Judgment 1. This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Roopnagar dated 21-4-1982 vide which the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court dated 22-9-1980 was partially accepted. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant while impugning the said judgment in appeal before this Court has raised following contentions, which, according to him, also raises question of law within the purview and scope of Sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. i) The defendant in the suit, respondent herein, cannot raise a claim of adverse possession without admitting the fact that the plaintiff-appellant herein or some other person was owner of the property in question. ii) The defendants have nowhere in the written statement or even in evidence mentioned the date on which the possession of the said defendant was adverse to the interest of the plaintiff or otherwise and from which date the period of 12 years has to be counted. iii) The claim for adverse possession as raised by the defendant is not permissible and suffers from the element of alternative destructive pleas. As a person, who himself claims to be the owner of the property cannot claim adverse possession against his own interest. 3. The learned counsel also contended that the findings arrived at by the learned Courts below holding the defendant is in adverse possession of the property and, therefore, the defendants had become owner by adverse possession suffers from the defect of a finding based on no evidence, finding recorded on inadmissible evidence and is also based upon the evidence led beyond pleadings and there is mis-appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record. 4. I am of the considered view that the questions of law and mixed question of law and facts arise for consideration in the present appeal. In order to determine the matter in issue, in the present case, it would be appropriate to refer to the facts giving rise to this appeal. 5. Smt. Subhadhra Devi on or about 14-1-1978 filed a suit for possession of house marked A B C D E F as shown in the map annexed to the plaint, situated in Tehsil and District Rupnagar. The details of the boundary of which are stated as under :- East : House of Balbir Nath alias Sadhu etc. defendants 1 and 2. The details of the boundary of which are stated as under :- East : House of Balbir Nath alias Sadhu etc. defendants 1 and 2. West : House of Shanti son of Shabdi. North : Kucha Bandgali. South : Jalaf Brahmin against the defendants. 6 According to the plaintiff, she had inherited the property, which was owned by her mother Smt. Durgi, who unfortunately died in November, 1975. Smt. Durgi had inherited this house along with other properties from her husband Sh. Barma Nand and as such the house had fallen to their share. Smt. Subhadra Devi is the daughter of Durgi and as per the averments made she inherited the house in question and being the lawful owner of the property was entitled to possession of the said house. It is also averred that the house in dispute is connected/adjacent to/with House No. 241, as entered in the Shajra Khasra No. 1852 of Abadi of Kurali. According to him, the defendants took possession of the house marked BCDE out of the house in dispute from Durgi as tenant. Defendant No. 4 took portion of ABEF out of house in dispute from Durgi mother of plaintiff on rent of Rs. 50/- per month. Both these defendants were in occupation of the property as tenant and they had not paid any rent since April, 1976. 7. The suit was contested by the defendants on the ground that the plaintiff is not owner of the property in dispute. Separate written statements on somewhat similar ground were filed. According to them, the house had two portions and each of them have taken on rent as part of the premises from Balbir Nath on a monthly rent. Location of the property was disputed and it was also averred that the suit was not properly valued for the purpose of jurisdiction and Court-fee. 8. The suit was also contested by the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who claim that they have become owners by way of adverse possession, as they and earlier their predecessor-in-interest were in occupation of the property for more than 50 years. 9. Learned trial Court on completion of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the property in dispute ? OPP. 2 Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction ? OPP. 3. 9. Learned trial Court on completion of the pleadings of the parties, framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the property in dispute ? OPP. 2 Whether the suit is properly valued for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction ? OPP. 3. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties and cause of action ? OPD. 4. Whether the suit is not within time ? OPD. 5. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have become owner of property in dispute by way of adverse possession ? OPD. 6. Relief. The parties led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective claim. 