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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2004 DIGILAW 903 (MP)

Anubha Munjare v. State of M. P.

2004-11-05

K.K.LAHOTI

body2004
ORDER K.K. Lahoti, J. 1. Petitioner was elected a President of Municipal Council, Balaghat in the election held on 28-12-1999. The office of President, Municipal Council, Balaghat was reserved for O.B.C. (General). It was a first direct election for the office of the President. Petitioner assumed charge on 13-1-2000 of the office. A notice, Annexure P-4 dated 9-4-2002 was issued to the petitioner showing six irregularities and petitioner was asked to show cause why she be not removed from the office under section 41(A) of M.P. Nagar Palika Adhiniyam, 1961. The allegation shown in the notice Annexure P-4 were in short as under :- (a) That on 13-1-2000 on the occasion of oath ceremony of petitioner, she arranged a function in which Rs. 58,116/- were spent. The aforesaid expenditure includes a work order of Rs. 39,326/- to Kadam Decorators, Balaghat, for which no tender was invited. There was no provision of huge expenditure and maximum limit for any public function was Rs. 2,500/- . (b) That on the occasion of Shaheed Divas and Chandrashekhar Jayanti petitioner spent Rs. 5,355/- and Rs. 5,860/- which were beyond the limit. (c) That for repair of fire brigade vehicle without inviting tenders and offers, petitioner obtained an estimate from Vishwakarma Coach, Motor Body Repairing Centre for Rs. 65,300/- , but without following procedure had issued work order to another shop Auto repairs to benefit it. (d) That for the recovery of weekly/daily market fees, petitioner changed her decision frequently, because of which the fees could not be collected in time and the Council has suffered a loss of Rs. 1,56,054/- between 1-4-2000 and 15-8-2000 and an estimated loss for the year of Rs. 4,18,812/- was suffered by the Council. (e) That for the repairing of vehicle MP 22B 6237 tenders were invited and minimum tender was of Radhaswami Engineering Works, Balaghat for Rs. 10,985/- , but without assigning any reason that tender was cancelled and fresh tenders were invited. In the fresh tender the rates were much higher, but in spite of this petitioner issued work order to M/s Sharma Auto Repairing for Rs. 40,000/- . By this- way, without sufficient reasons the petitioner cancelled the tender for minimum rates and had issued work order on a rate which was more than 4 times and has caused serious loss to the Municipal Council. 40,000/- . By this- way, without sufficient reasons the petitioner cancelled the tender for minimum rates and had issued work order on a rate which was more than 4 times and has caused serious loss to the Municipal Council. (f) That one shop was constructed by encroachment near Shankar Restaurant, Bus Stand, Balaghat, but in place of restraining the construction and removing it petitioner directed that the construction so raised on the property of Municipal Council shall be allotted in future by way of shop. By this way petitioner had not taken proper steps for misuse of the property of the Council and on the contrary had given protection which is contrary to the provisions of the Act. 2. On receiving aforesaid notice, petitioner submitted a letter dated 24-4-2000 Annexure P-5, by which petitioner sought time for one month and a copy of report of Collector, Balaghat, which was the basis of issuance of show cause notice. It was also stated that, in the aforesaid allegations what is the role of petitioner that cannot be ascertained without going through the concerned documents and files and till then she is unable to file reply. As the documents were sought by the Collector before two years, which were sent to him on 9-8-2000 and has not received back from the office of Collector. In the aforesaid circumstances, the reply cannot be filed without going through the record and the same record be got available for filing the reply. On 6-1-2004 petitioner also wrote a letter to the Chief Minister in respect of withdrawing the aforesaid show cause notice. Thereafter the order Annexure P-1 was passed by the respondent in which it is stated that the petitioner was issued notices to appear before respondent No. 1, but she did not appear before the respondent No. 1 and the order was passed, in which the allegations in the notices were found proved. It was held that in the opinion of the State Government the continuation of the petitioner on the post of President is not desirable in public interest and in the interest of Council, and the petitioner was removed from the office of President and declared disqualified for the office for 5 years from the date of the order. The order dated 11-2-2004 is under challenge in this petition. 3. The order dated 11-2-2004 is under challenge in this petition. 