JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In all these writ applications, common question of law and facts are involved and, therefore, heard and disposed of by this common judgment. In all these cases, the petitioners, besides other reliefs, prayed for quashing the order passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, whereby he has disposed of the claim of the petitioners under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement. 2. In CWJC No. 3280 of 1994 (R), the petitioner, namely, M/s. Pawan Biscuit Co. Pvt. Ltd. is a H.T. Consumer, having a contract demand of 190 KVA. Initially it has filed a claim for proportionate remission under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement for the year 1992-1993. The petitioner claimed remission for interruption of 4968 hours, including the interruption for Sundays and holidays. The petitioner also claimed remission in KVA charges as per details of interruption submitted by the Electrical Executive Engineer, Chakradharpur. The General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer allowed proportionate remission for the interruption of the period more than 30 minutes. 3. In CWJC No. 1263 of 1995 (R), the petitioner-M/s. Kwality Refractories has challenged the order dated 8.5.1995, whereby its claim under Clause 13 of the agreement for 1987-88 to 1993-94 has been rejected. In this case also the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer disallowed the interruption of similar duration, i.e. below 30 minutes and also rejected the claim for remission in KVA charges. 4. In CWJC No. 315 of 1996 (R), the petitioner-M/s. Bhagwani Product Pvt. Ltd. besides challenging the order passed under Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement also seeks a direction to the respondents to raise fresh bill after reducing the load from 250 KVA to 175 KVA and further challenged the order passed by the respondents reducing the load from 250 KVA to 200 KVA. 5. In CWJC No. 159 of 1996 (R) the petitioner-M/s. Raj Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. has challenged the order dated 22.3.1995, passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, whereby he has disposed of the claim of the petitioner under Clause 13 of the agreement for the year 1993-94 by giving proportionate remission, but for the period of interruption for 30 minutes or more and disallowed the claim for remission in maximum demand charges. 6. 6. In CWJC No. 3281 of 1995 (R), the petitioner-M/s. Bharat Safety Glass Pvt. Ltd. also challenged the similar order dated 28.8.1995, passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer, whereby he has disposed of the claim under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement for the year 1989-90 to 1993-94. 7. The impugned order has been challenged on various grounds including that there could not have been interruption only to the extent of 1 % or 2 % and further that the formula adopted for calculating the remission was totally against the law. 8. In have heard Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Jerath, learned counsel for the respondent- Electricity Board. 9. The common question in all these writ applications for consideration of this Court are as follows : (i) Whether the remission of each and every minute for non- supply of electricity is to be granted? (ii) Whether the consumer is entitled to remission on account of KVA charges? (iii) Whether the formula adopted by the authority in calculating or granting remission was justified? (iv) Whether application for remission under Clause 13 of the High Tension Agreement can be filed at any time or is there any limitation for filling claim under Clause 13 of the said Agreement? 10. Re : (i) On the point of remission on account of interruption in the supply of electricity, learned counsel relied upon the recent decision of this Court in the case of Rishi Cement Company v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 2001 (3) JCR 63 (Jhr) : 2001 (2) JLJR 9 . Learned counsel also put reliance on the decisions rendered in Suparabhat Steels v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1994 BBCJ 369; Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1999 (3) PLJR 683 and Balajee Wire Products v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1995 (2) PLJR 810. 11. The aforesaid question is no longer res integra. This Court in the case of Rishi Cement Company (supra), after considering the earlier decision rendered by the Patna High Court and this Court in Suprabhat Steels Ltd. (supra), Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (supra), and other cases held that remission in Annual Minimum Guarantee and Minimum Demand Charges is to be given irrespective of the duration of interruption. This Court in the case of Rishi Cement Company (supra), after considering the earlier decision rendered by the Patna High Court and this Court in Suprabhat Steels Ltd. (supra), Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (supra), and other cases held that remission in Annual Minimum Guarantee and Minimum Demand Charges is to be given irrespective of the duration of interruption. This Court observed as under : "This question was again considered by me in the case of Jamshedpur Roller Flour Mills (P) Ltd. v. B.S.E. Board and Ors., 2000 (1) All PLR 23: 1999 (3) PLJR 683, and it was held that on the plain reading or Clause 13 of the H.T. agreement consumer is entitled to remission proportionate to the Boards inability to supply electrical energy irrespective of the duration. I, therefore, hold that prescribing the period of 30 minutes interruption in the supply of electricity only will be considered for the grant of remission is wholly unjustified and against the law laid down by this Court referred to hereinabove and other decisions. Reference may be made to the decisions reported in 1995 (2) All PLR 920 : 1995 (2) PLJR 810; 1999 (2) PLJR 105 ." 12. Re: (ii) The second question regarding proportionate remission on account of KVA charges is also no longer res integra. 