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2004 DIGILAW 916 (MAD)

The Commandant & Others v. S. Selvam

2004-07-16

M.CHOCKALINGAM, N.V.BALASUBRAMANIAN

body2004
Judgment :- N.V. Balasubramanian, J. This Writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned Judge made in W.P.No.6409 of 1999 dated 19.11.2002 wherein the learned Judge has quashed the order of removal from service of the respondent in the Central Reserve Police Force and modified the order of removal from service by ordering reinstatement subject to certain conditions. 2.The brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: The respondent joined the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter referred to as CRPF) as constable at Avadi, Chennai from 1.4.1990 and after completion of basic training, he was posted to 28 Battalion. The respondent while on duty proceeded on leave for 30 days from 4.8.1995 to 3.9.1995 and thereafter he remained over stay leave for 11 days and reported at C/28 Jammu on 15.9.1995 and F/28 on 20.9.1995. It is stated that the respondent was called by the officer commanding F/28 in his chamber on 22.9.1995 seeking explanation for his overstay leave. It is the case of the appellants that the respondent while producing medical certificate in support of his over stay leave had misbehaved with his seniors in the presence of the company commander. Consequently, the respondent was awarded a punishment of two hours pack drill for one day i.e. On 22.9.1995, which the respondent refused to undergo. Thereafter, he was again awarded a punishment of 6 days Quarter Guard confinement with forfeiture of pay and allowances under Section 11 (3) of CRPF Act 1949. The respondent, according to the appellants, refused to undergo the punishment and he was found loitering outside the cell. As a result of which, he was again awarded the punishment of two hours pack drill on 24.9.1995 for 10 days to run concurrently which the respondent disobeyed to undergo. As a result of his disobedience, departmental enquiry was initiated and the following articles of charges were framed: Article -I: That No.901160813 CT.S. Selvam of F/28 Bn, CRPF while functioning as CT. As a result of his disobedience, departmental enquiry was initiated and the following articles of charges were framed: Article -I: That No.901160813 CT.S. Selvam of F/28 Bn, CRPF while functioning as CT. (GD) during the period from 1991 committed an offence of disobedience of orders in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 in that he refused to undergo the terms of punishment of one day pack drill from 2 hours and six days confinement to lines with two hours extra pack drill daily awarded to him on 22.9.95 by OC F/28 Bn, CRPF in his O.R. Article-II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said No.901160813 Ct.S.Selvam was guilty of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he addressed a petition/complaint against his seniors directly to higher authority without exhausting the normal channels. 3. It is also relevant to mention here that the Memorandum of Charge was also issued to the respondent by Memorandum No.P.VIII.11/96-28-EC-2 dated 9.1.1996 and in Office Memorandum No. P.VIII.3/96-28-EC-II dated 22.2.1996 one Shri B.C.Sharma A/C 28 Bn., CRPF was appointed as the enquiry officer. He was later changed and one K.Somasekharan was appointed as the inquiry officer by order dated 24.2.1996. The respondent submitted his explanation and enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer, K.Somasekharan and the enquiry officer has submitted his enquiry report. The enquiry officer found that both the charges have been fully proved against the respondent and the prosecution brought home the guilt and proved the guilt beyond any shadow of doubt and the charges framed against the respondent were proved. The Disciplinary Authority, however found that there were procedural irregularities in the inquiry and that there was a contradiction in the punishment awarded in orderly Room register from the one recorded in Article -I of charge. He also noticed that the enquiry officer has failed to discuss the charges under Articles I and II elaborately to arrive at conclusion basing on the relevant documentary evidence as well as statements of witnesses examined. He also noticed that the enquiry officer has failed to discuss the charges under Articles I and II elaborately to arrive at conclusion basing on the relevant documentary evidence as well as statements of witnesses examined. Hence, he recorded the finding that after having gone through the evidence on record, he felt that it will not be proper to issue any order on the enquiry report submitted by K.Somasekharan,A/C and to avoid further representation and procedural irregularities, he cancelled the office order P.VIII.11/96-28-EC-2 dated 22.2.1996 and ordered enquiry to be conducted de novo. It is no doubt true that the office order dated 22.2.1996 was the order appointing B.C.Sharma as the inquiry officer which was cancelled already by appointing K.Somasekharan as the inquiry officer. According to the decision arrived at by the disciplinary authority, a fresh enquiry was conducted. By order dated 30.1.1997, the following articles of charges were framed and issued to the respondent. ARTICLE-I That No.901160813 Ct.S.Selvam of F/28 Bn. CRPF while functioning as a Constable (GD), committed an offence of disobedience of orders in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949, in that, he refused to undergo the terms of punishment of one day pack drill for two hours awarded to him on 22.9.1995 and subsequently 6 days quarter guard awarded on 22.9.1995, in the orderly room by his Officer Commanding, which he refused to undergo on 24.9.1995 he was again awarded punishment of 2 hours pack drill for 10 days to run concurrently, which he continued to disobey. ARTICLE II That during the aforesaid period and while functioning in the aforesaid office, the said No.901160813 Ct.S.Selvam was guilt of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 in that he