3. The respondents filed reply in this case in which it is stated :- (a) that the petitioner requested for the supply of copy of the report submitted by the Collector under which the proceedings under section 41(A) of the Act were initiated. The petitioner was afforded opportunity to file reply and defend herself, but she did not avail the opportunity. The petitioner from the date of assumption of office started acting in a manner which was detriment to the interest of municipality. Certain complaints were made against the petitioner as regarding mis-feasons, mal-feasons and non-feasons. On the basis of said complaint a fact finding enquiry was conducted by the Additional Collector, Balaghat who found the allegations levelled against the petitioner were prima facie correct. (The copy of report submitted by Additional Collector has been filed as Annexure R-1 along with the return). The report filed by Additional Collector was scrutinised by the competent authority of State Government and on being satisfied that the charges levelled against the petitioner were of serious nature. So as to initiate proceedings under section 41(A) of the Act, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 9-4-2002 alleging six charges levelled against the petitioner. (b) that the petitioner was allowed 15 days time to file reply from the date of receipt of notice. The petitioner in place of filing reply submitted an application on 29-4-2002 in which she sought time to submit the reply and the copies of relevant record, including report submitted by the Collector. The petitioner appeared before the Principal Secretary, Department of Urban Administration & Development on 12-6-2002 and filed reply to show cause notice dt. 9-4-2002. In the reply petitioner denied the charges levelled against her, she also demanded copy of the record on the basis of which the charges were levelled against her. A copy of reply dated 12-6-2004 is filed as Annexure R-2. Thereafter the petitioner did not appear before the competent authority to inspect the record or to file her detailed reply to show cause notice. On the contrary she tried to delay the proceedings. The matter remained pending for a period of one and a half year. (c) that on 17-12-2003 a notice was issued to the petitioner by which she was directed to appear in person before the State Government on 22-12-2003. On the contrary she tried to delay the proceedings. The matter remained pending for a period of one and a half year. (c) that on 17-12-2003 a notice was issued to the petitioner by which she was directed to appear in person before the State Government on 22-12-2003. A copy of the said notice was also sent to the Divisional Deputy Director Urban Administration and Development, Jabalpur with a direction to make entire record available and for supply of documents by the petitioner. (Copy of said letter is Annexure R-3). The Divisional Deputy Director Urban Administration and Development, Jabalpur also sent a copy of the notice along with relevant record by a special messenger to the petitioner. The said letter dated 19-12-2003 is filed as Annexure R-4. The special messenger reached to the house of petitioner, but the petitioner who was present in her house refused to accept the said notice. The messenger thereafter pasted the said notice at a prominent place on the house of petitioner in the presence of witnesses and a panchnama was prepared on the back of office copy of notice dated 17-12-2003. The petitioner who refused to accept the aforesaid notice and documents cannot complain non-receipt of documents. Thereafter, the documents were sent to the Municipal Council and the Accountant of Municipal Council, Balaghat received the documents and letter on 20-12-2003, which is apparent from the perusal of Annexure R-5. (d) that though notice for personal hearing on 22-12-2003 was refused by the petitioner, the competent authority decided to afford one more opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. Accordingly, a notice Annexure R-7 was issued on 26-12-2003 by which petitioner was directed to appear in person on 5-1-2004 for personal hearing. A copy of said letter was also sent to the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Balaghat to ensure that it is served upon the petitioner and to send its service report latest by 31-12-2003. The notice Annexure R-7 was within the knowledge of petitioner. She submitted an application on 4-1-2004 seeking two months time to file reply. She again reiterated for the supply of documents relating to the charge, a copy of the application dated 4-1-2004 has been placed on record as Annexure R-8. The notice Annexure R-7 was within the knowledge of petitioner. She submitted an application on 4-1-2004 seeking two months time to file reply. She again reiterated for the supply of documents relating to the charge, a copy of the application dated 4-1-2004 has been placed on record as Annexure R-8. (e) it is stated that though the request made by the petitioner was unreasonable when the petitioner had already refused previous notice, the competent authority considering the totality of circumstances again allowed 3 days time to the petitioner to file reply by letter dated 5-1-2004 Annexure R-9. On 5-1-2004 another notice was sent to the petitioner informing the next date of hearing, which was fixed for 12-1-2004. It was clearly stated in the said notice that in case petitioner failed to appear on the said date, ex-parte order would be passed against her. Despite aforesaid notice petitioner did not appear before the competent authority on 12-1-2004. As ample opportunities were afforded to the petitioner to file reply, the competent authority decided to proceed ahead in the matter and passed final order on 11-2-2004 Annexure R-10 (Annexure P-1 along with the petition). (f) that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunities to defend herself, but she failed to avail the opportunities. The competent authority examining the matter on his own on merits and thereafter recorded his conclusion that the charges levelled against the petitioner are fully established. The competent authority has not recorded her conclusion merely on the basis of report of the Collector. (g) in the aforesaid circumstances, merely not supplying the copy of Collector's report will not be a ground to set aside the order. The petitioner has not submitted her reply in spite of various opportunities and she remained absent on 12-1-2004. The charges levelled against the petitioner were extremely serious in nature, as they pertained to financial irregularities. In the aforesaid circumstances, Annexure P-1 (Annexure R-10) is based on sound reasoning, application of mind and does not suffer from any legal infirmity by the jurisdictional error warranting interference of the High Court. 