Judgment :- N.Kannadasan, J. The above appeal is filed by the Revenue raising following substantial question of law:- "Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in terms of the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with Germany, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the payment made to the assessee foreign company was taxable at the rate of 20% as technical know-how fees and not at 30% as royalty? 2. The assessment proceedings of the foreign company represented by their agents Lakshmi Synthetic Machinery Manufacturers Limited, Coimbatore for the assessment year 1992-93 was completed under Section 143(3) of the Income Tax Act (hereinafter called as 'Act') on 11.1.1995. In the course of the assessment proceedings, a question arose as to whether the assessee should be taxed at 30% as applicable to the royalty or 20% applicable to technical know-how fees. The assessee/respondent herein contended that in the agreement entered into between the foreign company and their agents, separate clauses are existing viz., technical know-how fees and royalty. The Assessing Officer, by assessment order dated 11.1.1995, held that the disputed amount falls within the meaning of royalty and accordingly held that it has to be taxed at 30% in pursuance of Section 115-A. 3. Aggrieved against the said order of the Assessing Officer, the assessee filed the appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (hereinafter called as 'Commissioner'). The Commissioner held that the amount received would be termed only as a technical know-how fees and accordingly it is taxable at the rate of 20% as per Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. On further appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter called as 'Tribunal'), the order of the Commissioner was confirmed, against which the present appeal is filed by the Revenue. 4. The learned Standing Counsel for the appellant contended that the Assessing Officer has passed the order of assessment by correctly treating the amount as royalty within the meaning of Section 9(1)(vi) of the Act and accordingly contended that the assessee is liable for tax at the rate of 30% as against the rate of 20%. The learned counsel contended that the order of the first and the second Appellate Authorities are contrary to the relevant provisions of the Act and as such are liable to be set aside. 5. We have considered the contentions raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel contended that the order of the first and the second Appellate Authorities are contrary to the relevant provisions of the Act and as such are liable to be set aside. 5. We have considered the contentions raised by the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant. 6. A perusal of the order of the Commissioner discloses that a factual finding was rendered with reference to the agreement entered into between the parties to the effect that the payment of royalty is directly linked to commercial production of machines by the Indian company. The Commissioner further held that for the assessment year 1992-93, the company has not commenced the production of machines and accordingly concluded that the entire payment received by the foreign company as per Article 12.1 of the agreement constituted technical know-how fees only and taxable at the rate of 20% as per Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. 7. When the Revenue has filed a further appeal before the Tribunal, the order of the Commissioner was confirmed. That apart, it was specifically observed by the Tribunal to the effect that the representative of the Revenue has not raised any valid objection with regard to the findings of the Commissioner. 8. In the light of the above facts and circumstances, it is seen that the first Appellate Authority as well as the second Appellate Authority have rendered a categorical factual finding based on appreciation of evidence to the effect that the order of the Assessing Officer as not a correct one. Even though the appellant has not succeeded before both the Appellate Authorities, has chosen to file the present appeal, by contending that the substantial question of law as stated supra should be decided by this Court. A perusal of the substantial question of law clearly discloses that the appellant is aggrieved only with regard to the factual findings rendered by the Appellate Authorities, much less, there is no substantial question of law involved in the present appeal. The scope of Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act 1961 does not enable the parties to file an appeal, if they are aggrieved, as against the factual finding rendered by the Appellate Authorities. The above view is supported by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. K.Manickam (2004) 187 CTR (Mad) 493). 9. The scope of Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act 1961 does not enable the parties to file an appeal, if they are aggrieved, as against the factual finding rendered by the Appellate Authorities. The above view is supported by the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. K.Manickam (2004) 187 CTR (Mad) 493). 9. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that there is no substantial question of law is raised within the ambit of Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act. We are therefore of the considered opinion that the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.