., J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a company registered under the provisions of the companies act, 1956. It has its manufacturing activity, namely, the foundry unit as well as its machine tool unit both at harihar and it had employed about 1740 workmen. There were three unions in the said industrial establishment. The said three unions are arrayed as respondents 3, 4 and 5. Respondent 3 is a majority union. On account of general industrial recession in machine tool industry and also due to various severe competition for the products manufactured by the company both from the domestic manufacturers and also from imports of machines from abroad, the company suffered loss. They could not meet the statutory obligations. Power supply was disconnected for non-payment of electricity bills which brought the activities of the company to a total standstill. Petitioner-company was forced to lay-off all its workmen on 21-10-2000 and 23-10-2000 with the consent of the workmen/union. Thereafter, the petitioner-company was able to carry on its production activities partially by using diesel-generating set and by operating light machines only. Subsequently as that was not working economically all the workmen were laid off. After several rounds of talk between the trade union and the petitioner certain understandings were reached to try out from the difficult situation. The petitioner sought the co-operation of the workmen in this regard. Subsequently, the workmen indulged in arm twisting tactics like digging up trenches measuring 3 feet in depth and 2 feet in width in front of two gates of the company, one on the northern side and the other on the southern side with a view to forcibly prevent the movement of men, material, vehicles and other essential food articles, ingress and egress into the establishment including the residential colony area thereby affecting not only the normal production activities during the said lay-off period but also the normal life of the inmates in the residential colony of the petitioner- company. Subsequently, the agitating workmen took law into their hands and indulged in violent activities. The petitioner was constrained to approach civil court seeking an Orderof temporary injunction against the workmen. They were also constrained to file writ petition before this court as public interest litigation seeking urgent interim orders which were granted. Subsequently, the agitating workmen took law into their hands and indulged in violent activities. The petitioner was constrained to approach civil court seeking an Orderof temporary injunction against the workmen. They were also constrained to file writ petition before this court as public interest litigation seeking urgent interim orders which were granted. In Orderto prevent any further damage to the properties of the company and other persons who are confined, the petitioner-company had to effect a lockout in all departments with immediate effect from 1st January, 2001. Then there was a conciliation meeting with the second respondent- authority. Parties appeared before them, put forth their respective cases and the conciliation officer reported to the government that conciliation has failed. On the basis of the said report, government passed Order under Section 10 (1) of the industrial disputes act, 1947 (for short hereinafter referred to as 'the act'), referring the dispute between the parties, namely, whether the lockout dated 1-1-2001 declared by the management is legal, acceptable, for adjudication to the labour court by their Order dated 23-1-2001 as per Annexure-t. On the very same day the government proceeded to pass Order under Section 10 (3) of the act prohibiting the lockout with immediate effect, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-s. The petitioner being aggrieved by the Order passed under Section 10 (3) of the act prohibiting lockout as per Annexure-s has preferred this writ petition. ( 2 ) PETITIONER contends, when the lockout declared by the management was referred for adjudication to the labour court under Section 10 (1), the government had no jurisdiction to prohibit the very same subject-matter of reference by exercising power under Section 10 (3) of the act. Secondly, it is contended that the government without application of mind, without there being any material before it to justify such an action has passed the impugned order, therefore the same is liable to be set aside. ( 3 ) RESPONDENTS have filed detailed counter admitting the facts but denying the allegations made against them and contend that the lockout declared by the management is illegal and the conciliation having failed the government had no other option except to refer the dispute for adjudication to the labour court which they are obliged to do under Section 10 (1) of the act. After making such a declaration it was well- within the power of the government to pass Order under Section 10 (3) of the act prohibiting lockout in Order to maintain industrial peace in the industrial establishment and therefore the action of the government in passing the impugned Order prohibiting the lockout cannot be found fault with. Therefore, they have prayed for rejection of the writ petition. ( 4 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner assailing the impugned Order sought quashing of the same on two grounds. Firstly, he contended that the lockout declared by the management is in response to the violent activities indulged by the workmen in the industry and in Order to protect the plant and machinery as well as the residence of the industrial township the lockout was declared. The government without going into the question of the illegal activities indulged by the workmen has referred only the act of the management in declaring the lockout for adjudication to the labour court. Therefore, the government while exercising power under Section 10 (3) of the act, can only prohibit continuance of any strike or lockout in connection with such dispute and not strike or lockout itself which is the subject-matter of reference. Therefore, the Order passed under Secrion 10 (3) is one without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. Secondly, it was contended, merely because government has power to pass Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) prohibiting lockout it cannot be exercised mechanically. Before such power could be exercised there should be application of mind to the facts of the dispute in hand and only being satisfied that there are sufficient material which justify such an Orderthe government could pass an Orderprohibiting lockout. In the instant case the failure report submitted by the conciliation officer clearly discloses that there were no justifiable materials before the government to pass an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3 ). Even otherwise without application of mind the impugned Orderhas been passed and therefore the impugned Orderis liable to be quashed. In the instant case the failure report submitted by the conciliation officer clearly discloses that there were no justifiable materials before the government to pass an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3 ). Even otherwise without application of mind the impugned Orderhas been passed and therefore the impugned Orderis liable to be quashed. ( 5 ) PER contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contends that the dispute between the parties is whether lockout declared was legal and valid and when the conciliation failed government was under obligation to refer the dispute for adjudication to the labour court under Secrion 10 (1) of the act which has been done by the government in exercise of power conferred under such provision. The language employed under Secrion 10 (3) makes it very clear that it is only lockout or strike which is the subject-matter of reference which can be prohibited and if it is not the subject-matter of reference the government has no power to pass any Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) of the act. In that view of the matter, government was well-within its jurisdiction to prohibit lockout which is the subject-matter of the reference. The factual report submitted by the conciliation officer clearly shows the rival contention of the parties, the failure on the part of the officer in arriving at the settlement, and the government by looking into the said report being satisfied that a case for passing an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) is made out has exercised such power and therefore the contention of the other side that no ground exists and that the government has not applied its mind before passing the impugned Orderare without any substance and contrary to the material on record. ( 6 ) IN the light of the aforesaid facts and rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration are as under: (1) whether the government under Secrion 10 (3) of the act has a power to prohibit the continuance of any strike or lockout which is the subject-matter of reference under Secrion 10 (1) of the act? (2) whether the impugned Ordersuffers from vice of either no application of mind or want of material on record justifying the exercise of such power? (2) whether the impugned Ordersuffers from vice of either no application of mind or want of material on record justifying the exercise of such power? ( 7 ) POINT No. (1), in Orderto answer this point, first we have to look into the statutory provisions governing the power of the government to pass a prohibitory Orderprohibiting continuance of strike or lockout. Secrion 10 (3) of the act reads as under: "where an industrial dispute has been referred to a board, labour court, tribunal or national tribunal under this Secrion, the appropriate government May by Orderprohibit the continuance of any strike or lockout in connection with such dispute which May be in existence on the date of the reference". For the application of the aforesaid Secrion, the following conditions must exist: (a) there should be industrial dispute in existence. (b) such dispute must have been already referred for adjudication. (c) there should be strike or lockout in connection with such dispute. (d) such strike or lockout should be in existence on the date of reference. It is only when the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled, the government gets the power under the said Secrion to pass an Orderprohibiting continuance of strike or lockout. ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner relying on a judgment of the rajasthan high court in the case of Maharaja Kishangarh Mills limited v State of rajasthan , contended that if strike or lockout itself is the subject-matter of reference, then the government cannot prohibit such strike or lockout. In the aforesaid judgment dealing with the said question, it has been held as under:"11. It is true that a lockout itself May be the subject-matter of a dispute which might be referred to an industrial tribunal under Secrion 10 (1) or 10 (2) of the industrial disputes act. It is also clear that Secrion 10 (3), industrial disputes act leaves it within the discretion of the government to prohibit the continuance of a strike or lockout in connection with a dispute which might have been referred by it to an industrial tribunal. Where, therefore, a lockout or a strike has been resorted to by any one of the parties to an industrial dispute and where such strike or lockout is in connection with such dispute an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) might be made for prohibiting the continuance of such strike or lockout. Where, therefore, a lockout or a strike has been resorted to by any one of the parties to an industrial dispute and where such strike or lockout is in connection with such dispute an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) might be made for prohibiting the continuance of such strike or lockout. But where the strike or lockout is not in connection with any dispute but is itself a dispute it cannot be said that an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) could be made within its meaning. In Orderthat the strike or lockout May be in connection with a dispute it is necessary that the strike or lockout should be something different from the dispute itself. A strike or lockout which is the subject-matter of the dispute itself cannot be termed to be a strike or lockout in connection with such a dispute within the meaning of Secrion 10 (3 ). A strike or lockout which is itself a dispute would not justify an Orderunder Secrion 10 (3) for its prohibition because the language of Secrion 10 (3) requires that a strike or lockout should be in connection with a dispute in Orderthat an Orderfor its prohibition might be made by the government. Where the strike is not in connection with a dispute but is itself a dispute the matter is quite different and would not justify an Orderof prohibition. The discretion of the government therefore which has been exercised in the present case in making an Orderof prohibition is beyond the scope of Secrion 10 (3)". ( 9 ) AS against this, the learned counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice, the judgment of the Bombay high court in the case of Digvijay Cement Company limited v State of maharashtra and others. In the aforesaid judgment, para 7 is extracted hereunder: "7. The second submission urged by the learned counsel is about the validity of the Orderof the state government prohibiting the continuance of the lockout in connection with the dispute referred. It was urged by the learned counsel that the power conferred on the state government under sub-section (3) of Secrion 10 of the act enables the state government to restrain the continuance of the strike or the lockout provided the cause which gave rise to the lockout is referred for adjudication to the tribunal. It was urged by the learned counsel that the power conferred on the state government under sub-section (3) of Secrion 10 of the act enables the state government to restrain the continuance of the strike or the lockout provided the cause which gave rise to the lockout is referred for adjudication to the tribunal. It was urged that the cause which led the company to declare lockout has not been referred for adjudication and, therefore, the exercise of power was defective. It is not possible to accede to the submission advanced by the learned counsel". After referring to the sub-section (3) of Secrion 10 of the act, it was held as under: the plain reading of this Secrion makes it clear that the power could be exercised by the state government, provided an industrial dispute has been referred to the tribunal. The contention urged is that the lockout could be prohibited provided such lockout is in connection with the dispute which is referred. It was contended by Shri shetye that the lockout was declared because of go-slow tactics and the violence resorted by the workmen and the question as to whether the workers indulged in such activities has not been referred and, therefore, the powers under sub-section (3) were wrongly exercised. The submission is entirely misconceived. The dispute which is referred is in respect of the action of the petitioner-company in suspending the work and declaring the lockout and such dispute has a direct connection to the action of the petitioner-company and, therefore, the state government had ample powers to prohibit the continuance of lockout. The supreme court in the case of delhi Administration, delhi v Workmen of edward keventers and another, dealing with the power of the government under Secrion 10 (3) of the act, has held as under: "3. There is a distinction between strikes being illegal under other Secrions of the act and penalties being available against such illegal strikes on the one hand and strikes being contrary to Secrion 10 (3) of the act and liable to be prohibited thereunder. This distinction once grasped, the baselessness of the submission on behalf of the appellant necessarily follows. 4. Shri aggarwal pressed before us a ruling in kaventers' Karmachari Sangh v Lt. Governor of Delhi, 1971-ii-LLJ-375 (del.) Decided by the delhi high court. This distinction once grasped, the baselessness of the submission on behalf of the appellant necessarily follows. 4. Shri aggarwal pressed before us a ruling in kaventers' Karmachari Sangh v Lt. Governor of Delhi, 1971-ii-LLJ-375 (del.) Decided by the delhi high court. Although the ratio there is contrary to the same high court's ruling which is the subject-matter of the present appeal, we are obviously inclined to adopt the reasoning of the judgment under appeal. Imagine twenty good grounds of dispute being raised in a charter of demands by the workmen and the appropriate government unilaterally and subjectively deciding against the workmen on nineteen of them and referring only one for adjudication. How can this result in the anomalous situation of the workmen being deprived of their basic right to go on strike in support of those nineteen demands. This would be productive not of industrial peace, which is the objective of the industrial disputes act, but counter-productive of such a purpose. If government feels that it should prohibit a strike under Secrion 10 (3) it must give scope for the merits of such a dispute or demand being gone into by some other adjudicatory body by making a reference of all those demands under Secrion 10 (1), Secrion 10 (3) cannot operate. This stands to reason and justice and a demand which is suppressed by a prohibitory Order and is not allowed to be ventilated for adjudication before a tribunal will explode into industrial unrest and run contrary to the policy of industrial jurisprudence. 5. Thus, on principle and the text of the law, we are convinced that Secrion 10 (3) comes into play when the basis of the strike is covered by Secrion 10 (1 ). Reference of a dispute and prohibition of a strike on other demands is impermissible". The aforesaid judgment has been followed by a division bench of the orissa high court in the case of State Transport Employees' federation, Orissa v State of Orissa and others, dealing with Secrion 10 (3) of the act: a plain reading of the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that to invoke the power under the said sub-section for making an Orderprohibiting a strike, two conditions must exist: first, there must be an industrial dispute in existence and secondly, such dispute must have been already referred for adjudication. Obviously, therefore Secrion 10 (3) of the act cannot operate in regard to disputes which are not referred under sub-section (1) of Secrion 10. Under the industrial law a workman cannot be deprived of his basic right to go on strike in support of his demand as the right to strike is integral to a collective bargain. When the government unilaterally decides against the workman not to refer several disputes for adjudication and refers only a few, the workman cannot be deprived of the right to strike. If the government feels that it should prohibit a strike under sub-section (3) of Secrion 10, then it must afford a scope for a dispute or demand being decided on merits by adjudication in a reference of all those demands under sub-section (1) of Secrion 10. ( 10 ) A reading of the aforesaid Secrion and the judgments of the various courts makes it clear that the aforesaid provisions empowers the government to prohibit the commencement and continuance of strike and lockout in certain circumstances for achieving the object of settlement of industrial disputes in a peaceful atmosphere. The power therefore has to be exercised by the government in its discretion. The said power is exercised by the government during the pendency of the dispute referred for adjudication. Even when the dispute referred is the question regarding the legality of the strike or lockout, the government can prohibit the very same strike or lockout which is the subject-matter of reference. Existence of the strike or lockout is what confers the power on the government to pass a prohibitory order. When the said strike or lockout itself is referred for adjudication, it cannot be said that the said strike or lockout can continue pending adjudication, and only strike or lockout in connection with the subject-matter of reference only could be prohibited. The said Orderwill be in force till the appropriate authority to whom the dispute is referred adjudicate the dispute on merits. In other words, it is in the nature of interim Orderpassed pending disposal of the resolution of the dispute by the adjudicating authority. The sole object behind passing such an Orderis to maintain industrial peace which is the basic policy underlying the industrial disputes act. In other words, it is in the nature of interim Orderpassed pending disposal of the resolution of the dispute by the adjudicating authority. The sole object behind passing such an Orderis to maintain industrial peace which is the basic policy underlying the industrial disputes act. ( 11 ) HOWEVER the rajasthan high court has taken the view that "such dispute" has to be necessarily a dispute other than what is referred to for adjudication. If we keep in mind the object with which the provision is enacted, then whether the dispute pertains to the validity of the strike or lockout or whether the strike or lockout is continued in connection with such dispute, makes no difference. Any other interpretation is accepted it leads to absurdity. The Rule s of interpretation in this regard are well-settled. Though meaning has to be given to the words used in the statute, if literal interpretation of that provision leads to absurdity it has to be avoided. The object sought to be achieved by such provision has to be necessarily kept in mind, while placing interpretation on these provisions. If such a literal interpretation as placed by the rajasthan high court is accepted, it would not serve the purpose. I find it difficult to pursuade myself to accept the reasoning adopted in the said judgment. In fact, in the delhi administration case the supreme court has gone to the extent of saying only in respect of matters which are referred to adjudication, the government has got the power to pass an Orderprohibiting strike or lockout. Therefore, when the validity of the lockout or strike is the subject-matter of reference, certainly the court has the power to prohibit continuance of such strike or lockout which is the subject-matter of the reference, pending disposal of the said dispute being adjudicated. Such an interpretation would serve not only the cause of justice but also the object with which the legislation is passed. In the absence of any express words prohibiting continuance of strike or lockout, which is the subject-matter of reference itself, the only interpretation that can be placed on this provision is the government has the power to prohibit the continuance of any strike or lockout which itself is the subject-matter of reference and continuance of any strike or lockout in connection with dispute referred for adjudication which is in existence on the date of reference. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that the Orderpassed by the government prohibiting the continuance of lockout which is the subject- matter of reference itself under Secrion 10 (1) of the act is valid and legal and do not suffer from any illegality. ( 12 ) POINT No. (2 ). The learned counsel for the respondent next contended even if the Orderpassed under Secrion 10 (3) of the act is held that the government had power to pass such an order, as the said Orderis passed without application of mind, without there being sufficient material on record to satisfy itself as to the necessity to pass such an order, the impugned Orderis liable to be quashed on those grounds. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the supreme court in the case of Barium Chemicals Limited and another v Company Law Board and others. In the aforesaid judgment, a constitution bench of the supreme court was trying to find out the meaning of the word under the companies act, 1956. In that context it was held that formation of the opinion is subjective process but existence of circumstances suggesting inference of what has been set out in sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) must be made out. In that context they proceed to held as under:". . . . . . THOUGH an Orderpassed in exercise of power under a statute cannot be challenged on the ground of propriety or sufficiency, it is liable to be quashed on the ground of mala fides, dishonesty or corrupt purpose. Even if it is passed in good faith and with the best of intention to further the purpose of the legislation which confers the powers, since the authority has to act in accordance with and within the limits of that legislation, its Ordercan also be challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts". In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts". ( 13 ) IN the aforesaid judgment, the supreme court has laid down that an Orderpassed by the government could be quashed on the grounds of mala fides, dishonesty or corrupt purpose. Further, it is held such an Ordershould be within the limits of that legislation and it should not be passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or there are no grounds at all for passing such an Orderor the grounds are such no one can reasonably Order for information or statutes to the person to the legislation or if he does not applies his mind. ( 14 ) IN the instant case, the attack to the impugned Orderis on two grounds, namely, that it is passed without there being an application of mind and also on the ground that no grounds exist for passing such order. In Orderto appreciate this contention one has to look into the contents of the Orderwhich is produced at Annexure-r. The reading of the aforesaid Orderpoints out that the conciliation officer has set out the dispute between the parties and the contents of the document on which the parties relied upon. In respect of the respective contentions, he has recorded a finding that the efforts made to resolve the dispute having failed is sending the factual report under Secrion 12 (4) of the act for passing appropriate orders. It is by looking into this factual report, the government has proceeded to pass the impugned orders. The said report gives a clear picture of the dispute between the parties, the claims and counter-claims made by them, the havoc, created by the employees by taking law to their own hands, the litigation between the parties and also refers to the orders passed by courts and the factual report and the efforts to arrive at the settlement. If the government, on consideration of these materials has come to the conclusion that in Orderto preserve industrial peace, they are satisfied that an Order prohibiting continuance of lockout is necessary, it cannot be said that the impugned Orderis passed without application of mind or without there being any material to substantiate exercise of such power under the act. If the government, on consideration of these materials has come to the conclusion that in Orderto preserve industrial peace, they are satisfied that an Order prohibiting continuance of lockout is necessary, it cannot be said that the impugned Orderis passed without application of mind or without there being any material to substantiate exercise of such power under the act. I am satisfied not only the circumstances exist for exercise of power under Secrion 10 (3) of the act but also such power has been exercised after applying its mind to the circumstances and facts of the case. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the said contention also. ( 15 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the impugned Orderwas stayed by this court, the workers did not take law to their hands. With the dismissal of this writ petition, there is likely chance of the respondents resorting to strike and take law to their own hands and indulge in violent activities. I do not find any substance in the said contention also because dispute between the parties is already referred for adjudication to the government. During pendency of the said adjudication, both the parties have to maintain peace and harmony in the industry. Merely because this writ petition is dismissed and the Orderprohibiting the lockout is to upheld by this court, that does not enable the respondents to indulge either in strike or in any violent activities as the dispute between the parties is pending adjudication before the appropriate forum. --- *** --- .