Judgment : PRAKASH KRISHNA, J. - These two revisions were heard together and were decided by this court by a judgment dated November 13, 1991. This court quashed the orders passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal dated March 30, 1990 relying on the decision given by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1991] 83 STC 1; [1991] UPTC 585, and held that since section 3AAAA has been declared ultra vires by this court, the order of remand to the assessing authority for determination of the liability in the light of observations made in the body of the judgment is incorrect. Thereafter aforesaid rectification applications under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 were filed by the Commissioner of Sales Tax on May 19, 1993. Subsequently the State Government promulgated the U.P. Ordinance No. 45 of 1991 and section 3 of the Ordinance, section 3AAAA of the U.P. Sales Tax Act was substituted with retrospective effect from April 1, 1974. The said Ordinance has been replaced by Act No. 8 of 1992. An application after commencement of the Ordinance purported to be under section 22 of the Act has been filed by the Commissioner, Trade Tax, on the allegation that the infirmity pointed out by this court in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works [1991] 83 STC 1; [1991] UPTC 585 has been removed with retrospective effect in section 3AAAA, as the amending Act contains validation clause. The validation clause is section 17 of the Amending Act. Therefore the present application to reconsider the order dated November 13, 1991 and decide under section 22 of the Act in the light of U.P. Ordinance No. 45 of 1991 has been filed. The said application is under consideration and Shri B. K. Pandey, learned standing counsel was heard in support of the application and Shri Kunwar Saxena, the learned counsel for the dealer opposed the application. Shri Saxena, the learned counsel for the dealer proposed that he does not want to file any counter-affidavit as no factual controversy is involved and only legal issues are involved. Shri Saxena, the learned counsel for the dealer proposed that he does not want to file any counter-affidavit as no factual controversy is involved and only legal issues are involved. The learned standing counsel for the Department strenuously contended that in view of the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1992 (replacing Ordinance No. 45 of 1991) there is an error apparent on the face of the record in the judgment dated November 13, 1991 passed by this court and the mistake needs rectification. Elaborating his argument it was further pointed out that the judgment of this court given in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1991] 83 STC 1; [1991] UPTC 585 has not been approved by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Balaji v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1993] 88 STC 98; [1993] UPTC 318, in para 54, has held that section 3AAAA both before and after 1992 amendment, represents a perfectly valid piece of legislation. It is relatable and fully warranted by entry No. 54 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. On the other hand the learned counsel for the dealer submitted that the application as such is not maintainable. He made reference to section 17 of the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1992. Elaborating his argument it was submitted that the present case does not fall in any of the sub-sections of section 17 which is validation section. Therefore, the application is liable to be rejected. Section 17 of the amending Act reads as follows : "17. Validation. - (1) Notwithstanding anything in any judgment, decree or order of any court or authority, any notification issued or anything done or any action taken before the commencement of this section which conforms to the provisions of the Principal Act, as amended by this Act shall be deemed to be and always to have been valid and lawful as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all materials times. (2) Where before the commencement of this section any authority or court has, in any proceeding made, any assessment, levy or collection of any tax passed or an order imposing any penalty or making any other demand under the Principal Act, or passed any order modifying, setting aside or quashing (wholly or in part), such assessment, levy, collection, penalty or demand and such assessment or order becomes inconsistent with the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act then, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of any party to the proceeding or the Commissioner of Sales Tax may by September 30, 1992, make an application to such authority or court for review of the assessment or order and thereupon, such authority or court may review the proceeding and make such order, varying or revising the order previously made, as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Principal Act as amended by this Act. (3) The assessing, appellate or revising authority as the case may be, may within a period of one year from the commencement of this section or within the period specified in section 22 of the Principal Act, whichever expires later, make any rectification in any order passed by it where such rectification becomes necessary in consequence of the amendment of the Principal Act : Provided that no rectification which has the effect of enhancing the assessment, penalty or other dues, shall be made unless the authority concerned has given notice to the dealer or person concerned of this intention to do so and has allowed him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." Sub-section (2) of section 17 provides for making of an application to any authority or court for review of the assessment or the order passed by such authorities, which has become inconsistent with the provisions of the the Principal Act as amended by this Act. Sub-section (3) of section 17 of the amending Act gives power of rectification within a period of one year or within the period prescribed under section 22 of the Principal Act from the commencement of the amending Act to assessing, appellate or revisional authority whichever expires later, make a rectification in any order passed by it where such rectifications become necessary in consequence of the amendment of the Principal Act. Sub-section (2) and subsection (3) operate in different plans. Sub-section (2) and subsection (3) operate in different plans. The differences between these two sub-sections are as follows : "1. Sub-section (2) enables the Commissioner of Sales Tax to make an application before authority or court for review of the assessment order concerned inconsistent to the Principal Act. While sub-section (3) gives suo motu power to assessing authority, appellate, revising authority to rectify the mistake within the period of limitation mentioned therein. Under sub-section (3) filing of application is not required. 