4. The petitioner filed rejoinder in the case and contended that notice for hearing on 5-1-2004 or 12-1-2004 were never served on the petitioner and the copy of enquiry report by Additional Collector was never supplied to the petitioner. 5. 4. The petitioner filed rejoinder in the case and contended that notice for hearing on 5-1-2004 or 12-1-2004 were never served on the petitioner and the copy of enquiry report by Additional Collector was never supplied to the petitioner. 5. Learned Counsel for petitioner raised following contentions : (i) That the petitioner was not supplied copies of the relevant documents. The proceedings were initiated on the basis of enquiry report, which was never supplied to the petitioner. Even from the perusal of documents, which were sent to the Municipal Council by Annexure R-5, the said report was not sent. (ii) That the notice Annexure R-3, R-4, R-7 and R-9 (2 in nos.) were never served on the petitioner. The notice Annexure R-3 has been stated to be affixed on the house of petitioner while there was no such direction for affixation of notice on the house of petitioner. Under section 294 of the Act there is provision for service of notice. The aforesaid provision provides for the service of notice on the person or by Regd. A/D mode or by affixture. If the notice was not served personally then it ought to have been sent by Regd. A/D post or the competent authority should have passed an order for affixture. There is no such order for affixture of notice on the house of petitioner, in the absence of which the notice ought to have been sent by Regd. A/D mode. (iii) That notice dated 5-1-2004 by which date of hearing was fixed as 12-1-2004 was never served on the petitioner. There is no material on record that the aforesaid notice was ever served on the petitioner. (iv) That the report of Additional Collector filed as Annexure R-1 does not disclose that the alleged allegations are so serious in nature that the removal 'of petitioner is justified. So far as the expenditure on the occasion of oath ceremony is concerned, the impugned order is not based on the aforesaid charge. (a) So far as exceeding limits on two occasions; namely Shaheed Divas and Chandrashekhar Jayanti are concerned, the limit of expenditure was Rs. 5,000/- . In the aforesaid two occasion if the expenditure exceeded for Rs. 355/- and Rs. 860/- , this cannot be said to be so excessive that on the basis of that petitioner may be removed from the office of President. 5,000/- . In the aforesaid two occasion if the expenditure exceeded for Rs. 355/- and Rs. 860/- , this cannot be said to be so excessive that on the basis of that petitioner may be removed from the office of President. (b) That for the repairs of fire brigade estimate was obtained from Vishwakarma Coach Motor Body Repairing Centre for Rs. 65,300/- , while the Oriental Insurance Company assessed the loss of Rs. 51,550/- . The estimate of Vishwakarma Coach Motor Repairing Centre was higher, so the work order was issued to Sharma Auto Repairs for Rs. 51,550/- . The same' amount was reimbursed by the Insurance Company and infact there was no financial loss to the Municipal Council. If this work would have been done from Vishwakama Coach Motor Repairing Centre for Rs. 65,300/- then reimbursement from insurance company was only for Rs. 51,550/- . In the aforesaid circumstances, if the petitioner had got repaired the vehicle from Sharma Auto Repairs, then she had saved the money of Municipal Council. (c) So far as the daily bazar fee is concerned, the same had been collected by the employees of Municipal Council. Though there was some delay in taking decision for auctioning the contract, but the petitioner was of the opinion that the collection of aforesaid fees through the employees of Municipal Council would be more beneficial. Because of the aforesaid petitioner took some time in taking the decision in this regard. The petitioner being a lady and was elected for the first time in the election. She was not a politician. The delay in the decision was bona fide and on this ground the petitioner cannot be removed from the office. There was no ulterior motive behind this and nobody was extended benefit. There is no charge that the petitioner got herself benefited by the aforesaid. (d) So far as the shop which was constructed near the Shankar Restaurant, that shop was seized by the Municipality and it was decided by the Council that the said shop in place of demolition be allotted by public auction in which there was no malice or ulterior motive. On the contrary the shop which was constructed was seized and was declared as property of Municipal Council. On the contrary the shop which was constructed was seized and was declared as property of Municipal