Judgment S.S.Nijjar, J. 1. On the request of the counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 2. It is not disputed that the petitioner has been duly elected as Sarpanch. He claimed himself to be a Majbi Sikh belonging to Schedule Caste category. Subsequently, however, a complaint has been made that the petitioner, in fact, belonged to the Backward Class. Consequently, FIR No. 245 dated 4.8.2003 has been registered against the petitioner under Section 420, 467, 468, 477 and 120 of the Indian Penal Code. On registration of the F.I.R., the petitioner has been directed to be suspended vide order dated 28.10.2003 (Annexure P2). This order has been passed by the Deputy Director Panchayats exercising the powers of the Director Panchayats under Section 20(3) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). The appeal filed against this order, has been dismissed by the Special Secretary to Government Punjab by order dated 3.3.2004 (Annexure P-3). In this writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks the quashing of the order dated 28.10.2003 on the ground that even if the respondents have the jurisdiction to suspend the Sarpanch under Section 20 (3) of the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the registration of a criminal case the power can only be exercised after observing rule of natural justice. Mr. Bedi, submits that it was necessary for the respondents to issue show cause notice to the petitioner seeking his explanation before passing the impugned order (Annexure P-2). He submits that the impugned order is liable to be quashed as it does not set out any reasons as to how the continuance of the petitioner would be an embarrassment to the petitioner or the Panchayat. According to the learned counsel the order passed by the Special Secretary is also unsustainable for the same reasons. 3. The respondents have filed written statement. It has been categorically stated that it was not necessary to issue any show cause notice to the petitioner. Mr. H.S.Sran learned Addl. Advocate General, Punjab appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab has submitted that the petitioner has committed a fraud on the electorate as well on the authorities by masquerading as a reserved category candidate whereas he belongs to a Backward Class. Mr. H.S.Sran learned Addl. Advocate General, Punjab appearing on behalf of the State of Punjab has submitted that the petitioner has committed a fraud on the electorate as well on the authorities by masquerading as a reserved category candidate whereas he belongs to a Backward Class. On the basis of the written statement, Mr. Sran, submits that it was not necessary to hear the petitioner before passing the order of suspension. The FIR has been registered after due investigation into the matter by the Revenue Authorities. The conduct of the petitioner leaves much to be desired. Such a person should not be granted any discretionary relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. 4. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. We do not find any merit in the submissions of Mr. Sran. Mere registration of an FIR is not proof of the guilt of the petitioner. Registration of a false FIR is not a phenomenon unknown in India. This part the facts narrated in the FIR are yet to be scrutinised in judicial proceed- ings. The registration of the FIR alone would not be sufficient for passing an order of suspension under Section 20(3) of the Act. The petitioner is duly elected as Sarpanch. Very serious allegations have been made against him. Gravity of the allegations and the seriousness of the consequences would make it imperative that the Sarpanch is heard be- fore an order is passed under Section 20(3) of the Act. 5. It is by now well settled by a catena of judgments of the Supreme Court that any order which causes civil consequences cannot be passed, unless the person against whom it is passed, has been given an adequate opportunity to rebut the allegations/charges made against him.A duly elected Sarpanch has a legitimate expectation to continue as such for the entire term of five years. If the period is to be cut short, it is expected that the authorities would comply with rules of natural justice, before any or- der is passed adversely effecting the tenure of the Sarpanch. In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei} A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269, it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that "even an administrative order which involves civil consequences... must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice". In the case of State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss.) Binapani Dei} A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1269, it has been clearly held by the Supreme Court that "even an administrative order which involves civil consequences... must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice". The question as to what would contitute civil consequences was answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commission, New Delhi, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 851. Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Constitution Bench observed as follows:- "But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing, verbal booby-traps? "Civil Consequence" undoubtedly covers infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence." 6. In the case of Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969)2 Ch.D. 149, Lord Denning M.R. observed as under:- "The speeches in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1994) A.C. 40, show that an administrative body may, in a proper case be bound to give a person who is affected by their decision an opportunity of making representations. It all depends on whether he has some right or interest or, it would add, some legitimate expectation, of which it would, not be fair to deprive him." 7. From the above, it becomes evident that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of hearing before an order of suspension was passed against him. He is an elected Sarpanch and therefore, has a legal right to continue as such, unless disqualified, removed or ousted on a vote of no confidence etc. in accordance with law. 8. Mr. Sran has submitted that since the FIR has been registered against the petitioner, it would serve no useful purpose to observe rules of natural justice. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel. This very question has been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan and Ors., A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court 136. In the aforesaid case, Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Supreme Court observed as under:- "17. Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. In the aforesaid case, Chinnappa Reddy, J., speaking for the Supreme Court observed as under:- "17. Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approves the non-observance of natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs. But it will be a pernicious principle to apply in other situations where conclusions are controversial, however, slightly, and penalties are discretionary." 9. In Ridge v. Baldwin, (1964) A.C. 40, the same argument had been raised before the House of Lords that even if the appellant had been heard by the watch committee, nothing that he could have said could have made any difference. The argument was rejected. Similar argument was raised in the case of John v. Rees, (1970)1 Ch. 345, Megarry, J. observed as follows:- "It may be that there are some who would decry the importance which the courts attach to the observance of the rules of natural justice. When something is obvious, they may say, why force everybody to go through the tiresome waste of time involved in framing charges and giving an opportunity to be heard? The result is obvious from the start. Those who take this view do not think, do themselves justice. As everybody who has anything to do with the law well knows the path of the law is strewn with examples of open and shut cases which, somehow, were not of unanswerable charges which, in the event were completely answered; of inexplicable conduct which was fully explained; of fixed and unalterable determination that, by discussion, suffered a change. Nor are those with any knowledge of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision against them has been made without their being afforded any opportunity to influence the course of events." 10. Nor are those with any knowledge of human nature who pause to think for a moment likely to underestimate the feelings of resentment of those who find that a decision against them has been made without their being afforded any opportunity to influence the course of events." 10. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles, we are of the opinion that an order under Section 20(3) of the Act can only be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the Sarpanch, who is sought to be suspended. In this view of ours we find support from two judgments of this Court. In the case of Mange Ram Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat v. Financial Commissioner and Secretary to Government," (1997-2)116 P.L.R. 293 a Division Bench of this Court and in the case of Kashmiri Lai v. Deputy Commissioner, Sonepat, 1980 P.L.J. 222 a Full Bench of this Court while interpreting the pari materia provisions in the Punjab Gram Panchayat Act and State of Haryana have clearly held that before an order of suspension is passed against a Sarpanch, it is necessary to issue show cause notice to him. It has also been held that the respondents are duty bound to pass a speaking order giving reasons in support of the decision. Since the petitioner was not issued any show cause notice nor was he granted any opportunity of hearing before passing the impugned order Annexure P2, the same is liable to be quashed. Order Annexure P3 can not be upheld as the same is not supported by any cogent reasons as to how the continuance of the petitioner would be an embarrassment either to himself or the Panchayat. The petition is allowed and the impugned orders Annexures P2 and P3 are quashed. The respondents are at liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law and,,pass fresh orders.