2. Under sub-section (2) the period of filing of application is up to September 30, 1992 but there is no period of limitation for passing the order. But under sub-section (3) the period for passing the order on the suo motu exercise of power by the assessing authority, appellate or revising authority is, within a period of one year from the commencement of the amending Act or within the period specified in section 22 of the Principal Act, whichever is later. 3. Sub-section (2) talks about the court. But under sub-section (3) the word 'court' does not find place. 4. Sub-section (2) talks for review of the assessment order while sub-section (3) talks about rectification." In the present case the application was admittedly filed on May 19, 1993. Therefore, according to Shri Saxena the application could have been filed by September 30, 1992 and being beyond that time is liable to be rejected. It was further submitted that sub-section (3) of the Amending Act is not applicable as the application for rectification was filed before the High Court and the High Court is neither the assessing or appellate or revising authority and as such sub-section (3) shall not be applicable. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. [2000] 118 STC 422; [2000] UPTC 496. The Supreme Court considered section 39 of the another Amending Act (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1995) which also contained a similar kind of validation clause in section 39. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. [2000] 118 STC 422; [2000] UPTC 496. The Supreme Court considered section 39 of the another Amending Act (U.P. Act No. 31 of 1995) which also contained a similar kind of validation clause in section 39. The Supreme Court after interpreting the validation clause involved before it, which is pari materia to the validation clause in the present case has held that from the scheme of the Amendment Act, it is clear that both the powers of review and rectification were conferred upon different authorities to modify the earlier order to give necessary effect to the provisions of the principal Act as amended by the Amendment Act. When two specific and independent powers have been conferred upon the authorities both the powers can be exercised alternatively. The Supreme Court disagreed with the interpretation put by the High Court that the orders of review or rectification should have been passed on or before March 14, and not beyond that time. The Supreme Court has held that if such an interpretation is given then the provision for review becomes totally redundant or otiose and there will be no difference between the power of review and power of rectification. In my view the above judgment of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Here the situation is quite different. In the case before the Supreme Court turnover of rectified spirit and denatured spirit was held to be non-taxable under the U.P. Sales Tax Act as there was no levy on such items at the relevant point of time. By making amendment in section 3A and section 4 of the Principal Act a specific clause was added to bring the turnover of "alcohol" as defined under the United Provinces and Sale of (Motor Spirits, Diesel and Alcohol) Tax Act, 1939 among the other goods taxable. The result is that in the principal Act "sale of alcohol" as defined by the Amendment Act, became taxable. Thereafter a review application was filed before the Tribunal. In the background of these facts the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the validation clause, namely, section 39 of the Amendment Act. In the case in hand the position is quite different. Thereafter a review application was filed before the Tribunal. In the background of these facts the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the validation clause, namely, section 39 of the Amendment Act. In the case in hand the position is quite different. Section 3AAAA was declared ultra vires by this court in the case of Pioneer Tanneries & Glue Works [1991] 83 STC 1; [1991] UPTC 585. This judgment has been specifically overruled by the Supreme Court. It has been held that section 3AAAA was intra vires even before the amending Act and also after the amendment. Therefore even assuming for the sake of the argument that section 17 of the Amendment Act, i.e., the validation clause is not applicable, it cannot possibly be disputed that the levy having been ultimately held to be valid, the order can be rectified under section 22 of the Principal Act which gives the power of rectification to High Court also. The validating Act can render ineffective judgments and orders of a competent court or an authority, provided, it by retrospective legislation removes the cause of invalidity or the basis which had led to those judgments. If ultimately it is found that the disputed piece of legislation is a valid piece of legislation there is in my opinion no need to have recourse to the validation clause. There being no invalidity in the order or judgment of a court or authority the recourse to validation clause is not at all called for. The error or defect, if it can be rectified under the power conferred