addressed a petition/complaint against his seniors directly to higher authority without exhausting the normal channels. Along with the charges, the statement of imputation of misconduct was also furnished along with the list of documents and list of witnesses. The de novo departmental enquiry was conducted. It will be relevant to mention here that the respondent earlier challenged the de novo enquiry in W.P.No.3258 of 1997 on the file of this Court. In that writ petition the respondent sought to quash the memorandum issued by the first appellant herein dated 7.2.1997 in his proceedings No.P.VIII-4/97-28 EC-2. The de novo departmental enquiry was conducted. It will be relevant to mention here that the respondent earlier challenged the de novo enquiry in W.P.No.3258 of 1997 on the file of this Court. In that writ petition the respondent sought to quash the memorandum issued by the first appellant herein dated 7.2.1997 in his proceedings No.P.VIII-4/97-28 EC-2. This Court, by order dated 10.3.1997, directed the respondent to file his written objection to the memorandum dated 7.2.1997 and liberty was also granted to the respondent to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law if any order is passed against him. 4. The enquiry officer submitted his report and it was found in the enquiry report that the charge under Article-I & II were proved. On the basis of the enquiry officer's report, the disciplinary authority after complying with the procedural formalities accepted the report of the enquiry officer and awarded punishment of removal from service of the respondent with effect from 19.05.1998. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary authority, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Deputy Inspector General of Police, CRPF, Avadi, Chennai and the Appellate Authority also found that the charge under Article-I was proved to the extent of disobedience of orders of punishment-III i.e. Pack drill for 10 days from 25.9.1995 to 4.10.1995. He also found that the Article -II was proved. He held that the respondent is a person of habitual disobedience to the orders of authority and he held that the punishment of removal from service awarded by the commandant was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct. The respondent thereafter preferred a revision before the Revisional Authority, viz., the Inspector General of Police The Revisional authority found that the earlier departmental enquiry could not be finalised due to procedural irregularities in the departmental enquiry and therefore a fresh departmental enquiry was conducted and reasons were recorded for ordering fresh enquiry. He found that the order of the Appellate Authority for removal from service was justified as it was commensurate with the offence. He found that the charge under Article-II was proved as the respondent has admitted the charge. He therefore held that there were no grounds to interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority. He found that the order of the Appellate Authority for removal from service was justified as it was commensurate with the offence. He found that the charge under Article-II was proved as the respondent has admitted the charge. He therefore held that there were no grounds to interfere with the order passed by the appellate authority. The respondent has challenged the order of removal from service in W.P.No.6409 of 1999 and the learned Judge of this Court held that the punishment of removal from service appeared to be grossly disproportionate and it would have been more proper to impose some other punishment. Learned Judge proceeded on the basis that the main allegation against the respondent was absence from duty. Learned Judge found that adequate opportunity was not given to the respondent and the case required remand. Learned Judge held that interest of justice would be met by setting aside the order of punishment of removal from service instead of ordering remand and directed that the respondent shall be reinstated in service, but he shall be confined to Quarter Guard for a period of three days and no backwages would be paid to him for the period from the date of removal till the date of rejoining and the respondent herein shall report before the first appellant within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the said order and thereafter to undergo the punishment. It is against the order of the learned Judge, the present appeal has been preferred. 6. Mr.C.Krishnan, learned Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the view of the learned Judge that the punishment of removal from service has been passed for overstay of leave by the respondent was not justified. He also submitted that in fact, the main allegation against the respondent was not overstaying beyond the leave period, but the disobedience to the orders of the superior authority. We find force in his submission. Article I of the charge was framed for disobedience to the orders of the superior authority on three occasions and it was not for overstay of the leave period, though the charge has emanated when the respondent has overstayed the leave and he was called to explain the overstay and at that time the incidents had occurred for imposing the first punishment which he refused to undergo. The second charge was regarding sending his complaint directly to the Additional Director General of Police without exhausting the normal channels. The reading of the charge does indicate that the charges were framed not for overstay beyond the leave period, though it was the cause for all the charges levelled against the respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent has not seriously disputed that the charge was not for overstay leave. 