Judgment Adarsh Kumar Goel, J. 1. The respondent-plaintiffs filed a suit for mandatory injunction directing the appellant Life Insurance Corporation of India to pay the amount of Policy Nos. 6437984, 6497323, 6590302, 6437872, 6568459, 6571738, 22150887, 22177624, 6445152, 6499554, 6453469, 6455448, 6547273, on the life of deceased Tara Singh and also for recovery of Rs. 21,100/- being the balance amount of Policy Nos. 6590302, 6547273. 2. Case of the plaintiffs is that predecessor Tara Singh had taken LIC policies. He was missing since 30.7.1964 and is presumed to have died on that date. They filed a suit on 9.10.1972 for declaration which was decreed and it was declared that Tara Singh died on or about 30.7.1964. LIC was also made a party in the said suit.Amounts payable under the policies were attached by the Income Tax Department and a sum of Rs. 4,900/- was paid to the said department by the LIC out of Policy No. 6590302 and a sum of Rs. 2,790/- was paid to the Income Tax Department out of Policy No. 654272. The plaintiffs instituted suit at Jagraon (their place of residence) on 8.3.1977 but on account of want of territorial jurisdiction, the plaint was returned on 31.8.1979 for being presented at Jalandhar on or before 20.9.1979. 3. The defendant contested the suit with the plea that the suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. It was stated that the relief was available at the time when a previous suit for declaration of death of Tara Singh was filed. Plea of limitation was also taken. The trial Court decreed that suit for recovery of Rs. 20,100/- with bonus after adjusting the payment of policy and also granted mandatory injunction to make payments for the remaining policies. It was held that suit for recovery of the amount of policies could not be filed without a declaration that Tara Singh was dead and therefore, bar under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was not applicable. It was also held that decree of declaration that Tara Singh had died was granted on 3.9.1974 and the defendant paid dues of the income tax department on 25.1.1977 and, therefore, suit filed on 8.3.1977 was within time. 4. It was also held that decree of declaration that Tara Singh had died was granted on 3.9.1974 and the defendant paid dues of the income tax department on 25.1.1977 and, therefore, suit filed on 8.3.1977 was within time. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant claimed following substantial questions of law:- "(1) Whether suit for recovery of Insurance amount filed on 20.9.1979 claiming life insured is deemed to have died on 30.7.1964 as he had not been heard since that day is barred by limitation provided under Article 44(a) of Schedule to the Limitation Act? (2) Whether suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC in view of filing earlier suit decided vide judgment and decree Ex.P1?" None appears for the respondents. 5 I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and perused the record. 6. The suit was admittedly filed at Jagraon on 8.3.1977 and was returned for presentation at Jalandhar on or before 20.9.1979. Under Article 44 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, limitation is three years from the date of death or from the date of denial of the claim.If date of disappearance which is finally held to be the date of death is held to be the starting point of limitation in case of person who is missing, suit for recovery of policy amount can perhaps never be filed within limitation. In such cases, if a suit for declaration is to be filed as a condition precedent for making claim, decision of suit is likely to take time. The period of limitation has, thus, to be taken to commence from the date of decree declaring a person to have died. Under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presumption of death arises only after seven years and not before. A person has, thus, to wait for seven years before seeking a declaration that the person who is missing, is dead. 7. As regards bar under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, the courts below have rightly held that the cause of action in the present suit was the death of Tara Singh which cause of action was available only after the decree to that effect had been granted. Cause of action for the previous suit was not the same. 8. I, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.