statutory procedural infirmities e. g. for non-publishing advertisement or not inviting names from employment exchange, selection made without interview, fake and ghost interviews, tempering with records, fabricating documents or non-observance of reservation policy, anomaly in preparation of select list, unauthorised appointments made beyond expiry of the select list, taking benefit of manipulation in dale of birth and production of false certificates/degree, lack of eligibility criteria, deficiency in qualification, admission to a course or benefits/ gains in any form procured by foul means, non-observance of other provisions or requirements of relevant Act, rules, regulations, bye-laws, norms, government orders, official memorandum, legal established pattern, (as some examples out of many more variety of defects) then selected beneficiary candidate as an outcome of such defective selection or spoiled system if appointed and has started working, acquiring legal right to the post , in such circumstances the following aspects shall be necessary for consideration. (A) Whether the such beneficiary/ candidate is entitled for opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principles of natural justice before termination of his service in the above circumstances? (B) Whether the opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principle of natural justice shall be necessary to be given to the beneficiary candidate before termination of his service and to what extent? (B) Whether the opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principle of natural justice shall be necessary to be given to the beneficiary candidate before termination of his service and to what extent? When suo-moto or on general or specific complaint made on behalf candidates participating in the selection or appointment or gain in question or on the basis of preliminary inquiry conducted for and on behalf of the appointing authority or on the basis of some audit report or inspection report, the State Government or competent authority or employer thereafter has made itself or got conducted a detailed inquiry through C. B. I, or an independent agency or vigilance department or Committee, taking into consideration all the facts, circumstances, records, evidences and witnesses and on the basis of finding arrived at out of such inquiry or probe, the selection or appointment or gain in question is found to be defective on one or more out of above mentioned drawbacks/ grounds? (i) when beneficiary candidate was already associated and heard in the inquiry or probe; (ii) when beneficiary candidate was not associated and not heard in the inquiry or probe at all; (iii) when beneficiary candidate was provided opportunity of hearing in reference to the inquiry report or probe subsequently but before termination. (C) Whether for one or many of the above mentioned drawbacks the said selection or appointment or gain is found defective and the termination of the service of the beneficiary candidate is set aside for not providing opportunity of hearing and non-observance of principles of natural justice before termination of his service, in those circumstances; (i) Whether reinstatement of beneficiary candidate in service with consequential benefits shall be a usual phenomena? Or (ii) Whether on reinstatement of beneficiary candidate in service, the above mentioned defects and drawbacks inherited in the selection or appointment or gain in question are to be ignored or overlooked or shall be redundant or shall be automatically deemed to have been rectified? Or; (iii) Whether keeping in view the seriousness of defects and drawbacks occurred in the selection or appointment or gain in question, the Court at its pleasure in the interest of justice and to uphold the rule of law, may allow fresh inquiry or probe to be made allowing participation of the beneficiary candidate by providing opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principles of natural justice within a stipulated time? (D) Whether for reinstatement of the beneficiary candidate the sympathy may be shown for his bonafide, or for no fault on his part? (E) Whether the authorities or officials instrumental, involved in scandal and defective selection or appointment or gain are to be dealt with under law or their misdeeds and wroim on their Darts are to be ignored? (F ). Whether providing of opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principle of natural justice is farce or statutory or mandatory or directory or requirement or ingredient or legal formalities only to be observed in all cases in respect of termination of beneficiary candidate as an outcome of defective selection or appointment or gain? (G) Whether by different modes other than conventional modes, on adjudication over the pleadings of the parties any selection or appointment of gain is declared or proved before the court/ Tribunal to have been suffering from inherent defects then consequence of upsetting the termination of the beneficiary candidate on the ground of non-observance of principle of natural justice would be to hear a fresh in terms of such declaration? (H) When no inquiry conducted and in respect of selection or appointment or gain having acknowledged by Court/ Tribunal to have suffering from inherent defects as indicated in paragraph 7 and beneficiary candidate was not provided opportunity of hearing before termination? (I) Whether providing of opportunity of hearing in consonance to the principle of natural justice shall be necessary when the defects, deficiencies, fraud or forgery in cases of illegal admissions, selection or appointment or in matters of benefits/ gains in any form derived or based on the documents said to be the verdict of the Court or in the name of institutions/ institutional head/ constitutional dignitaries? ( 8 ) THERE are two principles of Natural Justice, which are universally recognised to be fundamental to the dispensation of justice. These are - (i) Nemo Judex in causa sua literally