ORDER Per Bobde. J.- Admit. 2. Since the appeal is against a money decree, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that this Court must consider directing the appellants to deposit the amount in the appeal or furnish such security as this Court thinks fit, in view of Order XLI, Rule 1 (3), which reads as follows : "I. Form of appeal-What to accompany memorandum.-(3) Where the appeal is against a decree for payment of money, the appellant shall, within such time as the appellate Court may allow, deposit the amount disputed in the appeal or furnish such security in respect thereof as the Court may think fit." We are not inclined to accept this submission primarily, in view of the fact that the appellants do not pray for any stay of the execution. In our view Order XLI, Rule 5 (5) makes it abundantly clear that the occasion to require an appellant to deposit the decretal amount in Court arises only when he makes an application for staying the execution of the decree. Their inter-connection is further clear from sub-rule (5) which provides for the consequence of the appellants failing to deposit the decretal amount as ordered by the Court and that consequence is that the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree." Sub-rule (5) reads as follows : "5 (5). Notwithstanding anything contained' in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) or Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree." 3. If the respondents' contentions were accepted any time an appeal is filed against a decree for money, the appellants would compulsorily have to deposit the decretal amount. On their failing to do so, the law would require the Court to refuse a stay, which they have not prayed for in any case. We are further fortified in our view because the amount receivable by the respondents under the decree is safe and secure, since the respondents can immediately levy execution in accordance with Order XXI and resort to all the benefits for execution of the decree specified in the order. 4. Mr. We are further fortified in our view because the amount receivable by the respondents under the decree is safe and secure, since the respondents can immediately levy execution in accordance with Order XXI and resort to all the benefits for execution of the decree specified in the order. 4. Mr. Sonak, the learned counsel for the respondents, who seeks a deposit of the amount by the appellants even though they have not applied for a stay, submits that Order XLI, sub-rule 3 mandatorily requires the Court to consider directing the appellants to deposit the amount in view of the use of the word 'shall' by the Parliament in that rule. We are unable to agree with this submission. The 'shall' in that sub-rule operates to compel the appellants to deposit after the Court has made an order to deposit or, furnish security within a certain time. On a true construction, sub-rule (3) is enabling. It confers on the Court a power to direct the appellant to deposit the amount in dispute in the appeal or furnish security, in that it uses the words 'may allow', It thereupon makes the appellant bound to deposit the amount or furnish security in accordance with the direction of the Court, in that it uses the words 'the appellant shall'. 5. Moreover, Order XLI, Rule 1 (3) need not be read in isolation and must be read schematically alongwith Order XLI, Rule 5 (5). Both the sub-rules (3) and (5) were introduced by the same Amending Act and, read together, clearly leads to only one conclusion, namely, that the Court must refuse stay, if the appellant does not deposit the amount as directed. But, this presupposes that the appellant has prayed for a stay. We are of view that Parliament has presumed that there would be no occasion for directing the deposit of the decretal amount by the appellant, if the appellant does not pray for a stay, since the remedy of execution is always available to the respondent/decree holder. 6. In any case, the legislative scheme does not warrant a mandate to the appellant to deposit the decretal amount. One indication of this interpretation being the intended one, is that it does provide for any consequence of non-compliance, such as the dismissal of the appeal. 6. In any case, the legislative scheme does not warrant a mandate to the appellant to deposit the decretal amount. One indication of this interpretation being the intended one, is that it does provide for any consequence of non-compliance, such as the dismissal of the appeal. In fact, such a provision was contemplated and rejected by the Joint Committee in its Report to the Parliament on 1st April, 1976. In paragraph 65, the Report stated as under : "65. Clause 87 (original clause 90).-(i) The Committee note that under the proposed new sub-rule (1-A) of Rule 3 in Order XLI if the appellant fails either to deposit the amount disputed in the appeal or to furnish security for such amount, the memorandum of appeal shall be rejected. The Committee feel that such a provision will deprive the judgment-debtor having a good case to pursue the appeal on account or his inability to deposit the disputed amount or to furnish security for such amount. The Committee are, therefore, of the opinion that in order to see that justice is done to both the parties, the proposed sub-rule might be amended in such a way that neither the judgment-debtor is deprived of his right to pursue the appeal nor the decree-holder is deprived of the remedy. Proposed sub-rule (1-A) has been amended to provide that stay of execution of the decree will not be granted unless the deposit is made or security is furnished and has been transposed as sub-rule (5) of Rule 5. (ii) ............................ ........... (iii) .................................. .... (iv) ................ ................. ......" 7. It is clear that an obligation on a party must arise from the statute and becomes enforceable only in the manner in which it is made enforceable. It is not possible to enforce an obligation even though the conditions in which it is made applicable have not come into existence. In the present case the statute does not require the deposit of the decretal amount on a mere filing of the appeal. It contemplates a direction to deposit where a stay is sought: going by the consequence of non-compliance contemplated by sub-rule (5). Therefore, the obligation to deposit cannot be said to exist even where the condition for such deposit is absent. 8. Mr. It contemplates a direction to deposit where a stay is sought: going by the consequence of non-compliance contemplated by sub-rule (5). Therefore, the obligation to deposit cannot be said to exist even where the condition for such deposit is absent. 8. Mr. Diniz, the learned counsel for the appellants, relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others. reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 , where the Supreme Court cited with approval the oft quoted words of Lord Tenterden, CJ in Doe v. Bridges, which read as follows : "10. In Doe v. Bridges, (1831) 1 B and Ad. 847 at page 859 are the famous and oft quoted words of Lord Tenterden. JC saying: "where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." We are of view that, having regard to the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 1 (3) and Rule 5 (5), the obligation to deposit arises only from an order being made for such deposit and the occasion to make such an order arises only upon an application for stay being made. There is no absolute obligation on an appellant to deposit the decretal amount nor an absolute obligation on the Court to direct him to deposit the amount, as it appears to us to be plain from the statute itself. It must be noted that we are not dealing with a case of making the admission of an appeal conditional upon the deposit of the decretal amount. It is nobody's case that an appeal cannot be admitted without deposit of the decretal amount. 