V. V. S. RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute raised in this writ petition has long chequered history. Petitioner is a society registered under Societies Act espousing the cause of Muslims known as Akhbari community (a sub sect of Shia Muslims ). It is their case that at or about the construction of Ibadath khana-e-Hussaini Darulshifa, Hyderabad founders created a wakfnama under which Muslims belonging to Akhbari community have a right to have a separate congregation to offer prayers on Holy days and that they can have the prayers led by their own Pesh-e-Namaaz (Priest leading namazis ). They have been agitating for such right before A. P. State Wakf Board, first respondent herein as well as this Court. ( 2 ) TO be brief, they filed writ petition being W. P. No. 6162 of 1999 before this Court to permit the members of the sect to perform prayers led by their own Priest. The writ petition was disposed of giving such permission. In the same writ petition, this Court on 28-3-1999 modified earlier order fixing a particular time slot to the members of petitioner community for conducting prayers. It was also observed that proceeding under Article 226 is not a proper remedy to resolve the controversy regarding entitlement of the members of petitioner association. Again in the year 2000, petitioners filed W. P. No. 4199 of 2000 was disposed of by Hon ble Sri Justice Bilal Nazki. His Lordship observed as under : this is a dispute basically between the writ petitioner and fourth respondent with respect to leading of the prayers at Ibadathkhana-e-Hussaini, Darulshifa. During the hearing the parties have come to an agreement. Therefore, this writ petition is disposed of in accordance with the agreement reached between the parties. The members of the writ petitioner association will offer their prayers at the site mentioned above between 11 a. m. and 12 noon on 17/03/2000 to be held by Moulana Syed Riyazuddin Hyder Jaffery (Akhbari) Quibla or his nominee. The premises shall be vacated by them at 12-15p. m. This order shall not be precedent and the petitioners shall not approach: this Court in similar proceedings on similar occasions without getting their rights established in appropriate Court. (Emphasis supplied) ( 3 ) IN the same year, petitioner again filed W. P. No. 25271 of 2000. The premises shall be vacated by them at 12-15p. m. This order shall not be precedent and the petitioners shall not approach: this Court in similar proceedings on similar occasions without getting their rights established in appropriate Court. (Emphasis supplied) ( 3 ) IN the same year, petitioner again filed W. P. No. 25271 of 2000. A learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition observing that the members of petitioner association are entitled to offer prayers along with their Muslim brothers. The petitioner herein assaulted the said order in W. A. No. 1766 of 2000. The Division Bench of this Court comprising their Lordships Hon ble the Chief Justice S. B. Sinha and Hon ble Sri Justice B. Subhashan Reddy (as their Lordships then were) dismissed the writ appeal. The Division bench referred to various earlier orders passed by this Court and observed as under : keeping in view the fact that in the earlier writ application the appellant-association was asked to pursue its alternative remedy and no adjudication in the appropriate forum has yet been made further having regarding to the fact that Justice Bilal Nazki while passing the order dated 15-3-2000 categorically stated that the petitioner should not approach this Court in similar proceedings on similar occasions without getting their rights established in appropriate Court, the question of entertaining the writ application does not arise. For the reasons aforementioned and further, having regard to the fact that it is not for the writ Court to fix the time for offering prayer, we are of the opinion that this writ petition cannot be entertained. The application filed by the petitioner before the appropriate forum may be adjudicated. The writ appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 4 ) THE petitioner filed similar writ petitions being W. P. Nos. 3745 and 25553 of 2001. Though there is a slight change in the relief prayed, the ultimate object was to get the relief of directing the Wakf Board to permit the petitioner association to have a separate congregation under their own Peshe-e-Namaaz. ( 4 ) THE petitioner filed similar writ petitions being W. P. Nos. 3745 and 25553 of 2001. Though there is a slight change in the relief prayed, the ultimate object was to get the relief of directing the Wakf Board to permit the petitioner association to have a separate congregation under their own Peshe-e-Namaaz. In W. P. No. 25553 of 2001, my learned brother Justice A. Gopal Reddy dismissed the writ petition filed by second respondent herein observing that if any right of the