Council. Contending aforesaid it is submitted that the allegations so made in the show cause notice were not sufficient to remove the petitioner, who was directly elected president of Municipal Council for the first time. The petitioner being a lady was elected for the first time for the office. Even if there were some lapses in taking decision, then until and unless some ulterior motive, mala fide or substantial loss to the Municipal Council or public exchequer is found, the petitioner cannot be removed from the office. Reliance is placed by the petitioner to the Apex Court judgment in the case of Tarlochan Dev Sharma vs. State of Punjab and others, (2001) 6 SCC 260 and two single Bench judgments of this Court in Daulat Ram Gupta vs. State ofM.P. and another, 2003 (3) MPLJ 264 and Rajiv Sharma vs. State ofM.P. and others, 2003 (4) MPLJ 28 and contended that in view of settled law by the Apex Court in Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) this petition deserves to be allowed and order Annexure P-1 be quashed. 6. Learned Counsel for State reitrated the contentions as stated herein above and contended that there is no merit in this petition. The impugned order deserves to be sustained under law. He has also placed his reliance to the Apex Court judgment in R. S. Saini vs. State of Punjab and others, (1999) 8 SCC 90 and contended that this petition be dismissed. 7. Considering the rival contentions of the parties it will be appropriate to consider following points:- (i) Whether petitioner was supplied copy of enquiry report by Additional Collector. (ii) Whether the petitioner was afforded due opportunity of hearing in the matter. To consider the first question whether the petitioner was supplied copy of Additional Collector's report which was the basis for initiating proceedings against the petitioner under section 41-A of the Act, the contention of respondent is that the aforesaid report was supplied along with letter Annexure R-5. From the perusal of Annexure R-5, it is apparent that in the list of documents sent along with Annexure R-5 there is no reference in respect of report of Collector. No document has been filed by the respondent showing that the aforesaid report was sent and received by the petitioner. From the perusal of Annexure R-5, it is apparent that in the list of documents sent along with Annexure R-5 there is no reference in respect of report of Collector. No document has been filed by the respondent showing that the aforesaid report was sent and received by the petitioner. Though the report has been filed along with the return in the case, but there is nothing on record that the aforesaid report was sent to the petitioner and was delivered to her prior to the passing of the order. 8. So far as the notice of hearing for 22-12-2003 is concerned, it appears that it was served by affixture. Though it is contended by the respondents that initially said notice was tried to be served but it was refused by the petitioner. When the notice was refused either it ought to have been returned with such endorsement, but it had been affixed on the house of the petitioner. Section 294 of the Act provides service of notices, addressed to individuals. The procedure as prescribed in section 294 reads thus :- 294. Service of notices, addressed to individuals.- (1) the service of every notice, and presentation of every bill under this Act on any person or to any person to whom it is by name addressed, shall, in all cases not otherwise specially provided for in this Act, be effected by a Municipal Officer, servant or other person authorised by the Council in this behalf- (a) by giving or tendering the notice or bill to the person to whom it is addressed; or (b) if such person is not found by leaving the notice or bill at his last known place of abode, if within the Municipal limits, or by giving or tendering the notice or bill to some adult member or servant or his family; or (c) if such person does not reside within the Municipal limits, and his address elsewhere is known to the President or other person directing the issue of notice or bill, then by forwarding the notice or bill, by Registered Post Acknowledgment due under cover bearing the said address; or (d) if none of the means aforesaid be available, then by causing the bill or notice to be affixed on some conspicuous part of the building or land, if any, to which the bill or notice relates. (2) When any notice, under this Act, is required or permitted by or under this Act to be served upon any owner or occupier of any building or land, it shall not be necessary to name the owner or occupier therein, and the service thereof in cases not otherwise specially provided for in this Act shall be effected either - (a) by giving or tendering notice to the owner or occupier of it there be more owners or occupiers than one, to any one of them; or (b) if no such owner or occupier be found, then by giving or tendering the same to some adult member or servant of the family of such owner or occupier as aforesaid; or (c) if none of the means aforesaid be available, then by causing the notice to be fixed on some conspicuous part of the building or land to which the same relates. (3) Every notice which this Act requires or empowers a Council or any Municipal Authority or Officer to give or to serve either as a public notice or generally, or by provisions which do not expressly require notice to be given to individuals therein specified, shall be deemed