10. Learned trial Court vide its judgment and decree dated 22nd September, 1980 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Learned trial Court, while answering issue Nos. 4 and 5, came to the following conclusion :- "........On the death of Ayudhia Prashad this property was inherited by Arjan Dass who was her husband and on his death he and her son Balbir Nath came in possession of property in dispute. Plaintiff has no concern with it. He has further stated that they are leasing out property in dispute. One of the portion of this house has been leased to Jagdish Rai and other to Arjan Dass. Prior to them Ram Chand and Nathu were residing in this house as their tenants. They are owners and in possession of this house for the last more than 45 years. He has also proved rent note Ex. DW-5/A and DW-5/B. From the oral evidence which has been discussed above, there remain no doubt that Jagdish Rai and Arjan Dass are in possession of house in dispute as tenants of Balbir Nath and Shanti. Exs. DW-5/A and DW-5/B rent notes also prove this fact. Ex. DW-5/B was scribed in the year 1952. It shows that this house is in possession of defendants for the last more than 28 years. Other documentary evidence has also been brought on record by defendants. Ex. D-4 to Ex. D-13 are treasury receipts regarding payment of property tax regarding the house in dispute. Property tax is being paid by Shanti Devi defendant. These documents show that Shanti Devi is owner of house in dispute since 27-6-63. Exs. Other documentary evidence has also been brought on record by defendants. Ex. D-4 to Ex. D-13 are treasury receipts regarding payment of property tax regarding the house in dispute. Property tax is being paid by Shanti Devi defendant. These documents show that Shanti Devi is owner of house in dispute since 27-6-63. Exs. D-4 to D-21 are the copies of entries made in assessment register.........." The plaintiff Subhadra Devi being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court, preferred an appeal before the learned first Appellate Authority. The learned first Appellate Authority, while dismissing, the appeal, came to the conclusion that the findings recorded on issue Nos. 4 and 5 were correct and the suit of the plaintiff was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Court. However, it specifically upset the findings recorded by the learned trial Court on issue No. 1 in relation to ownership of the plaintiff with respect to the property in dispute. While recording its findings on issue No. 1, the Court held as under :- ".........When both parties have entered evidence, the question of onus becomes immaterial and then the preponderance of evidence is to be seen. Towards the North of the house in dispute is Kucha band gali. Across the Kucha band gali is the house of Narain son of Kauroo now owned and possessed by the plaintiff and Balbir Nath alias Sadhu development No. 1 in the same row. Defendants have not led any evidence as to where house No. 239 shown to be owned and possessed by Narain son of Kauroo in the abadi of Kurali in the year 1852, disappeared. 12 Nar Singh (PW-3) stated that towards the East of the house in dispute is the house of Balbir Nath alias Sadhu which was previously owned by Bansi Jalaf. From Bansi Jalaf, this house was purchased by Ajudhya Parshad, grand-father of Balbir Nath alias Sadhu defendant. It is true, clear that the house in dispute was bearing No. 239 in the year 1852 in Shajra Khasra abadi of Kurali and that the same was owned and possessed by Narain son of Kauroo. Narain son of Kauroo was an ascendant of the plaintiff. Plaintiff inherited the house in dispute from Narain son of Kauroo. So far as Balbir Nath alias Sadhu defendant No. 2 is concerned he is the descendant of a brother of Narain. 13. Narain son of Kauroo was an ascendant of the plaintiff. Plaintiff inherited the house in dispute from Narain son of Kauroo. So far as Balbir Nath alias Sadhu defendant No. 2 is concerned he is the descendant of a brother of Narain. 13. Finding of the trial Court on this issue is wrong and is reversed and it is held that the plaintiff is the owner of the house in dispute." The plaintiff still being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the learned first appellate Court has preferred this Regular Second Appeal, while defendants-respondents have preferred cross-examination in relation to the findings recorded on issue No. 1. Resultantly, the appeal and the cross-objections both are being disposed of by this common judgment. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently contended that unless a person claiming adverse possession vis-a-vis, the date, when such adverse possession commences and completes requisite period of 12 years from that date, prior to the institution of the suit, the claim by adverse possession cannot be perfected, much less decreed by the Court. According to him, the Court has fallen in error of law in deciding issue Nos. 4 and 5 in favour of defendants-respondents. In support of his contention, learned counsel appearing for the appellant relies upon cases of S. M. Karim V/s. Mst. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254, Balkrishan V/s. Satyaprakash 2001 (2) SCC, 498 : (AIR 2001 SC 700) and Charan Dass V/s. Rajinder Paul, 2003 (1) Pun LR, 699 : (AIR 2003 P&H 263). 12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that it is not mandatory for a party to plead specific dates when the adverse possession commences. It is sufficient, if the party pleads and prove that 12 years prior to the institution of the suit, the party was in possession of the property in dispute openly, publicly uninterrupted to the knowledge of all concerned. Learned counsel for the respondents relies upon the cases Gurbinder Singh V/s. Lal Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1533 and Smt. Chandrakantaben J. Modi and Narendra Jayantilal Modi V/s. Vadilal Bapalal Modi, AIR 1989 SC 1269. 13. The proposition of law enunciated have been the consistent view of the Court in different decision. Before I Proceed to discuss this ground in any greater details, reference to the pleadings of the parties would be appropriate. 14. 13. The proposition of law enunciated have been the consistent view of the Court in different decision. Before I Proceed to discuss this ground in any greater details, reference to the pleadings of the parties would be appropriate. 