B. P. Singh v. State Of Jharkhand Through C. B. I.
2004-09-15
TAPEN SEN
body2004
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Tapen Sen, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sidharath Shankar Ray, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the Opposite Party. 2. The petitioners, who are all senior officers of M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited have prayed for the privilege of Anticipatory Bail in connection with R.C. Case No. 9(A)/1997(D) under Sections 406, 407, 409, 420, 120B of Indian Penal Code and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 now pending in the Court of learned Special Judge (C.B.I.-cum-First Additional District and Sessions Judge), Dhanbad. 3. Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the opposite party submitted that the petitioners do not deserve the privilege of Anticipatory Bail on account of the fact that investigations have revealed that each of them are responsible for causing loss to the exchequer through an offence which is now commonly known as the "Bitumen Scam". He refers to pages 51 to 57 of the petition and submits that these are the findings of the Central Bureau of Investigation. 4. Mr. Sidharth Shankar Ray, Senior Advocate, on the other hand, while referring to Annexure-3 herein, submits that so far as the charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act are concerned, sanction was not given because the sanctioning authority did not find any irregularities in the dealings of the petitioners who had discharge their official duties in the capacity of Officer of the Corporation. He further submits that during the course of investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation, the petitioners had fully cooperated with them and till now, they have not given any occasion which can go to show that the petitioners would run away and would not face trial. He further submits that cognizance was taken on 11.6.2002 by the Special Judge, Dhanbad after considering the police report dated 31.12.2001 which was submitted under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At that stage, nobody issued any warrants of arrest and the learned Special Judge had proceeded to issue only summons and not warrants of arrest. Mr. Ray further submitted that on 8.10.2002, the petitioner voluntarily filed an application under Section 205, even without summons having been served upon them. Thereafter, on 20.8.2003, without disposing of that application, the Court below passed an order of non-bailable warrants of arrest against these petitioners. 5. Mr.
Mr. Ray further submitted that on 8.10.2002, the petitioner voluntarily filed an application under Section 205, even without summons having been served upon them. Thereafter, on 20.8.2003, without disposing of that application, the Court below passed an order of non-bailable warrants of arrest against these petitioners. 5. Mr. Ray submits that this is not one of those cases where the charges are so heinous that the petitioner deserve incarceration. He further submits that the petitioners should be given a chance to face the trial. He relies upon two judgments of the Honble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Rajasthan, Jaipur v. Balchand alias Baliay, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 308 . This Court notices that the aforementioned judgment is a well known judgment which sets guidelines in relation to the principles meant to be observed in matters pertaining to bails and it has been held that the basic rule is to grant bail except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like. He submits that the petitioners being responsible officers of the Corporation would never resort to any of these deeds. In the background of what has been submitted, it would therefore perhaps be worthwhile to quote the observations of the Honble Supreme Court of India made in the said case. The relevant paragraphs 2 and 3 are therefore being quoted hereinbelow :- "2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also the heinousness of the crime.
We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative. 3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also the heinousness of the crime. Even so, the record of the petitioner in this case is that, while he has been on bail throughout in the trial Court and he was released after the judgment of the High Court, there is nothing to suggest that he has abused the trust placed in him by the Court; his social circumstances also are not so unfavourable in the sense of his being a desperate character or unsocial element who is likely to betray the confidence that the Court may place in him to turn up to take justice at the hands of the Court. He is stated to be a young man of 27 years with a family to maintain. The circumstances and the social milieu do not militate against the petitioner being granted bail at this stage. At the same time any possibility of the absconsion or evasion or other abuse can be taken care of by a direction that the petitioner will report himself before the police station at Baren once every fortnight." 6. The other judgment relied upon by Mr. Sidharath Shankar Ray is the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 2002 (1) East Cr C 121 (SC) : (2002) 2 SCC 210 . He refers to paragraph 7 of page 219 which also given similar guidelines in relation to the practice to be followed in the manner relating to grant of bail especially anticipatory bail. Paragraph 7 therefore is worth quoting in this order :- "7. The relief spoken of however pertains to Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is noteworthy that the 41st Report of the Law Commission recommended for the first time inclusion of a provision for what is called anticipatory bail [vide Section 438 Cr PC).
Paragraph 7 therefore is worth quoting in this order :- "7. The relief spoken of however pertains to Section 438 of Criminal Procedure Code. It is noteworthy that the 41st Report of the Law Commission recommended for the first time inclusion of a provision for what is called anticipatory bail [vide Section 438 Cr PC). Section 438 contemplates an application by a person on an apprehension of arrest in regard to the commission of the non-bailable offence : the object being to relieve a person from unnecessary harassment or disgrace and it is granted when the Court is otherwise convinced that there is no likelihood of misuser of the liberty granted since he would neither abscond nor take such step so as to avoid due process of law." [Italics by this Court] 7. In that view of the matter, this Court feels that the petitioner are entitled to the privilege of bail. 8. Let it recorded that this order is being passed in the special facts and circumstances taking into consideration the fact that even today, the petitioner are all senior officers of a Government of India undertaking. Additionally, this Court takes notice of the fact that while refusing to grant sanction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the refusal to do so was on the basis of elaborate reasons recorded in Annexure-3 herein and in conclusion, the sanctioning authority refused sanction and ordered that in spite of prosecution by the Central Bureau of Investigation, it would be appropriate to initiate departmental proceedings. 9. Taking all these into consideration, this Court feels that the petitioner should be given the opportunity to face trial. In that view of the matter, and also noticing the guidelines given by the Honble Supreme Court of India, this Court is for the opinion that if the petitioner surrender before the trial Court, then the trial Court shall release the petitioners on bail on furnishing bail bonds of the sum of Rs. 50,000/-(Rupees Fifty Thousand) each with two sureties of the like amount each to the satisfaction of the learned Special. Judge (CBI-cum-First Additional District and Sessions Judge) Dhanbad in connection with RC No. 9(A)/1997(D) said to be pending in this Court subject to such other terms and conditions which may be deemed fit and proper by the said Court. Some of these should include the following conditions :- 1.
Judge (CBI-cum-First Additional District and Sessions Judge) Dhanbad in connection with RC No. 9(A)/1997(D) said to be pending in this Court subject to such other terms and conditions which may be deemed fit and proper by the said Court. Some of these should include the following conditions :- 1. Unless specifically exempted by an order of the Court, the petitioner must be present on each and every date and assist the trial failing which their bail bonds shall stand forfeited. 2. During the period when the trial is going on, the petitioners would not leave the country, even on official work and if they are sent or permitted to go outside the country on any official work, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director shall be held responsible for interfering with the course of justice. 3. If any of the above conditions are breached, their bail bonds shall stand cancelled and the petitioners shall be taken into custody. 10. After the aforesaid Order was dictated, Mr. Ray stated and submitted that the petitioners are presently posted at far away places in Mumbai and Orissa and therefore, they be granted at least weeks time so as to enable them to surrender. He also prays, that till they surrender, they should be protected and should not taken into custody. 11. Consequently, this Court further orders that the petitioners must surrender within a period of three weeks from today as directed above and till then, they should not be subjected to any coercive steps.