to have been sufficiently given or served if a copy thereof is put up in such conspicuous part of the Municipal office during such period and in such other public buildings and places, or is published in such local papers or in such other manner, as the Council in bye-laws in this behalf prescribes. (4) No notice or bill shall be invalid for defect of form. (5) When any notice under this Chapter requires any act to be done for which no time is fixed by this Act, the notice shall fix a reasonable time for doing the same. (6) In the event of non-compliance with the terms of any notice under this Chapter, it shall be lawful, for the Council to take such action or such steps as may be necessary for the completion of the act thereby required to be done, and all the expenses incurred therein by the Council shall be paid by the person or persons upon whom the notice was served, and shall be recoverable in the manner provided in Chapter VIII. The aforesaid provision is very specific which provides that notice shall be served firstly to the person to whom it is addressed or if such person is not found then it should be tendered to some adult member or servant of the family or if no such person is available then the notice will be sent by Registered A/D post. If the aforesaid attempt fails then the notice is to be served by affixture. It appears that the aforesaid procedure was not followed by the respondents. 9. Thereafter the respondents sent a notice for hearing on 5-1-2004. The said notice was served or not is 'not on record. But from the perusal of letter dated 4-1-2004 Annexure R-8 it appears that the petitioner became aware about the date of hearing 5-1-2004 from the newspaper and appeared in the office of respondent No. 1 on 4-1-2004 and sought a short time in this regard. This letter was received by the respondent No. 1 is not in dispute. Thereafter respondent No. 1, as stated in the return, found it appropriate to issue a notice fixing a date of hearing for 12-1-2004. There is nothing on record showing that this letter was ever served on the petitioner. When the respondent No. 1 decided to afford opportunity of hearing and to fix date of hearing as 12-1-2004, in the aforesaid circumstances, it was the duty of respondent No. 1 to ensure that the aforesaid notice was served on the petitioner before the date of hearing. The Learned Counsel for State after going through the record of respondent No. 1 found that no such service report or acknowledgment is available in the record, showing that the notice for 12-1-2004 was served on the petitioner. The office copy of letter, though available in the record, but there is no endorsement of receipt of notice nor there is any service report. The petitioner has specifically contended that no such notice was served on the petitioner. In the aforesaid circumstances, the burden was on the respondents to substantiate their contention that such notice was served on the petitioner before the date of hearing on 12-1-2004. In absence of any material it cannot be presumed or inferred that such notice was served on the petitioner. 10. In the aforesaid circumstances, the burden was on the respondents to substantiate their contention that such notice was served on the petitioner before the date of hearing on 12-1-2004. In absence of any material it cannot be presumed or inferred that such notice was served on the petitioner. 10. The Apex Court in Tarlochan Dev Sharma (supra) considering the question of removal of President of Municipal Council on the ground of abuse of powers or of habitual failure to perform his duties, held that it is a serious matter and case for removal must be clearly met out before action can be justified. Holding and enjoying an office by discharging related duties is a valuable statutory right of not only the returned candidate but also his constituency or electoral college. Removal curtails the term of the office-holder and also casts a stigma upon him. Considering aforesaid the Apex Court held :- 7. In a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the incumbent is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected unless his election is set aside by a prescribed procedure known to law. That a returned candidate must hold and enjoy the office and discharge the duties related therewith during the term specified by the relevant enactment is a valuable statutory right not only of the returned candidate but also of the constituency or the electoral college which he represents. Removal from such an office is a serious matter. It curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office. A stigma is cast on the holder of the office in view of certain allegations having been held proved rendering him unworthy of holding the office which he held. Therefore, a case of availability of a ground squarely falling within section 22 of the Act must be clearly made out. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of section 22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 8. The proceedings for removal must also satisfy the requirements of natural justice. A President may be removed from office by the State Government, within the meaning of section 22, on the ground of "abuse of his powers" (of President), inter alia. This is the phrase with which we are concerned in the present case. 8. The proceedings for removal must also satisfy the requirements of natural justice. Second proviso to section 22 requires that the reason for the proposed removal shall be communicated to the person proceeded against by means of a registered letter and he shall be allowed 21 days for putting up his explanation in writing. And thereafter alone, the State Government may proceed to notify his removal. In between, a duty to take decision by due application of mind to the allegations made and the explanation given is implicit and shall have to be read in the provision though not expressly stated therein. The appellant is not charged with habitual failure to perform the duties of President of the Municipal Council. He is charged with having abused his powers of President. The vires of the impugned order dated 1-10-1999 have to be tested on the touchstone of the availability of this ground. 9. The phrase "abuse of powers" as providing a ground for proceeding under section 22 is not defined in the Act. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn., 1999) gives the meaning of "abuse" as "to depart from legal or reasonable use in dealing with (a person or thing)", "to injure (a person) physically or mentally", "to damage (a thing)". In Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. 1, p. 402) it is so stated : ABUSE As noun.- It has been said that the word is not a term of art in the law and that its everyday popular sense is well known; but that its proper signification when employed depends upon the context and subject-matter, in its largest sense, ill-use or improper treatment of another; misuse. In the plural as used with reference to the authority of governmental commissions to correct 'abuses', the word has been held to mean a disregard of duty imposed by law; any improper use of a right or privilege." The word "abuse" as occurring in section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 came up for consideration of this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala. The Court observed : ( AIR 1963 SC 116, para 10) "'Abuse' means misuse i.e. using his position for something for which it is not intended. That abuse may be by corrupt or illegal means or otherwise than those means. The word 'otherwise' has wide connotation and if no limitation is placed on it, the words 'corrupt', 'illegal', and 'otherwise' mentioned in the clause become surplusage, for on that construction every abuse of position is gathered by the clause. So some limitation will have to be put on that word and that limitation is that it takes colour from the preceding words along with which it appears in the clause, that is to say, something savouring of dishonest act on his part. The contention of the Learned Counsel that if the clause is widely construed even a recommendation made by a public servant for securing a job for another may come within the clause and that could not have been the intention of the legislature. But in our view such innocuous acts will not be covered by the said clause. The juxtaposition of the word 'otherwise' with the words 'corrupt or illegal means', and the dishonesty implicit in the word 'abuse' indicate the necessity for a dishonest intention on his part to bring him within the meaning of the clause. 10. To find the meaning of a word or expression not defined in an enactment the Courts apply the "subject-and-object rule" which means ascertain carefully the subject of the enactment where the word or expression occurs and have regard to the object which the legislature has in view. Forego the strict grammatical or etymological propriety of language, even its popular use; let the subject or the context in which they are used and the object which the legislature seeks to attain be your lenses through which look for the meaning to be ascribed. In selecting one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. Therefore when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.... Therefore when the context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular meaning out of the diverse meanings a word is capable of, according to lexicographers.... Judge Learned Hand cautioned 'not to make a fortress out of the dictionary' but to pay more attention to 'the sympathetic and imaginative discovery' of the purpose or object of the statute as a guide to its meaning." (See Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G. P. Singh, 7th Edn., 1999, pp. 258-59). 11. this Court in Daulat Ram (supra) and Rajiv Sharma (supra) considering the same has reiterated the law. In Rajiv Sharma (supra) this Court held :- That being so, it is not a case where the general principles governing review of the administrative decision will be applicable. Judicial review in the present case has to be undertaken keeping in view the fact that the power under section 41-A of the Act of 1961 is to be exercised by the State Government for removing an elected office bearer from his office. Meaning thereby that the State Government is acting against the wishes and mandate of the people who have elected the incumbent into office. Accordingly, the opinion with regard to feasibility of keeping such a person in office or the desirability of removing him in public interest has to be viewed objectively and irregularities or allegations alleged should be of such serious nature and of such magnitude that continuation of such a person is undesirable. As indicated by this Court in the case of Kaushalya Bai (Smt.) (supra), the consequence of exercise of power which is to be invoked by the State Government has serious civil consequence not only on the status of