JUDGMENT A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 in Sessions Case No. 181 of 1998 on the file of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, aggrieved by the conviction and sentence imposed on 04-09-1998 against them had preferred the present criminal appeal. 2. The Sub-Inspector of Police, Varadaiahpalem Police Station laid the charge sheet against A-1 to A-6 under Sections 147, 148, 342, 307, 355 read with Section 149 IPC in Crime No. 73 of 1997. 3. The version of the prosecution in nutshell is that the accused and the defacto complainant - P.W.1 belong to Yanadivettu village of Varadaiahpalem Mandal. On 30-05-1997 at about 4.30 p.m., while P.W.1 was standing on the road margin in Yanadivettu village, A-1 to A-6 with a common intention, surrounded him, A-4 beat him with a stone near his right eye and caused injury. When P.W.1 questioned about his highhanded act, A-4 threatened him that if he is not going to repay the debt of A-4, he would not only beat him but will also hang him. Then A-4, A-1, A-2 and A-6 tied a rope around the throat of P.W.1 and dragged him to a nearby ragi tree and tied him to the ragi tree and attempted to kill him. Then, under the impression that if P.W.1 was tied to nearby well, it will be clearly visible to all, and thereupon again they dragged P.W.1 to a nearby well and tied him again to the piller of the well. A-4 beat him with his cheppal and kicked him with leg. Again, accused dragged him with a rope to a nearby Eucalyptus tree situated near the house of A-4. Meanwhile, a jeep was coming on towards Yanadi Vettu, on seeing that jeep under the impression that it was a police jeep all the accused left P.W.1 and ran away. Thereafter, P.W.1 removed the rope around him and went to the house of Chandrabhushanamma-P.W.3. Then, L.Ws 1 to 3 i.e., P.W.1. G. Viswanatha Naidu and P. Chandra bhushan amma respectively went to the Police Station and P.W.1 gave a complaint to the police, which was registered as a case in Crime No.73 of 1997. Thereafter, P.W.1 removed the rope around him and went to the house of Chandrabhushanamma-P.W.3. Then, L.Ws 1 to 3 i.e., P.W.1. G. Viswanatha Naidu and P. Chandra bhushan amma respectively went to the Police Station and P.W.1 gave a complaint to the police, which was registered as a case in Crime No.73 of 1997. The Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Satyaveedu, had taken the cognizance of the same as P.R.C.No. 10 of 1997 and committed the case to the Court of Session and the learned Sessions Judge, had made over the same to the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, and the learned Judge, recorded the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 11 and marked Exs.P-1 to P.13 and M.Os.1 and 2, and came to the conclusion that the prosecution had proved the guilt of A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 and sentenced them and imposed-fine as specified in the judgment but recorded acquittal of A-1 and A-5. Aggrieved by the same, the present appeal had been preferred. 4. Sri C. Praveen Kumar, Counsel representing the appellants would submit that the conviction under Section 147, 148 and 149 definitely cannot be sustained, since there cannot be any unlawful assembly, and when only conviction had been recorded as against four members viz., A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6, and A-1 and A-5 had been acquitted, the conviction recorded on the ground that the rest of the four persons constituted unlawful assembly and had committed the other offences definitely cannot be sustained, and acquittal may have to be' recorded on this ground alone. The learned Counsel placed strong reliance on Achhey Lal v. State of U.P. AIR 1978 SC 1233 , Amar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1987 SC 826 and Nagamalleswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1991 SCC (Crl) 564. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the evidence of P.W.1 and also Ex. P-1 and would point out that apart from the accused, T. Parvathamma and K. Chenchamma also had been referred to both in Ex. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the evidence of P.W.1 and also Ex. P-1 and would point out that apart from the accused, T. Parvathamma and K. Chenchamma also had been referred to both in Ex. P-1-complaint and also in the evidence of P.W.1, but no charge sheet was laid as against those persons and that apart from this aspect of the matter, except P.W.1 all the other witnesses, so called eye witnesses were declared hostile inclusive of P. Chandra Bhushanamma-P.W.3, and hence, in the light of this factual background, the solitary testimony of P.W.1 may have to be scrutinized very carefully, and in the light of the evidence of P.W.1 and also the medical evidence and Ex. P-1, definitely the version of the prosecution cannot be believed. The learned Counsel also placed reliance on Prem Singh v. State of Punjab, Kartik Mulhar v. State of Bihar and Mani AIR 1977 SC 673 . Ram v. State of 1996 (1) ALT (Crl.) 212 (SC). Mani Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1994 Crl.L.J. 3848. The learned Counsel ultimately concluded that the medical evidence also is not clear and at least the age of the injuries had not been noted and the doctor had not deposed anything about this aspect and in the light of these infirmities, especially in view of the nature of injuries as revealed by the medical evidence, the prosecution case cannot be believed. 