on the court by the Principal Act, the validation clause will not come in the way to the court or the authority concerned. The provisions of section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act can be invoked in circumstances for rectification of mistake. This section gives suo motu power as well as power to rectify any mistake in any order passed by the court under the Act, apparent on the record within three years from the date of order sought to be rectified. Next it was urged that although in the heading of the application section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act has been mentioned but in the prayer it has been prayed that the judgment dated November 13, 1991 be reconsidered in the light of U.P. Ordinance No. 45 of 1991. Next it was urged that although in the heading of the application section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act has been mentioned but in the prayer it has been prayed that the judgment dated November 13, 1991 be reconsidered in the light of U.P. Ordinance No. 45 of 1991. The prayer in the application being defective it should be rejected as such. However, I find no merit in the submission which is more technical in nature. It is fairly settled that merely because prayer in the application is not accurately mentioned it is always open to a court to grant an appropriate relief looking to the contents of the application. Mere mention of a wrong section will not invalidate the order if the power to pass the order can be traced to a different section. Another objection was raised by the counsel of the dealer that the application is not maintainable before this court. Reliance was placed upon section 11(8) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. This court while allowing the revision by its judgment dated November 13, 1991, in the end of the judgment ordered as follows : "Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act." Placing reliance upon this sentence an argument was built up that ultimate order is the order of the Tribunal and the High Court has become functus officio after the judgment dated November 13, 1991. The application for rectification or review should have been filed before the Tribunal because the final order is that of the Tribunal. I am unable to accept the said contention of the learned counsel for the dealer. Section 11(8) of the Act reads as follows : "The High Court shall, after hearing the parties to the revision, decide the question of law involved therein, and where as a result of such decision, the amount of tax, fee or penalty is required to be determined afresh, the High Court may send a copy of the decision to the Tribunal for fresh determination of the amount, and such authority shall thereupon pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case in conformity with the said decision." It could not be disputed that the High Court after hearing the parties decides the question of law involved in the revision. The Tribunal is inferior to the High Court in hierarchy. Under section 11(8) where as a result of the decision by the High Court, the amount of tax, fee or penalty is required to be determined afresh, the High Court may send the copy of the decision to the Tribunal for fresh determination of the amount, and the Tribunal shall thereupon pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case in conformity with the said decision of the High Court. A plain reading of section 11(8) clearly demonstrates that the High Court may send a copy of the judgment to the Tribunal for fresh determination of the amount. To put it differently the calculation part of the amount of tax or fee of penalty shall be done by the Tribunal if not done by the High Court and pass the necessary orders to dispose of the case in conformity with the judgment of the High Court. No dispute is left open for decision to the Tribunal after the decision of the High Court. The decision making body is the High Court and the Tribunal has to pass a consequential order in conformity with the orders of the High Court. It does not mean that the order ceases to be that of High Court if the Tribunal has determined the amount of tax, fee and penalty afresh in the light of the judgment of the High Court. Strong reliance was placed upon a judgment of this court in the case of Indo International Industries v. Commissioner, Sales Tax [1982] 50 STC 249; [1982] UPTC 390, and submitted that the High Court exercises the advisory jurisdiction. The said submission has no merit. Reliance has been placed upon paragraph 11 of the said judgment. The aforesaid authority is distinguishable on account of the fact that it was given in a different statutory set up. Earlier this court was exercising advisory jurisdiction under section 11 of the Act before the commencement of U.P. Act No. 11 of 1978. By this Act sections 11 and 11A were substituted by a new section 11. Earlier to it there used to be an Additional Judge (Revision) in place of the Tribunal under section 10 of the Act (hereinafter to referred as AJR). It was not open to the parties to come directly against the order of the AJR before this court. By this Act sections 11 and 11A were substituted by a new section 11. Earlier to it there used to be an Additional Judge (Revision) in place of the Tribunal under section 10 of the Act (hereinafter to referred as AJR). It was not open to the parties to come directly against the order of the AJR before this court. The AJR used to make the reference on the question of law to this court and the court used to decide the questions of law and sent its opinion to the AJR for passing confirmatory order. The procedure was akin to that as was provided under the Income-tax Act prior to the insertion of section 260A of the Income-tax Act. U.P. Act No. 11 of 1978 by which the present section 11 has been substituted has brought a sea change in the scheme of the Act so far as the administration of justice under the U.P. Sales Tax Act is concerned. Under the amended section the High Court exercises revisional jurisdiction which is a part of