the person concerned but of his future prospects also and as no sufficient guidelines have been prescribed, State Government has to invoke the power only if strong and cogent reasons are available. It has been emphasised by this Court, in the aforesaid case of Kaushalya Bai (Smt.) (supra), power cannot be exercised on some trivial or minor irregularities in the discharge of duties by the holder of the office. As indicated in the aforesaid case the materials or the grounds on which the allegations are founded and the reason for removal of the office bearer should justify the exercise of such a drastic power of removal. As indicated in the aforesaid case the materials or the grounds on which the allegations are founded and the reason for removal of the office bearer should justify the exercise of such a drastic power of removal. Keeping in view the aforesaid, the scope of judicial review in such matters is to be considered. That being the legal position, the contention of Shri Jain that this Court cannot over the decision of State Government as an appellate authority has to be scrutinised keeping the aforesaid in view. There is no dispute that this Court cannot sit over the decision of the State Government as an appellate forum and scrutinise the action as if it is deciding an appeal against the order of the State Government, but in the backdrop of the legal principle enumerated hereinabove, in the matters concerning removal of democratically elected people, this Court can very well look into the matter to find out whether the removal is based on cogent and compelling reasons, whether interest of the public, interest of the council have been properly considered, whether material on the basis of which action has been taken is of such a nature that the persons can be held to be responsible for having misused his office to such an extent that retaining him in the office will have serious and far reaching consequence in the interest of the council and ultimately the public at large. this Court can always look into the matter to find out whether conditions and circumstances extraneous to the main purpose of the statute are being achieved by the exercise of its power. In case after appreciating the material on record, this Court comes to a conclusion that the irregularities or misconduct alleged are nothing but some discrepancies or irregularities which cannot be contemplated to and directly attributable to the persons certainly power of judicial review can be exercised. It is in the aforesaid background that the allegations and the material to substantiate the same is to be examined by this Court, to consider the fact as to whether the allegations and the irregularities complained of are so serious in nature that the person has to be unseated from his office. It is in the aforesaid background that the allegations and the material to substantiate the same is to be examined by this Court, to consider the fact as to whether the allegations and the irregularities complained of are so serious in nature that the person has to be unseated from his office. This power of review is approved by this Court in the case of Kaushalya Bai (Smt.) (supra), and therefore, it cannot be said that merely because opportunity of hearing has been given and there is no violation of any statutory provision, the decision of the Government has to be upheld and this Court cannot interfere in the matter. The judgments referred to by learned senior counsel are with regard to scope of judicial review namely in matters concerning disciplinary action against employee's and the Full Bench Judgment in the case of Natwar Singh (Rana) (supra) is with regard to the requirement of passing speaking order in such matters and therefore, are not much relevant for decision in the present case. 12. It is not in dispute that section 41-A of the Act confers extraordinary and overriding power on the State Government to remove an elected office bearer of a local authority on formation of an opinion that continuance of such office bearer is not desirable in public interest or in the interest of the Council or that she is incapable of performing her duties or is working against the provisions of the Act or Rules made thereunder. Before removal it is necessary to afford opportunity of hearing. The basis of formation of opinion and deciding the aforesaid ingredient, the State had based its action on the report of Additional Collector. The enquiry was conducted by the Collector behind the back of the petitioner, without issuance of any notice. When the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner against her removal, it was necessary on the part of respondent to supply copy of aforesaid report, which was the basis for initiating action under section 41-A. The petitioner specifically demanded copy of the report, but it was not supplied. Though the stand of respondent is that the said report was sent along with Annexure R-5, but from the perusal of list of documents sent by Annexure R-5, this report does not find place in the list. Though the stand of respondent is that the said report was sent along with Annexure R-5, but from the perusal of list of documents sent by Annexure R-5, this report does not find place in the list. Apart from this there is no material on record showing that inspite of demand the said report was supplied to the petitioner. Though the respondent No. 1 in the final order has stated that final order has been passed on the basis