7. The next submission of Mr.Krishnan, learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel is that the view of the learned Judge that the respondent was not given adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry is not justified. Here also, we find that the counsel for appellant is well-founded in his submission. We have gone through the records and we find that the respondent was given adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry. The Appellate authority has found that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the rules and the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority offered the opportunities to the delinquent officer. Hence, we hold that the respondent was given adequate opportunity during the course of enquiry to represent his case. As a matter of fact, in the affidavit filed by the respondent, there is no such averment that adequate opportunity was not granted to him during the course of the enquiry, nor has he made any complaint before the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority that he was not given adequate opportunity during the course of inquiry. 8. The next submission of Mr.Krishnan, SCGSC regarding the ground raised by the respondent herein in the writ petition filed by him that holding of fresh enquiry amending the earlier charges in the memorandum is contrary to law is not sustainable. The main grievance of the respondent is that after the first enquiry officer submitted his report, the disciplinary authority set aside the same and cancelled the same by office Order dated 30.1.1997 and that was done without jurisdiction. Hence, it is stated that the commencement by the of the fresh inquiry was not justified and consequently, the entire enquiry proceeding should be declared as null and void. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellants opposing the stand taken by the respondent submitted that a serious defect has crept in the first enquiry in the framing of the charge and there was no proper enquiry by the first enquiry Officer. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellants opposing the stand taken by the respondent submitted that a serious defect has crept in the first enquiry in the framing of the charge and there was no proper enquiry by the first enquiry Officer. He submitted that under the provisions of Decision 9 of Rule 15 of CCS(CCA) Rules, the Disciplinary Authority has recorded his reasons for cancellation of first enquiry report and new charges were framed. Further, it is stated that the earlier charges have been dropped without prejudice to the further action which is a manifest in the order of cancellation of the inquiry report and de novo enquiry was ordered. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the ratio laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. P.Thayagarajan (AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 449) would apply to the facts of the case and the ratio laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in K.R.Deb Vs. The Collector of Central Excise, Shillong (1971(2) Supreme Court Cases 102) does not apply to the facts of the present case. 9. Mr.Mohammed Ibrahim Ali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that the case in hand would fall within the ratio laid down in K.R.DEB's Case. According to him, it is not a case where some defects had crept during the the enquiry nor it is a case where some witnesses were not examined and he submitted that there is no provision under 27 of the CRPF Rules to set aside the report of the enquiry officer and to order fresh enquiry. He referred to Rule 27(c) Sub-Section(6) of CRPF Rules and submitted that when the enquiry officer has forwarded his report together with the proceedings, the disciplinary authority has to record his findings and pass orders and he has no power at all to set aside the findings of the enquiry officer and to order fresh enquiry. His main submission is that the fresh inquiry conducted by the enquiry officer is contrary to the rules and not in accordance with law. He urged that it is not open to the Disciplinary Authority to order a fresh enquiry by setting aside the finding of the earlier enquiry officer. His main submission is that the fresh inquiry conducted by the enquiry officer is contrary to the rules and not in accordance with law. He urged that it is not open to the Disciplinary Authority to order a fresh enquiry by setting aside the finding of the earlier enquiry officer. He further submitted that in P.THAYAGARAJAN's Case, oral statement was not recorded in the presence of the parties and hence, it was held that the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer was contrary to the rules but there is no such defect in the enquiry proceedings conducted in the present case. He also submitted that the Disciplinary authority in office order dated 30.1.1997 has cancelled the order P.VIII.3/96-28-EC-II dated 22.2.1996 appointing one Mr.B.C.Sharma as enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority has not set aside the report submitted by the earlier enquiry officer which shows complete non-application of mind on the part of the disciplinary authority, even as to the order which he intended to set aside and the fresh inquiry was conducted without even setting aside the report of the first enquiry officer. 10. We carefully considered the submission of Mr.Krishnan, learned SCGSC appearing for the appellants and Mr.Mohammed Ibrahim Ali, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 11. The Central Reserve Police Force Act 1949 provides for the constitution and regulation of an armed Central Reserve Police Force and Section 18 of the said Act deals with the power to make rules. The Rules, inter alia, provide for procedure for awarding punishment and Rule 27(c) of the said Rules provides for the procedure for conducting the departmental enquiry. Rule 27(c)(6) of CRPF Rules reads as follows: "27(c)(6): If the commandant has himself held the enquiry, he shall record his findings and pass orders where he has power to do so. If the enquiry has been held by any officer other than the Commandant, the officer conducting the enquiry shall forward his report together with the proceedings, to the Commandant, who shall record his findings and pass orders, where he has power to do so." The above rule is similar to that of Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. 