Srilasri Kundrakudi & Another v. Rajamurthy @ Soundararajan & Another
2004-07-14
V.KANAGARAJ
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- This civil revision petition is directed against the fair and decretal order dated 6.10.2003 made in I.A.No.161 of 2002 in O.S.No.986 of 1987 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai. 2. Today, when the above civil revision petition has been taken up for consideration in the presence of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the second respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that an application filed by the other side praying to condone the delay of 351 days in filing an application to set aside the exparte decree had been ordered by the trial court to the prayers, testifying the validity of which the petitioners have come forward to file the above civil revision petition. 3. Learned counsel, causing production of the certified copy of the order passed in E.P.No.211 of 1999 made in O.S.No.986 of 1987, would further submit that even the delivery of possession has been taken in this matter consequent to the order passed by the execution court, and therefore, for all practical purposes, the above revision would become only entitled to be allowed, for the suit is still pending. 4. On the other hand, on the part of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the second respondent would cite a judgment of the Apex Court delivered in Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao reported in (2002) 3 SCC 195 wherein their Lordships, while deciding the question of sufficient cause for setting aside the abatement of the suit and condonation of delay in taking steps to substitution of heirs and legal representatives, have held that the expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done which has to be decided on the facts of a particular case, further cautioning the courts regarding other valuable rights that would accrue on account of the delay and that such rights should not be defeated by the condonation of delay in a routine manner. 5. Learned counsel would also cite yet another judgment of this Court itself delivered in Arunachalam v. Arunachalam Chettiar reported in (2001) 1 MLJ 105 and would read out paras.
5. Learned counsel would also cite yet another judgment of this Court itself delivered in Arunachalam v. Arunachalam Chettiar reported in (2001) 1 MLJ 105 and would read out paras. 7 and 8 therein and would pray for an order falling in tune with the trends set by the Apex Court and by this Court itself earlier and since the said paras.7 and 8 are relevant for consideration, they are extracted herein:- "The upper form of law have more often held that even if the delay is not properly explained, the petitioner should not be punished with denial of opportunity to prosecute the case, wherein his valuable rights are involved and when once such petitioners are not allowed to participate in the further proceedings by dismissing the condonation applications filed to condone the delay on certain technicalities, the other side whether has any genuine rights or not, wins the entire case and the petitioner loses all his rights in the suit and to avoid such calamities; the petitioners could only be punished with costs and not with denial of opportunity to prosecute the case wherein his valuable rights are involved. Therefore, it is a case of that nature wherein, the petitioner, though left his suit for dismissal on account of default, now, having come forward to show genuine interests, should be given an opportunity to participate in the further trial proceedings in the suit, wherein the lower court will be in a position to decide the valuable rights of parties on merits. However, since by this time, the other side has gone a long way in executing the order obtained in the cross-objection and is in fact reported to have even taken delivery of possession of the suit property on 8.6.1999 as per the order made in E.P.No.61 of 1998, and hence, in consideration of the hardships and inconveniences undergone on the part of the respondents, this Court is also of the view that the petitioner must be mulcted with heavy costs and in such consideration, a cost of Rs.2,500/= imposed on the petitioner that is to be paid to the respondents will meet the ends of justice. The costs should be deposited within eight weeks from today, for being made available for the respondents to receive the same." 6.
The costs should be deposited within eight weeks from today, for being made available for the respondents to receive the same." 6. In consideration of the facts pleaded, having regard to the materials placed on record and upon hearing the learned counsel for both, what could be assessed is that there is a condonation of delay of 351 days which has occurred in filing the application to set aside the exparte decree and the same has been allowed by the lower court on payment of exemplary cost of Rs.1,000/= and the cost has been paid in time and in the mean time, the plaintiffs have come forward to institute the above revision petition on certain grounds as brought forth in the grounds of revision. 7. This Court is further given to understand that the suit is pending, even though some orders are said to be passed in execution of the exparte decree when the lower court itself has arrived at the conclusion to set aside the same, causing production of the said order, the petitioner seeking to allow the above revision is of no use since as adumbrated in the above two judgments cited by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is the substantial justice that is the hallmark and not the implementation of the exparte decree prior to an ultimate decision arrived at regarding the revival of the suit on applications made by the other side, and therefore, there is no gain saying regarding the execution of the exparte decree and it is upto the trial court to decide as to the conclusions of such an execution and for rectification. 8. So far as the above revision petition is concerned, the lower court has arrived at the only conclusion that could be arrived at in the circumstances of the case, thus falling in line with the present judicial thinking that even in the worst cases of delay, which could be held wilful and wanton, no doubt, the party causing the delay must be punished, but only with costs and not with denial of opportunity to contest the very suit, wherein his substantial rights are at stake. 9.
9. If a decision could be arrived at by this Court in these circumstances, it should be mentioned that the trial court itself has taken a valid decision in allowing the said application filed on the part of the respondents to condone the delay on payment of a cost of Rs.1,000/=, which is the most appropriate order that could be passed in the circumstances of the case, and therefore, this Court is left with no choice but to confirm the well considered and merited order passed by the lower court. In result, (i) the above civil revision petition, for the foregoing reasons assigned, does not merit acceptance, but becomes liable only to be dismissed and is dismissed accordingly; (ii) the fair and decretal order dated 6.10.2003 made in I.A.No.161 of 2002 in O.S.No.986 of 1987 by the Court of Additional District Munsif, Tiruvannamalai, is hereby confirmed; (iii) however, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs; (iv) consequently, C.M.P.No.3291 of 2004 is also dismissed.