of report and also on the basis of the record. But on asking by the petitioner it was mandatory on the part of respondents to supply copy of report. Section 41-A provides that no order under this section shall be passed unless a reasonable opportunity of being heard is given. Reasonable opportunity is not mere formality, it must be in substance an opportunity of being heard. Mere notice will not be sufficient if the material on the basis of which the notice was issued is not made available to the petitioner before her removal. The principles of natural justice requires that an opportunity should not be mere eye wash, but infact and in reality it should be an opportunity, to the person before the punitive action is taken against her. The petitioner was elected in the direct election and the entire public of the constituency had shown their confidence in the petitioner. Now the petitioner has been removed from the office against the wishes of the public with certain stigma and disqualification for 5 years to contest the election. In these circumstances, a heavy duty lies on the State to justify its action by application of mind and by providing due opportunity to the petitioner, In this case the petitioner had not been supplied copy of enquiry report by the Collector on the basis of which the action was initiated against the petitioner. The aforesaid report is also basis for the final order. Apart from this for 12-1-2004 when the hearing was fixed by respondent No. 1 no notice was served on petitioner for the date. Once the respondent No. 1 decided to afford a last opportunity to the petitioner, then it should not be a mere formality on paper or in file by issuing notice only. It was the duty of respondent No. 1 to ascertain whether such notice was infact served on the petitioner. Once the respondent No. 1 decided to afford a last opportunity to the petitioner, then it should not be a mere formality on paper or in file by issuing notice only. It was the duty of respondent No. 1 to ascertain whether such notice was infact served on the petitioner. But in this case there is no such material on record showing aforesaid fact that such notice was served on the petitioner. In this case the principles of natural justice has been violated and without following due procedure and affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner she has been removed from the office. As, in the case it is found that the petitioner was not afforded due opportunity of hearing and has been deprived to submit her reply after supplying copy of inquiry report of Additional Collector apart from opportunity of hearing on 12-1-2004 and only on this ground the order Annexure P-1 deserves to be set aside and matter deserves to be remitted back to be heard and decided by respondent No. 1 on merits. In these circumstances, though the contention has been raised by the parties on merits of the case, but those contentions are neither considered nor decided in the aforesaid circumstances so that respondent No. 1 will be free to consider and decide the case of petitioner in accordance with law. 13. In the aforesaid circumstances, the impugned order Annexure P-1 is not sustainable under law and is liable to be quashed. The matter deserves to be remitted back to the respondent No. 1 to afford an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. As the respondent along with the return has filed copy of the enquiry report which has been served on the petitioner and now it will not be necessary to supply any other documents to the petitioner. The petitioner shall be entitled to get a period of fifteen days to submit her reply before respondent No. 1. The petitioner shall be also at liberty to file all the documents within the period of fifteen days, or along with the reply, if any, in support of her contention. The petitioner shall be entitled to get a period of fifteen days to submit her reply before respondent No. 1. The petitioner shall be also at liberty to file all the documents within the period of fifteen days, or along with the reply, if any, in support of her contention. If the petitioner files such reply, the respondent No. 1 either on the same day shall fix a date of hearing which shall be intimated to the petitioner then and there and if no reply is filed by the petitioner or if no date is fixed by respondent No. 1 on the date of filing the reply, then the respondent No. 1 shall serve a notice by Regd. A/D post and/or to the petitioner by fixing a date of hearing, and on that intimated date of hearing shall hear, and decide the case, in accordance with law. 14. In view of aforesaid, this petition stands allowed and following directions are issued :- 1. The order Annexure P-1 is hereby quashed and petitioner is allowed fifteen days time from today to submit her reply before the respondent No. 1 personally. The petitioner shall be at liberty to file necessary documents along with the reply. In no case any further opportunity will be allowed to the petitioner in this regard. 2. Respondent No. 1 on filing aforesaid reply or otherwise, either shall fix the date of hearing in the presence of petitioner or if no date is fixed by respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 1 shall intimate to the petitioner the date of hearing by Registered A/D post or by a notice to the petitioner, as the case may be, and on that date of hearing shall hear the matter, and then decide the case, in accordance with law. No order as to costs.