JUDGMENT 1. - Prayer of the petitioner in the instant writ petition is as under : (i) to quash the charge sheet dated July 8, 1994 (Ann.6), punishment order dated December 30, 1995 (Ann. 16) and order dated April 6,1996 (ann. 19); (iii) to give all consequential benefits by quashing aforesaid orders along with arrears of salary and interest thereon. 2. Contextual facts depict that while the petitioner was working on the post of Clerk-cum-Assistant Cashier at Johari Bazar of respondent Bank the petitioner made a complaint to the General Manager stating that he was being harassed by the Chief Manager Mr. Golecha (respondent No. 4) and his annual grade increment has also been withheld by the respondent No. 4 in order to harass the petitioner. The petitioner again sent the letter dated May 22,1994 stating therein that a person Sunil Kumar in connivance with Mr. M.L. Golecha, Chief Manager is making draft in large number and the same are being sold at a higher price by Mr. Sunil Kumar, while public at large is being denied for the facility even those persons who are having their own account in the Bank. Again on July 8, 1994 the petitioner made complaint to the Zonal Manager that drafts in large number are being made by private persons related with PTO office and respondent No. 4 had taken away big slabs of Marbal Stone, which had come to the bank for flooring of the computer room.On July 8, 1994 a charge sheet came to be served upon the petitioner by the Chief Officer (Disciplinary Authority) wherein two charges were levelled against the petitioner namely (i) the petitioner was irregular to the Bank on March 11, 1994, March 12, 1994, March 15, 1994 and June 30, 1994 and (ii) the petitioner used abusive language against the respondent No. 4. Seven days time was given to submit explanation. The petitioner submitted his reply denying both the charges and stated that for the absence from duty on March 11, 1994, March 12,1994 and March 15,1994 the amount of Rs. 526.10 has already been deducted from his salary vide note dated March 23, 1994.The petitioner again on August 31, 1994 wrote letter to Chief Officer of respondent Bank stating therein that no action has been initiated on the complaints dated March 31, 1994, July 7,1994 and July 8,1994. 526.10 has already been deducted from his salary vide note dated March 23, 1994.The petitioner again on August 31, 1994 wrote letter to Chief Officer of respondent Bank stating therein that no action has been initiated on the complaints dated March 31, 1994, July 7,1994 and July 8,1994. Vide order dated September 5,1994 the petitioner was informed that no administrative action on the complaints of petitioner is to be initiated by respondent Bank.Vide order dated September 23, 1994 the petitioner was informed that enquiry has been initiated for the aforesaid charges and Mr. N.K. Yadav, Assistant Chief Officer has been appointed as Presenting Officer and Mr. S.P. Mathur as Enquiry Officer. The petitioner wrote a letter on October 15, 1996 to the Chief Officer of UCO Bank stating that the enquiry is being conducted under the pressure of respondent No. 4 with a prejudiced and bias mind. Thereafter the enquiry was concluded on August 4, 1995. Written arguments were submitted by the petitioner on September 5, 1995. The enquiry report was submitted on September 19, 1995 holding the charges to be proved. The petitioner wrote letter dated October 16, 1995 stating therein that the charges have wrongly been proved. Show cause notice dated December 20, 1995 was served on petitioner wherein the penalty was proposed for charges No. 1 dismissal from the Bank service without notice and for charge No. 2 stoppage of 3 annual grade increments with cumulative effect. Finally vide order dated December 30, 1995 the penalty of dismissal without notice and three grade increments were withheld. The appeal filed by petitioner on February 12, 1996 was dismissed vide order dated April 6, 1994.The petitioner stated that no preliminary enquiry was conducted which clearly shows the pre-determination of the respondent Bank. The enquiry is the result of enmity between the petitioner and respondent No. 4. The enquiry was conducted with prejudicial and bias mind. The charges are frivolous. The punishment order is highly disproportionate to the guilt and the same is violative of principles of natural justice. The demanded documents of over-time requisition slip for the months of March, 1995 were not supplied. The Presenting Officer M. K. Yadav was replaced by Mr. N. K. Banerjec without any administrative order and communication to petitioner. Deposition of Mr. S.P. Agarwal and Mr. D. K. Jain was not considered properly, who were superior officers of petitioner. 3. The demanded documents of over-time requisition slip for the months of March, 1995 were not supplied. The Presenting Officer M. K. Yadav was replaced by Mr. N. K. Banerjec without any administrative order and communication to petitioner. Deposition of Mr. S.P. Agarwal and Mr. D. K. Jain was not considered properly, who were superior officers of petitioner. 3. The respondent filed reply to the writ petition and raised preliminary objection about maintainability of writ petition. It was averred that the complaints made by petitioner against respondent No.4 cannot give any right to petitioner to commit misconduct of absenting from duty and abusing his officials. The charge sheet was issued after application of mind. The court does not sit as a court of appeal on the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority. There is no jurisdictional error. The petitioner has admitted allegation No.3 with certain explanation but the same are highly unparliamentary and filthy abusing language. 4. I have heard the rival submissions and scanned the material on record as well as the case law cited in support of contention. 5. The Lordships of the Supreme Court in (1) Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611 while quashing the punishment of dismissal of service imposed on Ranjit Thakur in Court-martial indicated thus:- (Para 25) "25..... The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindicative or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionately, as part of the concert of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." (Emphasis suppled) 6. (2) B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." (Emphasis suppled) 6. (2) B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749 was the case wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court propounded that if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons case to the High Court to consider support thereof. 