meaning- No one shall be a judge in his own cause. In other words, the person deciding the matter must not have anything like personal interest in the case; and (ii) Audi alteram partem literally meaning- hear the other side i. e. , the person (s) likely to be affected should be heard before any adverse action is taken. In other words, the person deciding the matter must not have anything like personal interest in the case; and (ii) Audi alteram partem literally meaning- hear the other side i. e. , the person (s) likely to be affected should be heard before any adverse action is taken. Lord Denning has summed up these rules as "impartiality" and "fairness" in Khanda v. Government of Malaya (1962) AC 322. In Administrative Law, Rules of natural justice are foundational and fundamental and law is now well settled that the principles of natural justice are part of the legal and judicial procedures. [1993 AIR SCW 2400 (para 9) (R. L. Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram (co-ed)H. S. School.)] ( 9 ) THE power of dismissal could not be exercised without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard and without observing the principles of natural justice. Natural justice is not vague or non-existent as observed in 1964 A. C 40= (1963) 2 All E. R. 66 (Ridge v. Baldwin) "in modern times, opinions have sometimes been expressed to the effect that natural justice is so vague as to be practically meaningless. But, I would regard this tainted by the perenniual fallacy because something cannot be cut and dry or nicely weighed or measured, therefore, it does not exist. " The idea of negligence is equally vague but everybody knows it is. Natural Justice is much more specific and definite. ( 10 ) ONE of the fundamental principles of natural justice is audi alteram partem, i. e. , no man should be condemned unheard. In Dr. Bentleys case, i. e. R. v. University of Cambridge, (1723)1 Str. 757, the Kings Bench traced the history of principles of natural justice and observed that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden and even "god himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence" ( 11 ) IN Painter v. Liverpool Oil Gas Light Co. , (1836) 3-A and E 433, it was held that " a party is not to suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard". ( 12 ) EVEN, if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order in question adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice must be given. (Vide East India commercial Co. ( 12 ) EVEN, if there is no provision in the statute about giving of notice, if the order in question adversely affects the rights of an individual, the notice must be given. (Vide East India commercial Co. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893 ). The notice must be clear, specific and unambiguous and the charges should not be vague and uncertain. (Vide Management of the n. R. Co-operative Credit Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1967 SC 1182 ). The object of notice is to give an opportunity to the individual concerned to present his case and therefore, if the party is aware of the charges or allegations, a formal defect would not invalidate the notice, unless, the prejudice is caused to the individual. (Vide Bhagwan Datta Shastri v. Ram Ratanji gupta, AIR 1960 SC 200 and Fazal Bhai Dhala v. Custodian General, Evacuee Property, AIR 1961 SC 1397 ). The party should also be given a reasonable time to file reply to the charges. (Vide State of J. and K. v. Haji Wali Mohammad and Ors. , AIR 1972 SC 2538 ). ( 13 ) WHERE a notice regarding one charge has been given, the person cannot be punished for a different charge for which no notice or opportunity of being heard was given to him. [vide annamuthado v. Oilfields Workers, (1961) 3 All ER 621 and Govindsinh v. G. Subbarao, (1970)1 GLR 89]. ( 14 ) IT is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but should manifest and undoubtedly be seen to be done. [lord Hewart C. J. in -R. v. Sussex JJ exparte Mccarthy, (1924)1 KB 256] ( 15 ) WHILE great urgency may rightly limit such opportunity timeously, perhaps, severely, there can never be a denial of that opportunity if the principles of natural justice are applicable. [durayappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 AC 337] ( 16 ) IN respect of balance to be struck between urgency and giving opportunity it to be noted that in Wiseman v. Borneman, [ (1967) 3 All ER 1945], there was a hint of the competitive claims of hurry and hearing. [durayappah v. Fernando, (1967) 2 AC 337] ( 16 ) IN respect of balance to be struck between urgency and giving opportunity it to be noted that in Wiseman v. Borneman, [ (1967) 3 All ER 1945], there was a hint of the competitive claims of hurry and hearing. Lord Reid said even where the decision has to be reached by a body acting judicially, there must be a balance between the need for expedition and the need to give full opportunity to the defendant to see material against him. ( 17 ) A similar view was reiterated in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 . ( 18 ) NATURAL justice is a great humanising principle intended to invest law with fairness and secure justice. The sole of natural justice is fair play in action in view of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of india, AIR 1978 SC 597 = (1978) 2 SCR 621 , where the passport of the petitioner was impounded by the Government of India "in public interest", without according an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before taking the impugned action, therefore, the order was found to be violative of the principles of natural justice. ( 19 ) IN Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1575 , the scope of hearing was confined by the enquiry officer only to the hearing of arguments and rejected the application of the appellant to lead oral or documentary evidence. The Supreme Court disapproved it observing that the delinquent should have been given an opportunity to lead evidence. ( 20 ) IN Bishambhar Nath Kohli v. State of U. P. , AIR 1966 SC 573 , in revision proceedings, the custodian General accepted new evidence produced by one party, but no opportunity was given to the other side to meet the same. The Supreme Court held that the order stood vitiated for non-observance of the principles of natural justice. ( 21 ) IN State of Kerala v. K. T. Shaduli Grocery Dealer etc. , AIR 1977 SC 1627 , right of cross-examination of witnesses was held to be necessary. ( 22 ) THE settled legal proposition, remain that principles of natural justice are in built in the statutory rules and require observance unless the same stand excluded by the rules itself. , AIR 1977 SC 1627 , right of cross-examination of witnesses was held to be necessary. ( 22 ) THE settled legal proposition, remain that principles of natural justice are in built in the statutory rules and require observance unless the same stand excluded by the rules itself. The adjudicating authority must be impartial and without any interest or bias of any type; where the adjudication Authority is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, the order must be made by that authority and that power cannot be delegated or sub-delegated to any other offices the adjudicating authority must give full opportunity to the affected person to produce all the relevant evidence in support of his case; the adjudicating authority must disclose all material placed before it in the course of the proceedings and cannot utilize any material unless the opportunity is given to the party against whom it is sought to be utilized; the adjudicating authority must give an opportunity to the party concerned to rebut the evidence and material placed by the other side; and in disciplinary proceedings under Article 311 of the Constitution against the civil servants and in cases or domestic inquiries by employers against their employees under the factory laws. ( 23 ) THE principle of natural justice had to be considered in the context of the fact-situation and in view of the scheme and the rules applicable in a particular case. If an employee, remains absent for more than a stipulated period and statutory rules or standing orders provide for automatic termination of his services in such an eventuality, without holding inquiry or giving opportunity of being heard, observance of principle of natural justice is mandatory proposition. The Supreme court has categorically held in a catena of decisions that a statutory rule is void if it stipulates for automatic termination of services of an absenting employee after expiry of a stipulated period. [vide Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour court and Ors. , (1990)3 SCC 682 ; Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Mulu amra, AIR 1994 SC 112 ; Scooters India Ltd. v. Vijay E. V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 549 ; Uptron india Ltd. v. Smt. Shammi Bhan, AIR 1998 SC 1681 and Scooters India Ltd. v. Mohammad yaqub and Anr. , (2001) 1 SCC 61 ]. , (1990)3 SCC 682 ; Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Mulu amra, AIR 1994 SC 112 ; Scooters India Ltd. v. Vijay E. V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 549 ; Uptron india Ltd. v. Smt. Shammi Bhan, AIR 1998 SC 1681 and Scooters India Ltd. v. Mohammad yaqub and Anr. , (2001) 1 SCC 61 ]. ( 24 ) HOWEVER, there may be circumstances where absence from duty, at the start, may not be a misconduct but absence of the employee stretches abnormally giving rise to a presumption that the employee is no more interested to continue in service or has voluntarily abandoned the job. Whether in such a case, before termination, a notice or inquiry is required? In Jeewan Lal (1929)Ltd. Calcutta v. Its Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 1567 and Shahoordul Haque v. The Registrar, co-operative Societies, Bihar and Anr. , AIR 1974 SC 1890 , the Supreme Court held that in such a case, "long unauthorized absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee. " Being a case of abandonment of service, no notice/ inquiry is required. ( 25 ) SIMILAR view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Barckingham and Carnotic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah and Anr. , AIR 1964 SC 1272 and S. T. Lad and Ors. v. Chemicals and Fibres india Ltd. , AIR 1979 SC 582 . ( 26 ) IN Syndicate Bank v. General Secy. , Syndicate Bank Staff Association and Anr. , AIR 2000 sc 2198 and Aligarh Muslim University and Ors. v. Mansoor Ali Khan, AIR 2000 SC 2783 , the supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave could be granted, he should be treated to have resigned from service. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or observe principles of natural justice as it would amount to useless formality. ( 27 ) IN Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 , the Supreme Court observed as under:" natural justice is not unruly horse, no lurking land line, nor a judicial cure all. ( 27 ) IN Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines and Anr. v. Ramjee, AIR 1977 SC 965 , the Supreme Court observed as under:" natural justice is not unruly horse, no lurking land line, nor a judicial cure all. If fairness is shown by the decision/maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and fundamentals of such essential process properly being conditioned by facts and circumstances of each situations, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. Unnatural expansion of natural justice, without reference to the administrative realities and other factors of a given case, can be exasperating. We can neither be finical nor fanatical but should be flexible yet firm in this jurisdiction. No man shall be hit below the belt- that is the conscience of the matter. " ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court has reiterated time and again that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of rigid formula and its application would depend upon the scheme and policy of the statute and