12. The scope of Rule 15(1) of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was considered by the Supreme Court in K.R.DEB's case and the Supreme Court held as under: "12. 12. The scope of Rule 15(1) of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was considered by the Supreme Court in K.R.DEB's case and the Supreme Court held as under: "12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry, but, it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to re-consider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9." 13.The Supreme Court has again considered the scope of Rule 15 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules in P.THAYAGARAJAN's case and after considering the earlier decision in K.R.DEB's case, the Supreme Court held as under. "8. A careful reading of this passage will make it clear that this Court notices that if in a particular case where there has been no proper enquiry, because of some serious defect having crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or were not examined, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry officer to record further evidence but that provision would not enable the Disciplinary Authority to set aside the previous enquiries on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. In the present case, the basis upon which the Disciplinary Authority set aside the enquiry is that the procedure adopted by the Enquiry officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties and not that the report does not appeal to him. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in a miscarriage thereof. When important evidence, either to be relied upon by the department or by the delinquent official is shut out, this would not result in any advancement of any justice but on the other hand result in a miscarriage thereof. Therefore, we are of the view that Rule 27(c) enables the Disciplinary Authority to record his findings on the report and to pass an appropriate order including ordering a de novo enquiry in a case of present nature." 14.In this connection, it is also relevant to note the Government of India Decision 9 of Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules which reads as follows: "(9) Reasons for cancellation of original charge-sheet to be mentioned if for issuing a fresh charge-sheet- It is clarified that once the proceedings initiated under Rule 14 or Rule 16 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 are dropped, the Disciplinary Authorities would be debarred from initiating fresh proceedings against the Delinquent Officers unless the reasons for cancellation of the original charge-sheet or for dropping the proceedings are appropriately mentioned and it it duly stated in the order that the proceedings were being dropped without prejudice to further action which may be considered in the circumstances of the case. It is, therefore, important that when the intention is to issue a subsequent fresh charge-sheet, the order cancelling the original one or dropping the proceedings should be carefully worded so as to mention the reasons for such an action and indicting the intention of issuing a subsequent charge-sheet appropriate to the nature of charges the same was based on." Rule 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules has been amended by notification dated 21st August, 2000 for remitting the matter to the enquiry officer and we are not concerned with the amendment which came into force subsequently. 15.We have carefully gone through the decisions of the Supreme Court both in K.R.DEB'S case and R.THAYAGARAJAN'S case and the Supreme Court has held that Rule 15 of the C.C.A.Rules provides for one enquiry and there is no provision for completely setting aside previous enquiry on the ground that the report of the Enquiry officer does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority as the authorities concerned has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 16.The Supreme Court in R.THAYAGARAJAN'S CASE, after considering the earlier decision in K.R.BEB'S case, held that the disciplinary authority would be justified in setting aside the enquiry when the procedure adopted by the enquiry officer was contrary to the relevant rules and affects the rights of the parties. In R.THAYAGARAJAN'S case, the Supreme Court found that the disciplinary authority would be justified in setting aside the enquiry where it is set aside not on the ground that the report of the enquiry officer does not appeal to him but it was found that setting aside the enquiry officer's report is necessary in the advancement of justice and if it was not set aside, it would result in miscarriage of justice as the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority was contrary to the Rules as the relevant evidence in the case was shut out. We are of the view that the ratio laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in R.THAYAGARAJAN' S case would apply to the facts of the case. 17. We find on the facts of the case that there was a defective framing of the Charge under Article I in the first inquiry and Article I of the charge was so framed that it did not reflect the imputation made against the respondent truly and correctly and it was not in accordance with the orderly room Register. The Disciplinary authority, therefore found that the enquiry officer did not apply his mind as to the nature of imputation made against the respondent as there was defective framing of charge and due to the defective nature of the charge the relevant evidence in support of the charge was not properly placed before the enquiry officer in the departmental enquiry. We are of the view that it is a case where the disciplinary authority found that serious defect has crept into the enquiry even as regards the framing of charge and if the report of the enquiry officer was to be accepted, it would not result in any advancement of justice, but would result in miscarriage of justice as the relevant evidence would not be forthcoming due to the defective framing of