appellate jurisdiction as held by the Supreme Court in the case Shanker Ram Chandra Abhyanker v. Krishna Ji AIR 1970 SC 1 , following the judgment of the Privy Council given in the case of Nagendra Nath Day v. Surendra Chand Day AIR 1932 PC 165 it was held that "the revisional jurisdiction to be part and parcel of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court." The learned counsel for the dealer in support of his contention that the rectification application should be filed before the Tribunal, as the order of the Tribunal is the final order, and the application is not maintainable in the High Court, has placed strong reliance on para (11) of the judgment of Indo International Industries [1982] 50 STC 249 (All); [1982] UPTC 390, which reads as follows : "The jurisdiction of the High Court under section 11 continues to be to decide the questions of law, though it has been vested with the power of deciding questions of law involved in the case, unlike the power to render decision of questions of law preferred to it. If the decision of the High Court does not require determination of the amount of tax, fee or penalty afresh, that is, where the altered in spite of the decision of the High Court, nothing further is to be done to make the decision of the High Court effective (sic). The final order remains that of the Tribunal. Where, however, the amount is to be determined afresh as a result of the decision rendered by the High Court on the questions of law involved in the case, a copy of the decision of the High Court is to be sent to the Tribunal which shall 'thereupon pass such orders as are necessary to dispose of the case in conformity with the said decision'. That is to say, the matter is to be finally disposed of by the Tribunal in conformity with the decision of the High Court. In either case, therefore, the order which effectively disposes of the controversy is the one passed by the Tribunal, because under section 11, even as it stands today in order to bringing the controversy to a close, so far as it relates to the amount payable by a dealer, is the one passed by the Tribunal." The above observations should be considered and understood on the context of that case, specially the controversy involved therein. The above observations were made in a different factual and legal background. The controversy involved in the present case was not at all involved therein. A Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court, very recently in Padmasundra Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu [2002] 255 ITR 147 (SC); [2002] 3 JT 1 (SC), has observed as follows : "Courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, and said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] 2 WLR 537. There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case, and said Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board [1972] 2 WLR 537. Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases." A feeble attempt was made by the learned counsel for the dealer that the order of the High Court merges with the order of the Tribunal. This argument is devoid of any merit. The High Court being a superior court its order will not merge with the order of the Tribunal, an inferior authority. The principle of merger applies when there are two orders, the order of the inferior court merges in the order of the superior court and not vice versa. Next it was urged that if a law provides a thing to be done in certain manner it should be done in that manner or not at all. The principle that a special provision shall exclude the general provision was also pressed into service. The learned counsel went to the extent of arguing that if anything has to be ignored then it is a judgment of the Supreme Court which should be ignored by me. I am afraid that these principles have hardly any application. These submissions were made on the assumptions that section 17 of the validating Act is a special provision and will exclude section 22 of the Act. In my view section 17 of the validating Act is not at all attracted and cannot be pressed into service in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court holding that the provision is intra vires and valid. As regards the judgment of the Supreme Court is concerned the same is the law of the land and is binding on every authority, Tribunal and court in view of article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within territory of India. It has also been held that even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding under article 141 of the Constitution of India. The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within territory of India. It has also been held that even obiter dicta of the Supreme Court are binding under article 141 of the Constitution of India. A judgment of the High Court which refuses to follow the direction of the Supreme Court or seeks to revive a decision of the High Court which had been set aside by the Supreme Court, is a nullity (Narendra v. Sujeet [1984] 2 SCC 402). Now the only question which is left is as to whether in view of the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court given in the case of Hotel Balaji [1993] 88 STC 98; [1993] UPTC 318 there is an error apparent in the judgment of the High Court taking a contrary view, to be rectified under section 22 of the Act. This court in the case of Ram Singh and Sons Engineering Works v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1977] 39 STC 424; [1977] UPTC 74 followed in Hotel Clarks Shiraz v. Commissioner of Sales Tax [1992] UPTC 986 has held that such an error can be rectified under section 22 of the Act and the rectification application is maintainable. In the result the applications under section 22 of the U.P. Sales Tax Act are allowed. The judgment of this court being inconsistent to the judgment of the Supreme Court given in the case of Hotel Balaji [1993] 88 STC 98; [1993] UPTC 318 is rectified and the judgment is recalled. The revisions are restored to their original numbers for hearing on other points, if any.