13. In the case of M/s. Suprabhat Steels (supra), a Division Bench of the Patna High Court after considering various decisions has held that the Board is entitled to recover the Annual Minimum Guarantee Charges and Maximum Demand Charges, but that is subject to the provision of Clause 13 of the Agreement, which in clear terms applies not only In the case of Minimum Guarantee Charges, but also Minimum Demand Charges. 14. 14. In the case of Bihar Gases Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 1992 (2) PLJR 105 a similar question was considered and it was observed as under : "The General Manager is quite wrong on all scores; in making the above quoted observations, in formulating the equation and In giving the reason for holding that no remission in maximum demand charges was admissible to the petitioner- Like many other cases, in this case too the General Manager seems to have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that remission in maximum demand charges would be admissible only in case the recorded reading is less than 75 % of the contracts demand and the maximum demand charges are, therefore, levied on the basis of 75 % contract demand. It is an erroneous assumption not warranted by the plain language of Clause 13 of the H.T. Agreement that no remission in maximum demand charges would be admissible in case the recorded reading in the meter is as per the contract demand or within 75 % of the contract demand. This Court has repeatedly held that remission in contract demand, on the basis of hours of non-supply of electricity as provided in Clause 13 of the agreement is to be allowed regardless of whether the recorded reading was as per the contract demand or within 75 % or below 75 % of the contract demand." 15. Recently, in the case of Rollwell Enterprises v. Bihar State Electricity Board, 2002 (2) JCR 623 (Jhr) : 2002 (2) JLJR 558 , a Division Bench of this Court (in which I was member) has dealt with a very different case in which the consumer claimed remission in Minimum Guarantee Charges and Maximum Demand Charges. In that case, it was found that the consumer did not pay any amount towards Minimum Guarantee Charges against the Maximum Demand Charges. In the facts of the case, it was held that when the consumer has not paid any thing against the Minimum Demand Charges, the question of grant of remission in the matter of payment of Maximum Demand Charges for the period in question does not arise. 16. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, it is held that the consumers are entitled to proportionate remission in Maximum Demand Charges also. 17. 16. Taking into consideration the facts of the case, it is held that the consumers are entitled to proportionate remission in Maximum Demand Charges also. 17. Re: (iii) The next point which falls for consideration is whether the formula adopted by the authority in calculating or granting remission was justified. 18. From perusal of the impugned orders, passed by the General Manager-cum- Chief Engineer, it appears that he has adopted a different formula. 19. It is well settled that remission is to be granted on the basis of liability of the Board to supply electrical energy to the consumer. It is very clear from Clause 13 of the Agreement that the consumer is entitled to remission proportionate to Boards inability to supply electrical energy and the consumers ability or inability to consume energy is irrelevant and immaterial for the purpose of calculating the proportionate remission to be granted to the consumer. 20. The next and the last question that needs consideration is whether the consumer is entitled to lodge a claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement at any time without there being any limitation. The submission of Mr. Mittal, learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no limitation for filing the claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. 21. The guidelines were prescribed by the Board vide Resolution dated 20.7.1994 for settlement of claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement. In terms of the guidelines, the consumer is required to file claim for remission under Clause 13 within the period of 90 days from the date when the bill for Annual Minimum Guarantee or M.D. Charges is raised by the Board. 22. Even in absence of any limitation prescribed in the said Agreement or in the guide lines, the consumer is supposed to file a claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement within a reasonable time. In my opinion, therefore, in no case a consumer is allowed to lodge the claim under Clause 13 of the Agreement beyond the period of three years in absence of any time limit fixed by the Board in the Agreement or in the guidelines, issued by the Board from time to time. 23. Having regard to the facts of the case and discussions made above. 23. Having regard to the facts of the case and discussions made above. I am of the opinion that the impugned orders, passed by the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer disallowing the proportionate remission without adopting the correct formula are liable to be set aside. 24. However, I affirm the order of the General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer passed in CWJC No. 3280 of 1994 (R), whereby he has disallowed the claim of the petitioners for the year 1985-86 to 1989-90. In this case, the petitioner lodged the claim for remission for the year 1992-93 on 29.10.1994. After few months, he lodged another claim for remission for the year 1985-86 to 1991-92. The authority, therefore, rightly held that such a claim beyond the period of three years was not entertainable. 25. In the result, all the writ applications are allowed in part and the matters are remitted to the concerned General Manager-cum-Chief Engineer for passing a reasoned order in the light of the discussions made hereinabove and also after considering the law settled by the Supreme Court and also by this Court.