petitioner is recognised by the Wakf Board, the second respondent may have to agitate the same under Section 83 of the Wakf Act. On the eve of Eid-ul-fitr (Ramzan) 2003, petitioner herein filed W. P. No. 24705 of 2003 seeking a direction to the respondents herein to permit the members of petitioner society to perform Eid-ul-fitr prayers led by their own Peshe-e-Namaaz. This Court by order dated 24-11-2003 passed an interim order to the effect that the members of petitioner society shall be permitted to perform prayers of Eid-ul-fitr at Ibadath khana-e-Hussaini, Darulshifa, Hyderabad. Subsequently, the said writ petition was dismissed as infructuous on 23-1-2004. ( 5 ) IT may also be noted that in W. P. No. 3745 of 2001, petitioner herein challenged the order of first respondent dated 28-2-2001 whereby and whereunder the Wakf Board refused to consider the request of petitioner and decide under Section 32 of the Wakf Act. This Court in its interim order dated 5-3-2001 did not agree with the Wakf Board and observed that under Section 32 of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Board has adequate powers to determine the grievance of the petitioner. This Court also by the same order-directed the Wakf Board to consider and determine the request of petitioner for offering prayers. Subsequently by order dated 15-3-2001, the writ petition was dismissed as infructubus. ( 6 ) ON the eve of Idd-ul-Zuha/idd-ul-Azha (Bakrid) falling on 2-2-2004, petitioner approached the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board requesting to direct the management of Ibadath Khana-e-Hussaini, second respondent herein to allow the members of petitioner association to offer prayers on 2-2-2004 and Idd-e-Ghadeer on 10-2-2004 led by their own Pesh-e-Namaaz in congregation at the place of worship by allotting separate sittings between 8. 00 a. m. to 9-30 a. m. to them. 00 a. m. to 9-30 a. m. to them. Alleging that the Waif Board has not passed any orders on their representation dated 13-1-2004, petitioner filed the present writ petition seeking a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents herein to permit the members of petitioner society to perform the Idd-ul-Azha prayers falling on 2-2-2004 and Idd-e-Ghadeer prayers falling on 10-2-2004 led by their own Pesh-e-Namaaz in Ibadath Khana-e-Hussaini, Darulshifa, Hyderabad. ( 7 ) KEEPING in view various orders of this Court in as many as seven earlier writ proceedings, the matter was heard at length at the preliminary stage itself. The learned counsel for petitioner Mr. M. A. Bart, the learned Standing Counsel for A. P. State Wakf Board Mr. A. M. Qureshi and the learned counsel for second respondent Mr. M. V. S. Suresh Kumar made submissions dealing with wide range of issues regarding right of Muslims to offer prayers in a Mosque, right of congregation of Muslims belonging to a separate sect to perform prayers at a given time in a Mosque and the right of such sect of Muslims to have a separate Jamat with separate Pesh-e-Namaaz. The learned standing counsel for Wakf Board also placed before this Court copy of Letter No. 26/hyd/dm/03 dated 28-1-2004 informing President of petitioner society, to approach managing committee of Ibadath Khana-e-Hussaini to perform Namaz-e-Id-ul-Zuha and Idd-e-Ghadeer for the year 1424 Hijri. ( 8 ) IT is axiomatic that a writ of mandamus shall be issued by this Court only to enforce an existing right or to compel the public authority to discharge a public duty. In the absence of an existing right be it in relation to the fundamental right to religion under Articles 25 and 26 this Court cannot issue any mandamus to a public authority. If any authority is required, a reference may be made to the latest judgment of the- Supreme Court in Director of Settlements v. M. R. Appa Rao, AIR 2002 SC 1598 , wherein a three Judge bench of the Supreme Court relying its earlier judgment in Kalyan Singh v. State of U. P. , AIR 1962 SC 1183 , laid down as under (para 17): the powers of the High Courts under Article 226 though are discretionary and no limits can be placed upon their discretion. It must be exercised along recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations. It must be exercised along recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed limitations. The expression for any other purpose in Article 226, makes the jurisdiction of the High Courts more extensive but yet the Court must exercise the same with certain restraints and within some parameters. One of the conditions for exercising power under Article 226 for issuance of a mandamus is that the Court must come to the conclusion that the aggrieved person has a legal right, which entitles him to any of the rights and that such right has been infringed. In other words, existence of a legal right of a citizen and performance of any corresponding legal duty by the State or any public authority could be