9. Mr. Diniz, the learned counsel for the appellants, next relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Kayamuddin Shamsuddin Khan v. State Bank of India, reported in (1998) 8 SCC 676 , where the Supreme Court considered the present scheme of rules and observed as follows : "7. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the High Court was right in giving the direction regarding the deposit of Rs.75,000 as per the aforesaid provision and since the appellant has failed to comply with the same the appeal has been rightly directed to be dismissed. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the High Court was right in giving the direction regarding the deposit of Rs.75,000 as per the aforesaid provision and since the appellant has failed to comply with the same the appeal has been rightly directed to be dismissed. We, however, find that the only consequence for non-compliance with the direction given under sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XLI is as provided in sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 of Order XLI which reads as under: "(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-rules, where the appellant fails to make the deposit or furnish the security specified in sub-rule (3) of Rule 1, the Court shall not make an order staying the execution of the decree." (Emphasis supplied) 10. In a recent judgment in MGMT of M/s. Devi Theatre v. Vishwanath Raju, reported in 2004 AIR SCW 3102, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "6. It is a different matter, in case the appellant prays for stay of the execution of the decree or for any order by way of an interim relief during the pendency of the appeal, it is open for the Court to impose any condition as it may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. Otherwise imposing a condition of deposit of money subject to which an appeal may be admitted for hearing on merits, is not legally justified and such order cannot be sustained." The observations of their Lordships in the above matter clearly suggest that the Supreme Court was of the view that the occasion to direct the deposit or impose any condition arises where the appellant applies for stay. 11. Mr. Diniz, the learned counsel for the appellants, brought to our notice the decision of the Delhi High Court in Union Bank of India and another v. Jagan Nath Radhey Shyam and Co. and another, reported in AIR 1979 Delhi 36, in which the Delhi High Court observed in paragraph 20 as follows : "20. Reading sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of the Order XLI, along with sub-rule (5) of the Rule 5 of the Code, all that can be said is that so long as the decretal amount is not deposited or security is not furnished, the Court shall not make order staying the execution of the decree. " 12. Reading sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of the Order XLI, along with sub-rule (5) of the Rule 5 of the Code, all that can be said is that so long as the decretal amount is not deposited or security is not furnished, the Court shall not make order staying the execution of the decree. " 12. He also relied on a: similar view of a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in J. Lakshmikantham v. Uppala Rajamma and others, reported in AIR 1982 Andhra Pradesh 337, in which the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed as follows ; "Depositing decretal amount or furnishing security in the appellate Court is not a condition precedent for hearing and disposal of an appeal against a money decree, within the meaning of Order XLI, Rule 1 (3). It is true that the word "shall" has been employed in Order XLI. Rule 1 (3) making it appear as though it is mandatory that the appellant will have to deposit the amount covered by the decree if it is a money decree, in the appellate Court when an appeal is sought to be preferred against it. But though this provision has been brought in for the first time by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 nevertheless the legislature has not brought in the consequential provisions as to what should happen in case the appellant does not either deposit the amount or furnish security and therefore inferentially it must be presumed that the legislature did not intend to penalise in case the said provision is not complied with. In these circumstances, the word "shall" has to be considered as "may". Order XLI. Rule 5 (5) saves the decree-holder from his decree being stultified or he being deprived of his right because for some reason or the other if the judgment-debtor does not comply with the provisions enacted in Order XLI, Rule 1 (3) then certainly it is open to the decree-holder to file an execution petition and have the decree executed." We find ourselves in agreement with the views of these High Courts. 13. Mr. 13. Mr. Sonak, the learned counsel for the respondents, relied on a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bhogwati Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. v. M/s. Chaugule and Sons, AIR 2003 Bombay 185, where the learned Single Judge has taken the view that the appellate Court is competent to call upon the appellant to show cause why he should not be called upon to deposit the decretal amount even though he has not prayed for a stay of the decree. 14. For the reasons indicated above we are not in agreement with the judgment of the learned Single Judge in the case of Bhogvati Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. and that it does not lay down the law correctly. 15. Mr. Sonak, learned counsel for the respondents, also relied on another judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Prabhakar v. Vinayakrao, reported in AIR 1983 Bombay 301. Admittedly, that case was different in that the admission of the appeal itself was made conditional upon the deposit and the learned Single Judge reversed the order of the appellate Court. However, the learned counsel relied upon the observation of the learned Single Judge towards the end of the judgment where the learned Single Judge observed that it would be open for the appellate Court to pass an order under Order XLI. Rule 1 (3) again if it is called upon to do so and if it thinks necessary to do so otherwise than as a condition precedent for the tenability of the appeal. Mr. Sonak, learned counsel for the respondents, submitted that this clearly suggests that the learned Single Judge has taken the view that, even otherwise, as a condition precedent for the tenability of the appeal, a direction to deposit can be made. We are not in agreement with this submission, since what the learned Single Judge possibly contemplated was that the appellate Court could be called upon to do so by the appellant asking for stay. 16. In this view of the matter, we reject the respondents prayer for a direction to the appellants to deposit the amount. Needless to state the respondents are free to execute the decree. Appeal dismissed.