5. Per contra, the Additional Public Prosecutor had pointed out the specific allegations made in ExP-1 at least as against A-2, A-3 and also in relation to A-4 and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor also pointed out the evidence of P.W.1 in this regard. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would submit that apart from the evidence of P.W.1, there is evidence of P. W.9-doctor and when there is no possibility of having self-infliction of these injuries, the version of the prosecution may have to be believed. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would conclude that even if there is only solitary testimony if such witness is a trustworthy witness, conviction on the strength of even such evidence definitely is sustainable. 6. Heard both the Counsel. Perused the material available on record and also the findings recorded by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti. 7. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would conclude that even if there is only solitary testimony if such witness is a trustworthy witness, conviction on the strength of even such evidence definitely is sustainable. 6. Heard both the Counsel. Perused the material available on record and also the findings recorded by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti. 7. It is not in controversy that except the evidence of P.W.1, there is no other direct evidence available on record. P.Ws.2 to P.W.8 were declared hostile. Likewise, P.W.10 was also declared hostile. P.W.11 is the investigating officer. EX.P-1 complaint given by P.W.1 reads as hereunder: "Sir, Today on 30-05-1997 evening at 4.30 p.m., while I was standing on the road, K. Mohan, K. Suresh sons of K. Munikrishnama Naidu, wife K.Chenchamma, T. Munichandrudu, T. Prabhakar sons of Thummala Kodhanda Naidu, K. Munikrishnama Naidu, son of K. Pandu Naidu, P.Dhananjayulu Naidu, son of P. Yanadhi Naidu, Parvathamma wife of T. Kodhanda Naidu came and surrounded me with sticks and thick ropes and scolded me in filthy language. T. Prabhakar beat me with a stone on my right eye and caused blood injury. Then I questioned why they are beating unnecessarily. Meanwhile T. Munichandrudu replied that I may not only be beaten but also will be killed if I do not repay the debt payable to him. By saying K. Mohan, K. Suresh, P. Dhananjayulu Naidu combined themselves and tied a rope to my throat and dragged me from the 'Marri' tree where I was standing, to a near by 'Ragi' tree and tied me. The aforesaid four members tried to kill me by pulling the rope, which was tied to my throat and again dragged me to a nearby well from there and tied me to the pillars of the well. Then T. Munichandrudu, T. Parvathamma, K.Chenchammabeat me with chap pals and kicked me with legs and proclaimed" "that they will kill me there itself and challenged me to go and report where I got support and beat me. Again untied the rope and by pulling the rope tied to my throat and shoulders they dragged me from there to the house of T. Munichandrudu and tied me with thick ropes to a Euculyptus tree. The aforesaid persons went to the house of T. Munichandrudu. Again untied the rope and by pulling the rope tied to my throat and shoulders they dragged me from there to the house of T. Munichandrudu and tied me with thick ropes to a Euculyptus tree. The aforesaid persons went to the house of T. Munichandrudu. At that time I rescued from the ties and ran in fear and came to the house of my sister Chandrabhushanamma. The all the aforesaid things were also seen by G. Viswanadham Naidu, P. Masthan Naidu, P. Chandrabhushanamma and some of the villagers. I request you to enquire all the above persons and save me and provide life protection from the persons who beat and tried to kill me." 8. This is the earliest version of the prosecution. It is specifically mentioned in Ex.P-1-complaint that T. Munichandrudu, T. Parvathamma and K. Chenchamma beat him with chap pals and kicked him with legs and proclaimed that they will kill him there itself and challenged him to go and report wherever he got support, and beat him. No doubt, several other allegations had been made specifically in Ex.P-1-complaint. For the reasons best known, the investigation had not proceeded further as against T.Parvathamma and K. Chenchamma and they were not charge sheeted. P.W.1 also deposed about the participation of K. Chenchamma and T. Parvathamma specifically. Be that as it may, A-1 to A-6 alone were tried, but A-1 and A-5 were acquitted and A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 alone had been convicted. (i) In Achhey Lal case (1 supra), the Apex Court held that "Where the High Court in appeal acquitted all accused but one of the offence under Section 302 read with Section. 149 and Section 147 but there was no finding by the High Court that after (the acquittal of those accused the unlawful assembly, consisted of five persons or more, known or unknown, identified or unidentified, the provisions of Sections 149 and 147 could not be invoked for convicting the sole accused. His conviction would be illegal in absence of any individual act assigned to him." (ii) In Amar Singh case (2 supra), at paragraphs 7 and 8 the Apex Court held as follows- "In assailing the judgment of the High Court, the first point that has been urged by Mr. Frank Anthony, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants Nos. His conviction would be illegal in absence of any individual act assigned to him." (ii) In Amar Singh case (2 supra), at paragraphs 7 and 8 the Apex Court held as follows- "In assailing the judgment of the High Court, the first point that has been urged by Mr. Frank Anthony, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants Nos. 1 and 2, is that the conviction' of the appellants under Sections 148 and 149, IPC is bad in as much as of the seven accused, the trial court had acquitted two of them, namely, Amar Singh and Rattan Singh, both sons of Isher Das, and the High Court acquitted the accused Bachan Singh. It is submitted that after the acquittal of the three accused persons out of seven, the appellants who are the remaining four, cannot be held to have formed an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Sections 148 and 149, IPC were not at all maintainable. In our opinion, there is much force in the contention. As the appellants were only four in number, there was no question of their forming an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141, IPC. It is not the prosecution case that apart from the said seven accused persons, there were other persons who were involved in the crime. Therefore, on the acquittal of three accused persons, the remaining four accused, that is, the appellants cannot be convicted under Section 148 or Section 149, IPC for any offence, for, the first condition to be fulfilled in, designating an assembly an "unlawful assembly" is that such assembly must be of five or more persons, as required under Section 141, IPC. In our opinion, the convictions of the appellants under Sections 148 and 149 IPC cannot be sustained." (iii) In Nagamalleswara Rao case (3 supra), the Apex Court held at paragraphs 9 and 10 as hereunder: "In Maina Singh case (1976) 2 SCC 827 the appellant in that case and four others were charged with offences under Sections 302/149, IPC, the appellant with having shot at the deceased and the other accused with giving blows to the deceased with a sharp-edged weapon. The trial court acquitted the four accused and convicted the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the State against the acquittal as also the appellants' appeal against the conviction. The trial court acquitted the four accused and convicted the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC. The High Court dismissed the appeal of the State against the acquittal as also the appellants' appeal against the conviction. In the appeal before the Supreme Court it was contended for the appellant that it was not permissible to take the view that a criminal act was done by the appellant in furtherance of the common intention of other co-accused when those accused who had been named had all been acquitted and that all that was permissible for the High Court was to convict the appellant of an offence which he might have committed in his individual capacity. The head note in the report brings the ratio of the judgment correctly and that may be quoted (See SCC pp. 833 & 835, paras 14 & 19) "In a given case even if the charge disclosed only the named persons as co-accused and the prosecution witnesses confined their testimony to them, it would be permissible to conclude that others, named or unnamed, acted co-jointly with one of the charged accused if there was other evidence to lead to that conclusion, but not otherwise. The charge in the present case related to the commission of the offence of unlawful assembly by the appellant along with four-named co-accused, and with no other person. The trial in fact went on that basis through out. There was also no direct or circumstantial evidence to show that the offence was committed by the appellant along with any other unnamed person. So when the other four co-accused had been given the benefit of doubt and acquitted, it would not be permissible to take the view that there must have been some other person along with the appellant in causing injuries to the deceased. The appellant would accordingly be responsible for the offence, if any, which could be shown to have been committed by him without regard to the participation of others." The facts in the Amar Singh cases in short were that seven accused were charged for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Two, out of the seven accused were acquitted by the trial court and on appeal the High court acquitted one more accused. Two, out of the seven accused were acquitted by the trial court and on appeal the High court acquitted one more accused. However, the High Court convicted four of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment. The four convicted accused appealed to this Court and it was contended on their behalf that after the acquittal of three accused persons out of seven, the appellants who I were remaining four cannot be held to have formed an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 IPC and accordingly the charge under Section 149 was not maintainable. Accepting this contention this Court observed (SCC p. 682, para 9) "As the appellants were only four in number, there was no question of their forming an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141IPC. It is not the prosecution case that apart from the said seven accused persons, there were other persons who were involved in the crime. Therefore, on the acquittal of three accused persons, the remaining four accused, that is, the appellants, cannot be convicted under Section 148 or Section 149 IPC for any offence, for, the first condition to be fulfilled in designating an assembly an 'unlawful assembly' is that such assembly must be of five or more persons, as required' under Section 141 IPC. In our opinion, the convictions of the appellants under Sections 148 and 149 IPC cannot be sustained." 9. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor would contend that it is no doubt true that on the ground of unlawful assembly or the related offences conviction cannot be sustained in the light of the fact that A-1 and A-5 had been acquitted by the learned Judge. But specific acts relating to the other offences had been deposed by P.W.1, and hence, as far as conviction under those charges is concerned, the same may have to be confirmed. 10. Now, the question with which this Court is left is that in the light of this factual back drop, whether the whole story of the prosecution relating to the other charges also to be disbelieved or conviction and sentence imposed by the learned Judge under other charges as against the appellants to be confirmed in the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. 11. The evidence of P.W.1 is that on 30-05-1997 at 4.30 p.m. when he was near the temple on the road all the accused and one Chenchamma and Parvathamma attacked him armed with sticks and ropes and they surrounded him and immediately A-4 came to him and fisted with a stone on his below the right eye, for which he received strong dumb injury and he asked A-4 why he was beating him, for which, he stated that if he is not paying the debt, otherwise they will kill me. All the other accused came to him and surrounded him and beat him with sticks and later A-2 and A-3 took one rope and tied around his neck and dragged him near ragi tree and later A-3 stated that "Vsedini Chettuku Vesi Voori Thiyandi" and all the accused took him near .the well and tied him to one Dimme with ropes. His right shoulder was caught hold by A-2. A-3 caught hold of his left shoulder. A-4 and A-6 caught hold of his legs. After removing ropes from Bavi dim me, he was taken by them by way of dragging him to the house of A-3. At the house of A-3, A-3 tied him to Eucalyptus tree with the same rope. A-1 to A-6 saw a jeep thought that it is a police jeep, they ran away from that place. Later he (P.W.1) removed the rope from his mouth and later removed entire rope and ran to the house of Chandrabhushanamma and Chadrabhushanamma was examined as P.W.3, who had not supported the version of the prosecution. The other witnesses, who had been specified to have witnessed the incident, also had not supported the version of the prosecution. P.W.1 also further deposed: about some money transaction and specifically deposed that A-1 to A-6 attacked him with an intention to kill him. While he was tied by A-3 to well dimma at that time A-3 beat with his chappal on his head and also kicked him with his legs on his stomach. P.W.1 also further deposed: about some money transaction and specifically deposed that A-1 to A-6 attacked him with an intention to kill him. While he was tied by A-3 to well dimma at that time A-3 beat with his chappal on his head and also kicked him with his legs on his stomach. P.W.1 also specifically deposed that one Chenchamma and Parvathamma also beat him with chappals on his head and also they kicked him on his stomach and he also mentioned in EX.P-1 that A-3, Parvathamma and Chenchamma beat him with chap pals and with their legs and kicked him on his stomach and also mentioned in the complaint-Ex.P-1 that they stated that they will kill him at the same place. M.O.1 is the stone and M.O.2 is the rope and his sister handed over the M.Os. 1 and 2 to the police in his presence. In the cross-examination, this witness deposed that he had not stated before the police that he had borrowed Rs. 400/- from A-3, and the same was not mentioned in Ex. P-1-complaint also. The houses of L..Ws. 2 to 9 are towards the western side of the main road leads to Satyavedu. The houses of the accused are towards the eastern side of the road. The distance between Marri Chettu and the temple is about ten meters. Approximately the distance between A-3 and Marri Chettu is 50 or 60 meters. Several questions relating to the geographical features also were put to this witness. This witness also deposed that all the accused beat him with sticks all over his body and he had mentioned in his statement before the police and in Ex. P-1 complaint that A-2 and A-3 caught hold of him and dragged him, including A1 to A-6 beat him with sticks and other two ladies beat him with chappals and he had mentioned in Ex. P-1-complaint that A-4 asked him about the loan of A-3 and he had not specified in EX.P-1 that no one came forward to rescue him due to fear of the accused and he had not mentioned in Ex. P-1 that A-3 kicked him with his legs on his abdomen and he had not mentioned that the accused thought that it is a police zeep and they ran away. P-1 that A-3 kicked him with his legs on his abdomen and he had not mentioned that the accused thought that it is a police zeep and they ran away. The offence had taken place about one and half hours and he had not observed the persons who witnessed the incident because they were beating him. No doubt, he had denied a suggestion that in the prohibition period he was in a habit of selling the alcohol and brandi bottles taking from Madras and selling at Satyavedu and when the Excise Authorities arrested him, he utilized his influence and to see that there was no case against him. He studied ITI in Tirupathi. But he failed due to certain circumstances. With a view to assail the character of this witness, certain suggestions were put which were denied and all other suggestions also were denied by P.W.1. 12. P.Ws.2 to 8 and P.W.10 were declared hostile. Even otherwise, there is nothing in support of the prosecution version in the evidence of these witnesses. 13. P.W.9-Woman Assistant Surgeon, examined P.W.1 and found the following injuries. (1) A ligature marked over Adam's apple upto SCM medial border (i.e., thyroid cartillege i.e., neck) both sides 5 cm. x 1/4 cm. (i.e., upto sterno eleido Mastoid muscle SCM) (both sides of neck) (2) A contusion below right eye-1/4 x 1/4". This witness is of the opinion that injury No.1 is grievous in nature and injury No.2 is simple in nature. She deposed that on 31-05-1997 she examined P.W.1. He was inpatient for two weeks and about two days back till now she had verified all the records at Hospital with regard to admission and treatment of P.W.1 as an inpatient. As per the records, P.W.1 was treated as inpatient but exactly she could not remember how many days he was treated as inpatient but could remember that he was in hospital for one week to ten days. Injury No.1 will be caused generally if any person caught hold of the neck and throttling. Injury No.1 can be caused if rope put on the neck of the patient and pulled the rope in both ends by two persons or else any branches of tree (twig) put on neck of a person and pulled the injury might have been caused. Injury No.2 can be caused with a blunt object may be a stone or closed fist. Injury No.2 can be caused with a blunt object may be a stone or closed fist. EX.P-9 the wound certificate issued by her. This witness deposed that it is not true to say that while the police brought P.W.1 to the hospital by saying that P.W.1 was in drunken stage, and this witness had not measured the entire portion but she had mentioned injured portion of the neck mentioned in EX.P-9. She had not mentioned in EX.P-9 the possibilities of injury Nos.1 and 2 and she is not aware of that she has not mentioned in EX.P-9 the cause of the injuries with which weapon, and if any person dragged from some place with a rope definitely he will sustain injury On the body, and if any person beat with sticks on anyone of the person the marks will be sustained on the body on the basis of only force, if it is forcibly beaten the marks can be visible or otherwise it will not be visible and she had not observed anyone of the injuries on the body of P.W.1, other than the injury Nos.1 and 2. Injury No.2 there is possible if any person fall on the rough surface. But this witness also deposed that as far as injury No.1 is concerned, self infliction is not possible. 14. P.W.11-lnvestigating Officer, who deposed about the details of investigation and recording of the statements and observing the scene of offence, preparation of observation proceedings under Ex. P-12, and seizure of M.Os .1 and 2 near the house of A-3, arresting of the accused and also filing of the charge sheet. Since several witnesses were declared hostile, the relevant portions of 161 Cr.P.C. statements were put to this investigating officer. 15. This is the nature of evidence available on record. Submissions at length were made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. On the strength of the evidence of P.W.1, it is no doubt true that the Doctor-P. W.9 deposed that the injury No.1 is not possible by self infliction. An acquittal had been recorded as far as A-1 and A-5 are concerned, and the other two, who had been mentioned both in Ex. P-1-complaint and also in the evidence of P.W.1, had not been charge sheeted. An acquittal had been recorded as far as A-1 and A-5 are concerned, and the other two, who had been mentioned both in Ex. P-1-complaint and also in the evidence of P.W.1, had not been charge sheeted. The overt act attributed to A-6 also appears to be a minor overt act but however, the overt acts spoken to by P.W.1 as against A-2 and A-3 had been stressed by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor with vehemence. There cannot be any controversy about the proposition even on the strength of a solitary testimony, if it is trustworthy and believable, conviction can be sustained. But, here is a case where Ex.P-1-complaint was made as against several persons, the other two also apart from A-1 to A-6. But, the prosecution version as far, as A-1 and A-5 had been specifically disbelieved and acquittal had; been recorded by the learned Judge. (i) In Kartik Mulhar case (5 supra) the Apex Court while dealing with the appreciation of the evidence of a solitary witness held as hereunder: "This section marks a departure from the English, Law where a number of statutes still prohibit convictions for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a single witness. This difference was noticed by the Privy Council in Mohamad Sugal Esa Mamasan Per Alslan v. The King AIR 1946 P.C. 3, wherein it was laid down as under: "It was also submitted on behalf of the appellant that assuming the unsworned evidence was admissible the Court could not act upon it unless it was corroborated. In England, where provision has been made for the reception of unsworned evidence from a child, it has always been provided that the evidence must be corroborated in some material particularly implicating the accused. But in the Indian Act there is no such provision and the evidence is made admissible whether corroborated or not. Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworned but this is a rule of prudence and not of law". Once there is admissible evidence a Court can act upon it; corroboration unless required by statute goes only to the weight and value of the evidence. It is a sound rule in practice not to act on the uncorroborated evidence of a child, whether sworn or unsworned but this is a rule of prudence and not of law". The Privy Council decision was considered by this Court in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614 , in which it was observed as under:- On a consideration of the relevant authorities and the provisions of the Evidence Act, the following propositions may be safely stated as firmly established: (1) As a general rule, a Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness though uncorroborated. One credible witnesses out ways the testimony of a number of other witnesses of indifferent character. (2) Unless corroboration is insisted upon by statute, Courts should not insist on corroboration except in cases where the nature of the testimony of the single witness itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted upon for example, in the case of a child witness, or of a witness whose evidence is that of an accomplice or of an analogous character. (3) Whether corroboration of the testimony of a single witness is or is not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case and no general rule can be laid down in' a matter like this and much depends upon the judicial discretion of the Judge before whom the case comes. In view of these considerations, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention that in a murder case, the Courts should insist upon purality of witnesses, is much too broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act has categorically laid it down that no particular number of witnesses shall, in any case, be required for the proof of any fact. The legislature determined as long ago as 1872 presumably after due consideration of the pros and cons, that it shall not be necessary for proof of disproof of a fact, to call any particular number of witnesses." This Court further observed as under: "It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilty depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony of a single witness only could be available in proof of the crime, would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the circumstances of each case and the quality of the evidence of the single witness whose testimony has to be either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony is found by the Court to be entirely reliable. there is no legal impediment to the conviction, of the accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused maybe proved by the testimony of a single witness, the innocence of the accused may be established on the testimony of the single witness, even though a considerable number of witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in our Opinion, it is a sound and well established rule of law that the Court is concerned with the-quality-and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for proving or disproving a fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony of this context may be classified into three categories. Namely: (1) wholly reliable: (2) wholly unreliable (3) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first category of proof, the Court should have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way-it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of a single witness. If it is found to be above approach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence of subordination. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. If it is found to be above approach or suspicion of interestedness, incompetence of subordination. In the second category, the Court equally has no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in the third category of cases, that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. There is another danger in insisting on plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the quality of the oral evidence of a single witness, if Court were to insist on plurality of witnesses in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly encouraging subordination of witnesses. Situations may arise and do arise where only a single person is available to give evidence in support of a disputed fact. The Court naturally has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which tend to render oral testimony open to the suspicion. It becomes its duty to act upon such testimony. The law reports contain many precedents where the Court had to depend and act Upon the testimony of a single witness in support of the prosecution." The above decision has since been followed in Ramratan and others v. The State of Rajasthan AIR 1962 SC 424 , Gulli Chand and others v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1974 SC 276 , Badri v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1976 SC 560 , Vanula Bhushan @ Venuna Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu AIR 1989 SC 236 and Jagdish Prasad v. State of MP. AIR 1994 SC 1251 . Some other cases of this Court in which the question of sole witness constituting the basis of conviction or otherwise has been considered are State of Haryana v. Manjo Kumar (1994) 1 SCC 495 , Brij Basi Lal v. State of M.P. 1991 Suppl. (1) SCC 200, Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) (1991) 2 SCC 37, Peddireddi Subbareddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1991 SC 1356 , Jaya Ram Shiva Tagore v. State of Maharashtra 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 677, Anil Pukhan v. State of Assam AIR 1993 SC 1462 and Ram Kumar v. State of UP. (1) SCC 200, Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) (1991) 2 SCC 37, Peddireddi Subbareddi v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1991 SC 1356 , Jaya Ram Shiva Tagore v. State of Maharashtra 1991 Suppl. (2) SCC 677, Anil Pukhan v. State of Assam AIR 1993 SC 1462 and Ram Kumar v. State of UP. IAR 1992 SC 1602." (ii) Reliance was also placed on Prem Singh case (4 Supra) Wherein it was held that "In a charge under Section 302 IPC conviction based solely on evidence of two eye-witnesses who were brothers of deceased, evidence of some witnesses with regard to participation of four other accused had been rejected by the Court as unreliable, conviction was held to be illegal." 16. No broad proposition can be laid down in the case of appreciation of evidence. There may be cases where a prosecution witness may give exaggerated versions may also give some improved versions and may mix the truth or untruth and may depose about the incident, always as a matter of rule, it cannot be laid down in each and every case, such witness may have to be totally rejected. Truth may have to be separated from the false version. The same principle is 'made applicable even in the case of the appreciation of the evidence of a hostile witness. In Mani Ram case (6 supra), it was held that "Where the direct evidence is not supported by" the expert evidence then the evidence is wanting in the most material part of the prosecution case and, therefore, it would be difficult to convict the accused on the basis of such evidence. If the evidence of the prosecution witnesses is totally inconsistent with the medical evidence that is a most fundamental defect in the prosecution case and unless this inconsistency is reasonably explained it is sufficient not only to discredit the evidence but the entire case. In the instant case the prosecution withheld the independent witnesses and had only chosen to examine the solitary interested witness who was the real brother of the deceased and the evidence of said witness was wholly inconsistent with the medical evidence, therefore, it would be difficult to accept him as an eye-witness to the occurrence and therefore it would not be safe to base the conviction on the solitary evidence of such a witness. There was no other evidence to support the prosecution case. There was no other evidence to support the prosecution case. Consequently the conviction of the accused would be liable to be set aside." 17. A careful scrutiny of the allegations made in Ex. P-1-complaint and also the evidence of P.W.1, especially in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Judge disbelieving the version of the prosecution as against A-1 and A-5, and also taking the fact that the other two ladies, who are said to have participated, not having been charge sheeted, and in the light of the fact that all the other alleged eye witnesses were declared hostile and none supported the version of the prosecution, and also the manner of the happening of the incident as deposed by P.W.1, being artificial, this Court is not inclined to rely upon the solitary testimony of P.W.1, which is not corroborated by any other evidence. No doubt, serious attempt was made to sustain the conviction at least as against A-2 and A-3, on the strength of the medical evidence to the effect that self infliction is not possible as far as injury No.1 is concerned. But, it is pertinent to note that P.W.9 had not deposed anything about the age of the injury and the other particulars relating to this aspect. Thus, the medical evidence also is devoid of certain essential particulars and hence, in view of the over all facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellants-A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 are entitled to the benefit of doubt of all the charges with which they had been charged. 18. In the result, the conviction and sentence dated 04-09.1998 in Sessions Case No. 181 of 1998 imposed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Srikalahasti, against the appellants-A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 are hereby set aside and the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The bail bonds of the appellantsA-2, A-3, A-4 and A-6 shall stand cancelled. It is needless to say that the appellants are entitled to refund of the fine amounts.