14. Defendants No. 1 and 2, while denying title and interest of the property in question have specifically raised a claim of perfecting title by adverse, possession on the ground that the defendants and/or their predecessor-in-interest had been in occupation of the house, hostile open and without interruption and any objection from any quarter for the last more than 50 years. This was a specific additional plea taken in the written statement. The plaintiff filed a replication to the written statement, wherein the averments were denied and it was stated that defendants have acquired no adverse possession against the plaintiff. It must be noticed that in the replication filed the question of limitation, as sought to be argued before this Court now, was not pleaded. 15. Defendants No. 3 and 4 filed written statement. However, practically conceded the claim of defendants No. 1 and 2 with regard to being tenant under them. In the written statement filed by defendant No. 3 it was denied that plaintiff was daughter of Smt. Durgi and that the defendant was a tenant of one of the house under defendant No. 1 at monthly rate of Rs. 22/- per month. The evidence led by the parties was in consonance with their pleadings. Defendants No. 3 and 4 in their statement have categorically stated that they had been in possession of the property in question for the period of more than 8/9 years. The rent receipts were produced and proved on record. It is true that in the written statement, where the claim of perfecting title by defendants No. 1 and 2 did not state specifically as to when their possession become adverse to the interest of the appellants or otherwise, it has also not stated that the defendants are owners of the property. Absence of mentioning a date in that behalf would be fatal to the claim of adverse possession or not, is the question that falls for consideration of the Court in the present case. 16. In case of S. M. Karim (supra), the Court stated the principles governing adverse possession. Absence of mentioning a date in that behalf would be fatal to the claim of adverse possession or not, is the question that falls for consideration of the Court in the present case. 16. In case of S. M. Karim (supra), the Court stated the principles governing adverse possession. It was held that adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, publicity and to an extent essentially must be assertive The plea must be raised so as to show when the possession of limitation against the party affected can be traced Vague pleas were not sufficient. This principle was followed by single Bench of this Court in the case of Charan Dass (supra) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant also relies upon the case of Balkrishan (supra). 17. On the other hand, as already noticed, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the cases of Gurbinder Singh and Smt. Chandrakantaben J. Modi (supra), to contend that it is not obligatory or at least mandatory for a person claiming adverse possession to specify the exact date when the possession became adverse in favour of the party, but it has to be 12 years before the date of filing of suit and have completed this period. Article 65 of the Indian Limitation Act, a person is entitled to claim possession of the immovable property based on title. This period would be when the possession of the defendants become adverse to the plaintiff. 18. In the present case, the plaintiff filed a suit for possession simpliciter in which a claim for adverse possession was raised. The defendants No. 3 and 4 took a specific plea that they had been in continuous possession of the property publicly and to the knowledge of the concerned, for the last more than 50 years. Thus, the period of 50 years was duly specified, which was at best, take the said defendant taking 50 years from the date of written statement. The period indicated there is much in excess to the period specified under the relevant provisions of the law. The observations of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurbinder Singhs case (supra) can be usefully referred at this stage. The period indicated there is much in excess to the period specified under the relevant provisions of the law. The observations of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Gurbinder Singhs case (supra) can be usefully referred at this stage. "In a suit to which Art. 144 is attracted the burden is on the defendant to establish that he was in adverse possession for 12 years before the date of suit and for computation of this period he can avail of the adverse possession of any person or persons through whom he claims but not the adverse possession of independent of the third column of Art 144 of the definition of the word defendant in S. 2 (4)." For the reasons afore-recorded, I do not find any merit in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant in regard to limitation. 19. The defendants No. 1 and 2 in principle had denied the very claim of the plaintiff in relation to inheritance, title of the property as well as possession of the plaintiff over the disputed property. It was in the alternative that without admitting possession of the plaintiff, they had claimed title by way of adverse possession. 20. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that till the time the defendant would admit the plea of ownership of the plaintiff, they cannot raise the claim of adverse possession against the plaintiff. This argument suffers from a basic fallacy. The defendants are not claiming adverse possession, as their principle relief. It is the plaintiff, who has approached the Court of law for claiming possession of the property on the basis of the title, their inheritance. This plea ought to be established by the plaintiff on the strength of his own case by leading positive evidence. The plaintiff having failed to succeed on this ground cannot be permitted to argue unless the defendants No. 1 and 2 had admitted the title of the plaintiff, they could not claim adverse possession. On the other hand, the defendants were claiming to be owners of the property and in the event they fail to establish such plea, they had raised the plea of adverse possession in the alternative. The plea of adverse possession had been held in favour of the defendants by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate authority concurrently. The plea of adverse possession had been held in favour of the defendants by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate authority concurrently. The learned first appellate authority, in fact, has decided the issue of ownership in favour of the plaintiff. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the plaintiff is owner of the property despite the denial thereof by the defendants still, the defendants cannot be debarred from claiming adverse possession on the strength of their own case. In the case of Chandrakantaben J. Modi (supra), the Hon ble Supreme Court clearly stated the principle that it is not necessary for a claimant to be in actual physical possession of the property even a tenant under the claimant could hold the property and it would raise no adverse consequences to the claimants. 21. In the present case, the claim of the claimants is primarily based upon title to the property and in alternative adverse possession 22. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents had appeared and argued though subsequently today she is not present. In order to avoid any controversy, I had clearly asked the learned counsel appearing for the parties as to whether there was any dispute or challenge with regard to description of the property. In other words, whether property for which each of the parties were raising rival claim was the property subject-matter of the suit or was distinct or different property. The counsel had submitted that there was no dispute with regard to description of property over which the plaintiff claimed title and the respondents claimed adverse possession in alternative. 23. While determining the question of possession, emphasis was placed on exhibits D. 4 to D. 13 which are the property tax receipts relating to disputed property. In these documents, defendant No. 2 was recorded to be the owner, while defendants No. 3 and 4 were recorded as tenants. Rent note exhibit DW5/B and DW/5A was executed by defendant in favour of earlier tenants prior to defendants No. 3 and 4. In these documents, defendant No. 2 was recorded to be the owner, while defendants No. 3 and 4 were recorded as tenants. Rent note exhibit DW5/B and DW/5A was executed by defendant in favour of earlier tenants prior to defendants No. 3 and 4. This documentary evidence read in conjunction with the statement of witnesses of plaintiff weighed with the Courts below to decide issues No. 4 and 5 in favour of defendants The learned first appellate Court rejected the plea of variation in the description of property in dispute, while sustaining the claim of the plaintiff in relation to ownership. 24. Another material piece of evidence, which was considered by the learned first appellate Court and rightly so was that Smt. Durgi had served notice upon defendants No. 3 and 4 for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent etc. This notice was replied to by the said defendants specifically denying the very title of Smt. Durgi in relation to the disputed property. In fact, they impliedly admitted the possession of defendants No 3 and 4 in relation to the property in question. There was definite evidence on record to show that defendants No. 1 and 2 have claimed themselves to be owner of the property as they were in possession for a considerable period, and in any case much in excess of prescribed period of 12 years. 25. Cross-objections filed by the respondent before this Court are also without any merit. The contention raised before this Court were identical to the contention raised before the first appellate Court. The contention that they were owners of the property in their own right was rejected by the learned first appellate authority for valid and good reason. The property was never actually mutated and/or transferred in the names of the respondents herein. Of course they claimed to have paid tax with regard to the property for some time. That itself would not arm the person with title. The respondents have not been able to establish by oral and/or documentary evidence their inheritance to the property in dispute and or its transfer in their favour by any process acceptable in law. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the findings of the learned first appellate Court even with regard to this issue. 26. The respondents have not been able to establish by oral and/or documentary evidence their inheritance to the property in dispute and or its transfer in their favour by any process acceptable in law. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the findings of the learned first appellate Court even with regard to this issue. 26. The above findings are concurrent findings of facts and the Courts below have appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective. I see no reason to interfere in the finding recorded on all issues by the learned first appellate Court. 27. For the reasons afore-stated, both the appeal and the Cross-objections are dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Order accordingly