Judgment :- N.V.Balasubramanian, J. This writ appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Judge rendered in Writ Petition No.7616 of 1989 dated 12.11.1998 wherein the learned Judge while allowing the writ petition, held that all the proceedings subsequent to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in so far as they relate to the petitioners' land in question are quashed, reserving liberty to the respondents in the writ petition to proceed with the acquisition proceedings, if so desired, from the stage subsequent to the issuing of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). 2. The writ petitioners who filed the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings, have filed the writ appeal on the ground that the time limit for issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Act has already expired by the time the learned Judge quashed the 6 declaration giving liberty to the respondents 1 and 2 to proceed with the acquisition proceedings keeping the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act in tact. 3. The facts necessary for the disposal of the writ appeal are: On 5.11.1988, paper publication was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act by the respondents 1 and 2 invoking the provisions of Section 17 of the Act on the ground that there was some urgency in the acquisition proceedings. The notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published in the gazette on 16.11.1988. The appellants herein filed the writ petition on 22.5.1989 challenging the 4(1) notification mainly invoking the urgency clause and the appellants have raised other grounds also. This court, by order dated 16.6.1989 in W.M.P.No.10832 of 1989, granted interim stay of taking possession alone. Since this court has not granted interim stay of all further proceedings, the respondents 1 and 2 have proceeded further and issued declaration under Section 6 of the Act on 18.11.1989 which was also published on the same day. Subsequently, on 24.1.1991, this court vacated the interim stay already granted. The appellants, thereafter, on 9.8.1996, filed a writ miscellaneous petition in W.M.P.No.15360 of 1996 to amend the prayer in the writ petition to challenge Section 6 declaration as well. This court, by order dated 9.8.1996, allowed the said amendment petition. However, by order dated 14.8.1996, this court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings. The appellants, thereafter, on 9.8.1996, filed a writ miscellaneous petition in W.M.P.No.15360 of 1996 to amend the prayer in the writ petition to challenge Section 6 declaration as well. This court, by order dated 9.8.1996, allowed the said amendment petition. However, by order dated 14.8.1996, this court quashed the entire acquisition proceedings. Aggrieved by such order, the third respondent filed writ appeal in W.A.No.232 of 1997. By judgment dated 26.8.1997, this court allowed the writ appeal and remitted the matter back for fresh disposal. Hence on the basis of the direction of the Division Bench of this court, the learned Judge considered the matter again and on 12.11.1998, allowed the writ petition keeping in tact the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act and quashed further proceedings which were initiated pursuant to Section 4(1) notification. Though the writ petition was allowed, the appellants have filed the present writ appeal challenging the order of the learned Judge keeping in tact the 4(1) notification, as according to them, it is impermissible for the respondents even on the date when the learned Judge passed the order on 12.11.1998 to proceed further with the notification as the time limit for issuing declaration under Section 6 of the Act had expired and the learned Judge should have quashed the 4(1) notification as well. 4. We heard Mr. Rabu Manohar, learned counsel for the appellants, learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. Ahsok Menon, learned counsel for the third respondent. 5. In our view, the issue raised in the writ appeal is covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu ( (2002) 3 SCC 533 ). The matter was dealt with by a Constitution Bench, in view of different views expressed by different Benches of the Supreme Court and the Constitution Bench resolved the conflict holding that the language of Section 6(1) of the Act is plain and unambiguous and it is not permissible to read something into it. The Supreme Court, after considering the various decisions, held as under: Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. The Supreme Court, after considering the various decisions, held as under: Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah case the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation." 6. We are of the view that the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao's case stated supra, would squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. As already noticed by us, the interim stay granted by this court on 16.6.1989 was vacated by this court by order dated 24.1.1991 and therefore, the one year period to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act has already expired when the learned Judge considered the matter and quashed the acquisition proceedings subsequent to the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In other words, the respondents 1 and 2 were not in a position to issue the declaration under Section 6 of the Act as the period of one year has already expired on the date when the learned Judge passed the order quashing the acquisition proceedings subsequent to 4(1) notification. Since the respondents were not in a position to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the learned Judge need not have kept in tact the 4(1) notification. Since the respondents were not in a position to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act, the learned Judge need not have kept in tact the 4(1) notification. The learned Judge probably kept the notification in tact to enable the respondents to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act as the law stood at that time permitted the notification to be kept in tact, though the declaration was quashed. However, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao's case cited supra, the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the instant case has necessarily to be quashed. The writ appeal stands allowed. Though we quash the 4(1) notification, we make it clear that it will be open to the respondents 1 and 2 to initiate acquisition proceedings, if they so desire, for the acquisition of the same land. No costs.