relevant circumstances involved in a particular case. [vide union of India v. P. K. Roy and Ors. , AIR 1968 SC 850 ; Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 and Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar pandey and Ors. , (2001) 1 SCC 182 ]. ( 29 ) IN S. K. Kapoor v. Jag Mohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , the Supreme Court has observed that where on admitted or undisputed fact, only on conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue the writ to compel the observance of the principles of natural justice as it would amount to issuing a futile writ. Similarly, in State of U. P. v. O. P Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679 , the Supreme Court has observed, that the Courts have to see whether non-observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case, there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case, there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. This Court does not function as a Court of Appeal over the findings of the disciplinary Authority, rather it has limited power of judicial review to the departmental proceedings in which appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The Court can review only to correct the error of law or fundamental procedural requirements which lead to manifest injustice or Court can interfere with the impugned order if the same has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice. (Vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath smghand ors. , AIR 1997 SC 1908 ). ( 30 ) IN Syndicate Bank (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with a similar case and held that where a show cause notice is served upon the delinquent employee and the employee chooses not to respond to the said notice even after expiry of the notice-period she employer has a right to presume that the employee does not want to say anything and he is no more interested in the services of the employer. The Court observed as under. " it is no point laying strength on the principles of natural justice without understanding their scope of real manner. There are two essential elements of natural justice which are: (a) no man shall be a Judge in his own cause; and (b) no man shall be condemned either civilly or criminally without being afforded an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charge made against him. In course of time by various judicial pronouncements. . . the Bank ad followed the requirement (of law ). . . . Under these circumstances, it was not necessary for the Bank to hold an enquiry before passing the order. An enquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contend that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. An enquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contend that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. Assuming for a moment that enquiry was initiated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to Dayananda and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation for his absence from duty and did not report on duty within thirty days of the notice. . . . It is undoubtedly relevant on the principles of natural justice by the Tribunal and even by the High Court has certainly led to a miscarriage of justice as tar as the Bank is concerned. The conduct of Dayananda, as an employee of the Bank, had been outstanding. " ( 31 ) IN Punjab and Sindh Bank and Ors. v. Sakattar Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 214 , the Supreme Court impliedly approved the law laid in Syndicate Bank (supra) and held that if the employee has no intention to join duty and does not turn up inspite of notice, nor gives an explanation for his absence satisfying the management that he has not taken up another employment or avocation and that he has no intention of joining the duty, the employee will be deemed to have retired from service on expiry of the time fixed in the notice. If the employee furnishes satisfactory explanation and comes after expiry of the notice, he may be allowed to work without prejudice to the right of the employer to take action against him under the law. In such a case, termination of service will not amount to punishment but would be a discharge simplicitor from the service. The Court observed as under: "thus, there is no punishment for misconduct but only to notice the realities of the situation resulting from long absence of employee from work with no satisfactory explanation thereto. The principles of natural justice cannot be examined in vacuum without reference to the fact-situation arising in the case. . . . It also realises, the futility of continuation with a situation when no employee, without appropriate intimation to the Management, is playing trount. The principles of natural justice cannot be examined in vacuum without reference to the fact-situation arising in the case. . . . It also realises, the futility of continuation with a situation when no employee, without appropriate intimation to the Management, is playing trount. If the respondents had submitted an explanation regarding his unauthorised absence or placed any material before the Court that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join the duty, enquiry may have been initiated but not otherwise. " ( 32 ) IN Dharmarathmakara Raibahadur Arcot Ramswamy Mudaliar Educational Institution v. Educational Appellate Tribunal and Anr. , (1997) 7 SCC 332, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "giving an opportunity or an enquiry is a check and balanced concept that no ones right be taken away without giving him/her opportunity or when enquiry in a given case or where the statute requires. But this cannot be in a case where allegations and charges are admitted and no possible defence is placed before the authority concerned. What enquiry is to be made when one admits violations. . . . In a case where the facts are almost admitted, the case reveals itself and is apparent on the face of the record, and inspite