enforced by issuance of a writ of mandamus. "mandamus" means a command. It differs from the writs of prohibition or certiorari in its demand for some activity on the part of the body or person to whom it is addressed. Mandamus is a command issued to direct any person, corporation inferior Courts or Government, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. A mandamus is available against any public authority including administrative and local bodies, and it would lie to any person who is under a duty imposed by statute or by the common law to do a particular act. In order to obtain a writ or order in the nature of mandamus, the applicant has to satisfy that he has a legal right to the performance of a legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and such right must be subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one Imposed by the Constitution, a statute, common law or by rules or orders having the force of law. (Emphasis supplied) ( 9 ) WHETHER the members of the petitioner society have any right to have a separate Jammat/congregation under the leadership of their own Pesh-e-Namaaz ? The learned counsel for petitioner Mr. M. A. Bart does not dispute that the right of petitioner association and its members has to be established in a competent Court of law or judicial forum. The learned counsel for petitioner Mr. M. A. Bart does not dispute that the right of petitioner association and its members has to be established in a competent Court of law or judicial forum. Indeed as observed by this Court in W. P. No. 6162 of 1999 dated 28-3-1999, W. P. No. 4199 of 2000 dated 15-3-2000 and W. A. No. 1766 of 2000 dated 27-12-2000, a remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a proper remedy to decide the right of members belonging to Akhbari sub sect of Shia Muslims to have a separate Congregation at Ibadath Khana-e. Hussaii. I may however, hasten to add that this Court, may not be understood as- expressing any opinion on the right of petitioner association and its members under wakfnama or by its custom or usage. This has to be decided by a competent Civil Court or A. P. Wakf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 (1) of the Wakf Act. ( 10 ) THE learned counsel for petitioner Mr. M. A. Bari contends that under "shariat" (Muslim Law), every Muslim has right to offer prayer under the leadership of Pesh-e-Namaaz of his choice. He would also urge that when second respondent is not validly appointed managing committee, and when second respondent is adversary of petitioner, action of first respondent in advising petitioner to approach second respondent for permission is irrational and unreasonable. These submissions are strongly refuted by the learned counsel opposing the writ petition. ( 11 ) IN Khalil Ahmad v. Israfil, (1917) 37 Ind Cas 302 : (AIR 1916 Patna 87), Sifat All Khan v. All Mian, (1933) 144 Ind Cas 298 : (AIR 1933 Allahabad 284), Amir Hussain Shah v. Hafiz Ghulam Rasul, AIR 1936 Peshwar 65, Mahomed Was v. Bachchan Sahib, AIR 1955 Allahabad 68 (SB) various High Courts considered the question raised by Mr. M. A. Bari. It is not necessary to refer to statement of law in all these cases. A brief reference to some of them would only be necessary. (In Sifat All Khan v. Ali Mian (supra), plaintiffs who were Ahmadis filed a suit for declaration that they were muthawallis and Imams of Mosque and that defendants and all other non-Ahmadis had no right to offer their prayers in the congregation led by some other Priests than; Plaintiffs Imam. The suit was dismissed. The first appellate Court reversed trial Count judgment. The suit was dismissed. The first appellate Court reversed trial Count judgment. Defendants approached the Allahabad High Court by way of Second Appeal. ;the Division. Bench of the Allahabad High Court held as under : , the plaintiffs did not, in so many words, claim any declaration of right to offer up prayers in the mosque simply in the capacity of Mohamedans. They claimed a declaration of exclusive right to lead prayers as Imam and to exercise the authority of mutawallis- In order to avoid further dis-putes however we think that it would be advisable to give the plaintiffs a declaration on the lines granted in the case cited. That is to say, the plaintiffs right to offer up prayers in the mosque as Mohamedans should be recognised but only subject to certain conditions. We therefore allow the appeal to this extent that we set aside the injunction granted by the Court below but we substitute a decree declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to enter the mosque if they please and to offer up prayers with the regular congregation, behind the Imam chosen by the members of the congregation, but they are not entitled to pray in a separate congregation behind an Imam of their own. (Emphasis supplied) ( 12 ) IN Amir Hussain Shah v. Hafiz Ghulam Rasul, (AIR 1936 Peshawar 