7. In (3) Kailash Nath Gupta Vs. Enquiry Officer (2003 Lab. I.C. 2290) , where Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities of the Allahabad Bank after holding enquiry found Kailash Nath Gupta (Manager of Allahabad Bank) guilty of misappropriating money and ordered his removal from service and the Allahabad High Court refused to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and remitted the case of the High Court to consider afresh the aspect of the quantum of punishment. Their Lordships indicated in para 11 as under : "11. In the back ground of what has been stated above, one thing is clear that the power of interference with the quantum of punishment is extremely limited. But when relevant factors are not taken note of, which have same bearing on the quantum of punishment, certainly the Court can direct reconsideration or in an appropriate case to shorten litigation, indicate the punishment to be awarded...." 8. In (4) High Court of Judicature at Bombay Vs. Shashikant S. Patil and Another, (2000) 1 SCC 416 , it was indicated that : "Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But it cannot be overlooked that the departmental authority is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which that findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. In (5) Union of India and others Vs. Narain Singh, (2002) 5 SCC 11 , it was held where there are relevant materials which support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court to arrive at an independent finding. If an enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. 10. The Division Bench of this Court in (6) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and others Vs. Shri Ram Yadav, 1995 (1) RLR 610 = 1995 (3) WLC (Raj.) 16 , observed as under : "The law enjoins that a person accused of even petty offences must be heard on the question of sentence. It is elementary that the sentence should be neither too lenient nor too harsh. The sentence must be just even when the penalty likely to be imposed is a penalty of fine or a short term of imprisonment. The accused is required to be heard on these points and the authority is required to consider all these aspects. Therefore, there is greater reason for insisting on the disciplinary authority discharging this very delicate function in relation to the life and career of the employee concerned. The disciplinary authority has to strike a neat balance and to determine a just penalty. The penalty cannot be, and should not be characterised either as too lenient or too harsh. It may be that the disciplinary authority may commit an error in selecting particular penalty and a different view may be possible. But at least he is found to make an effort by weighing the pros and cons of every charge from the stand point that the gravity of the offence and the compulsion to impose the maximum penalty or more serious penalty resulting into economic death sentence. But at least he is found to make an effort by weighing the pros and cons of every charge from the stand point that the gravity of the offence and the compulsion to impose the maximum penalty or more serious penalty resulting into economic death sentence. After making an honest attempt in ascertaining just penalty called for in the facts and circumstance of each case, the disciplinary authority can pass an appropriate order of punishment. But if he makes no attempt it cannot be said that he has discharged quasi judicial function in the manner required by law. In such a situation it has got to be held that he has not applied his mind to the most important function of selecting the penalty." 11. Three Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in (7) Ved Prakash Gupta Vs. M/s. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., AIR 1984 SC 914 , observed that dismissal of employee on charge of abuse of some worker and officer of management was unjustified, particularly in absence of any previous adverse remarks against him. 12. It is thus evident that under Article 226, the High Court does not act as an appellate authority and order of punishment can only be interfered with if it is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. The High Court in an appropriate case to shorten the litigation may indicate the punishment to be awarded. 13. Coming to the facts of the instant case it may noticed that the petitioner was removed form service on the charge of hurling abuses to Chief Manager. From the evidence collected during enquiry it appears that there were no previous adverse remarks against the petitioner. It is also borne out from record that on being provoked by the Chief Manager the petitioner lost his mental balance and suddenly incident occurred. In such a situation it was incumbent on the disciplinary and the appellate authorities to strike a neat-balance and to determine a just penalty. Since there were no previous adverse remarks against the petitioner, his removal from service on the charge of hurling abuses to the officer of the Bank is unjustified as is held by the Bench of Hon'ble three Judges of Supreme Court in Ved Praksh Gupta V/s. M/s. Delton Cable India Ltd. ( AIR 1984 SC 914 ) . Since there were no previous adverse remarks against the petitioner, his removal from service on the charge of hurling abuses to the officer of the Bank is unjustified as is held by the Bench of Hon'ble three Judges of Supreme Court in Ved Praksh Gupta V/s. M/s. Delton Cable India Ltd. ( AIR 1984 SC 914 ) . In the facts and circumstances of this case the punishment of removal from service awarded to the petitioner can be regarded as disproportionate to the proved charges as to shock the conscience of the Court. I would have remanded the matter to the appellate authority for passing appropriate order of punishment but looking to the fact that incident occurred in 1994, I, in order to shorten the litigation deem it appropriate to modify the impugned order of punishment. In my opinion, instead of removing the petitioner from service the ends of justice would be met if punishment of stoppage of three grade increments with cumulative effect is imposed on the petitioner. 14. For these reasons, the writ petition is partly allowed and the impugned punishment order stands modified as indicated above. The petitioner shall be reinstated in service with continuation of service as if he was never removed from service but he shall not be entitled to back wages.There shall be no order as to costs.Petition Partly allowed. *******