of opportunity no worthwhile explanation is forthcoming as in the present case, it would not be a fit case to * interfere with the termination order. " ( 33 ) IN Aligarh Muslim University (supra) the Supreme Court has held that holding of enquiry in a case, where there can be no answer to the charges, would be useless formality. Similar view has been reiterated in Union of India and Anr. v. Mustafa and Najibai Trading Co. and Ors. , (1998) 6 SCC 79 ; Dr. J. Shashidhara Prasad v. Governor of Karnataka and Anr. , (1999) 1 SCC 422 ; M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1999) 6 SCC 237 and Designated Authority (Anti-Dumping, Directorate) Ministry of Commerce v. Haldor Topsoe A/s, (2000) 6 SCC 626 . ( 34 ) IN H. C. Sarin v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1686 the Supreme Court placed reliance upon the judgement of Lord Denning in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex-parte mugal, (1973) 3 All. ER 796, wherein it has been observed as under:" the rule of natural justice must not be stretched too far. ER 796, wherein it has been observed as under:" the rule of natural justice must not be stretched too far. Only too often, the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rule of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences. " ( 35 ) WELL-SETTLED legal proposition is that every action complained of is to be tested and analysed one the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. [vide Maj. G. S. Sodhi v. Union of India and Ors. , (1991) 2 SCC 382 ; State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S. K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 , S. K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and Ors. , (1996) 6 SCC 415 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of M. P. , AIR 1996 sc 2736 ; Mansoor Ali Khan (supra) and Manika Jain v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. , 1998 (1)RLW 71]. ( 36 ) IN K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, AIR 1984 SC 273 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "it is not possible to lay down rigid rules, as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. . . . there must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirement of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the Tribunal is , acting, the subject matter to be dealt with, and so on so forth. " ( 37 ) IN view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised as under :" for any misconduct, the employer must initiate disciplinary proceedings as per the law and conclude the same, even if the statutory provisions provide for automatic termination of service holding an enquiry is mandatory. In exceptional circumstances where the absence from duty becomes very long and it can be assumed that the employee had abandoned the service. No enquiry is necessary as it would be a case of abandonment of service voluntarily. In exceptional circumstances where the absence from duty becomes very long and it can be assumed that the employee had abandoned the service. No enquiry is necessary as it would be a case of abandonment of service voluntarily. In a case where the fact remains undisputed and undeniable, an employee cannot submit any reply, holding an enquiry would be a futile exercise where an employee is absent from duty and he is given notice by the employer to join the duty within a stipulated period and he has thus not joined the service, no enquiry is needed for passing the order of termination. As the facts stand proved and it would be assumed that the employer is no more interested to serve. " ( 38 ) JUST as principles of natural justice ensure fair decision where the function is quasi-judicial, the doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action where the function is administrative. [ (1994) 4 SCC 104 (124) (Assistant Excise Commr. v. Issac Peter)] ( 39 ) THE principles of Natural Justice are integral part of the guarantee of equality assured by article 14 of the Constitution. [ 1993 AIR SCW 1995 = (1993) 3 SCC 259 (O. K. Yadav v. J. M. A. Industries Ltd.)]. Principles of Natural Justice are applicable to both law relating to procedure and rule of substantive law. In State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 SCR 284 , per majority, a seven Judge bench of the Supreme Court held that the rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within the purview of Article 14 of the Constitution as any rule of substantive law. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 SCR 621 another bench of seven judges held that the substantive and procedural laws and action taken under them will have to pass the test under Article 14 [d K. Yadav (supra)]. ( 40 ) STRICT adherence to rules of Natural Justice essential while taking decision affecting rights of a person as observed in (1986) 3 SCC 103 para 22 (Ram Chander v. Union of India) "it is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the rights of any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case. Both the Privy Council as well as this Court have in a series of cases required strict adherence to the rules of natural justice where a public authority or body has to deal with rights. " ( 41 ) THE observance of the rules of natural justice is hot referable to the fatness of the stake but is essentially related to the demands of a given situation. It does not supplant but supplement the law, (1988) 3 SCC 579 para 12 (Jain Exports (P) Ltd. v. Union of India ). ( 42 ) A fair hearing must be given before taking decision affecting rights of any person as observed in AIR 1987 SC 2257 (O. P. Gupta v. Union of India) (para 16)" It is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will affect the rights of any person without first giving him an opportunity of putting forward his case. Both the Privy Council as well as this court have in a series of cases required strict adherence to the rules of natural justice where a public authority or body has to deal with rights. . . there