charge. Hence, the disciplinary authority, on perusal of the first inquiry report which was also adverse to the respondent, recorded a finding that it would not be proper to issue any order on the enquiry report submitted by the earlier enquiry officer to avoid further representation and procedural irregularities. We are of the view that it is not a case where the report was not accepted on the ground that the report did not appeal to the disciplinary authority, but the disciplinary authority found that a serious defect has crept in the enquiry. We are of the view that the defect in the enquiry would include not only cases where the important evidence was shut out, but also would encompass within itself the defective framing of charge as the charge is the basis on which the inquiry is held. We are of the view that without the proper charge it will be neither possible for the delinquent to meet the case levelled against him, nor it will be possible for the department to lead all evidence. We are of the view that the defects in the enquiry are not to be confined to certain material irregularities committed during the course of conducting the enquiry after the charge is framed, but would extend to cases where there is a defective framing of the charge as well. The emphasis made in P.THAYAGARAJAN case is that the disciplinary authority would be justified in setting aside the enquiry report on the ground that the acceptance of the enquiry report would not result in advancement of justice and it would result in miscarriage of justice if so accepted. In our view that the disciplinary authority in such cases would be justified in setting aside the inquiry report as he would be setting aside the report not on the ground that it did not appeal to his mind, but on the ground that the acceptance of the report would result in injustice. In our view that the disciplinary authority in such cases would be justified in setting aside the inquiry report as he would be setting aside the report not on the ground that it did not appeal to his mind, but on the ground that the acceptance of the report would result in injustice. We are of the view that by reason of defective nature of the charges framed, there was no possibility for the Department to lead proper evidence which would mean that the enquiry officer has not applied his mind even as to the nature of imputation made against the delinquent as the charge framed is far different from the one recorded in the official record, viz., the Orderly Room Register which contains the nature of disobedience committed by him. We therefore hold that where the inquiry officer proceeded on the basis of a defective charge framed and submitted his report, the disciplinary authority will be perfectly justified and it will also be open to him to set aside the enquiry officer's report arrived at on the basis of defective charge. In our opinion, the enquiry concluded though apparently may seem to be proper, but the serious infirmity in such an enquiry is the defective framing of charge on the basis of which the enquiry is held. We therefore hold that the disciplinary authority, on the facts of the case, was justified in setting aside the report of the first inquiry officer. 18.Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that since the enquiry officer has set aside only the office order dated 22.2.1996 appointing B.C.Sharma as enquiry officer, but has not set aside the enquiry officer's report, the fresh enquiry conducted was not proper. We are of the view that the order of the Commandant dated 31.8.1998 has to be read as a whole and the order indicates that he had applied his mind to the defective enquiry conducted by the earlier enquiry officer and non-placing of relevant evidence before the enquiry officer and then, came to the conclusion that the enquiry officer has failed to discuss the charge under Article 1. He found that the report of the enquiry officer was defective and suffered from procedural irregularities, and hence, to avoid further representation and further procedural irregularities, he set aside the order of the enquiry officer's report. He found that the report of the enquiry officer was defective and suffered from procedural irregularities, and hence, to avoid further representation and further procedural irregularities, he set aside the order of the enquiry officer's report. Though in the penultimate part of his order he set aside the office order dated 22.2.1996, it is manifest from the reading of the order as a whole that he set aside the report of the earlier enquiry officer as he ordered de novo enquiry. In our view, it will be futile to focus one's attention to one part of the order, and the order has to be read as a whole and if so read, it is apparent that the disciplinary authority has applied his mind to the serious defective nature of the charge and he set aside the report by ordering a fresh inquiry. 19. We also find that the disciplinary authority has recorded his reasons for not taking any action on the basis of the earlier enquiry report and in the order dated 31.1.1997, he has also clearly indicated his intention to issue a fresh Charge with the charges properly framed and on that basis, de novo enquiry was also initiated. We therefore hold that there is no procedural irregularity in ordering de novo enquiry. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that the charges levelled against the respondent have not been proved. We have gone through the evidence on record and we find that the disciplinary authority has arrived at his conclusion based on the materials on record. The Appellate Authority has also found that the charge under Article I stood proved to extent of disobedience of orders of punishment III, i.e., pack drill for 10 days from 25.9.1995 to 4.10.1995 and he found that the charge under Article 1 stood proved to the extent of disobedience to the orders of punishment for 10 days pack drill for 2 hours. The charge under Article II was fully proved as the respondent himself has admitted the commission of the same. The Revisional authority on the basis of the material came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. Hence, we reject the submission that the charges were not proved as we find that all the three authorities on the basis of materials arrived at their findings and there are no reasons not to accept the same. 21. The Revisional authority on the basis of the material came to the conclusion that the charges were proved. Hence, we reject the submission that the charges were not proved as we find that all the three authorities on the basis of materials arrived at their findings and there are no reasons not to accept the same. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned Judge has modified the order of removal from service as to one of reinstatement subject to certain conditions and this Court as a Appellate Court may not interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Judge. We find that the learned Judge has proceeded on the basis that the main allegation against the respondent was absence from duty and he has proceeded on the basis that the respondent has over stayed and therefore the order of removal was passed. We find that the allegation against the respondent was not for his absence from the duty, but one for disobedience to the orders of the higher authorities and there was a consistent disobedience to the orders and the respondent disobeyed the orders of punishment awarded by the competent authority more than once. Moreover the learned Judge was of the view that adequate opportunity was not granted to the petitioner during the enquiry, but on the other hand, we find from the records that the respondent was given ample opportunity during enquiry and it is also not his case as well in the writ petition filed by him that adequate opportunity during the course of enquiry was not granted to him. Hence, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Court may not interfere with the discretion of the learned Judge regarding reduction of quantum of punishment is not acceptable on the facts of the case. 22.Learned counsel for the respondent then submitted that the respondent is only aged about 35 years old and he is the sole bread winner of family and his future will be affected if the order of removal of service is sustained. As already set out, both the charges against the respondent have been proved. The respondent is serving in a disciplined force and the discipline and dedication of duty are hallmark in a disciplined force like CRPF. As already set out, both the charges against the respondent have been proved. The respondent is serving in a disciplined force and the discipline and dedication of duty are hallmark in a disciplined force like CRPF. The disobedience of the order of superior officer in a disciplined force like CRPF cannot be viewed lightly and if the indiscipline in a disciplined force in any form is condoned, it will give a wrong signal to the other members of the Force. It was also found that the respondent was persistently disobeying the orders of the superior authorities more than once, more particularly in the place which is affected by terrorists. Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the appellants rightly brought to our attention the provisions of Sections 9,10 & 11 of the CRPF Act and submitted that under Section 9(c) and (e) of the Act, the disobedience of the lawful command of the superior officer is a more heinous offence and the punishment prescribed is transportation for life for a term not less than seven years or with imprisonment for a term which may extent to fourteen years or with fine which may extend to three months' pay or with fine in addition to such sentence of transportation or imprisonment. Under the CRPF Act, the removal from service is treated as a minor punishment and viewed in that light, the punishment imposed on the respondent cannot be stated to be severe. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan Lal Arya Vs. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and others ( 2004(20CTC 301), State of U.P. Vs. Jaikaran Singh (2003 Supreme Court Cases (L & S) 1176), MITHILESH SINGH VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( (2003) 3 SUPREME COURT CASES 309) and KANTHA DEVI VS. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER ((2003) 4 SUPREME COURT CASES 753) and submitted that in those cases, the Court interfered with the quantum of punishment. We have already found that it is not a case where the punishment inflicted is grossly unjust that shocks the conscience of the court. We have already held that the respondent has disobeyed the orders of the higher authorities. We have already found that it is not a case where the punishment inflicted is grossly unjust that shocks the conscience of the court. We have already held that the respondent has disobeyed the orders of the higher authorities. He was serving in the terrorist affected area and if a member of an armed force persistently disobeys the orders of the higher authorities, it would seriously affect the morale and discipline in the organisation. 24.Hence, we hold that the learned Single Judge was not correct in interfering with the order of removal from service of the respondent. The writ appeal stands allowed. Though we sustain the order of removal from service, considering the fact that the respondent is aged about 35 years and he has to maintain his family, following the decision of the Supreme Court in LAXMI SHANKAR PANDEY VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ( AIR 1991 SUPREME COURT 1070) the respondent is permitted to make a representation to the 4th appellant viz., The Director General of Police for re-employment and if the respondent makes any such representation, the fourth appellant may consider his application for re-appointment of the respondent to any suitable post as a fresh appointee. We make the above suggestion and we trust that the suggestion would be considered in a proper and fitting manner. With these observations, the writ appeal stands allowed. There will be no order as to costs.