V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THIS common order shall dispose of all the Writ Petitions. All the petitioners are lessees of property belonging to Sri Lakshmi narayana Swamy Temple, Tirupati since 1983. They constructed structures thereon and living there. Second respondent temple initiated action for eviction of petitioners under Section 83 of the Andhra Pradesh charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1987 (for short, the act) by filing original applications being o. A. Nos. 11, 8 and 9 of 2000 respectively. After receiving notices from Deputy commissioner of Endowments, Kurnool, first respondent herein, petitioners filed interlocutory applications based on a news item published in Telugu Newspapers eenadu and Vaartha dt. 12-11-2003 to the effect that second respondent temple handed over property to third respondent. Their contention was that second respondent is no more lessor and therefore cannot maintain application under Sec. 83 of the Act. By separate impugned orders passed on the same date i. e. , 29-11-2003 first respondent rejected the interlocutory applications holding that petitioners did not file any documentary evidence except producing newspapers clippings. These orders are assailed in the Writ Petitions. ( 2 ) AFTER perusing the impugned orders, I find no illegality or error apparent on the face of the record. A charitable or religious institution is required to invoke jurisdiction under Section 83 of the Act for removing encroachments from the property belonging to religious institutions. In case pending such application some other institution steps into shoes of the applicant institution, the Deputy commissioner of Endowments does not loose jurisdiction to entertain the case. The successor institution can always seek impleadment and continue proceedings or if an order is passed under Section 83 of the act, the order of the authority can be enforced in accordance with Sections 84 and 85 of the Act. Therefore, mere allegation that second respondent institution transferred the property to third respondent is of no consequence and is no relevance. ( 3 ) FURTHER, as per Section 149 of the Act the procedure contemplated under Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) "as nearly as may be" is applicable to the enquiries under the Act. Therefore, mere allegation that second respondent institution transferred the property to third respondent is of no consequence and is no relevance. ( 3 ) FURTHER, as per Section 149 of the Act the procedure contemplated under Code of civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) "as nearly as may be" is applicable to the enquiries under the Act. A Division Bench of this Court in P. Mohan Reddy v. D. R. T. A, Mumbai interpreted the words "as far as possible" appearing in Section 29 of the Recovery of debts due to Bank and Financial Institutions act, 1993 has observed as under. . . . . . . . Section 29 of the Act thus authorises the Debt Recovery Officer to follow the Second and Third schedules to income Tax Act, 1961 as far as possible with necessary modifications. The phrase "as far as possible" can be interpreted in various ways. Keeping in view the intent and object of the Act, in our view, use of this phraseology "as far as possible" in Section 29 does not impose an obligation on the Recovery officer to meticulously follow the provisions of Section and Third schedules. Section 29 does provide liberty to Recovery Officer to follow the provisions of Second and third Schedules with necessary modifications. It gives him enough discretion that he has to follow the provisions of Second and Third schedules as far as possible and may make necessary modifications. The language employed is such that three is flexibility and not mandate to follow the rules as they are. The Rules no doubt have to be followed but as far as possible with necessary modifications. ( 4 ) THEREFORE, though the procedure under cpc is made applicable, in my considered opinion, Order XIV Rule 2 (1) which enables a Civil Court to decide a preliminary issue has no application to the enquiries under section 83 of the Act. Therefore, first respondent was justified in not entertaining the interlocutory applications filed by petitioners pending adjudication of the original applications. The petitioners may approach first respondent for expeditious disposal of original applications preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. ( 5 ) WITH the above observations, the Writ petitions are dismissed.