65) (supra), the Division Bench of Peshawar High Court held as under : there can be no doubt that every Mohamedan has a right to say his prayers in any mosque, provided he does not disturb or Interrupt other worshippers. That question however does not dispose of the further question whether the plaintiffs have a right to hold a separate congregation. There Is definite authority on this point however from the Patna High Court. The case is 37 IC 302 (2 ). In that case it was held that the plaintiffs, who to that case were Ahmedis or Qadianis, were not allowed to hold a separate congregation. It was pointed out that there was no authority for the contrary proposition, and furthermore, that it would lead to insurmountable difficulties and continual friction. The reasoning which was applied in that case appeals to us. We are not pfepared to refuse a declaration to the plaintiffs merely on account of the fact that to grant such a declaration might lead to a breach. of the pealce. The reasoning which was applied in that case appeals to us. We are not pfepared to refuse a declaration to the plaintiffs merely on account of the fact that to grant such a declaration might lead to a breach. of the pealce. ra person is not to be prevented from exercising a legal right merely because other persons object to his doing so. ( 13 ) M Mahomed Was v. Baehchan Sahib, (AIR 1955 Allahabad 68) (supra), Hon ble the Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court observed that in a country like India, where people are free to follow their own faith according to-their own belief, the policy of live and let live must govern the relationship between followers of various religions or. sects, so long as it does not conflict against the rules of public morality or decency. It is not open to a member of a particular sect to claim that the others should not follow their faith according to their belief because it offends against his susceptibilities. His Lordship referred to entire case law and in para 32 summarised the principles as under : from all the authorities cited above it would appear that it is now well settled that: (1) a Mosque is dedicated for the purpose that any Muslim belonging to any sect can go and say prayers therein; (2) it cannot be reserved for Muslims of any particular denomination or sect; (3) no one can claim to have the form of congregational prayer usually said in a mosque altered to suit him; (4) even though the congregational prayers are said in a mosque in a particular form any Muslim belonging to any other sect can go into a mosque and say his prayeas at the back of the congregation in the manner followed by him so long as he does not do anything mala fide to disturb the others: (5) the object of the dedication can neither be altered nor the beneficiaries limited or changed; and (6) a Muslim will have a cause of action if he is deprived of his right to say prayers in a mosque or in prevented from doing so. (Emphasis supplied) From the above precedents, it becomes clear that no sect of Muslims can claim a separate Jamat (Congregation) under their own Pesh-e-Namaz. (Emphasis supplied) From the above precedents, it becomes clear that no sect of Muslims can claim a separate Jamat (Congregation) under their own Pesh-e-Namaz. Such a right is not recognised under Islamic Law and according to tenets of Holy scriptures of Islam, every Muslim has right to offer prayers at any place of worship. Islam does not recognise the place of worship, a mosque or Ibadath Khana as dedicated to a particular sect or denomination. Therefore, I am afraid I cannot agree with the submission of the learned counsel for petitioner. ( 14 ) AS laid down in various authorities and by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in MD. Wasi v. Baehchan Sahib, (AIR 1955 Allahabad 68) (supra), all the members of the petitioner association have absplute right to go to Ibadath Khana-e-Hussaini on 2-2-2004 during any Jamat/ congregation and offer prayers along with other Muslim brothers. It is for the members of the petitioner association, if they so desire, to stand at the back of congregation and offer prayers in the manner they generally offer. It is also open to the petitioner association at least now to approach the appropriate legal forum and get their right established as has been claimed. Any such forum shall decide the issue without being in any manner influenced by the observations made hereinabove on the right of the petitioner association to have a separate congregation. The question whether the present managing committee is a usurper or validly appointed, by A. P. Wakf Board to manage Ibadath Khana-e-Hussaini, Darulshlfa, is left open to be decided by A. P. Wakf Tribunal. ( 15 ) THE writ petition, with the above observations and directions is accordingly disposed of at the stage of admission. There shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly.