ORDER A.K. Shrivastava, J. 1. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged order dated 23-3-1993 (Annexure-I) passed by Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara dismissing the services of the petitioner and appellate order dated 17-12-1993 (Annexure-O) passed by DIG, Jabalpur Range dismissing his appeal. 2. According to petitioner on 7-11-1992 Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara had gone to Jabalpur on official tour, at that time, his duty was from 20 hrs to 8 hrs. One Constable Prathwiraj of Home Guard was also on duty as a Security Guard at the bungalow of S. P. On 9-11-1992 at about 4.30 in the morning S. P. Chhindwara came back from Jabalpur and at that time Gate Keeper was not present, but, as soon as the Gate Keeper heard blow of horn he, opened the gate of bungalow which took little time and during that time the vehicle, in which S. P. was sitting, remain stationary. According to petitioner, this made an annoyance to S. P. (respondent No. 4) and as per petitioner, respondent No. 4 called him. Thereafter as per the case of petitioner, Superintendent of Police also started beating him and simultaneously hurled the filthy abuses to him. 3. A charge-sheet was issued to petitioner which is marked as Annexure-F dated 9-12-1992. The charge-sheet was issued by the same Superintendent of Police, and he is arrayed as respondent No. 4 in this petition. The charges which were imposed on the petitioner read thus:- According to petitioner charge-sheet was sent at the address of his village. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that no personal service of charge-sheet was affected on him and enquiry was conducted in ex parte. The enquiry was completed on 28-1-1993. Shri V. N. Pachori, who was serving on the post of Additional Superintendent of Police was appointed as Enquiry Officer by respondent No. 4 (Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara). 5. According to respondents before passing final order against petitioner a DE was held against him and respondent No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara, who is disciplinary authority issued notices to the petitioner at his home address where he was supposed to reside but the same were not served on him. Copies of those notices dated 2-2-1993 and 8-2-1993 are Annexure-IV and V. Later on, notice was also sent through registered post but the same was received back with the remark that addressee is not available and his whereabouts are not known. Copies of those notices dated 2-2-1993 and 8-2-1993 are Annexure-IV and V. Later on, notice was also sent through registered post but the same was received back with the remark that addressee is not available and his whereabouts are not known. Photocopy of the envelop containing endorsement of the postman is Annexure-VI and thereafter notice was affixed on a conspicuous place of his abode. In the return it is not mentioned which is the place of abode of petitioner. Thereafter on 23-3-1993 respondent No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara passed the impugned order of termination. 6. It be seen before the DE was initiated petitioner submitted an application on 9-11-1992 (Annexure-A) to respondent No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara stating therein that on 7-11-1992 since gate of his bungalow was opened little late by the constable who was deputed there for that purpose, respondent No. 4 became annoyed and the petitioner, who was deputed to attend telephone, was beaten by respondent No. 4. In the said application it has also been mentioned that respondent No. 4 showered filthy abuses on him, as such petitioner stated that he wants to resign from the service. 7. In the return the averments made in the petition in regard to Annexure-A have not been refuted. 8. On going through Annexure-A dated 9-11-1992 which is an application of petitioner addressed to respondent No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara, it is gathered that the petitioner has stated about the so-called misbehaviour of respondent No. 4 against him, in such circumstance, according to me, respondent No. 4-Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara ought not to have acted as a disciplinary authority. In this regard I may profitably rely the decision in the case of Arjun Chaubey vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1984 SC 1356 wherein in paras 5, 6 and 7 the Apex Court has held as under :- 5. The letter dated May 22, 1982 which contains accusations of gross misconduct against the appellant enumerates 12 charges, out of which Charges Nos. 2 to 7 and 11 refer to the appellant's misconduct in relation to respondent No. 3. For example, the second charge alleges that the appellant entered the office of respondent 3 and challenged him in an offensive and derogatory language. Charge No. 3 says that the appellant was in the habit of forcing himself on respondent 3 two or three times every day with petty complaints. For example, the second charge alleges that the appellant entered the office of respondent 3 and challenged him in an offensive and derogatory language. Charge No. 3 says that the appellant was in the habit of forcing himself on respondent 3 two or three times every day with petty complaints. Charge No. 4 alleges that the appellant stormed into the office of respondent 3 and shouted at him, using foul words. Charges 5, 6 and 7 contain similar allegations. The allegation contained in Charge No. 11 is to the effect that behaving as a leader of goondas, the appellant hired the services of other goondas and created security problems for respondent 3 and the members of his family. It is obvious that if an inquiry were to be held into the charges framed against the appellant, the Principal witness for the Department would have been respondent 3 himself as the main accuser and the target of appellant's misconduct. It is surprising in this context that the explanation dated June 9, 1982 which was furnished by the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, 1982 was considered on its merits by respondent 3 himself. Thereby, the accuser became the Judge. The letter written to the appellant by respondent 3 on June 10, 1982 says : I have carefully gone through your defence explanation dated 9-6-1982 to the charges given in this office letter of even No. dated 22-5-1982 and the same is not convincing at all. Before taking any action under D. and A.R., I would like to offer you another chance for giving your explanations to the specific charges conveyed to you vide this office letter dated 22-5-1982. Please submit your defence explanation within three days as to why a deterrent disciplinary action should not be taken against you. The appellant submitted his further explanation, which also was considered by respondent 3 himself. The order of dismissal dated June 15, 1982 which was issued by respondent 3 recites that he was fully satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's conduct as provided by the Rules and that he had come to the conclusion that the appellant was not fit to be retained in service and had, therefore, to be dismissed. Evidently, respondent 3 assessed the weight of his own accusations against the appellant and passed a judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he himself was a truthful person and the appellant a liar. In doing this, respondent 3 violated a fundamental principle of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related to his conduct qua respondent 3. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge of his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an inquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry. The order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands vitiated for the simple reason that the issue as to who, between the appellant and respondent 3, was speaking the truth was decided by respondent 3 himself. 6. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Nooh, 1958 SCR 595 at p. 609 : AIR 1958 SC 86 atp.94), S. R. Das, C. J., observed, while speaking for the majority, that the roles of a judge and a witness cannot be played by one and the same person and that is futile to expect, when those roles are combined, that the judge can hold the scales of justice even. We may borrow the language of Das, C. J., and record a finding on the facts of the case before us that the illegality touching the proceedings which ended in the dismissal of the appellant is "so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves an indelible stamp of infirmity" on the decision of respondent 3. 7. Mr. Mridul, appearing on behalf of the respondent, contended that though this may be the true legal position, the appellant does not deserve the assistance of the Court since, he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline. This argument does not impress us. In the first place, to hold the appellant guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline is to assume something which remains unproved. Secondly, the illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by respondent 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehaviour on the part of the appellant cannot cure or condone it. In the first place, to hold the appellant guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline is to assume something which remains unproved. Secondly, the illegality from which the order of dismissal passed by respondent 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehaviour on the part of the appellant cannot cure or condone it. In the present case also petitioner made certain allegations against respondent No. 4 - Superintendent of Police. Therefore, in all fairness he should not act as disciplinary authority. It is well settled in law that justice should not only be done but it should appears to have been done. Since certain allegations were made by petitioner against respondent No. 4, therefore, in the interest of justice and for holding fair and impartial departmental enquiry and trial, he was not supposed to act as disciplinary authority. The decision of the Apex Court in the case of Arjun Chaubey (supra) has been relied on by this Court in the case of Mahesh Kumar vs. State ofM. P., 1985 MPU 516 : 1986 JU476 and in para 20 this Court has held as under :- 20. It is rightly observed that the role of the accuser of the witness and of the Judge cannot be played by one and the same person and it is futile to expect when those roles are combined that the Judge can hold the scales of justice even, In this connection the following observations in decision in Arjun Chaubey's case are pertinent:- Evidently, respondent No. 3 assessed the weight of his own accusations against the appellant and passed judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he himself, was a truthful person and the appellant a liar. In doing this, respondent No. 3 violated a fundamental principle of natural justice. The main thrust of the charges against the appellant related to his conduct qua respondent No. 3. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered'by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Therefore, it was not open to the latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered'by the appellant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witness can certify that his own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal stake in an enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the inquiry." (Emphasis supplied) The decisions in Rameshwar's case and S. Venkata Chalan's case are also pertinent. 9. In this view of the matter, since certain allegations were made by petitioner against respondent No. 4 - Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara, who is disciplinary authority, therefore, in my opinion; the punishment order passed by respondent No. 4 against petitioner dismissing him from service cannot be allowed to stand. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Mahesh Kumar Kanskar vs. Mandla Balaghat Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Mandla and others, 2002 (2) MPU 528 : 2002 (2) MPHT 200 , but the said case law is not applicable in the present factual scenario and is tangentially off the point. In this case disciplinary authority was examined as a witness and in that situation, it was held that he cannot be a punishing authority. However, in the present case since there is direct allegations made against respondent No. 4 Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara by petitioner, according to me, for the ends of justice and for a fair trial, he should not act as a disciplinary authority. 11. Since on this ground alone this petition is being allowed, therefore, I am not dealing the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that there is total non-compliance of Rule 14(11) of the M.P. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 and the procedure contemplated under this rule was not followed since inquiry was conducted in ex parte. 12. Resultantly, this petition is hereby allowed and Annexure-I dated 23-3-1993 passed by respondent No. 4 Superintendent of Police, Chhindwara and appellate order Annexure-0 dated 17-12-1993 passed by D. I. G. are hereby quashed. Respondents are directed to take petitioner in service back with all consequential benefits. Respondents shall bear the costs of the petition. Counsel's fee Rs. 2,000/- , if pre-certified.