JUDGMENT 1. - The appellant-defendant No. 2 Hajari Lal has preferred this appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4.4.1994 passed by learned District Judge, Bundi. 2. The relevant facts in brief are that the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 Ratan Kumar instituted a civil suit in August, 1988 against Smt. Kishan Bai the defendant No. 1 and Hajari Lal for cancellation of the sale deed dated 13.7.1988 and for permanent injunction with the averments that one Gopal Singh had four sons namely Chhitar Singh, Parwat Singh, Badat Singh and Samundar Singh. Chhitar Singh died issue less, Badat Singh and Parwat 13 Singh had no son while Sumandar Singh father of the plaintiff-Ratan Kumar had four sons namely, Ratan Kumar-the plaintiff Laxman Singh, Kesar Singh and Bhagwan Singh. Parwat Singh and his wife Smt. Kishan Bai (the defendant No. 1) had brought up Ratan Kumar since his childhood in 10.1.1979. Parwat Singh executed a will in favour of the plaintiff in presence of his wife Smt. Kishan Bai. Thereafter, Parwat Singh died on 6.6.1979 and thus the plaintiff became the owner of the entire movable and immovable property of Parwat Singh on account of this will. 3. Thereafter, in absence of the plaintiff the defendant No. 1 Smt. Kishan Bai executed sale deed and got it registered on 13.7.1988 in favour of defendant No. 2 for agricultural land of Khasra No. 238 measuring 3 beeghas and Khasra No. 239 measuring 21 beeghas i ciswas 4. The plaintiff made a prayer that since the defendant No. 1 had no 5 right to execute the sale deed, the same be cancelled and the defendant No. 2 should be restrained not to take the possession of the same. 5. The defendants in their written statements while denying the facts relating to execution of the will by Parwat Singh pleaded that the defendant No. 1 had a right to execute the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2. 6. Issues were framed. Evidence of the parties was recorded and having heard learned counsel for the parties learned District Judge, Bundi decreed the plaintiff's suit vide impugned judgment dated 4.4.1994 with further direction that the defendant No. 2 shall hand over the possession of the disputed land to the plaintiff within two months. 7. This appeal was filed after a delay of 2707 days (after a delay of more than 7 years and 7 months). Therefore. 7. This appeal was filed after a delay of 2707 days (after a delay of more than 7 years and 7 months). Therefore. an application u/s. of the Limitation Act, 1963 (in short 'the Act') was filed along with affidavit of the appellant-Hajari Lal. The respondents filed reply of this application alongwith affidavit of the respondent No. 1 Shri Ratan Kumar. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties on application under section 5 of Vie Act. It is not in dispute that this appeal was filed after a delay of 2707 days. Section 5 of the Act provides that any appeal or any application may he admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal 25 or making the application within such period. Learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance upon N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, (998) 7 Supreme Court Cases 123 contended that the appellant was serving a; General Manager, State Trading Corporation of India since April, 1983, he was transferred and posted as Branch Manager to the United Kingdom d firing September, 1990 and the appellant joined new assignment on 2 12.1990, that the appellant was transferred back to India in February, 1992, thereafter the appellant took voluntarily retirement in September, 1992 and joined Duncons Limited in United Kingdom and thus the appellant was in United Kingdom upto June, 1994 and he came back to India on 14.6.1994 and settled at Delhi. It was next contended that the appellant had appointed one Shri Heeralal as his General Power of Attorney Holder in the year 1989 and since the Heeralal was attending the case in the Court that the appellant had engaged Shri Raghunath Prasad Sharma as his advocate in the year 1989 and both of them i.e. Heeralal and Shri Raghunath Prasad assured the appellant that they would protect and safeguard the interest of the appellant in the said suit and whenever his presence would be required, they would inform him accordingly. According to learned counsel for the appellant neither Shri Heeralal nor Shri Raghunath Prasad ever informed him till 1:.9.2001. According to learned counsel for the appellant neither Shri Heeralal nor Shri Raghunath Prasad ever informed him till 1:.9.2001. On 9.9.2001 the appellant came to Bundi for purchasing rice from the rice mills and thus upon inquiry from advocate Shri Kapoor Chand he came to know that advocate Shri Raghunath had expired long back and it also came to the notice of the appellant that Heeralai and his brother Kishan Gopal were murdered long back. Upon instructions by the appellant Shri Kapoor Chand-Advocate informed the appellant on 11.9.2001 that the suit filed by Ratan Kumar has already been decreed on 4.4.1994. Thereafter, copies of the judgment, decree and other documents were obtained on 24.11.2001 and this appeal filed on 1.12.2001. Thus, as per counsel for the appellant, the appellant is in no way negligent, he was depending upon the assurance given by his Power of Attorney Holder as well as his counsel but both of them never informed him about the progress and the judgment of this case till 12.9.2001 and thus the appellant has explained the entire delay. 9. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that according to the appellant he was never informed about the progress of this case from the year 1989 to 2001 while the statement of the appellant was recorded in the trial Court on 27.7.1990 and thus it is wrong to say that the appellant never knew about the progress of this case since 1989. It was next submitted that according to the appellant himself he returned to India in June, 1994 and settled in Delhi and thus there was no reason for the appellant not to make any inquiry about the progress of the suit till filing of this appeal in December, 2001. It was also submitted that the plaintiff 15 respondent No. 1 got the possession of the disputed land through the Court process of 22.10.1994 and thus the affidavit of the appellant is wholly unreliable that he came to know about the impugned judgment in September, 2001. He placed reliance upon P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2276 and Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1201 . 10. I have considered the rival submissions. He placed reliance upon P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998 Supreme Court 2276 and Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 Supreme Court 1201 . 10. I have considered the rival submissions. In N. Balakrishnan's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Act should be construed liberally. Acceptability of explanation for the delay is the sole criterion. length of delay is not relevant and in 25 absence of anything showing male fide or deliberate delay as a dilatory tactic, the Court should normally condone the delay. The trial Court had condoned the delay of 883 days and set aside the exparte decree passed against him, but the High Court in revision set aside the order of the trial Court on the ground that the appellant-defendant was negligent and was not careful enough to meet the advocate to verify the stage of the proceedings for a long time. In view of these facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in interfering with the exercise of jurisdiction by trial Court in condoning the delay. in P.K. Ramchandran's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the delay cannot be condoned without recording satisfaction of reasonable or satisfactory explanation for delay of 565 days in filing the appeal. It was further held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribe and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. In Ram Nath Sao alias Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the expression 'sufficient cause' should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute that 'sufficient cause' or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. 11. On a careful consideration of the entire facts and circumstances as put by learned counsel for the appellant I find no such sufficient reason to allow this application. The impugned judgment was delivered on 4.4.1994 having heard learned counsel appearing for all the parties. 11. On a careful consideration of the entire facts and circumstances as put by learned counsel for the appellant I find no such sufficient reason to allow this application. The impugned judgment was delivered on 4.4.1994 having heard learned counsel appearing for all the parties. It is the case of the appellant himself that he returned from United Kingdom to India in June, 1994 and had settled at Delhi. I find no ground as to why the appellant did not take any step to know about the progress of his case till September, 2001 while his own statement was recorded in the Thai Court in July. 1990. it is a clear case of total inaction and gross negligence on the part of the appellant. While considering such matter, the Courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning 5 the delay in a routine like manner. The appellant has only tried to shift his own burden upon his Power of Attorney Holder as well as his counsel while as a matter of fact he himself did not take any care to know about the progress and position of the case pending since 1988. 12. Thus, in view of the entire discussion made hereinabove, the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of such inordinate delay of 2707 days in filing this appeal. 13. Therefore, this application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is hereby dismissed and since this appeal has been filed out of limitation, hence it is also dismissed.Appeal And Condonation Application Both Dismissed. *******