is always the duty to act judicially wherever the rules of natural justice are applicable. There is therefore the insistence upon the requirement of a fair hearing. " ( 43 ) IN respect of curtailment of existing rights the principles of natural justice is attracted as observed in (1989) I SCC 764, para 11 (H. L. Trehan v. Union of India)" It is now a well established principle of law that there can be no deprivation or curtailment of any existing right, advantage or benefit enjoyed by a government servant without complying with the rules of natural justice by giving the government servant concerned an opportunity of being heard. Any arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power prejudicially affecting the existing conditions of service of a government servant will offend against the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. " ( 44 ) PRINCIPLES of Natural Justice must be applied in the unoccupied. interstices of the statue unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. Any arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power prejudicially affecting the existing conditions of service of a government servant will offend against the provision of Article 14 of the Constitution. " ( 44 ) PRINCIPLES of Natural Justice must be applied in the unoccupied. interstices of the statue unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. In Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Rama, ( AIR 1987 SC 7 ?, Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1990) 1 SCC 613 : ( AIR 1990 sc 1480 ), (Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster case) and C. B. Gautam v. Union of India, (1993) 2 SCC 78, the doctrine that the principles of natural justice must be applied in the unoccupied interstices of the statute unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary, is re-iterated. [ air 1994 SC 1074 (1089) = (1993) 4 SCC 727 (Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar)] ( 45 ) THE statute providing for observance of Natural Justice in a particular manner then it has to be observed in that manner and no other as observed in AIR 1981 SC 818 (Swadeshi Cotton mills v. Union of India), "where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and no other. No wider right than that provided by the statute can be claimed nor can the right be narrowed. " Where the statute is silent about the observance of natural Justice, presumption is in favour of following it. The implication of the natural justice being presumptive it may be excluded by express word of statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest, the presumption must necessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced. ( 46 ) RULES of natural justice are not rigid rules, they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the background of statutory provision, nature of the right, which may be affected and the consequences which may entail, its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 46 ) RULES of natural justice are not rigid rules, they are flexible and their application depends upon the setting and the background of statutory provision, nature of the right, which may be affected and the consequences which may entail, its application depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. [ air 1987 SC 593 , para 25 (R. S. Dass v. Union of India)] ( 47 ) AS observed by the Supreme Court in Suresh Koshi George v. University of Kerala, Civil appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15. 7. 1968, the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the tacts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. 1 he aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision in the facts of that case. [ air 1970 SC 150 , para 20 (A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India)] ( 48 ) THE rules of natural justice are not embodied rules the question whether the requirements of natural justice have been met by the procedure adopted in a given case must depend to a great extent to the facts and circumstances of the case in point, the constitution of the Tribunal and the rules under which in functions. [ air 1969 SC 198 , para 7 (Suresh Koshi v. University of kerala)] ( 49 ) THE soul of audi alteram partem rule is fair-play in action. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more but nothing less-[ air 1978 SC 851 (Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief election Commissioner)]. "fairness itself is flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction"- the Court observed in this case, and also added that there was no ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gained access. "fairness itself is flexible, pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction"- the Court observed in this case, and also added that there was no ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gained access. ( 50 ) WHATEVER standard of Natural Justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned has a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. "lord Denning expressed the paramount policy consideration behind this rule of public law (while dealing with the nemo judex aspect)with expressiveness. "justice must be rooted in confidence; and confidence is destroyed when right minded-people go away thinking the judge was biassed. " We may adopt it to the audi alteram situation: "justice must be felt to be just by the community if democratic legality is to animate the rule of law. And if the invisible audience sees a mans case disposed of unheard, a chorous of no-confidence will be heard to say, that man had no chance to defend his stance," that is why Tucker L. J. in Russal v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All. ER 109, 118, emphasised that whatever standard of natural justice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case. What is reasonable in given circumstances is in the domain of practicability; not formalised rigidity. " Para 56, Mohinder singh Gill (supra ). . .